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As the sub-title suggests, and, as I start to write, this might not turn out to be 
an ordinary thesis. And who ever said that contingent agency was the sole 
preserve of the "posties". This introduction is intended to be a digressive 
statement of annoyance/anger, condensation of the research's core 
theoretical themes, continuation of a theoretical project started in the '70s, an 
indication of areas that require further work, and thus, as that solidary 
prosaism would have it, "work-in-progress. 
The Route 
This is a resuscitation of theoretical themes developed for my first university 
based research in the mid seventies based on the work of Jurgen Habermas. 
It has been kept alive and critically tested in the intervening period, primarily 
within the sphere of local governance, through the practice, experiencing and 
empirical validation of race, politics and work, areas contextualised by an 
increasing neo-conservative invasion of the public sector, community, 
family, person, and, a concomitant growth in differance pursuing pseudo- 
radical theorising. The problem tackled by that original research2 was, 
using Tanzania as the "laboratory", why the progressive change based 
theories of the relationship between the "first" and "third" worlds proferred 
solutions that would see the third world turned into a work camp. The 
seemingly schizoid world of these theorists, not just as expressed through the 
canonical texts, but through the beavering acolytes in various academic sites, 
would see the hurrahing and championing of engendered civil rights (but not 
at that stage deracialised ones) in the UK, but their condemnation by silence 
in the third world through support for so-called progressive regimes. Vast 
areas of "African" human experience were homogenised under 
"peasantization", and therein encoded to backwardness. Progress and 
freedom were to be sought in the nascent African working class. 
Introduction into the debates of commentary such as, " questions about 
social institutions, family structure, subjugation of women etc. cannot be left 
to the post-revolutionary period.... (nor can)..... the question of the puritanical 
authoritarianism of socialist Third World countries, which in European 
socialist countries is condemned by Western Marxists. That is white 
liberal condescension with a vengeance. i3 - provoked either a "whose-side- 
are-you-on? " or a stronger "technical progress before we live" response. 
This was especially so within the strong theoretical Althusserian paradigm 
that then existed. The collapse of that anally retentive theoretical cul-de- 
sac with its anti-humanist and agency overtones and the absorption of its 
now apostate disciples into paralleling post-modernist genres was not 
symptomatic of better solutions found, but merely the move from one form 
of meta-physics to negative metaphysics. The problem still remained 
which, at its simplest, is how to establish a complementarily equivalent and 
mutually respectful commonality between the claims to differing forms of 
social life, especially where those differentiations are unjustly structured 4 
The empirical vindication of the that key question, and the theoretical 
approach of that first research, can be seen, some twenty five plus years later, 
in the identification of, and struggles for, substantive democratisation in 
many parts of Africa. 
One of the more fecund theoretical but contrasting endeavours was, and is, 
therefore, the project undertaken by the heirs to the Frankfurt School critical 
theorists, in particular Jurgen Habermas with his critique of Marxism that 
whilst the universals of human development cannot be reduced to social 
labour, this requires not a rejection of universalism, but a move to another 
level of abstraction.. In other words the "Enlightenment" is not yet dead. 
However, the espousal of the "death of the Enlightenment" was, and is 
however, the basis for a similar set of theoretical projects originating in 
France and which I'll categorise under the catch-all of post modernism. For 
the purposes of this introduction, this can be defined as, "that variant of 
modernism which has given up hope of freeing itself from the ravages of 
modernity or of mastering the forces unleashed by modernity. "5 In the 
seventies and eighties, as Black6 people in the UK and South Africa fought 
to fulfill the promise of the Enlightenment, a sigh of "that-is-so-passe" 
resignation could be heard from `once-were' radicals in the West, including 
my erstwhile modernity journeying professor, Bauman, in the face of what 
appeared to be the omnipotence of modern capitalism. Whilst I am aware of 
the differences between post-Marxism, -structuralism and -colonialism, they 
are not so important as the common characteristic that they critique and 
reject the foundations of modernism. The similarity of the two projects - 
one a critique and extension of modernism, the other a critique and rejection 
- entailed a critical excursus via the canons of the major post-modernist 
thinkers, including their acolytes who have used their works to analyse race. 
Here I include post-colonialists such as Spivak, Bhabha, and Said, and those 
who have concentrated on race in the metropolitan countries, such as Gates, 
Goldberg and Stoller. 
That core question about the conditions for complementarity between claims 
to differing forms of social life remains the key interrogative leit motiv to the 
main motivation to this piece of research. This concerns the reasons for the 
development of an explicit commitment to race equality in the early eighties 
in many UK urban local authorities, and its subsequent jettisoning by the 
early nineties. There are three key contextualising areas, and thus questions. 
The first is that of local governance, which is simply about how people at the 
local level can govern themselves. The second is about `race', where race, 
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and the differences between `races' is not endowed with any biological 
grounding, but is seen as a social construct. The third, given that race is a 
social construct, is how such forms of local governance can work through 
the problems of race, notably that of the unjust differentiation of racism, so 
that `race' is not a debilitating factor for some in the establishment of 
complementarity. It is about de-racialising race without incorporating it. 
Such an approach implies a dimension of active agency. It is to be 
differentiated from the social constructivism of post structuralism in which, 
whilst denying the biologism of race, surreptitiously licence another level of 
on tology by ceding too much determinist power to `discourses', i. e. the over 
determination of "`knowledge' as a socially constituted category through 
which power is manifested and deployed". 7 However, just as it appeared 
that local authorities in the UK were abandoning the substantive resolution 
to these questions in the early nineties, so another opportunity to examine 
them anew was presenting itself in the rapidly changing political 
environment of South Africa where the possibility for a racially inclusive, 
radical de- and reconstruction of local government, more so than in the UK, 
existed. 
This was opportune for two reasons. Firstly the experience of race and 
racism of the primary researcher and the need to make sense of that socially 
and politically, is a key motivation in this piece of research. This was 
forged in both South Africa and the United Kingdom. Secondly in framing 
the interpretation of this through critical theory, but in particular Jurgen 
Habermas, brings into focus the subliminal unease, experienced as one of the 
`Other', with certain aspects of his theory, especially as it pertained to its 
relevance, or not, in the concrete experience of the struggles for race equality 
in local governance. Not only does this bring into the argument the 
criticisms of the Enlightenment raised by post modernists, it also, in a real 
sense, tests the universalistic claims of Habermas, by asking whether or not a 
theory derived from the `provincialism' of German thought, has any 
relevance for a situation some six thousand miles away. 
Staying with the work of Habermas, whilst it acknowledges a long 
developed and well thought out project, the fundamental aims of which I 
support, it does not entail, however, endorsing it warts and all. There are 
problem areas, particularly with regard to the `inclusion of the Other', but 
which do not of themselves pose problems of such substantive principle that 
they entail abandoning the project, particularly as this relates to the 
reconstructive agency of emancipation and what that means. A brief 
outline of this, compared to that offered by post modernism, is given below 
as an overview theoretical lead into the main body of the research. 
More practically, in terms of the structure of the research and thesis, there is 
a debate, argumentation and critical interrogation, primarily of Habermas, 
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which is conducted at three levels: the meta-level, looking at the 
philosophical implications for Habermas' theory if a proper accounting of 
race is to be had; the meso- or macro-level, examining the political, social 
and local governance institutional implications arising out of a critical 
theoretic approach; and the micro-level, which dissects the detail of the UK 
and South African case studies of race equality and local governance. 
Why Habermas? 
In sum because Habermas still attempts to develop a theory of emancipation 
and reconstructive agency whose universalism, I contend, is of direct 
relevance to Black people and to the fight against racism. 
I want to outline Habermas's idea of emancipation around three principal 
themes in an evolving spiral fashion so that these will be fleshed out in 
enlarging cycles "doner" style. This reflects nothing more than the 
difficulty of attempting to condense into a few pages a plethora of sources. 




As a preface to these considerations, it has to be noted that Habermas's 
project is essentially a political one aimed at providing the means to address 
key issues: "respect for each other, the moral autonomy of the individual, 
economic and social justice, equality, democratic participation, civil and 
political liberties comparable with principles of justice, solidaristic human 
associations. "8 In other words "socialism which used to mean making an 
attempt which was as fallibist as possible and as open to self correction as 
possible, to at least reduce identifiable injustice, avoidable repressions, in 
other words, to resolve through collective efforts, and from a specific 
perspective problems which have to be dealt with and resolved as one goes 
along the way..... can be (now) characterised in abstract terms: namely, to 
arrest the destruction of solidaristic collective life - in other words, life-forms 
with possibilities for expression, with space for moral practical orientations, 
life forms which offer a context within which one's own identity and that of 
others can be unfolded less problematically and in a less damaged way. "9 
The importance of this project is that it provides a non-privileging means to 
link the individual level with the collective level. 
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Let me at this stage introduce an on togenetic core around which the spiral 
will develop. This model set out by Benhabib1° is as follows: 
Pace Kant, this subject of reason is a human infant whose body can only be 
kept alive, whose needs satisfied and whose self can only develop within the 
human community into which it is born. This infant becomes self through 
its speech and interaction in the human community. The self becomes an 
individual by becoming a social being capable of language, interaction and 
cognition. The selfs identity is constituted by a narrative unity which 
integrates what "I" can do, have done and will accomplish with what you 
expect of "me", interpret my acts and intentions to mean, wish for me in the 
future etc. For Habermas Western modernization has given rise to a 
skewed lop-sided development and utilization of the potentials for rationality 
within modernity. The possibilities that therefore still exist for domination 
free rationality mean that he is not prepared to do a deluded Jericho gig - 
endlessly circling the walls of reason blowing his (own) trumpet. 
"What constitutes the idea of socialism forme is the possibility of overcoming the 
capitalistic simplification of the process of rationalisation. Simplification that is, in 
the sense of the rise to dominance of cognitive-instrumental aspects, through which 
everything else is driven into the apparent realm of irrationality. "'1 
In a development from an earlier distinction between "labour" and 
"interaction", Habermas distinguishes between communicative rationality 
and instrumental/strategic rationality that turns on the theorisation that 
linguistic interaction has built into it a rationality that cannot be reduced to 
contextual or instrumental dimensions. For him the speech acts of 
competent actors conform to rules which help establish the criteria for 
communicative rationality. Such rules set the competence a speaker has for 
using sentences aimed at reaching an understanding. When an actor is so 
inclined, he/she is engaging in communicative action. In terms of speech 
acts, Habermas argues that every utterance has a propositional component 
that predicts something of an object. The utterance's meaning is 
dependent upon the force with which it is put forth i. e., its force which is 
given by its illocutionary component -I wish, I promise, etc. Such 
utterances make three validity claims: a truth claim which relates to the 
objective world of states of affairs; a rightness claim that relates to the social 
world of normatively regulated interpersonal relations; and a sincerity claim 
relating the subjective world of experiences to which the speaker has 
privileged access. Habermas's claim is that these are universally true, 
implicitly or explicitly for every speech act. In other words the three claims 
to validity transcend the particular context or linguistic community in which 
the utterance is made. There are three world correlates to the speaker - 
objective, social and subjective. Truth validation occurs not by comparing 
the statement with what is in the world, but by looking at the reasons given 
5 
in support. These reasons are evaluated in terms of inter-subjective 
acceptability. Arguments are accepted because they are better, and not 
because of the power one speaker has over another. Before we go into the 
deon tological basis to what has just been described i. e the "ideal speech" 
situation, it would help to digress by way of explaining Habermas's notion of 
the "lifeworld". 
Situational based processes of coming to an understanding takes place 
against and within a background of lifeworlds. The lifeworld is the 
repository interpretive work of preceding generations. It acts therefore "as a 
conservative counter weight to the risk of disagreement that arises with every 
actual process of reaching understanding. " 12 Such problems of 
disagreement are temporary dislocations in an otherwise shared horizon 
which helps define what should be done and how "authentic expressions" are 
to be assessed. The "rationalised lifeworld" on the other hand, comes 
about as follows: 
"To the degree that the institutionalised production of knowledge that is specialised 
according to cognitive, normative and aesthetic validity claims, penetrates to the 
level of everyday communication and replaces traditional knowledge in its 
interaction guiding functions, there is rationalisation of everyday practices that is 
accessible only from the perspective of action oriented to reaching 
understanding........ the need for achieving understanding (thus) is met less and less by 
a reservoir of traditionally certified interpretations immune from criticism..... 13 
For Habermas the rationalised lifeworld can reproduce only to the extent that 
communicative action functions as the medium. Social action is guided less 
by normative prescriptions arising from non-traceable sources of authority 
and more by attempts to secure inter subjective consensus. Implicit in what 
I have described so far, but explicit in Habermas's work is an evolutionary 
model of developmental universalism in which there are pre-conventional, 
conventional and post-conventional modes of culture. It is the overlap 
between the modem world and the post-conventional mode that the 
rationalised lifeworld can be realised. What Habermas is clear about is 
that the developmental scheme is not premissed upon a stages of history telos 
that sees an endpoint of world history and culture somewhere in the vicinity 
of modem day Frankfurt! As I shall argue later such levels are not natural 
sequential progressions, but can be short-circuited because in many instances 
they exist side by side. 
Returning, therefore, to the "ideal speech" situation, this assumes a state of 
symmetry between competent speakers whenever they enter into 
understanding-interaction. Ideal is used to denote that which has a 
regulative function and which cannot be hypostasised. 
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"The ideal of universal agreement that is projected by every validity claim, and the 
correlative ideals of world-totalities corresponding to all true statements, to all correct 
norms and to all truthful expressions, function in communication as critical reference 
points. " 
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Implicit in the above, but explicitly stated elsewhere in Habermas's work - 
and which I will not go into now - is a deon tological moral theory in which 
the emphasis is on justice and rights (as I see it the regulative framework), 
and not on the "good life". However, the notion of the "ideal" speaks of 
forces which inhibit the attainment of such. It is here that we need to 
introduce his ideas on the "colonization of the lifeworld". 
To do this we need first to paint a backdrop in which Habermas sees 
capitalism as having generated an uncoupling of systemically integrated 
spheres of action, i. e. those of the economic and administrative systems, and 
those integrated by communicative action. Colonisation of the rationalised 
lifeworld in modernity occurs when the expansion of systemic integration 
begins to undermine functions essential to the reproduction of the 
rationalised lifeworld. That is when the systemic media of money and 
power begin to displace the performative attitude actors might have towards 
other interactees and validity claims. Action which is co-ordinated by 
money and power require an objectivating attitude and, variations on the 
"Yowser! Yowser! Let's go kick some arse. " It is this process of 
colonisation which generates the pathologies of advanced capitalism, as well 
as opposition in the form of new social movements. By this Habermas is 
referring to movements such as the environmental, womens, race etc. 
These movements are therefore, under this schema, not relegated to the 
marginal but are central to the understanding of the potentials for change in 
advanced capitalism. There are key moral. ethical and political questions 
which are linked directly to the participants in such phenomena In an 
advance on Weber's idea of disenchantment in modernity because of 
increased differentiation, Habermas proposes that "it is not the 
differentiation and development of cultural value spheres according to their 
own logic which leads to cultural impoverishment of everyday life, but the 
elitist splitting off of expert cultures from the contexts of everyday 
practice. " 15 This theory provides a means for looking at the emancipatory 
potentials of individuals and groups by concentrating on the resources the 
lifeworld has for preventing functionalisation of domination, promoting 
rebellion, and, determining the hidden capacities for self determination. 
Let me tease out some more of Habermas's ideas on emancipation by looking 
at one of the key post-modernist criticisms voiced against him; that of being 
insensitive to difference and the "other". His universalism, they hold, 
suppresses the claim of the individual over and against the universal. 
Habermas points to two strands of current thinking on the unity/plural theme 
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that has been present within metaphysics since its inception. The one 
evoked by the radical contextualist thinking of people like Lyotard who 
summon up pluralities of histories and life forms in opposition to a singular 
world history, "attributes responsibility for the present crises of the present to 
the metaphysical legacy left by unitary thinking within the philosophy of the 
subject and philosophy of history. The other, in an attempt to go back to 
metaphysics, or even a further regression, want to protect "the powers of 
tradition which are no longer rationally defensible... " 16 Both I claim, even 
though Habermas has not on this occasion said so, give succour to the neo- 
conservative forces. 
Habermas, on the other hand is clear that he is not privileging the universal 
above the individual, the "other" or difference, but, rather is attempting to 
ensure that the individual is not entombed in extreme relativistic and/or 
racist/culturo-centric particularisms. Metaphysics on the other hand does 
suppress the individual at the expense of the universal since the individual 
totality is made dependent upon an absolute totality. Habermas contends 
that it is possible to conceptualise the individual in a way that fleshes out the 
dimensions of autonomy and the capacity to be oneself, and allows for a 
distinction to be made between social differentiation and progressive 
individuation. 
"The metaphysical priority of unity above plurality and the contextualistic priority of 
plurality above unity are secret accomplices. My reflections point towards the thesis 
that the unity of reason only remains perceptible in the plurality of its voices - as the 
possibility in principle of passing from one language to another -a passage that, no 
matter how occasional, is still comprehensible. This possibility of mutual 
understanding, which is now guaranteed only procedurally and is realised only 
transitorily, forms the background for the existing diversity of those who encounter 
one another - even when they fail to understand each other. " 
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The argument contained in that passage has two critical moments. The first 
builds on the realisation contained in the paradigmatic move from the 
philosophy of consciousness to the philosophy of language, that it is through 
language that the historical and cultural substantiation of the human mind 
can be accessed. Eschewing objectivistic and relativistic strands in the 
philosophy of language model, and in particular with the relativistic one that 
"there are no standards of rationality that point beyond the local 
commitments of the various universes of discourse", Habermas proposes that 
in the process of reaching understanding all participants acknowledge, 
implicitly or explictly, the potential that exists for consensus, even if these 
potentials originate in different contexts. 
"Concepts like truth, rationality, or justification play the same grammatical role in 
every linguistic community ...... all languages offer the possibility of distinguishing 
between what is true and what we hold to be true"18 
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The explicit acknowledgement of a post-conventional self not tied to a 
"civilised" telos provides the basis for the second critical moment whereby 
Habermas distinguishes between two dimensions in which the post- 
conventional self appeals to a universal community. In the first, the moral, 
an individual through discourse seeks consensus with a larger community 
about the rightness of binding norms. In the other, the ethical, the 
individual lays claim to a unique identity which is implicitly or explicitly in 
contradistinction to the imposition of a social type. In this agreement with 
the larger community is not so much sought as the recognition of that 
individual as the one he/she wishes to be. Here the self is not conflated 
with "I-wannabee", but launches a claim to radical authenticity through 
engaging in the non-distorted process of recognition by others. The post- 
conventional self, and the possibility for such, which requires the taking up 
of a critical attitude towards the given norms in a particular society, means 
that individuation cannot be equated with social differentiation. Let me 
pursue this line of thought in Habermas, because, as I shall propose and 
adumbrate in the body of the thesis, it provides for new thinking on the issue 
of race and the potential for change, both collectively and individually. 
Habermas does, however, believe that social differentiation results in 
flooding the conventional individual's carburettor with conflicting demands 
which can result in the break-up of that conventional identity... But this is 
an ambiguous process in which the individual can proceed ambivalently, 
able to realise the emancipatory potential only if he/she can "transitionise" to 
post-conventional identity structures. This requires not isolation, but the 
projected re-integration into a larger community. Thus the supposition of a 
projected of a universal community relies upon, not the subsumption of the 
individual, but the existence of a complementary relationship. 
"Repulsion towards the One and veneration of the... Other.... obscure the transitory 
unity that is generated in the porous and refracted intersubjectivity of a linguistically 
mediated consensus (which) not only supports but furthers the pluralisation of forms 
of life and the individualisation of lifestyles. More discourse means more 
contradiction and difference. The more abstract the agreements become, the more 
diverse the disagreements with which we can nonviolently live. "19 
A summation of this brief outline up to now, will serve too as a prefatory 
introduction to Habermas' key disagreements with the main post-modernist 
theorists, which in turn will further flesh out his ideas. 
Habermas believes that increasingly with the decrease in "traditional means 
of will unification", that the contents of political action has the capacity to be 
co-ordinated by acts of collective mutual understanding. Only political 
institutions which can guarantee such processes will ensure the respect of 
their citizens. His model of developmental logic, which is neither on 
tological or teleological, but used as a heuristic device, aims at securing the 
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autonomous individual as the site for locating the moral capacity for 
individuals to be able to critique and revise social conventions in the light of 
their own principles. His analysis integrates both domination and 
emancipation with the emphasis on the "way the life world co-ordinates 
contexts of action. t, 20 His notion of "critical theory", not a term I have used 
to date because of the baggage of its earlier proponents, is always connected 
to the views of participants in real social struggles. Or as Habermas himself 
has said, "a theory of society with practical intent. " 
"We can ..... distinguish theories according to whether or not they are structurally related 
to possible emancipation. "21 
By focussing on the moral and institutional barriers that prevent domination 
he posits an interest, that can be historically analysed, in the possibilities of 
resisting total domination. Never again the "Musselman i22 which lurks as 
the only real alternative in postie's like Foucault. Above all the theory 
eschews the philosophy of consciousness pitfalls with its implicit metaphors 
of overhead tramlines of essential reality waiting for the collective/individual 
conductor rods. Social reality is not premissed upon historical, political 
certainties. In the "process of enlightentment there can only be 
participants" means that there cannot be "true" or "false" statements, only 
more or less justified ones. Contingent empirical fallibility, sans 
therefore, the idealism of empiricism, is the key because the logic of 
communicative reason is such that even the bases for its emergence as a 
medium is contingent. 
Because in the rationalised lifeworld communicative action does not make 
equal use of its potential, normatively secured consensus, as opposed to a 
discursively achieved consensus, does occur. e. g. women's roles in a 
traditional family background which are beyond normative scrutiny. 
Domination therefore is not a mugging from behind which removes concrete 
persons from their experiences, but is an articulation of blockages which 
both prevent individuals from engaging in performative acts that have a 
reflexive transforming effect on what is being criticised, and institutions and 
cultures from engaging properly "in public processes in which a society 
thematises itself. "23 There is in this the basis for an analytical link between 
domination and emancipation which allows for a better look at forms of 
domination, such as racism and sexism, and is not reliant on "weak notions 
of counter-resistance"24. It also, in terms of anti-racism, provides better 
grounds for assessing the legitimacy or illegitimacy of different social and 
political movements - e. g. those "radicalised" Others who are nothing more 
than nouveau closet `etniks', a term which is explained further on. 
Finally unlike the enlightenment thinkers such as Hobbes, Descartes, 
Rousseau, Locke, and Kant, who believe reason to be a natural condition of 
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the human mind, and unlike Nietzche's total critique of modem values, or 
Montequieu's relativistic half-way house conservatism, Habermas advances a 
theory of discursive justifcation and validation of truth claims in which no 
moment is privileged -a communicative concept of rationality in other 
words. 
As Against Post-Modernism - or, The Postie always knocks, and knocks 
without being able to open the door. 
I want to deal briefly with the fundamental differences between the theories 
of those I have loosely labelled "post-modernist", and those of theorists such 
as Habermas. Whilst acknowledging the similarity of their projects' areas, 
and therefore the possible complementarity of their approaches, thus 
signalling the potential for a loosening of boundaries, I want to push these 
differences to the outer margins because the posties' critique of liberal 
enlightenment in fact is aimed at the foundations of normative democratic 
politics. 
"If there is one commitment which unites post-modernists from Foucault to Derrida to 
Lyotard it is the critique of Western rationality as seen from the perspectives from the 
margins... " 
25 
I will concentrate on outlining a general immanent critique of Foucault 
which uses his work to reflect similar concerns about the whole post- 
modernist genre, not only because he has been the most influential, but also 
because there are similarities in his and Habermas' project and yet too 
"differance". 26 
There are for me, three key areas of similarity. Others have attempted to 
establish more. 7 But I regard the differences in approach within these 
additional areas to move them out of the purviews of "similarity". The first 
is that both call for a fundamental restructuring of the notion of "pure 
reason" through a non-foundational attempt to reconstruct those supra- 
individual rules and structures which are socio-cultural in origin. Secondly 
both reject the the type of autnomous subject that lies at the heart of the 
domineering, discriminating and exploitative Western rationalism. And 
finally both critique the human sciences, in particular the instrumentalising 
impetuses and the disempowering role played by "experts". 
Foucault's genealogical endeavours seek on the basis of his pithy "every- 
society-has-its-regime-of-truth" to examine how, in pursuing "truth", people 
govern themselves and others. Within the human sciences, which he targets 
for particular attention, he unravels the ways in which power relations both 
conditions and effects the production of truth about human beings. Human 
sciences, according to Foucault, arose in hierarchically structured 
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institutions, have continued to be developed in such settings, and form the 
framework in which coercion by violence has been replaced by subtler 
means of control through "experts" The pursuit of truth has always been 
contaminated by that processes' interconnections with changing power 
arrangements. This is the tragedy of the Enlightenment. Its pursuit of 
truth through reason has produced a totalised disciplin-ary/ing regime hell 
bent on eliminating, marginalising, controlling the Other. In this respect 
there is much that overlaps with the pessimistic auguries of the later 
Horkheimer and Adorno, especially in the "Dialectic of Enlightenment". 
Both regard the humanist project, including Marxist humanism, as a project 
of domination in which the individual is merely one of the prime effects of 
power. The genealogical analysis, whilst seeking to account for the 
individual within a historical framework, deliberately excludes from these 
considerations the individual's beliefs, actions or intentions - the 
Zombification of action. To be fair the later Foucault, probably as a result 
of having finally read Habermas and other Frankfurt School theorists, 
gestures away from the one dimensional on tology towards a multi- 
dimensional approach which almost mirrors Habermas'. i. e the individual 
relating to the objective world, social world, and her/himself. The problem, 
however, is that even in this changed on tology, power still becomes a 
determining factor, not simply as domination, but now too, as determining 
continuing strategic games marked by perpetual asymmetries of power in 
which people try to determine the conduct of others. In fact what Foucault 
does is to conflate, in Habermassian terms, the distinct areas of social 
interaction with strategic interaction. If autonomy in the earlier Foucault 
was a fiction, in the later one it emerges blinkingly in the relationship one 
has with one self -rapport ä soi. 
Let me now bracket Foucault with Derrida and Lyotard to outline an 
immanent critique which can be broad brush stroked over their approaches 
generally without necessarily applying to very detail of their "theories"EI. 
Briefly for Derrida, the Other is always there and is irreducible. It is not 
simply a name for that which is excluded, e. g. race, gender etc., but exists in 
a logic of binary opposition which is ineliminable. Thus the Orient is there 
to enable the Occident etc. The act of differing is differance. For 
Lyotard the grand narratives of Western modernisation always exclude the 
small narratives, e. g. women, Black people. They all share the vision that 
behind the grand edifice of Reason can be seen the flickering phospherescent 
spectres of excluded others. Unfortunately they share too some common 
fault lines. 
Despite the deliberate attempt to ditch social systems and society for 
micro/fragmentary analyses, and despite that "essentialist" characterisation in 
secondary commentaries, post modernist theorists are just as universalistic as 
those they criticise. Foucault and Lyotard both have produced totalising, 
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on tologically reductive, empirically challenged theories of historically 
complex situations which are over-generalised and simplified. The 
underlying premise that the history of the human species is characterised by 
increasing power of instrumental reason is just as metaphysical as those who 
presuppose an evolving progress, a situation described by Habermas as 
"negative metaphysics". Or, perhaps a case of META-meta-physicians heal 
thyselves. More importantly "posties" have no theories of capitalism, the 
state, agency, both social and individual, and, because of their 
"cynicalisation" of bourgeois consciousness, fictionalise any kind of 
normative framework from within which immanent critiques can be 
launched. 
There is a performative self contradiction which posties share with the 
earlier Frankfurt School theorists which is that if self enlightenment is fated 
to be impossible because of the domination of reason, what guarantee is 
there then that their own work is not subject to the same distortions? If 
there is this process of total domination and/or perpetual asymmetrical power 
relationships, then posties can only make that claim from the advantageous 
context of some temporary sanctuary "out there". If there is no subject, 
then the posties' moral identification with the victims, say of racism, can only 
come from outside, and not from within. What makes them so special? 
Such elitism, with its potential for the politics of paternalism, smacks of the 
emperor-like vanguard party and/or the enlightened liberal in new clothes. 
By cutting off acess to inter-subjective otherness there is no basis for any 
possible collective action against the dominant discourses of modernity. 
One of the undesirable spin-offs, as advanced by Foucault is that there is no 
necessity for there to be any causal relationship between an author's 
theoretical position and his or her political practice. 28. In the face therefore 
of, say racism, post-modernist discourse appears to offer no more than 
consolation to acidulated intellectuals who have given up hope of any kind 
of social change. In other words, good for white boys, if I might borrow a 
Foucauldian metaphor, writing their careers on racism whilst advocating to 
Black people that equality, freedom and justice are the creations of the 
brothers Grimm. 
This leads on to the second major performative self contradiction of post- 
modernism, a variation on the "heads-I-win-tails-you-lose" syndrome. 
This is that posties presuppose a liberal pluralism more open to the right of 
difference and otherness. They depend upon the legal and moral 
achievements of modernity so that the outcome of the rapport ä soi, even if it 
is a fractured self, has the right to pursue his/her sense of the good. In the 
end the inabiltiy to theorise collective and individual agency, and therefore, 
causation, leads posties to merely replicate liberal pluralism. The question 
is why posties so easily write off the normatively informed autonomous 
subject and rationalised democratic procedures upon which they so evidently 
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rely. "Perhaps, " as one critic puts it, "because as the sons of the French 
revolution they have enjoyed the privileges of modernity to the point of 
growing blase vis-a-vis them. i29 
Finally I agree with Habermas that it is no coincidence that the growth in 
neo-konservativism, which accepts a highly technicised modernism, but a 
regressive culturalism, since the 70's has seen a growth too in the nouveau 
conservatism of post modernism. Conservative, not only because of the 
'liberal pluralist assumptions of their theorising, but because their opacity of 
agency has the potential for irrationalist conclusions which the celebration of 
the "Other" cannot performatively judge or condemn. In the end they have 
no way of distinguishing between Louis and the "Farrakhanites" and the 
Southall Black Sisters30 as outcomes. 
This results in what I term the `Sowetoisation of Race'. This celebration of 
the coming out of the "Other" as that which the Enlightenment has 
suppressed rests on the posties having been sold and then bought the dummy 
of accepting that the "Other" was beyond "History". Hegel's exemplary 
removal of Africa from the spirit of world history was one of many co- 
existent theories not only Aryanising but also white maling the eighteenth 
century. In their acceptance, apolitically and ahistorically, that this particular 
form of universalism excludes the "other", Universalism is excluded from 
the "other"'s development so that "other" becomes the "Other" in a process in 
which their reality (e)merges with/to Reality. This form of theorising has 
legitimated the emergence of the new ethnicisation of race, as opposed to the 
"Dark Strangers" variant, in which, for example, the apartheiding of an 
American university campus is celebrated co-voce with Mandela's ending of 
Apartheid 
. 
31 Aziz's seminal dismantling of the myth of an Islamic culture 
echoes this concern. 
"What we have is a culturalist differentialism.... (in which).. supposed differences of 
"culture" within a discourse... can be either heterophilic or heterophobic...... In the 
course of the past two decades... race became ethnicity, then culture, and normative 
hierarchy and inequality gave way to representation in terms of difference. Thus we 
find fused in racist and anti-racist discourse alike the concept of non-transmissable 
life styles.... "32 
Thus, in a heuristic echo of the attempt to create a false Coloured ethnicity in 
South Africa, still resonating in the "ag, siestog" type reporting of that group, 
let me, post coventionally, differentiate the new ethnicisation from the old by 
calling it "etnikfication", in which the word "etnik" has phonetic 
communicative links with other Black constituencies. This `etnik' 
differentiation, with its trailing baggage of conscious or sub-conscious post 
modernist justification, can be seen in the displacement of race equality in 
the circles of governance by `diversity'. The neo-conservative effects are 
demonstrated in the limits to race equality change in which the goals of anti- 
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racist and Black struggles are to be contained within a WYSIWYG present 
reality. The corollary of this would be tantamount to saying that collective 
action against racism can be conflated with joining the Labour Party. 
There is, therefore, a need, as I argue in the thesis, to advance the argument 
against racism within a universalistic context, but one that avoids the social 
labour incorporatist pitfalls of Marxism. Symbiotically co joined with this 
new argument is a linked need to re-fantasise the outlines of a substantive 
racially inclusive form of governance. Both of these are attempted through 
a reconstruction of the normative potential of Habermas' theory from a race 
perspective. 
Structure of the Thesis 
The rest of the thesis is therefore constructed as follows: 
Chapter 1 attempts a de- and reconstruction of race and racism within a 
communicative paradigm. 
Chapters 2,3, and 4 critically examine current local governance theoretical 
orthodoxies of `progressive' change within a perspective which asks what it 
would mean for these to be properly racially inclusive. 
Chapters 5 and 6 derives a Habermassian based version of local governance 
and submits this, as well, to a critical interrogation through the prism of race. 
Chapter 7 tries to outline the fantasy of a racially inclusive form of local 
governance, based on the insights gleaned from the earlier chapters. 
Chapter 8, in anticipation of the examination of the empirical details, derives 
a relevant critical theoretic methodology. 
Chapter 9,10 and 11 examines the rise and fall of a race equality 
programme in a London borough, the borough of `X', in the eighties, 
referencing key developments with what went on in other local authorities, 
but also using this overall experience to help validate the theoretical 
developments derived from chapters 2,3,4 and 5, particularly that of a 
racially inclusive critical theory. 
Chapter 12 attempts a similar exercise with a South African local authority, 
focussing on post 1990 and post-apartheid developments. 
Chapter 13 draws together the relevant key issues and major conclusions. 
A Brief Note On Terminology 
As is evident in this `introduction', I have, when the occasion requires it, 
neologised to help explain and clarify certain issues. Further, throughout 
this thesis the main local authority used as the research source for the UK 
part of the research, is anonymised, and referred to as the Lonodon Borough 
of "X". I have also called it "The Target Borough", as an alternative label. 
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SECTION I 




De- and Reconstructing Race, Racism, and Black Anti-Racist 
Politics 
1.0 Introduction 
".... we are asked to believe that human beings are now so speciated by gender and 
race - though we are silent about class - that there can be no universal knowledge, 
politics or morality. These ideas have not grown up among the masses defeated by 
the empty hopes of our kind. It is not the masses who have sickened of the injustice 
and exploitation that grinds their lives, weakens their families, starves their children, 
murders and terrorises them each hour of the day and night in every corner of the 
world. No, it is not these people who have abandoned idealism, universalism, truth 
and justice. It is those who already enjoy these things who have denounced them on 
behalf of the others. "33 
I want to outline roughly a number of theoretical projects which form the 
basic frameworks to further research. In so doing I make no claims to 
"first order never been done before theoretical projects" since all we ever do 
in such endeavours is build modestly on what has gone before. This 
"modesty", which circumscribes the theoretical boundaries derives from the 
acknowledgement that no moment is ever privileged, and that therefore, a 
fallibilism in which even the empirical methods are contingent, underpins the 
theoretical construction. These theoretical constructions are built on an 
abstracted theory of capitalism which does not empower a notion of social 
labour derived human development as being deterministic in the last 
instance, but provides the analytical framework for the development of 
fallibilistic micro-theories. These, whilst focussing on the 
emancipation/domination continuum, allow for reflexive learning. i. e. have a 
critical idealism where the distance is maintained between that which is held 
to be true here and now and a conception that is true. This allows for policy 
and practice interventions which, whilst not WYSIWYG types, do not 
postpone such actions by privileging "class struggle. " Furthermore the 
"truth" claims are determined by us as participants - not out there - in the 
struggles to achieve that symmetrical relationship between "us" and "them" 
so that the settlement of validity claims are consensually arrived at. It is 
within this inclusive reconstructive framework that I want to tease out the 
implications for race theorising and politics; those which speak of the 
politics of radical democracy, and within that accountability. Counter 
pointedly I want to move away from the perpetual contextualising "it's a 
Black thing you wouldn't understand" type of theorising with its "Ag! 
Siestog"34 tendencies to "victim" Black people through entrapping them in 
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the language of "racial disadvantage" because unlike those who pursue the 
culturalist differentiating line, like Bhabha and co., I do not want to indulge 
in new forms of ethno-theorising that attempt to create cultural traditions 
devoid of controversy, discard the moral and ethical bases upon which such 
cultures are "equalised", and give licence to what can described as "the 
cognescenti of the niggeratii35. Part of that means, as Black people, 
being able to distinguish and discard some of the detritus passing itself off as 
radical authenticity and which is protected by the "Othering" of reason. 
1.1 Proposal 
The proposed reconstruction adumbrates a number of theoretical concerns 
surrounding race, racism and anti-racism within the modernist - post- 
modernist spectrum, and are themselves part of and signifiers of the need for, 
further research. This is a research made more urgent by the experiental 
common sense evidence - that sixth sense validation process which the 
everyday racist assault upon our lifeworlds evokes and which so eludes the 
capture of orthodox research36 - that the situation is worsening for Black 
people here, in Europe and world wide. The project to decompose and 
recompose "race" is structured within a "keep-in-the-forefront" framework 
oriented towards the following ideal-type goals: 
f that the analysis should seek to show the distinctive nature of 
rac(e)ism, as against other "ideological representations". (And here I 
'quotationalise', a term explained later. ) 
f that the analysis is not particularistic 
f that it is not teleological 
f that it is reflexive 
f that it provides the means for policy and practice interventions which 
can be radically distinguished from the WYSIWYG genre because 
they are linked to substantive issues of democratic will formation 
f that it provides the basis for pursuing the deracialising of race 
These ideal type objectives are the markers against which the progress of the 
theoretical project and its process of validation, can be measured. Whilst 
the framing of these goals might, at first reading strike a chord with the overt 
depoliticised, private sector based neo-mangerialism currently informing 
decision making in the local and national polities, I am in fact talking about 
deneutralising the techno-managerial claims of strategic planning through a 
communicative discourse framework, and, by so doing, periodizing "utopia". 
The objectives speak therefore of an explicit immanence, as opposed to the 
implicit immanance of post-modernist policy WYSIWYG mirroring attempts 
in which the underlying attempted "deracination of radical critique", because 
it is incapable of putting anything in its place, ends up merely inferring neo- 
liberal pluralist politics. 7 To talk about gradualising "utopia" is not to 
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give succour to the suprabundance of vision statements and the like with 
which institutions, democratic, quangos and others, parade their new found 
pro-active mode. It is, however, oxymoron "stylee", about practical 
critical idealism which rejects the new realist, absolutist implying, 
perjorativising of utopia. I have introduced "utopia" because it permits 
discussion to take place, without inhibitors, about action oriented towards 
change for a better future; and in raising therefore the issue of racism and its 
doing away, i. e. anti-racism, utopian considerations are implicit, even where 
there is an explicit theoretical/political rejection of these 
1.2 Utopia 
Whilst the traditional view of the idea of utopia bifurcates into the 
censorious, perjorative condemnation of being unreasonable, at one end, and 
as a proclamatory image of an alternative world at the other, the reality is 
that the two are the visible outer signposts of a spectrum of positions, all 
oriented towards changing the world. Let us therefore take on "tick/spec" 
Bloch's view that the desire to create a better world is an anthropological 
constant 38 Utopian considerations can then, in my view, be heuristically 
better categorised threefoldedly by time and change parameters as 
traditionalist/neo conservative ones, accommodationist ones, and 
transformative ones. Traditionalistlneo-conservative utopias hark back to 
some "golden age" and attempt to put a time drag on the present. The 
accomodationists, in rejecting teleological immnance, which is not what I am 
advocating, have sought also to banish utopia as part of the collateral 
damage, and have therefore allowed themselves to get caught up with those 
who, in absolutising the present, absolutise the dominant status quo. 
Attempting to then bridge the contradiction that there are utopian tedencies 
latent in their policy proposals for change with their theory that rejects 
utopia, results in ad hoc short term pragmatism. Transformative uotpias, 
on the other hand are future oriented towards qualitatively better changes 
aimed at greater equality, freedom and justice. They catalyse critical 
thinking because: 
Utopias relativise the present. One cannot be critical about something that is 
believed to be an absolute. By exposing the partiality of current reality, by 
scanning the field of the possible in which the real occupies a tiny plot, utopias 
pave the way for a critical attitude and a critical activity which alone can 
transform the present predicament of man. The presence of utopia, the ability 
to think of alternative solutions to festering problems of the present, may be 
seen therefore as a necessary condition of historical change 39 
As part of this introductory foregrounding to the reconstruction of racism 
and anti-racism, I want to briefly explore utopia, Black experiences and 
racism via a brief linking exposition on emancipatory politics. Generally, 
and this is very generally, Black life experiences are touched in one way or 
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another by racism where racism, as a crude, at this stage, definition, can be 
said to be the disruption of life chances because of biological or attributed 
biological differences. There is enough historical and contemporary 
evidence to support this statement whilst acknowledging that there is no 
necessary synchrony between individual Black experiences and that general 
observation. Nor does this assume some metaphysical existence of racism, 
anymore so than claiming that the capitalist system gives rise to unfair 
inequalities is metaphysical. Allied to this we can look briefly at the notion 
of emancipatory politics within, at this stage, a critical skimming of a 
schemata put forward by Giddens40, not because I accept fully his 
characterisation of such, but because, for the purposes of this introduction, it 
is a useful shorthand heuristic device and I do not have time to re-invent the 
sjambok. 
Gidden's threefold acknowledged over-simplified characterisation of 
emancipatory politics as being radical, liberal or conservative in which 
liberal denotes progressive emancipation of the individual in conjunction 
with the liberal state, and conservative denotes a rejection of the other two, 
echoes my distinctions of "utopias". Whilst it is implied I would add 
explicit time parameters so that radical, liberal and conservative are, 
respectively, future, indeterminantly present and past oriented. I would 
accept for the moment his definition of emancipatory politics "as a generic 
outlook concerned above all with liberating groups and individuals from 
constraints which adversely affect their life chances .... 
i. e.... the objective of 
emancipatory politics is either to release under privileged groups from their 
unhappy condition, or to eliminate the relative differences between them. i41 
The characterisation of such politics as having two main elements, 
relinquishing the past to permit a transformative attitude towards the future, 
and overcoming the illegitimate domination of some by others, I agree with 
at one level. The problem is, as my research into race and local 
government will show, is that very often the two are conflated to the extent 
that a transformative attitude towards the future partially relinquishes a 
racialised past, but projects forwards a backwards facing vision premissed 
upon false socially constructed ethno-histories.. I would prefer the more 
general, simple strategic characterisation of defining the problem i. e. racism, 
and working at the solutions, two very different, though linked, processes. 
At one level this accords with Pieterse's definition of emancipation which is 
that it "is a matter of critique and reconstruction of which resistance 
represents the first step and transformation, in the sense of structural change, 
the second. "42 As I shall argue later, I prefer the terms, emancipating the 
first from the bosom of the post-structuralists, `de'- and `re-construction. In 
Habermas' version of emancipation, as Pieterse rightly observes, the "future 
is past" because it is prefigured in the project of enlightenment, unlike 
Foucault who can see no future. 3 What matters then is, in terms of the race 
dimension, is how inclusively the past is defined. Emancipatory politics 
20 
works not just with a notion of power that is hierarchicalised, pace Giddens, 
but a more refined notion of a hierarchy that is unjustly applied. It is only 
on that basis that Giddens can derive the key directing aims of such politics 
as that of wanting to reduce or eliminate exploitation, inequality and 
oppression. I would go further and put these three under the general rubric 
of "injustice". Exploitation then is not the illegitimate denial of resources 
to one group, but is the unjust use of power to coerce one group to produce 
goods for which they are then either not rewarded, or under rewarded. 
Inequality, in an emancipatory context, then derives from those situations in 
which there is unjust denial of, or limitation of access to, resources and/or 
material rewards. Giddens definition of oppression as "a matter of 
differential power applied to limit the life chances of another", is the flabby 
response from those who have to peer out at the world from the hermitically 
sealed vacuum of Oxbridge. Oppression is the unjust domination of one 
group or individual of another group, or individual to the extent that life 
chances are limited, ground down, or terminated with extreme prejudice. 
Obviously these are not closed categories of unjust power applications, but 
often elide with each other, or give rise to one or the other, or co-exist. 
Motivationally Giddens gives primacy to justice, equality and participation, 
as the imperatives of emancipatory politics. I think this short circuits the 
basic imperatives which I take instead to be equality and freedom, both of 
which are underpinned by politico-moral issues of justice in which 
participation is but one of the possible outcomes of attempting to realise the 
"freedom" imperative. Finally, in finishing with the Giddens schema, he 
correctly defines the main orientation of such politics as being "away from", 
as opposed to "towards" -a variation on my defining the problem and 
working at the solutions differentiation. This reluctance to "think in 
utopian terms" is a charge that has been levelled at Marx, the "later one" that 
is, as well as Habermas with the common theme that both do not believe that 
the future social order must be left to those who usher in that new dawn 44 
Habermas, for example, whilst claiming that the imputation that "because the 
theory of communicative action focuses attention on the social facticity of 
recognised validity claims, it proposes, or at least suggests a rationalistic 
utopian society" is wrong, maintains that "the only utopian perspectives in 
social theory which we can straightforwardly maintain are of a procedural 
nature... (because)... the utopian lineaments of any future emancipated society 
can be no more than the necessary conditions for it. "45 This I agree with 
insofar as it sets the framework for working at solutions that are justice 
based. I won't at this stage elaborate on the particular emancipatory 
politics espoused by Habermas in terms of communication, but do want to 
pursue the utopian moment. As one commentator put it, "who, after all, 
would man the barricades for a utopia of procedures? i46 Just as his 
male engendered language undermines the piquancy of his sarcasm, so too 
anyone who has had to endure the racism of an equality procedureless work 
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environment would willingly erect and staff the barricades. There is a 
sense then in which anti-racism can flesh out the pursuit of justice as an 
underpinning to the uotpian moment. Let's run with Bloch's notion that 
"unresolved problems as well as unfulfilled hopes can carry over from one 
phase of history into another, "47 with the form, content and use changing 
with the prevailing socio-economic and political structures of that period. 
This obviously has implications for phenomena such as racism where we can 
postulate that the utopian drive to the need for the reconciliation of such 
contradictions will gather momentum to the extent that the working out of 
modernity's promise cannot be conceived without the explicit, but integrated 
solution to those, up to now, epochal excrescences. We can now refine 
more the radical uotpian moment to which we previously assigned a 
temporal character. Thus for someone like David Harvey, radical 
oppositional politics have been much better at conducting place based 
battles, and that the dimension of spatial power has been overlooked 48 For 
him capitalism has managed to compress and control the space-time 
continuum. However, if utopia relativises the present, in anticipation of 
better future, that rumble of the foundations affects both place, that area 
lived in, and time. For Black people there is a further dimension because 
racism relativises the presence. That "go-back-to-where-you-came-from" 
relativises the present, the place and the space. This is where racism and its 
solutions have the potential to push back further the boundaries of 
modernism because in the utopian moment there is the potential to realise, as 
Massey believes a global sense of place so that there really is "no place like 
home! X49 Swept up, thus in this linkage of utopia and racism, are, as I 
argue later, those necessary reconstructed practices, labelled elsewhere as 
"the politics of recognitioni50 and which I thematically contend that we 
cannot assume identities other than by entering into communicative 
discourse aimed at mutual understanding. 
If the utopian vision we should aspire to is the transformative, forward 
looking one, the question then is, "What are we supposed to be changing? " 
The answer isn't simply racism, but racism situated within a specific 
historical, socio-political and economic context, increasingly global in reach, 
i. e. capitalism. In proposing that analyses of racism and anti-racism have to 
take cognizance of capitalism, and therefore have some theorization of that 
process, means that orthodox Marxist analyses of race cannot so easily be 
dismissed without showing why and how they are inadequate. This I intend 
to do via a summary of Habermas' critique of Marx, as a means of engaging 
with an othodox Marxist analysis of racism which focuses on South Africa. 
There is a reflexive sub-objective built into this enterprise which is contained 
above in the non-marginalising bench mark of modernity's success or not, 
and against which, therefore, Habermas' own project can be scrutinised. 
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1.3 Habermas and Marx 
For Habermas, the unique, crucial aspect of Marx's theory lies in his analysis 
of the double nature of the commodity form which allows him both to 
outline the character of capitalist development objectively, and to infer the 
subjective perspective of those involved. The objective is distinguished as 
a "crisis-ridden process of the self realisation of capital", whilst the 
subjective pans out as a "conflict-ridden interaction between social 
classes. i51 The uniqueness of the analysis refers to the idea that the conflict 
inherent in all class based societies has fundamentally changed under 
capitalist class societies by becoming "objectivistically concealed" and 
objectivated through the medium of exchange. In Habermassian terms, 
labour power operates through concrete actions and cooperative 
relationships, but is absorbed as an abstract process. This sets up the 
relationship between those who produce labour and those who buy labour as 
a "site of an encounter between the imperatives of system integration and 
those of social integration: as an action it belongs to the lifeworld of the 
producers, as a performance to the functional nexus of the capitalist 
enterprise and the economic system as a whole. 02 This abstraction, real 
abstraction, takes place when actions are no longer norm or understanding 
co-ordinated, but, co-ordinated via the medium of exchange value. The 
participants therefore, adopt an objectivating attitude towards each other 
thereby instrumentalising such relations. On the basis of this identification 
of Marx's kernel, Habermas flags up some pluses and minuses. Briefly on 
the plus side, Habermas sees Marx's scheme as pinpointing the rules for the 
essential relationship between the economic system and the lifeworld via the 
process of valorization. Thus "problems of system integration - that is to 
say the crisis ridden pattern of accumulation - can be reflected at the level of 
social integration and connected with the dynamics of class conflict. "53 But 
this bilingual nature of Marx's theory, because it uses the theory of value to 
travel from/to the lifeworld and the economic system, contains the seed of its 
fundamental weaknesses as well. 
What are these weaknesses? The first major one is that Marx remains tied 
to an Hegelian concept of totality in which the difference between system 
and lifeworld is maintained only at the level of a semantic distinction which 
harbours therefore the assumption, in logic, that the transformation of the 
lifeworld is dependent upon the development of the system. In other words, 
Marx "does not see that the differentiation of the state apparatus and the 
economy also represents a higher level of system differentiation which 
simultaneously opens up new steering possibilities and forces a 
reorganisation of the old, feudal class relationships. "54 The second linked 
weakness relates to the theory of societal change. Marx's future state of 
affairs envisages a world in which the objectivating power of capital will 
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have disappeared, via the revolt of the industrial classes led by a theoretically 
advanced avant garde, thereby re-empowering the spontaneity of the 
proletariat. In Habermassian terms the systematically autonomous process 
of economic growth will be brought back into the fold of the lifeworld. 
The error therefore lies in the fact that Marx did not "allow for a sufficiently 
sharp separation between the level of system differentiation attained in the 
modern period and the class specific forms in which it was institutionalised. " 
ss The third faultline appears in Marx's theory of alienation where he has 
no criteria to distinguish between the destruction of traditional forms of life 
and the reification of post-traditional forms of life. Under the theory of 
value, a worker's life chances are reduced because of the violation of justice 
contained in the exchange of equivalents, but "life" remains, in Marx, 
unspecified, and therefore ambiguous. Because he bases his theory of 
alienation on the process of the proletarianization of craftsmen etc. his theory 
of value cannot distinguish between reification, where it does occur, and 
individuation that results from the separation of culture, society and 
personality in the modern world. The two processes cannot be conflated. 
The final identified weakness relates to the inflated case made for subsuming 
the lifeworld under the system. Reification occurs not just in the sphere of 
social labour, but too in the domain of the private through both media of 
money and power. Thus whilst Marx identifies only one route, the theory of 
value, which "explains" the monetarization of labour power and thus 
allocates alienation to the public sphere of occupation, Habermas identifies a 
number. "Reification effects can result in like manner from the 
bureaucratization and monetarization of public and private areas of life. 06 
It is on the basis of those identified weaknesses that a summary of Habermas' 
critique can be said to be that he finds the concept of social labour not 
abstract enough to encompass the universals of human development. His 
observation, on the back of his critique, that there are many aspects of 
modern capitalism which present themselves in class unspecific ways is true. 
His identification of the welfare state as one phenomenon the orthodox 
Marxists have difficulty reconciling with their theoretical parameters, is too 
obvious. There are trans-epochal unresolved processes of unjust social 
differentiation, such as sexism and racism, which have more salience as key 
cornerstone puzzles the solution to which are the benchmark tests of a 
theory's validity. Having identified, then the class unspecific nature of 
modern capitalism, the question is whether or not Habermas' theory can deal 
with the phenomenon of racism. In attempting to answer that, I want to go 
on a slight excursion via an orthodox Marxist theorisation of racism, using 
that as an incandescent light around which are attracted the moths of 
variegated Marxist theories of race. 
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1.4 Marx, Race and Habermas 
Hillel Ticktin's text, entitled "The Politics of Race: Discrimination in South 
Africa", combines a purist orthodox Marxist approach to the issue of race in 
South Africa, which is equally applicable, if the explicit theoretical 
assumptions are to be enacted, in other geographical contexts of political 
economy where the laws of such are refracted through the category of racial 
discrimination 5.7 He identifies an ambiguous relationship between the 
capitalist class and different sections of the working class through an 
examination of the concept of abstract labour. The fundamental 
problem then in South Africa is that "abstract labour has necessarily to be 
fractured to maintain the system. " 58 This results both in a conflict between 
the economic and political interests of the capitalist class, and in the 
development of "impure" community based, as opposed to class based, 
struggles of Black workers. The drag on the rise of class based struggles in 
South Africa, as it is no doubt in other racialised political economies, is 
down to the fracturing of abstract labour. This fracturing occurs because 
"a capitalism which can foresee its own overthrow needs to limit and contain 
accumulation in a way that it maximises its own life even at the expense of 
the law of value.... (so)...... in South Africa the expansion of value, and so 
surplus value, has been partially diverted by cessation to white workers of a 
limited degree of control over the process of extraction of surplus value from 
Black workers. 09 The ideology of white superiority derives not from 
previous history, but from the capitalist class seizing on colour as a visible 
means to divide the working class. What this does, i. e. the fracturing of 
abstract labour, is to politicise workers since commodity fetishism based 
control has been partially done away with. The political outcome of this is 
the creation of a community and racial conflict rather than a class conflict. 
Black workers, therefore, do not see their boss as a capitalist, but as a white 
oppressor. The essential outcome for Ticktin is a form of supra- 
exploitation of Black workers who are differentiated out as the less 
privileged section of the working class. The logic of change that flows 
from this sort of analysis would either have the historical laws of capitalism 
naturally running to its conclusion, or, have the intervention of a party led by 
the theoretically enlightened. Both, however, would need to premise a 
twofold change in the consciousness of the proletariat which sees first the 
shedding of the false consciousness of racial difference and the assumption 
of colour blind class solidarity, and then the exposition in their 
consciousness of the true nature of capitalism. Likewise the capitalist 
class is involved uni-epochly in a conscious conspiracy to use race in a way 
that assumes they know better. Now, whilst the issue of race and modem 
capitalism, and in particular the recent changes in South Africa, are not 
synchronous with this sort of analysis, that does not legitimate damning it 
completely. The analysis obviously holds modem capitalism explicit. 
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It still talks about exploitation, inequality and oppression. In dealing with 
the acknowledged class unspecific nature of race, it recognises the 
politicisation of areas that might otherwise in terms of the logic of his 
argument have been purely valorized. The question is whether or not 
these class unspecific phenomena betoken a capitalism inadequately 
theorised or a reality that defies theory. 
Let's therefore relook at Ticktin's argument in Habermassian terms as an 
opener into other Marxist theories of race, and into a wider examination and 
application of Habermas' theory to race. In so doing, as the previous chapter 
argues, this entails a rejection of the post-modernist argument that the 
multiplicity of phenomena are unique and can only ever be categorised 
through a recognition of a particular trans-epochal discourse, say racism, in 
which disparities can only share ever a generalised denominator, say 
exclusion. In its projected pure form, Ticktin's theory of capitalism would 
translate into seeing the commodity form as those rules which govern the 
interchange between the worker's lifeworld and the economic system. In 
other words problems of system integration can be linked with those of 
social integration. The impure version, in which the impurity stems from 
the conscious appropriation by the capitalist class of an epochally unique 
phenomena of race, the interchange between the worker's lifeworld and the 
economic system is corrupted by racism. Thus the workers' lifeworlds 
bifurcates around Black/white notions of race in which the white worker 
occupies a hierarchical position a step or two up the valorization scale. 
From this we can infer that economic crises are likely to see an increase in 
the exploitation of the Black worker which is experienced as direct 
oppression by the white worker. The pure/impure distinction of abstract 
labour in Ticktin's analysis expresses the weakness identified above in which 
the desire to re-secure the totality is expressed by wanting to wish away the 
issue of race as a conscious conspiracy of the capitalist class. There is an 
inherent contradiction in this sort of analysis whereby if there is a pure form 
of alienation which is commodity fetishist tied, then an impure form 
represented by race must increase the likelihood of revolt, not just amongst 
Black workers, but white as well. And yet what emerges is an argument 
that's tantamount to saying that first we have to get rid of this political 
reification of race before the pure form of alienation allows for the 
oppressional framework within which true class consciousness can develop. 
In other words this highlights the other aspect of the critique outlined above 
qua Marx's theory, and which is that the theory of alienation has difficulty 
distinguishing between reification, which may be economically or politically 
induced, and the structural differentiation of the lifeworld, which might very 
well give rise to community forms of protest. 
Other Marxist theories of race and racism, which whilst they might differ in 
their analysis of the content of racism, and Ticktin does not say what the 
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content of South African racism is, although we know it has a 
biological/religious pre-ordained character, agree on the fundamental 
characteristic of racism. Hall, for example, in his analysis of racism 
within the UK, whilst he warns "against extrapolating a common and 
universal structure to racism which remains essentially the same outside of 
its specific historical location", then goes on to define racism and its root 
cause in a way that echoes Ticktin. 60 Hence racism is, "one of the dominant 
means of ideological representation through which white fractions of the 
working class come to live their relations to other fractions, and through 
them to capital itselfi61 Whilst in specific social formations, Hall sees 
racism as being reworked and ideologically reconstituted by the dominant 
class, it still boils down to a fracturing of abstract labour and partial 
valorization of capital, not to mention the machinations of the ruling class. 
Thus too for the CCCS posse in the early eighties, there is a concentration on 
the changing content of British racism, especially as this comes to be 
expressed through the thinking and actions of the Conservative Party, but 
which has to be seen in the context of the development of an organic crisis of British capitalism. Racism can, under this analysis, "mistakenly make 
sense of the world and thereby provide a strategy for political action for 
sections of different classes, ...... 
(and that therefore because)..... racism is an 
attempt to understand a specific combination of economic and political 
relations...... strategies for eliminating racism should concentrate less on 
trying exclusively to persuade those who articulate racism that they are "wrong" and more on changing those particular economic and political 
relations. i62 In terms therefore of the two track strategy for change identified in the latter, the priority given to the systemic element, i. e. 
economic, means that there is the assumption that the lifeworld of workers is 
subsumed under the system. In all three orthodox Marxist analyses briefly discussed there is the unspecified articulation that racism exerts a drag on the "natural" connection that can be made between the development of the 
system and the structural transformation of the lifeworld. The utopian 
vision that can be inferred is a backward/forward looking one in which the lifeworld reclaims the economic system totalistically, but only providing that 
the Black worker downscales her/his interests to those of the white worker. 
To that extent they are similar to the crude anti-racist emancipatory projects 
with their partial relinquishment of a racialised past, but forward projection 
of an etnik utopia. Both are still held in thrall to "a form of totalising 
conceptions of order.. " which seek inter lifeworld integration through a 
group/individual enlightening growth of political consciousness adduced 
through struggle. This holds true, as well, for the Manichean RAT 
derived homogenising "Black perspectives" theorising which aims at 
sustaining an anti-racist movement within social work in the UK. The key 
question then is if not the orthodox marxist/pseudo-radical anti-racist 
theorising, and if not, as I argue later, the post-modernist ones, what then? 
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1.5 De- and Reconstructing Racism 
1.6 De- 
Whilst what I am proposing is based upon accepting that validity claims are 
raised here in the present within specific contexts and with outcomes that 
affect social interaction, my explicit racialising of the process in order that 
race may not play a part in the acceptance or rejection of such claims means 
that the assumption that we were always here, as opposed to out there, has to 
have a history. In reconstructing race via the history of "white over Black", 
I am building on, but not necessarily accepting all of, Habermas' gutting and 
refurbishing of historical materialism in which the "concept of mode of 
production is not abstract enough to capture the universals of societal 
development. " In short I want to use the issue of "race" as the axis around 
which to subject Habermas' "reconstruction" to immanent critique, for as he 
says: 
"reconstruction entails taking a theory apart and putting it back together again in a 
new form in order to attain more fully the goal it has set itself. "63 
In brief this is a social evolutionary theory which is non-unilinear in 
conception, non-teleological, and without assumptions of necessary 
continuity or reversibility. It tracks back to "anthropological deep-seated 
general structures which were formed in the phase of hominization and 
which lay down the initial state of social evolution; these structures 
presumably arose to the extent that the cognitive and motivational potential 
of anthropoid apes was transformed and reorganised under conditions of 
linguistic communication. "M This history therefore gives greater primacy 
to reconstructing the shapes of development of normative structures in 
cultural traditions and institutions as a means of unravelling the learning 
capacities of such societies when faced with social evolutionary challenges. 
Categorization of these patterns I'll leave for another paper, suffice at this 
stage to roughly sketch out the implications for "race". What I want to 
propose is that prior to, and during the initial stages in, the development of 
dominant capitalism in Europe, that not only were the learning boundaries 
between Europe and the "Black" world surrounding it more fluid and open 
than the Aryanising of history would have us believe, but that there were too 
similarity of learning problems as well. The emergence of "race" as a 
white/Black issue I want to examine as Miles has sketched out, in relation to 
the white-Black colour differentiation in Western Judaeo-Christian culture as 
the substrate around which normative legitimations of racial domination 
crystallised on the basis that the move from one developmental epoch to 
another, as I believe Western imperialism entails, prerequires the societal 
learning processes of the preceding epoch to have begun the articulation of 
the problem. 65 In other words, as I outline in more detail below, part of 
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the development of the normative based learning processes of capitalism was 
that which facilitated racial domination. Within a few months of occupying 
the Cape in 1652, the Dutch leader of the expedition was referring to the 
Khoikhoi as "dull, stupid and oderous", and as "black, stinking dogs". The 
observation then by Beck gains greater saliency when analysing race. 
"... the lifeworld norms, value orientations and lifestyles that characterise people in 
developing industrial capitalism are, in terms of their genealogy, not so much the products 
of the formation of industrial classes, but are often the relics of precapitalistic and pre- 
industrial traditions. "66 
There is agreement, therefore, at a general level with Miles' outlining and 
evocation of the representation of the other, and in Kovel's psychoanalytic 
history of racism. Both, unlike the Marxist approaches, locate the origins 
of racism in the stirrings of White-Black domination that began occurring 
pre-capitalism. What I propose therefore, is to provide a brief historical 
description framed through key categories, which can then be refracted 
through a theoretical reconstruction of Habermas' re-examination of 
historical materialism. 
At the outset of this description let's follow Miles in his use of Moscovici's 
notion of representations of the Other as images and beliefs which categorise 
people in terms of real or attributed differences when compared with self as 
the oscillating kernel around which we can categorise key phases. Unlike 
Marxist analyses of race discourse, this "historicity of representations" does 
not apply a synchronous clamp between base and superstructure so that race 
and racism begin at the onset of early capitalist expansions into the Americas 
and Africa. As part of validating the unique logic of the development of 
normative structures postulate, this history tracks back into earlier European 
times. Thus the Graeco-Roman empires did have a "conception of human 
diversity, spatially dispersed, but bound together by the possession of 
characteristics that distinguished human beings from gods and animals... i67 
Pace Miles, however, the Graeco-Roman representations of the barbarian 
Other beyond the boundaries of the empire were not, despite their cultural 
deficiencies, recognised as human beings. It was the reality of conquest, 
conversion and acceptance of the politico-religious order that promoted 
those aliens from non-human to human. Contact between the empire and 
Africa was quite extensive. There was a certain ambivalence in the 
response to Africans. Africans were distinguished anthropometrically 
phenotypically by skin, nose and hair type, though these differences were 
attributed to environmental factors. On the other hand there was not only a 
hierarchical colour cultural symbolisation which associated white with 
beauty and Black with death and the underworld, but also, the 
"identification" of extra-boundaried population groups characterised by 
spatial and phenotypical traits. Parts of Africa - those beyond direct 
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experience - and India were supposedly peopled by those not only 
pigmentally different, but also, inhumanly deformed, e. g. dog headed, flesh 
eaters etc. In the Graeco-Roman world natural events were taken as 
indicators of the deities' intentions towards humans, and were defined as 
monstra. This carried over into medieval times where "Christianity 
became the prism through which all knowledge about the world was 
refracted" increasingly via the use of the bible as a literal explication of the 
material world. 68 Deviations from the norm, like these "monstra", were 
attributed to God's divine wrath which resulted in the disfigurement of these 
people and their banishment to the peripheries. There are, within that, 
obvious emerging patterns which matured through the later Calvinistic 
strand of the Reformation and which centuries later still resonated in the 
theocratic apologia overlap between the Dutch Reformed Church and the 
apartheid establishment. What is key, however, is the increasing ossifying 
of the ancient world ambivalence towards representations of the Other into a 
growing hierarchicalisation of the symbolic "white-Black" difference as 
signed in the phenotypical, and in particular, pigmental human 
charactersitics of those beyond Europe's boundaries. These were being 
"realised, not through imaginary spatial, phenotypical projections, but 
through increasingly violent interaction with Islam. Through early to late 
medieval times continuing political conflict between the Christian European 
world and the Islamic Arab world over dominance of geographical areas 
sought legitimation through issues of theological validity. Within this 
context the representation of the Islamic Other came to be "portrayed as 
barbaric, degenerate, and tyrranical.... characteristics which were rooted in 
the character of Islam as a supposedly false and heretic theology. The 
object of much of the attack was the prophet Muhammed who was 
represented as an imposter by claims that his life exemplified violence and 
sexuality. .. (resulting from the 
fact).. that the theology that Muhammed 
created for his own ends embodied violence and sexuality, with the 
consequence that believers of the theology inevitably behaved in similar 
ways. "69 Before dealing with the subsequent period of European 
expansion, colonialism and imperialism, it is suffice to say that many 
Marxist and other radical analyses of race and racism claim a genetic starting 
point for these phenomena with that of the period indicated i. e. with the 
advent of systematic capitalist growth. I am not therefore going to outline 
the key facets of the white-Black dialectic because this has been done in 
countless other works, other than point to the crucial characteristics. The 
major summary features of these characteristics are twofold. These are: 
fa growing, and maintenance of, a power hierarchicalisation of white 
over Black through throughout the social integrative and systemic 
areas of life 
f and, the fact that this power related hierarchicalisation originated long 
before the start of systematic capitalist development 
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The characteristics of the period from the 15© onwards were, and are, a 
development of pre-capitalist patterns of white over Black in which to 
exclude entails consciously, or unwittingly, creating the criteria for inclusion 
i. e. I can call you "savage" because I have and meet the criteria for being 
civilised. These saw the patterns changing over time according to 
circumstance, but without violating the fundamental power relationship; a 
discourse develop framed within epochal dominant paradigms of religion, 
science and culture. 
In seeking to locate the descriptive analysis within its political and economic 
context, theorists like Miles, whilst critical of the Marxist works which tie 
expansion and colonialism too closely with the origins of racism, 
nevertheless still clings to modes of production historicism in which racism 
is an ideology that is multi-dimensional and historically specific. The trans 
mode epochal character of racism arises because of the development of 
capitalist, in continuous articulation with non-capitalist, modes of 
production. Thus "ideological reproduction is therefore a consequence of a 
transaction between historical legacy and individual and collective attempts 
to make sense of the world. "70 For Miles the nature of this ideology of 
racism presumes a process of racialisation i. e. differentiating social 
collectivities on the basis of real or ascribed natural characteristics, but has a 
dialectical process of representation in which the other is negatively 
evaluated in relation to Self. Part of the problem with Miles' analyses is 
the fact that the retention of the modes of production thesis, gives rise to a 
contradiction between the class unspecific nature of racism, and which his 
analysis hints at, and the class specific basis of change which the "modes of 
production" logic dictates. More importantly because of the philosophy of 
consciousness baggage that goes with such types of analyses, there is no way 
to look at either why and how racism is structured, or why and how those 
who experience racism react to such experiences. But then the reason for 
taking this detour via Miles is because his emphasis on signification inches 
towards a perspective I think is crucial to a reconstruction of racism. 
"Consequently my interest is in the production and reproduction of 
meanings, a focus that leads to a particular emphasis upon systems of 
communication in order to understand the reproduction of racism. 01 
1.7 Re- 
Lets begin the reconstruction proper then by looking at Habermas' 
reconstruction of historical materialism whose parameters of investigation 
are framed "in the question whether the concept of social labour adequately 
characterises the form of the reproduction of human life. 02 On the basis of 
this and anthropological evidence, Haberman goes on to propose that social 
labour is adequate as an explanatory key for distinguishing the hominization 
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stage of human evolution i. e. the development from primate to humans, but 
does not "capture the specifically human reproduction of life. 03 The 
crucial reproductive features were only begun to be established when the 
economy of the hunt was supplemented by a family structure, a process in 
which the status system became mediated by language derived social norms. 
We are then talking about the evolution of social role systems based on the 
"intersubjective recognition of normed behaviour". 74 The orthodox 
version of historical materialism proposes six modes of production which 
signify universal stages in social evolution and which, according to the ultra- 
orthodox, "set down a unilinear, necessary, uninterrupted and progressive 
development of a macrosubject. " The foundations of Habermas' 
reconstruction are thus: 
f it is not a species subject that undergoes evolution, but societies and 
the actors integrated therein so that social evolution is marked by the 
replacement of rationally constructed structures by more 
comprehensive rational structures 
f the need to separate the logic from the dynamics of development so 
that history does not become bounded by the teleological parameters of 
unilinearity, necessity, continuity or irreversibility 
f the postulation therefore that the development of more comprehensive 
social structures are contingently bounded and can only be investigated 
empirically 
f the conclusion that many paths can lead to the same level of 
development, a process with no guarantee of uninterruption. (There are 
therefore retrogressions that can occur) 
f evolution does not presuppose a cumulative based direction, but, like 
Marx, progress can be judged, not measured, by criteria which look at 
the development of productive forces and the maturity of forms of 
social intercourse. In Habermassian terms "progress in these two 
dimensions is measured against the two universal validity claims we 
also use to measure the progress of empirical knowledge and of moral- 
practical insight, namely the truth of propositions and the rightness of 
norms. "75 
In my view the last characteristic flags up an ambivalence in Habermas' 
theory which can be interpreted as giving some licence to that which he is 
attempting to avoid, viz. the objectivism of the philosophy of history. I 
prefer, therefore, to use the term "judge" so that the differentiation in the 
spheres of productive forces and social intercourse dis-aggregates progress 
into numerous decisions that need to be taken, and thus a continuing process 
of the "jury being out. " In sum Habermas concludes that the "concept of a 
mode of production is not abstract enough to capture the universals of 
societal development" What is required are more abstract principles of 
social organization where such principles are understood as " innovations 
32 
that become possible through developmental logically reconstructible stages 
of learning, and which institutionalise new levels of societal learning. 06 
This he attempts to do by classifying, according to evolutionary features, the 
forms of social integration determined by the principles of social 
organisation. On the basis that the evolutionary learning process of 
societies is dependent upon the competencies of the individuals that belong 
to them, three stages of interactive competence are identified which parallel 
Piaget's developmental stages of moral consciousness. 
f the preconventional stage signified by a single plane of action, motive 
and acting subjects 
f the conventional stage where motives can be assessed independently 
of concrete action consequences 
f the postconventional stage where norms require justification from 
universalistic points of view 
A heuristic categorisation of four ideal type societies is arrived at in which 
social integration is characterised threefoldedly according to general 
structures of action, structures of world views and structures of 
institutionalised law and binding moral representations. In each respective 
category can be summarised a level of interactive competence. Thus 
societal forms are never all preconventional, conventional or post 
conventional, but an admixture. A diagramatic summary is given in figure 
1. 
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\Social \Intergration Structures of Action World View Law and Moral 
\Level Structures Structures 
Society Type 
Neolithic Conventional mythological still legal regulation of 
enmeshed with action conflicts from 
system preconventional point 
of view 
Early Civilizations coventional structure mythological view set conflict regulation on 
off from action basis of conventional 
system morality tied to 
justice administering 
figure 
Developed conventional structure development of non- conflict regulation on 
Civilizations mythological conventional basis 
rationalized world detached from ruler 
view or justice figure 
Modern Age Postconventional universalistic conflict regulation 
action structures - developed doctrines through strict 
differentiation of of legitimation separation of legality 
universalistically and morality - 
regulated domain of principled general, 
strategic action. formal and 
Political will rationalised law, 
formation based on private morality 
principles guided by principles 
It is clear that Habermas' analyses is not meant to provide the dynamic 
blueprint for a history of the species, but seeks instead to set out the key 
analytic tools, at a more abstracted level, with which a society's development 
may be examined. What it does not do is provide, in the first instance, the 
means to look at the processes of domination, exploitation and oppression 
although Habermas does use these analytical tools i. e. the development of 
relevant learning processes and competencies as the necessary precursor to 
the expansion of the productive forces, to sketch out the evolutionary path of 
class societies. What can be inferred, therefore, from this type of analysis, 
is that there might be multi-variate forms of any one kind of ideal type 
society. I am therefore, going to use this to try and arrive at a variant of 
modem society which seeks to show that the development and domination of 
Western capitalism imposed a set of different learning problems on the Black 
world, not a better set, whose evolutionary impetus and logic, whilst located 
in Europe, still had to be dealt with. And further, that a fundamental part 
of this learning process, a dialectical one in the sense that the logic of the 
process infers an unspoken "unlogic" so to speak, was and is that which 
relates to the learning parameters of domination via the medium of race i. e. 
domination mediatised through race. The origins of this I see as having 
begun temporally long before the advent of the capitalist system and as lying, 
instead, in the intensifying relationship of subjugation between the white and 
Black worlds. My reading of Habermas is that there is an ambiguity 
contained in his notion of the learning processes insofar as he does not 
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appear to differentiate between learning which furthers the rationalisation of 
society, and learning which furthers the necessary dominating aspects of that 
society. 77 I want to run critically, therefore, with his brief excursus on 
progress and exploitation in which he claims it is no longer possible to apply 
those characteristics in a blanket fashion to describe the character of a 
society. Rather one has to differentiate the use of these concepts so that 
there will be features of. say neolithic society which are progressive when 
compared with, say the level of progress in some areas of modern society. 
Likewise, exploitation and oppression can be disaggregated into "bodily 
harm, personal degradation and spiritual desparation" and to which 
correspond respective hopes. My contention is that when it comes to 
race, that progress in one area is tied to exploitation and oppression in 
another in a way that makes the differentiation of these phenomena time 
lagged so that oppression and exploitation still belatedly maintain the con 
tours of their dedifferentiated form. This locks into race in terms of the 
Blochian notion of " unresolved problems and unfulfilled hopes", as the trans 
epochal leitmotiv, the finale of which is one of the key benchmarks against 
which we can test whether or not modernity can/or has run its course. 
The con tours of this societal form I'll leave for later because the journey 
there entails an excursus via a reconstructive look at the development of 
normative structures: a reconstruction that seeks to unmask the racialised 
nature of Western normative structures despite their liberal democratic based 
ostensible claims to deracialised status. 
1.8 (Norm)alising Domination 
Habermas regards the necessity of reconstructing societal normative 
structures as having arisen out of the lack of clarity surrounding those 
foundations of Marxian theory, a theory which, he quite rightly, views as 
making claims to being "critical", as opposed to being affirmative, of 
bourgeois social theory and institutions. The basis for the Marxian critique 
could be the immanence of bourgeois normative content. But when, as 
Habermas puts it, "the bourgeois ideals have gone into apparent 
retirement,.. (so that)... there are no norms and values to which an immanent 
critique might appeal.. then the only path open to a philosophical ethics is 
that which allows for the justification of norms and values through 
communication. In other words, as outlined earlier, a critical idealism in 
that arise out of action orientated towards reaching understanding and in 
which are always implicit universal validity claims. Learning processes 
are therefore not only located in the realm of technical knowledge, that upon 
which the productive forces depend, but also in the dimension of "moral 
insight, practical knowledge, communicative action and consensual 
regulation of action conflicts i79. These latter learning processes reveal 
normative structural patterns in which can be discerned a development logic 
which is inherent in cultural traditions and institutional change. To talk of 
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"logic" is not to talk about the means of this development, but only to flag up 
the range of cultural value, normative etc variations at any level of societal 
organisation. For Habermas " the change of normative structures remains 
dependent on evolutionary challenges posed by unresolved economically 
conditioned system problems and on learning processes that are a response to 
them. i80 For me this ambiguity - an ambiguity which is escehewed in his 
later works, the reconstruction of historical materialism having been done in 
the mid-seventies - allows too much of the Althusserian last instance 
determination by the economic. As a preface, therefore, to the detail of 
the normativisation of racialised group identities I want to propose the 
following which whilst relating directly to the history of white over Black, 
also highlights the core unresolved problem of modernity: 
f that, following Bloch, there are also unresolved problems in the 
normative based learning processes which can carry over from one 
epoch into another 
f that these problems relate to the relations of domination which are 
trans-epochal and which can eventually allow one society to meet the 
evolutionary challenges posed by systemic problems of their economy 
by imposing new relations of domination on another. 
f that, therefore immanence is not totally exhausted so that, for 
example, the immanence of bourgeois law, retains some relevance 
when reconsidered in the light of the notion of racial (in)justice, to the 
extent that the time-laggedness of this issue apropos the 
developmental dynamics allows for time warping examination of 
modernity's unfulfilled hopes once Black people are brought explicitly 
into the frame. 8' 
The basis of Habermas' thinking on normative structure development is the 
contention that there are homologies between ego structures and world views 
in which both exhibit "growing decentration of interpretive systems and to 
an ever clearer categorical demarcation of the subjectivity of internal nature 
from the objectivity of external nature, as well as from the normativity of 
social reality and the intersubjectivity of linguistic reality. "82 A similar 
point is made by Kovel in his attempt to delineate a psycho-history of 
racism. 83 This is the ground for developing the supplementary contention 
that there are homologies between ego and group identity structures thus: 
the epistemic ego is characterised by those abilities (cognitive, linguistic and 
action) held in common with other egos whilst the practical ego "lives" as an 
individual in performing its actions. It, in other words, " maintains the 
continuity of life history and the symbolic boundaries of the personality 
system through repeatedly actualises self identifications"84, so that the 
identity of the person is the sum of the achievements of that person. 
Identities, according to Habermas, can be twofold - propositional and those 
that people claim for themselves and maintain in communicative action. A 
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propositional stance requires that we make a statement about things, or 
people. Persons are very often identified propositionally by reference to 
some somatic feature, like skin colour. These can never be sufficient, and 
there is the further requirement that the person or persons are asked to clarify 
their own identity. Thus, if the propositionally ascribed identity is denied, 
"we cannot be certain whether he/she is simply disavowing his identity or is 
not in a position to sustain his/her identity, or whether he/she is not the 
person we suspect on the basis of external characteristics. "85 To resolve 
this requires a performative attitude in which the person concerned is asked 
to identify him/herself. Ego self identification cannot be accomplished in a 
propositional attitude, but only in the performance of communicative action 
where the participants must suppose that self contra-distinction is recognised 
by those others. On this basis Habermas can claim that asserting one's own 
identity can only be done through intersubjectively recognised self 
identification. This thesis can be pursued through examining the possible 
identity permutations arising out of personal pronouns. "I" and "you" and 
"we" and "you(pl. )" are performative i. e. they have "primarily the meaning of 
personal self representation on the basis of intersubjective recognition of 
reciprocal self representations. " "We" also proposes a complementary 
relation to that individual's group. On the other hand, "he", "she", "it" and 
"they" denotes more of a propositional attitude. For Habermas, "I-you- 
we" relations are the foundations upon which collective identities are created 
in which such identities are those that are not freely chosen by members, are 
ascribed to members, and, therefore extend beyond the life histories of 
members. These identities do regulate the inclusive/exclusive boundaries of 
societal membership through the "taken-for-granted, consensual, basic 
values and institutions that enjoy a kind of fundamental validity in the 
group. "86 
I want to re-examine critically the above notions as refracted through 
systems of hierarchicalised power, especially as revealed in systems of racial 
domination by, at this stage, looking at a number of contentions. The first 
is that hierarchies of power which whilst they have inbuilt the tendency for 
propositional attitudes, especially from those in power about those 
disempowered, they do allow for the formation of collective identities. 
The second contention relates specifically to the one outlined above in terms 
of the earlier proposition that there is a growing hierarchicalisation of power 
between black and white which has pre-capitalist roots, and this is that at the 
core of this hierarchicalisation is the dynamic which maintains and renews a 
propositional attitude of white towards Black thereby retarding or preventing 
the attainment of common white and Black collective identities. The use of 
the term "common" does not give succour to the misread and misinformed 
carping of people like Goldberg that Habermas's notion of communicative 
action is incorporatist87. Rather it speaks of the conditions which will 
ensure that inter-subjective based discourse does not allow the parameters of 
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"common" to be so circumscriptive that white subsumes Black identities. 
This second contention is key because its genesis marks it out from issues of 
gender and class based hierarchies insofar as pigment based phcnotypical 
features catalyse an "othcring" atavism in white societies which maintain in 
the socially constructed arena of white/Black race, the propositional spatio- 
temporal attitudes. In other words white women and the working class 
can still share a collective identity which can be national or trans national 
e. g. the European, but which is denied in practice to Black people. The 
corporeal identification of Black people always has implicit spatio-tcmporal 
characteristics, i. e. newly arrived from out there, and has, therefore, common 
overlaps with the identification of "things". Just as a green stone in the 
garden has no need of a performative based identity, so too it would appear 
with Black people. The denial of a propositionally ascribed identity, has 
not in the past, and very seldom in the present, been followed by a 
performative attitude by white society in which there is an invitation, 
communicatively framed, to self identify. But therein too is contained 
one of the fundamental arcana of modernity's unfulfilled promise, especially 
in this era of increasing globalisation, and which goes to the heart of the 
white psyche. This is that the assertion of white identity is not complete 
until there is intersubjectively recognised self identification which is 
inclusive of Black people. In other words until we can truly become part of 
the "I-you-we", on the basis of communicatively based reciprocity, and in so 
doing shatter the "he-she-it-they" glass prison, marginalisation will continue. 
To advance the argument further, we need to look at Habermas' attempt to 
reconstruct the thinking on collective identities. Isis contention that with 
the transition to the modem world that "there proceeded a strong structural 
compulsion for the development of personality structures that replaced 
conventional role identity with ego identity", is true in one respect. 88 
However conventional identification i. e. the expectation of certain roles, 
continued in the areas of gender, class, but, qualitatively more so in the area 
of race. Pace Habermas therefore, the new empires - and it is here that 
Habermas' theorisation appears deficient insofar as he does not take 
sufficient account of the growing symbiotic relatonship that arose between 
the white and Black worlds - did attempt to represent itself as a universal 
unity, but not through a conventional role shattering i. e. post-conventional 
identification process, emancipation of citizens who could know themselves 
as being free and equal subjects of civil law, morally free subjects or 
politically free subjects, but rather through an "appeal" to Black people to be 
a part of but not a participant, in an entity. The white working class and, 
increasingly, white women became participants in the creation and 
maintenance of nation and Empire, whilst Black people only became part of 
Empire. The tenuousness of only "being part or' i. e. a "you", as opposed to 
being a "participant in", i. e. a "we", is a leitmotiv that recurs through the 
history of Black experience. Conventionalisation of Black people is not 
only the Bhabhian attempt to range the spectrum between the Fanonian 
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"Look! A negro" and his evocation of the less obvious distancing that can be 
"caught in a gaze" or heard "in the solecism of a silence". 89 This would 
still put the roling on a par with that of Simmel or Goffman. The identified 
bookends are still too closely spaced to be able to include the full meaning of 
the maintenance of race based communicative distorted communication.. 
Catachresistically, the enrolment of a Black person is also the maintenance 
of those spatio-temporal parameters so that, transitively and neologistically, 
it can be said to a Black person, "I conventionalise you". This speaks not 
only of doing to, as opposed to doing with, but also is premissed upon the 
ability of the doer to so do. It speaks, in other words, of unjust hierarchy. 
The continual nurture of a racialised propositional attitude is thus far more 
than just exclusion for it is too entrapment, enslavement, imprisonment, 
ensnarement of Black people in a dynamic which renews atavistically the 
normative structures underpinning those taken-for-granted values of racism. 
This is not to give succour to the Foucauldian argument about continual 
asymmetrical positions of power. It is, on the other hand as I shall detail 
later, to say that the galvanising of the conventional-post-conventional 
interface is far greater for white people in areas of gender and class, say, than 
in the area of race. If exclusion dimensionally has implicit spatially a 
horizontal, almost neutered, visualisation, conventionalisation projects a 
three dimensional hologram that has vertical and horizontal parameters as 
well as an oscillation temporally with the past and future. My interest then 
is not in the defensive, past oriented part of the oscillation wave within 
which not only is, for example, the Bhabhian range located, but also the 
fertile ground for the "Ag siestog" redemption songs about manifest visible 
injustices. Rather my focus is on the future oriented part which I locate as 
the sharp cutting edge to anti-racist initiatives; here at the interface between 
conventional and post-conventional identifications that are racialised or non- 
race based. It is here, for example, that the locus of the failure of equal 
opportunity initiatives to stem the enrolment of Black people resides. It is 
here where the PC white subconsciously ratchets back the Black person's 
starting position despite all his/her training and belief in equality. That 
back of the mind barely conscious half formed query about competency 
which is not enacted with white colleagues, is of greater relevance than the 
"Look! A negro". Particularly as far as race is concerned, I agree with 
Habermas that "normative structures do not simply follow the path of the 
development of productive processes and do not simply respond to the 
pattern of system problems, but that they instead have an internal history. i90 
The key characteristic of this internal history in relation to the white-Black 
dynamic is that Black people are "thinged" thereby maintaining not only a 
vertical hierarchical relationship of power, but an unjust relationship of 
power insofar as the opportunity for a performative attitude is denied to 
Black people. If thus bureaucracies encompass the instrumentalisation of 
action, then one can see the continuities between the achievement of primal 
ends by modern means, which the Holocaust has been described as, and the 
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persistence of institutional racism within overtly "equality oriented" 
organisations. Does this capture the essence of the 
irrationality/irrationalization of modernity's racism to date if, as Habermas 
does, we accept rationalization to mean " extirpating those relations of force 
that are inconspicuously set in the very structures of communication and 
prevent conscious settlement of conflicts, and consensual regulation of 
conflicts, by means of intrapsychic as well as interpersonal communicative 
barriers"? 91 Racism can then be descriptively described as the 
maintenance of racialised dominance, such as exploitation, exclusion, 
oppression and creation of inequality, which gives rise to the unjust 
disruption of life chances. Substantively, however, racism can be 
defined as the maintenance of relations of force in the structures of 
communication, through conventionalisation of biological differences or 
ascribed biological differences. 
1.9 Forming Racial Domination 
Miles' criticism that contemporary theories of racism are still too tied to 
notions of colonialism is true only to the extent that such theories retain the 
historicity of orthodox historical materialism, and therefore their ideologies 
of racism-productive forces linkage. On the other hand post modernist 
attempts to denarrativise racism by engaging with "discrete racisms" 
characterised, if at all, only by a core effect, such as exclusion, proves itself 
incapable of dealing with the reality of a world wide growing white-Black 
divide in which the sources of the inter and intra-national connections of 
power and economic disparities are transparent. At this stage I want to put 
forward a number of proposals which are the bases for an outline, as 
promised earlier, of a variant of modem global society built on racial 
domination. These are that: 
f race has to be placed within a global framework of economy and 
power 
f this framework has a history 
f there is no assumption of an a priori relationship between 
economy/power and the con tours of racial domination 
These are already contextualised in earlier delineated arguments summarised 
thus: 
f that the origins of racism are pre-capitalist, whilst acknowledging the 
significant pump-priming action capitalism had on its subsequent 
development 
f that early mythological based views of the "anthropophagi" become 
transformed along the path to the modern age into conventionalised 
40 
background norms normalising white domination over Black, 
including those which attempt to `culturalise' differences 
f that maintaining these relations of dominance mediatized by race are 
an integral part of the learning processes of the West and thus an 
unresolved problem the solution to which is the touchstone to the 
fulfillment of the modern age 
Just as Habermas attempted to use his schemata to outline the rise of class 
societies, so too I want to reconstruct his theory to sketch out the rise of 
racialised societies using the the phenomenon of white over Black relations. 
In employing his meta-distinction between system and social integrations, I 
do not regard these separations as ontic, but as heuristic devices to aid 
analyses. To this end racism's origins are not tied to the advent of 
capitalism, rather the advent of what Habermas describes as the "modern 
age" is taken as the beginnings of a world system in which racialised 
relations of domination are transposed globally. One can talk therefore 
about core/metropolitan and peripheral states systemically, the way 
Wallerstein does, which does not make any assumptions about the 
synchronisation of social integrative processes with the development of those 
systemic processes. Rather one can talk about the logic of the 
development of learning processes which enables new forms of crisis 
avoiding system integration to be implemented where this implementation is 
tied to new institutional arrangements. Thus, more concretely, if we are 
talking about current learning processes including that of racial domination 
to enable a global system of racial disadvantage, then, concomitantly we are 
talking about increasing the cognitive potential of anti-racist knowledge to 
both release inclusive institutional arrangements, and revised systemic 
arrangements, which might not be in the direction of increased forces of 
production. Hence: 
"By principles of organisation I understand innovations that become possible through 
developmental-logically reconstructed stages of learning, and which institutionalise 
new levels of societal learning. "92 
Furtado's attempt to capture the quintessential quality of the genesis of the 
relationship between the first and third worlds by describing it as a capitalist 
wedge driven into those societies is in part true echoing as it does my earlier 
description of the imposition of a new set of learning problems 93 However 
it still places too heavy an emphasis on the leading evolutionary role of new 
productive forces. Likewise Ray's welcome, but belated attempt, to use the 
Habermassian analysis outside of the West, places too heavy an emphasis on 
the global systemic crisis and its influence on the legitimation strategies that 
arise in so called peripheral states. Whilst paying heed, therefore, to the 
areas of system problems, I want to concentrate more on the social 
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integration aspects of the relationship and its history, and in particular the 
white-Black nexus. 
Europe's contact with Black populations at its periphery transmogrified into 
a full blown conquest with near global geographical parameters via a 
cognitive potential already structured through a cultural nascent normatively 
framed hierarchicalisation of white over Black. The transformation of 
early mercantile capitalist penetration of Black societies into formal 
structures of politico-economic domination I see as providing the 
institutional framework for the further development and implementation of 
racialised learning processes of domination. Unlike orthodox Marxists, 
neo-Marxists, like Furtado, critical theorists, like Ray, and even post- 
modernist commentators, like Said, whose emphases lean towards either 
system or culture, I see this process as that of a wedge, if I might borrow 
again that metaphor, of new systemic and social integrative actions in which 
there is a sharper bifurcation between white and Black at the socio- 
integrative level. Systemically new structures of economic and 
administrative power were imposed on these societies which ruptured and 
realigned some of the traditional systems according to priorities determined 
by a dynamic located elsewhere. Social integrative institutions and 
processes were disrupted as well not just by the penetration of new forms of 
systemic action, but by the imposition of social integrative action that 
consensualised norms hierarchicalising white over Black, which were 
instrumentally applied, and therefore experienced as direct domination. 
Economies and polities were re-oriented via a permission sanctioned overtly 
by forcible control, as exercised through the military, police and imposed 
judicial systems, and via a justification normatively secured for white society 
by the "de-anthropophaging"/induction into "humanity" trope as exercised on 
Black people through Christo-redemptive institutional practices of the 
church, school, and public health agencies. There is enough evidence to 
show the outward resource draining orientation the new economic systemic 
arrangements occasioned, and which continue today. I am not going to 
concentrate so much on that, other than to lock economic crises in peripheral 
states into system integrative responses to crises of the world economy, and 
the impact the economic system, and particularly crises, have on the social 
integrative systems in such societies/states. Instead I want to focus on the 
hybridity effects the imposition of white social integrative actions and 
institutions had on Black societies by looking categorically at the two 
collectivities in a way that seeks to draw out principled characteristics 
without assuming any reductive homogeneities. White societies in the 
peripheral subject "states" were crucial access conduits to Black subjects, 
especially where the lack of any kind democratic polity made the gap 
between white civilian life and the administering state even narrower. The 
administered "state" with its non-challenged, affirmative polity provided a 
more fertile ground upon which phenotypical based propositional statements 
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about subjects out there could be made. Those who ranged from beasts of 
burden to not quite yet adults, were not and could not be party to the norming 
through the growing repository of conventional(ised) wisdom about the 
naturalness of Black people being subjected. The growing boundaries of 
Western knowledge, and within that the enlarging boundaried differentiation 
of "subject" areas, reflected within each as an integral moment, knowledge 
about Black people, very often negotiated through those white settler 
societies in the form of the colonising power's phantasms of progressive 
empire. These societies' social institutional core were very much linked to 
the relevant metropolitan/colonial country. The spatio-temporal 
parameters were in a state of very slow flux in which "home" was frozen in 
the memories transported with them and kept on ice by the slow rate of white 
societal change on the periphery. Systemic crises, other than 
revolutionary upheaval in the colonial states, were those that occurred in 
metropolitan countries. In a sense then the distance the white settlers had to 
travel to truly see Black people still detoured via the colonising society -a 
greater distance than the actual mileage separating the two societies. This 
time and distance lagged stagnation simply increased the conventionalisation 
of Black people. It jump started those othering tendencies into the creation 
of essentialised exaggerated white national identities. This is not to argue 
that such white societies were an undifferentiated group, but it is to argue 
that despite differences of class, gender, status etc within such societies there 
was still a commonality of conventional knowledge about and 
conventionalising attitude towards their Black subjects. The assumption of 
new nationhood which marked the passage into post colonialism offered no 
resolution. These were epochal problems about white over Black which 
carried over unresolved into another era in which the institutional framework 
for new levels of learning, i. e. one that substantively deracialises white and 
Black, becomes displaced on to a world scene. The question then is what 
are the key characteristics of this displacement. To answer this means 
tracking back to delineate the main features of white subjugation, and, more 
importantly, Black societies' responses. There were two main features. 
Firstly a systemic disruption and re-alignment due to the imposition of new 
economic and political systems of power that had its impetus tied to the 
systemic manouverings of the metropolitan country manifested in an 
objective of selected resource drainage, not radical societal transformation. 
The nascent cognitive potential that sanctioned, and in the process 
developed, the civilised-uncivilised, human-beast, clean-dirty 
hierarchicalisation justified a range of systemic interventions - slavery, 
indentured labour, plantationising, mineral appropriation, poll taxes etc. 
However, subjugation disrupted as well a range of social integrative 
institutions, and not just kinship systems as the "mode of production" 
theorists would have. In so doing it imposed a different set of societal 
learning problems the solution to which involved/involves the inclusive 
participation of white societies - but more of that later. Habermas has 
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attempted at his abstract level of analysis to characterise the formation of 
class societies by postulating that these arose when the material production 
process was uncoupled from the kinship system and re-organised via 
relations of political domination. Using that as a crude analogy it can be 
said that white subjugation not so much uncoupled material production as 
selectively re-orientated it via relations of racialised domination. The 
systemic effect on Black life worlds cannot be considered without looking 
too at the attempts to institutionalise new forms of social integration. 
Political integration was sought through the introduction of colonial subjects, 
not citizens, who could owe allegiance to white regent based parental figures 
in metropolitan Xanadus. Limited introduction of extra life world 
socialising institutions - limited in the sense that the introduction of these 
institutions were tied to the instrumentalised micro-systemic needs of 
individual subjugated areas e. g the production of clerks for minor 
functionary jobs in the administrative set-up, and not, as in metropolitan 
societies, tied to systemic legitimation strategies - through educational, 
public health, social policy and religious interventions were refracted 
through a core concern to naturalise white-Black hierarchicalisation. In 
other words the "I" of white society and "you" of Black society could only 
ever become a "we" under limited circumstances of sharing a common 
political ruler, monarchically symbolised in some colonising powers and/or 
through normative subjugation via "Black skin, white masks" assimilation 
processes, but effected through a universal franchise in colonising countries, 
and an enforced universalisation in the colonised ones. Thematically 
compulsory socialisation of ersatz cultures, as one of the facets of the epoch 
straddling unresolved white-Black problem, is burped once again from the 
belly of the imperial beast in the form of the knowledge restrictive to 
conventionalise "who belongs" in the redefined UK educational processes 
governing the formation of the national curriculum. The second main 
feature then relates to the disruption of the social integrative institutional 
core by the imposition of new systemic and social integrative processes, and 
thus on the evolutionary learning, i. e. the cognitive potential, of those 
societies, and the responses this evoked. In so doing I am but attempting to 
delineate at a generalised level the categorical range of probable responses, 
and its invitation to empirical validation within specific contexts, both as a 
reaction away from the empirically narrow implications of the "mode of 
production" teleogy, and the inference of infinite multi-cultural entities 
contained within the textualised post-modernist theorising. Re-alignment 
of the social integrative mechanisms occurred through a process of life- 
world colonisation. Now Habermas identifies life-world colonisation in the 
West as that process of systemic intervention of economy and power that 
results in the displacement of consensual norms and has, therefore, as one of 
its outcomes post-conventionalisation, manifested in the formation of 
modernity questioning new social movements. These new social 
movements, as against the orthodox Marxist notion of class conflict, are 
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indicators of the modernity questioning twilight zones of change. My 
claim, however, is that this process manifested itself, as one of the responses 
to colonial racial subjugation, time-warpedly, long before their visible 
appearance in the West. Touissant L'Ouverture's stakeholder in humanity 
claims for Black ex-slaves in the very heart of the political centre and 
practice of the Enlightenment is one, as is, relatedly and more importantly, 
the subsequent creation by France and the States, between those insticies of 
change, of the "Doc"toring of Haitian history. I have identified 
categories of responses. These are not made with any claim to all 
embracing inclusivity, other than to flag up that they do attempt to resolve 
one of the principal objections of the newly emerging school of post- 
coloniality which postulates that radical Western theories of, and about, the 
Third World prevent the "subaltern" from speaking because their parameters 
of change are too circumscriptive and thus have an inbuilt imputation of 
nativism/traditionalism for those phenomena that do not fit. I am not going 
to differentiate between system and social integrative imposition, but will 
run them together as an en bloc subjugation giving rise to similar responses. 
Categorically we can talk about the following: 
f Systemic and/or system-social integrative overload in which systems 
penetration disrupts the social integrative core so much that it 
disintegrates. The impact of slavery on some of the smaller 
societies in West Africa is an example; or under other categories the 
description of individuals totally pathologised by the process 
f Partial systemic and/or system-social integrative imposition in which 
organic (preferred term to describe those social integrative institutions 
that existed before colonial subjugation) social integrative core 
remains largely untouched, i. e. it can still renew the belief values of 
that society. This can describe as well those situations of 
encouraged ethnicity, i. e the subjugating powers 
allow/encourage/facilitate the nativism of the "natives". This can be 
the basis of an offensive oriented action to restore what was; or a 
defensive oriented attempt to "pickle" in frozen time and place an 
ethnicity. An example of this would be the Zulu so called nation 
which historically has exhibited both offensive and defensive 
attitudes. 
f Organic social integrative displacement in which life world 
colonisation through imposed social integrative processes and sytemic 
penetration displace the organic core. Displacement is the operative 
word because it allows for the qualification of degrees of 
displacement. Total, or near total displacement, will depend on the 
extent to which systemic impositions coincide with the inherent 
legitimations of the substitute social integrative core. One of the 
key factors affecting the level of coincidence would be the extent of 
de-to anti-racialisation of the replacement socio-integrative core 
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The imbalance towards the colonial administration system as a bureaucratic 
steering vehicle for new inspirations is a better way of relooking at someone 
like Alavi's notion of the overdeveloped colonial/post-colonial state. 94 The 
development of organic economic systems with a dynamic sufficient to 
withstand external pressure might offer a way of looking at latterday 
Singapore. To get back to the main concern, the inherent 
conventionalisation which seeks to legitimate white over Black alongside 
promises of incorporation into civilised humanity within the imposed socio 
integrative core, means that there are a number of responses that can be 
idealised within this type of category. The first is represented by the 
"coconut/choc-ice/chocolate teacake/speelwit" syndrome in which the 
disengendered "white man"-as-best is accepted wholly either by a total 
displacement, or partial adaptation of organic systems. There is the 
rejection of the white-Black hierarchicalisation which can take a number of 
forms: defensive actions cast within the organic socio-integrative core which 
can reject the imposed systemic and socio-integrative institutions and pose 
idealised alternatives; rejection of the imposed socio-integrative core, 
partially or wholly, but acceptance of the systemic interventions on condition 
they are under "Black" control i. e this includes the varieties of nationalist 
decolonising movements; or interrogation of both sets of systemic and socio- 
integrative process which pose questions about the conditions for white 
acceptance of Black and vice versa i. e this includes the range of Marxist 
oriented movements, post-modernist theorising, and, the conceptualisation of 
post-conventionalisation in "Third world" contexts. The abstracted 
framework outlined above is a better one within which specific contexts can 
be analysed and held up to the scrutiny of localised empirical studies without 
having to jettison a global interconnectedness or, concomitantly, postulate an 
infinite number of unconnected specificities. In the latter type of analyses, 
allowing the subaltern to speak is premissed upon a base line that goes no 
further than providing a configuration within which better understanding can 
be non judgementally achieved, thereby providing the Goldbergs of this 
world the specificity bound comprehension to understand the phenomenon of 
necklacing without condemning it 95 I, however, want to go further by 
prefacing the analytical framework with the critically interrogative question 
of what constitutes the way of seeing things which can provide the means to 
examine the basis for non-distorted communicative discourse both here and 
over there. In other words not only can one acknowledge and understand 
the variety of responses to white-Black hierarchicalisation as possible 
outcomes, which the philosophy of consciousness school does not allow, but 
one has a basis for engaging in practice, with that overall objective in mind, 
to resolve the multitudinous claims made. Imperialism can be 
reconstructed in terms that move beyond the productivist logic normally 
entailed therein to allow, for example, analyses which lock post-colonial 
state legitimation into the narrow band of congruence between systems of 
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economic and administrative power and social integration that exists, 
sometimes transiently, for those countries' urbanised elites; analyses which 
allow for acknowledgement of religio-cultural ethnicities, authoritarianism, 
populist democratic movements etc. as authentic exit signs of a systemically 
provoked legitimation crisis. It allows for a reconstruction that permits the 
construction of solutions to the charge of racism made about the West by 
post-colonial national leaders, the moral and ethical content of which applies 
equally to the action of those leaders within their own countries. One can 
now view migration of Black people, post-colonially, to white countries as 
part of those exiting phenomena associated with legitimation crises in post- 
colonial societies, whether this be for economic or political reasons, or belief 
in the "streets-paved-with-gold" phantasm. People thus migrate for a 
number of reasons with manifold value systems. With the UK there was, 
and is, the promise of full participatory rights, that is of synchronicity of 
space and temporal parameters which comes with journeying to "home", that 
original harbinger of universal rights. But hierarchicalisation of the white- 
Black nexus, which in metropolitan countries expresses itself through an 
even greater systemic colonisation of Black life-worlds, finds the 
legitimation crisis exit signs being displayed at a greater rate from the Black 
communities, and, in relation to white society, temporally advanced. 
Conventional racism from the colonial epoch, itself a development of pre- 
colonial hierarchicalisation of white over Black, becomes part of the 
repository of knowledge about Black people which is inclusive of the 
learning strategies that arise out of maintaining relations of force in 
communicative discourse, an example of which is the divide and rule tactic 
of promoting frozen ethnicities in metropolitan countries as a means of 
dispersing claims of racial justice. In fact it can be said that the whole of 
the colonial period can be characterised as an exercise in the propositional 
identification of Black people "out there" in which the propositional process 
is inclusive of subjugation that prevents the self identification of "these 
Others", other than in representational form through the activities of the 
colonisers and the burgoening nationalist elites who come to speak "for the 
people". Post-colonially this becomes displaced on to the world scene 
underpinning the inter-relationships between white and Black countries, 
whilst intra Western countries, these phantasms of imperial days past are re- 
engaged and reformed with the growth of Black populations internally as a 
result of migration. This displacement and re-engagement are not the only 
symptoms of epochally unresolved problems of racism. Within ex-colonial 
societies, legitimation problems soon arise because the promise of systemic 
rewards inherent in the independence movements, cannot be met. Issues of 
white-Black racialisation begin to recede and are displaced by those of 
"Wa'benzi". 96 But these are not new; they are, instead, a re-ignition of the 
process of questioning of certain aspects of the hybrid socio-integrative core 
which post-colonial societies become after formal independence, and a 
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questioning of the systemic arrangements. Thus issues of gender, 
democracy, exaggerated ethnicities, etc., which are masked by the 
independence promise of universalism, come to the fore, as they are 
increasingly in so-called Third World countries, and in a way in which the 
orthodox Marxist domination of "imperialism" has been, and is incapable of 
predicting or adequately analysing.. 
1.10 Racism in the Metropole 
Let me preface the outline of a reconstructed idea of racism that is globally 
envisaged by mentioning now a phenomenon I want to examine in more 
detail later. This is, is this pattern of racialised force in colonial relations of 
communication so dissimilar from what is going on now in white countries 
with large Black populations? The cognitive potential of learning to 
dominate, increased through the colonial and post-colonial period, is, if I 
might only speculate at this stage because of the need for further research, a 
better way of accounting, perhaps, for the pattern emerging now. By way 
of analogy Arendt's perceptive characterisation of the forming Afrikaaner 
domination of South Africa captures the selectivity I am trying to describe. 
Hence: 
"Imperialism was willing to abandon the so-called laws of capitalist production and 
their egalitarian tendencies so long as profits from specific investments were safe (to 
the extent that) whenever rational labour and production policies came into conflict 
with race considerations, the latter won. "97 
Thus there is today in Western countries with Black populations a de- 
universalisation of the claims of the systemic processes, i. e the synchronicity 
of socio-integrative institutions and systemic interventions self evidently 
applies to only a narrow band of elites, large sections of the society are 
subalternised i. e placed in positions of greater communicative force, with the 
Black communities being the pathfinder ones at the cutting edge; a selective, 
sometimes forced, e. g. workfare, systemic engagement with these 
communities e. g. permanent unemployment, withdrawal of the welfare state; 
an imposed socio-integrative core based upon idealised past standards that 
have their philosophical bases in a communitarian impulse ranging from 
"left" to "right", as a result of panics about so called organic socio- 
integrative institutions, like the family, but which are coded ways of talking 
about those aliens in our midst, i. e. Black people. 98 Perhaps we should 
disinter and critically re-construct theories like Blauner's notion of internal 
colonialism. 
Let's start, though with the phenomenon of migration of Black people to 
colonising countries, like the UK, not out of a belief that racism started there 
in time, but to emphasise the point made earlier about the re-ignition of long 
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standing, imperially enhanced, knowledge, lurking in all socio-cultural 
processes, which maintains white-Black hierarchicalisation. The 
distinction attempted by Habermas in his belated, but welcome attempt to 
deal with the resurgence of overt neo-nazi racism in Germany, between those 
European countries with a "tradition" of migration, and here he means Black 
migration, to them, and those without, such as Germany, appears to give 
sustenance to the argument that it is an issue of culture clash. 99 My 
contention is that the learning processes of racial domination occurred long 
before the phenomenon of Black migration. Thus, for example, Germany's 
imperial forays into Black countries and the reservoir this provided for the 
emergence of anti Afro-German racism post- Second World War is testament 
to these tendencies. '°° Black people arrived, certainly in the case of the UK, 
from the many corners of the Black world with a range of localised and 
nascent world views, and from a range of backgrounds. There was a criss- 
crossing at the terminus, of socio-economic, gender, and socio-cultural 
backgrounds. What is certain is that these were not hermetically sealed 
ethnic entities that arrived. It was not the transportation of ethnic 
continuities, as implied by the ethnic, and latterly, etnik, minority specialists, 
nor the centuries old Caribbean excursus via slavery, of a cultural lineage, 
covering for biologically based authenticity, as implied by the Afrikaanists, 
nor the migration of historically unchanging religio-cultural social 
formations. If there is any common denominator it is that which not only 
characterises the reasons for migration, but also testifies to the primacy of 
the "here-and now" nature of identity formation and motivations. That is to 
say that migration from nascent Third world countries and transitional 
colonial states in the '50s and "60s is one of the visible signs of a legitimation 
crisis amongst some of their populations. Migration expresses at a general 
level, and for a multitude of individual reasons, at the micro-level, a 
rejection of that country. These reasons could range across the spectrum of 
"systemic" interventions, or absence of these, e. g. political refugees or those 
who migrate for economic betterment, or the spectrum of socio-cultural 
displacement, e. g the belief in "God, Queen and mother country", or the hope 
of a fully compensatory claim to those "universal ideals". One of the few 
areas of synchronicty between white and Black was in that coalescence 
around the identification of "white" as a general description for Europeans, 
but exhibiting as well a normative bifurcation between the two collectivities 
expressed through the social missionary "white man's burden" on the one 
hand, and the "white as subjugators" on the other. Black people arrived 
with their localised identities, not self identifying as Black, except in those 
few instances where colonial propositional practices had "niggered" the 
colonised descriptions. It is worth mentioning briefly the belated attempt 
by some to reconstruct the Black experience in terms of space and time 
considerations, usually, unfortunately, by those who because their post- 
modernist theoretical proclivities have knocked away the structural linkages 
betweeen metropole and periphery, contrary to experience and evidence, 
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now see this as a way of re-instating that necessary link. I have attempted 
to sketch out an analysis which gives primacy to the universalisation of a 
specific form of dominance i. e. racialised, with different space and time 
parameters one of whose specific effects was to delegitimise local place in 
favour of a metropole made more favourable by the promise of universalised 
"fruits" at the end of the journey between the two locales. However, 
arrival in the metropole initiated an accelerated re-colonisation process, 
which I'll detail later, and, which in effect was a racialised blitzkrieg on 
every aspect of their being. Those racialised relations of force, which are 
trans-epochally unresolved problems of the hierarchicalisation of white over 
Black, and which have entered into the learning processes of the modern age 
as a means of securing the short term solutions to systemic crises, structures, 
overtly and covertly, the decision making processes relating to Black 
people's lives. The brief, temporary, transistory glimpse of systemic and 
socio-integrative isochronism which first foot on the soil evokes, and later 
because of increasing racist immigration practices, which the actual journey 
offers, is wiped aside as racism re-asserts those dominative space and time 
parameters which destabilise place. Racism focuses the Black immigrant's 
experience back on to the margins. "Go back to where you came from" 
which re-asserts the parameters of global space in a racialised dominative 
mode, has, too, a retro time element, that encapsulates the backward 
temporal displacement of the continual not being accepted as "we". 
Racism then soon shatters that brief convergence of time, space and place 
and differentiates hierarchically once again the respective time and space co- 
ordinates of white and Black. In re-averring racial domination, racism, if I 
might run with a mathematical allegory, vectors white space and time 
parameters, and pesudo-vectors Black ones, so that the white vector field 
determines the space and time of Black people to the extent that physical 
place become the axes for their pseudo-vectors of space and time. Here 
the experience of place is the space of the ghetto, and of time that extra 
weight that slows down the pendulum of opportunities for self determination 
out of those circumstances. It also, as one of the outcomes, freeze dries 
those sedimented ethno-memories as an etnik blueprint, which are then 
evoked and reconstructed in the here and now by the rapaciousness of racism 
in the metropole whilst claiming an organic pedigree of time lineage, which 
in reality is empirically challengeable. This racialised irrationalisation in 
the sense of the maintenance of relations of force in communicative 
discourse, means that in reality despite the physical proximity of field 
vectored Black communities to, for example, local Town halls, the 
communicative distance that has to be travelled is still via the colonies. 
Yet all of this is contained within the dialectic in which that experience of 
relativising of the presence allows "us", as one of the delegitimising exiting 
routes, to time warp to the future to pose substantive questions about society 
well ahead of the rest. That questioning of "home", that belated realisation 
that "jobs are not for life", that wakening up to global inter-connectedness 
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which are issues now, can as a recent trans-national Pepsi advertisement 
would have it, be reconstrued as; pace white experiences, "Been there. Done 
that..... " 
Thus the universalisation of a specific form of domination, which, whilst 
imposing different spatial and temporal parameters, was only intermittently 
active, as evinced by the stagnation of colonial structures and as picked up 
by Arendt, and thus never able to achieve the same degree of colonisation of 
the lifeworld, which I'll detail below, as in the Western centre. It is within 
this "caesura" that we can explore and distinguish notions of the "lost 
undifferentiated community" yearning forms of resistance, and immanently 
"time warping" ones of Black people appropriating the dangled fruits of 
equality, freedom etc. and thus pushing back the boundaries of modernism. 
In so doing I want too to run with the notion of this forced bi- 
temporal/spatial multi-linguism as one of the emancipatory means by which 
the colonial/post-colonial/Black person not so much catchresises, as 
neologises in pursuit of validity claims about racial justice This also, I 
believe, provides a better framework for looking at hybridisation. 
I want to explore therefore the detail of the why and how of racism and the 
use of "Black" by looking at Habermas' notion of the colonisation of the 
lifeworld. This exploration bifurcates into an examination of the non 
psycho-analytic but normative anchoring of white racism, and into an 
examination of the experience and effects of racism vis-a-vis the lifeworld of 
Black people; the latter as a basis for developing the notion of an accelerated 
autonomous post-conventional identity as one of the outcomes. alongside 
others such as newly reconstructed conventional ones, and pathological ones, 
all of these characterising the non-predictable outcomes of such colonisation. 
Let me re journey briefly over Habermas' theory of colonisation of the 
lifeworld via both his own and other commentators' work as a foregrounding 
to a reconstruction through testing its universalist claims in the domain of 
race and racism. The idea of the lifeworld arises out of Habermas' 
categorical distinction between action theory and systems theory; a 
distinction someone like Chatterjee in his analysis of colonial India echoes. 
101 That is "one must distinguish mechanisms for co-ordinating action that 
harmonise the action orientations of participants from mechanisms that 
stabilise non-intended interconnections of actions by way of functionally 
intermeshing action consequences (whereby the in the former) integration of 
an action system is established by a normatively secured or communicatively 
achieved consensus (and in the latter) by non-normative regulation of 
individual decisions that extends beyond the actors' consciousness. " In this 
distinction between system and lifeworid, the latter is defined by Habermas 
as "a culturally transmitted and linguistically organised stock of interpretive 
patterns". 102 Categorically the lifeworld can be broken down, as 
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Outhwaite, points out, in terms of "cultural reproduction[continuity of 
tradition, coherence and rationality of knowledge], social 
integration[stabilisation of group identities, solidarity] and 
socialisation[transmission of generalised competencies for action, 
harmonization of individual biographies with collective forms of life]"103. 
Habermas' theory has it that under the modern age, increased differentiation 
means that the lifeworld and system become detached from each other, and 
there is an increasing pattern in which the exchange, ie. between system and 
lifeworld, media of economy and power, become sub-systems themselves. 
They become "detached from normative contexts" and thus "challenge the 
assimilative power of the lifeworld, " to the extent that, "the social system 
made up of these subsystems escapes from the intuitive knowledge of 
everyday communicative practice, and is henceforth only accessible to the 
counter-intuitive knowledgeof the social sciences... " Habermas sees this 
delinguistified medium, such as money, as providing the basis for the 
transformation of normative grounded actions into success oriented actions. 
By inference, too, one can say that there is a displacement of normative 
based actions by power medium grounded actions, such as status and control. 
Outhwaite therefore discerns that the system and social integration 
distinction is underpinned by two further micro-distinctions: "between action 
oriented to succcess and action oriented to mutual understanding and 
between mechanisms of action co-ordination which develop and formalise 
mutual understanding.... and mechanisms which replace it, such as money 
and power. " °4 To this, in advance of the reconstruction of the 
colonisation of the lifeworld thesis I see as necessary, I would add that some 
of the counter actions to mutual understanding that need to be flagged up are 
those oriented to actions such as status and control. Habermas uses these 
distinctions to argue that in the dominant societal formations of the modern 
age i. e. advanced capitalist and bureaucratic socialist, as then was, its 
members become "organisation dependent", as employees and clients, to the 
extent that communicative action processes are peripheral to those processes 
of conventionalisation within the organisation. Displacement becomes at 
the same time colonisation. Habermas pinpoints, in the modern age, the 
nuclear family's prioritisation of socialisation and consumption and the 
differentiation out of the cultural processes as the lynchpin to the 
colonisation process. I don't want to go into, at this stage the feminist 
criticisms about the location of the family as the life world core, suffice to 
mark it up as one of the crucial areas surrounding a race based 
reconstruction. 105 It is thus that "the adaption of individuals to 
organisational imperatives" gives rise to the "elimination of moral-practical 
reasoning". But colonisation is only one of the possible outcomes of 
increasing systemic and social differentiation. Within the resultant 
amibivalent indeterminancy there is, as well, the possibility of increasing 
rationality in the Habermassian sense in which "the further the structural 
components of the lifeworld and the processes that contribute to maintaining 
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them get differentiated, the more interaction contexts come under control of 
rationally motivated mutual understanding, that is of consensus formation 
that rests in the end on the authority of the better argument" 106. Or as 
Outhwaite, in an echo of White puts it, "towards a hypothetical end state in 
which cultural traditions are constantly criticised and renewed, political 
forms are dependent on formal procedures of justification, and personalities 
are increasingly autonomous. "1 7 In a crude nutshell, if that is Habermas's 
theory of life world colonisation, then its validity claims to universality, 
especially since it was constructed within the purviews of Western society 
and its Enlightenment, have to be tested against the, as then, 
unacknowledged presence of Black lifeworlds in the metropole. 
To that extent I want to colour Habermas' use of the term "colonise" both as 
an inclusive acknowledgement of Black presence here, and to reclaim the 
dominative energetic use the term has come to symbolise through the history 
of white over Black. Thus I agree with Kunneman that Habermas's work 
reads as if colonisation is no more than the replacement of one principle of 
sociation with another. 108 It is more than that, especially where formal 
semantic definitions of colonialism include that of being "the policy of a 
power in extending control over weaker peoples or areas. " 109 This brings 
in too Honneth's query about the motivational source for inter-subjective 
communicative discourse. 110 But, then again, given his all white 
treatment of the subject, this is not that surprising for there is an inherent 
problem in moving from the prima facie motivational collectivities of class 
to the autonomous individual based new social movements in the emerging 
constellations of change in white society which does throw up questions 
about the role of collective identities as the source for actor based social 
change. It is thus within this Habermassian notion of linguistic based social 
interaction with its primacy given to the role of actors in societal processes 
that I want to locate the earlier mentioned bifurcation of the impact of racism 
on Black and white life-world in terms of "experiencers" and "perpetrators". 
These. like the use of the terms, "Black" and "white", are categorical 
heuristic differentiations and not hypostatisations. 
Earlier I defined racism as "the maintenance of relations of force in the 
structures of communication through conventionalisation of biological 
differences and/or ascribed biological differences", where 
"conventionalisation" is taken to mean the perpetuation of a propositional 
identification of, and thus concomitant denial of a performative attitude 
from, Black people. Racialised conventionalisation within the white 
socio-integrative processes allows the structuration of actions so that the 
outcomes for Black people see them over represented in the formal indices 
of exploitation, oppression exclusion, and inequality. Apropos those who 
argue a common denominator of exclusion to the phenomenon of racism, it 
must be pointed out that the general outcome for Black people is in fact their 
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over inclusion in the social constructions of the criminalised, mentally 
pathologised, the unemployed, etc. In the process of racism, Black people 
are done to. Their experiences are not the "Oops! " like after effect of a 
societal belch. This restatement and amplification of the earlier definition 
I want to use as the preface for the general characterisation of the Black 
lifeworld in the metropole as that of being over colonised. In support of 
that let's start the detailed considerations by re-examining Habermas 
contention that success oriented actions transform normative grounded ones. 
Now this might do for the bourgeois Yuppie, but its logic would be 
irrelevant to the experience of the dispossessed. That it is not, however to 
dismiss this particular notion. Rather it is to argue that the lack of success 
is equally, if not more forceful, in transforming normative grounded actions, 
especially where that lack of success is mediated by racialisation. Lack of 
success makes visible increasingly, the wider context to that orientation 
towards success, with every failed attempt at inclusion. Where this is 
mediatized by racialised hierarchicalisation of white over Black, there is in 
fact a spectrum of visible economic force of success to the invisible "dark" 
side of lack of success in which Black people's attempts at full inclusion are 
nearly always ratcheted back. Perhaps we should use the term negative 
economic systemic intrusion to describe this specific colonisation of the 
Black life world. Now, it might be argued that this occurs to the White 
unemployed as well. That much is true. The qualitative difference, 
however, is that conventionalisation ensures that this process is that much 
greater and intrusive in the Black life world thereby differentiating the white 
from the Black dispossessed. I'll come to its likely effects later. First let's 
look at the tandem of political/administrative force contained in Habermas's 
theory in which the welfare state transforms the unsuccessful into 
organisation dependent clients. One of the routes to that stage is via what 
Habermas refers to as "juridification". This, as Outhwaite rightly 
summaries, "is part of a broad process of extension and deepening of the 
sphere of law in which it comes to cover more and more areas of life in 
greater and greater detail. ""' Juridification, however, embraces both 
dependency, and in some cases greater freedom. 
"The point is to protect areas of life that are functionally dependent on social 
integration through values, norms and consensus formation, to preserve them from 
falling prey to the systemic imperatives of economic and administrative subsystems 
growing with dynamics of their own, and to defend them from becoming converted 
through the steering medium of law to a principle of sociation that is, for them, 
dysfunctional. "' 2 
It is certainly true, as my research into Black children in care shows113, that 
laws positivistically framed. i. e. not on the basis of substantive 
communicative discourse, have inherent the potential for dysfunctional 
applications. The difference when it comes to Black people is that laws, 
particularly welfare laws, are applied within a discretionary context that 
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allows for welfare actors' actions to be structured within conventionalised 
knowledge about Black people. Conventionalisation includes both the 
pejorative assessment of Black people, e. g. my research which showed that 
white social workers in their court reports were referring to Black parents 
who were illiterate as "unintelligent", and the new forms of "progressive" 
essentialist etnikfying of Black experiences, e. g. the one local authority 
Black Worker's Group who, in their defence of a Black member accused of 
threatening a child in care, claimed that authoritarian parenting was a part of 
Afro-Caribbean culture, or, those agencies who do not bother to provide 
certain services to Black Asian people because the "family takes care of 
those problems. " Habermas' notion ofjuridification then does not 
adequately capture the true extent of what happens to Black people within 
the welfare service context His underlying contention that these sort of 
processes underscore the move from one principle of sociation to another, 
because it does not articulate the power relationship involved, implies a 
painless transition It is much more painful than that for Black 
communities in the metropole. I prefer, therefore, the idea of forced 
sociation, i. e. of the pressurised attempt to change through control strategies 
Black socio-integrative processes because of racism as defined. To that 
extent there is congruence with Kunneman's claims about the re-emergence 
of asymmetrical power relationships even in therapeutic so-called 
equivalence based services. There is an overlap, then with his idea of 
"pseudo-communication", and my one of racialised conventionalisation in 
which the latter allows for discretionary based re-assertion of the Black- 
white hierarchicalisation even in so-called "equal opportunity" environments. 
Having pushed criticisms of Foucault to the limits in the previous chapter, 
there is then an acknowledgement of the need for a slight rapprochement 
with his work, but with the proviso, as Outhwaite, correctly points out, that 
"Foucault's undifferentiated concept of disciplinary power must be refined in 
terms of distinctions implicit in Habermas's work" 4. One of the over- 
riding distinctions is that this particular power relationship has to be 
constructed in terms of specific blockages which "prevent individuals from 
engaging in performative acts that have a reflexive transforming effect on 
what is being criticised", i. e. articulating the racialised relations of force in 
communicative structures. The universalist claims of the law are thus 
undercut either by the over administration of such processes, or the lack of 
administration, i. e services are inappropriate or discriminately refused. In 
fact the transformation of the notion of universality in welfare into explicit 
selectivity by the new right means that compensatory welfare interventions 
can be targeted on the grounds of efficiency etc. away from Black people 
without recourse to new laws but simply by ministerial fiat. This can be 
justified by an appeal to fictive cultural values which existed in the past, or, 
in extremis, by a resurrection of the contention that certain racial groups are 
less intelligent and therefore resources which are affirmative action targeted 
are wasted. This is a variation on the increasing past oriented, but rooted in 
55 
today phenomenon of the deliberate social construction of nostalgia 
exemplified by the cultural media trend of buying in time locked white 
settler television programmes so that the past and present can be 
"Neighbour"(ed). This points to my argument, detailed later, about the 
new technical racism in which high technicism and its selective white 
control allows for the recreation of racialised communicative distance and 
power asymmetry by trading in cultural conservatism/irrationalism. There is 
a sense then in which we can talk as well about negative politico- 
administrative systemic intrusions into Black life worlds. This goes to my 
earlier notion that Habermas's idea of the learning processes which support 
evolutionary stages and are the prefiguring bases for the move from one to 
another has, certainly in the move to, and during the modem age, to highlight 
its shadow because those learning processes are inclusive of a curriculum for 
maintaining racial domination. However, unlike post-modernists, I do not 
see these as irreconcilible, but rather the carry over of trans-epochal to date 
unresolved resolvable problems built around atavisms which lurk in the 
white normative anchored sub-conscious, structuring modem age "Fortress 
Europes", as the fear of the Black evil forces victory in the imagined 
Ragnorök. Thus in the material nexus that develops between white and 
Black success orientation because of conventionalisation, grows racialised 
exploitation and inequality; in the gap that develops between lack of success 
administrative inspired interventions in white and Black life worlds, grows 
racial oppression. It's like the imagined response a Black welfare recipient 
would give to a white welfare recipient where the latter had complained 
about his benefits that "All this amounts to is shit! "; which was; "Hell, I get 
shit asking for shit, then I don't even get the shit I'm entitled to. " In sum, 
racialised conventionalisation by maintaining relations of force in the 
structures of communication, contributes to the key characteristic of its 
impact on the Black lifeworld, which is that that lifeworld is over colonised. 
The structures of communication I interpret to mean as those arrangements 
of institutions, processes, procedures and practices which facilitate non- 
distorted communication, and which speak of the political and ethical 
potential language has. Thus the inherent problem the post-modernist turn 
towards prioritising culture has is in its inability to use this as a basis for 
launching a political counter-offensive; a problem shared even by those 
modernist culture based theorists of race like Gilroy. The over colonisation 
of the Black life world gives rise to a number of outcomes which can be 
outlined at an abstract level categorically. This abstraction, like the earlier 
qualification on the Manichean use of white and Black, delineates building 
block principles that allow for regional and localised levels of analyses 
guided by empirical refelexive realities in which the "intutitive social 
sciences", one of the avenues now open to understanding the excluded 
experiences as a result of systemic colonisation, are "competent and capable" 
enough to encompass Black lifeworld experiences. 
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Over colonisation results in a range of phenomena far greater than that 
occurring to white lifeworlds, which make explicit time, space and place 
parameters to the extent that some of these phenomena represent the cutting 
edge to the fulfilment or not of modernity's promise of "progress". 
Whereas Habermas speaks of the displacement of a new form of sociation 
with another which results in, amongst other outcomes, "progressive" new 
social movements based on post-conventional norm formation, i. e as the 
result of reflexive communicative discourse amongst individuals, I want to 
outline an interim stage which the Black lifeworld exhibits, and which 
maintains a group/collective character, itself a basis for motivation. I want 
to retain Habermas's distinction between "defensive" and "offensive" 
outcomes, but refine them by contextualising them within the previously 
raised issues surrounding past, present and future oriented utopias. The 
best way to arrive at this intended abstracted map of the effects on the Black 
lifeworld is to cross-tabulate those six columns of past, present and future 
oriented defensive and offensive leaning outcomes by considerations of 
identity, sub-divided categorically into individual, group and collective 
identities. One of the reasons for this is so that we can short circuitedly 
bring into the fold, and at the same time deal with, those standard bearer 
questions about hybridity and differences with which postie race theorists 
have assailed the excluding grand narrative discourses. The other reason is 
because, as I shall argue, over colonisation as an outcome of racialised 
conventionalisation brings to the fore at a sharper rate simultaneously for 
Black people questions about individual, group and collective identities 
which are not unique to them, as is implied in the postie celebration of 
difference, but harbingers of wider societal issues; the same sorts of issues 
which have given rise to the new right and resurgent neo-fascistic 
romanticism of a "golden white past". 
We can describe racialised conventionalisation as that of a process of forced 
social differentiation in which the racial hierarchicalisation inherent gives 
rise to a relativisation of the Black conventional identity. Forced 
sociation, over systemic intervention, the maintenance of propositional 
identification, together with the space, place and time vectoring of these, 
give rise to the Black individual asking more quickly and regularly than 
his/her white counterpart questions about who he/she is, where they fit in, 
and how they fit in. Let's deal with the most obvious outcome which is the 
overwhelming of the individual resulting in pathologisation as evidenced by 
the health profiles of Black communities in the metropole. However, 
maintaining the communicative distance and hierarchy because of racialised 
conventionalisation means that the relativisation of the Black person's 
conventional identity can result in the re-affirmation of that convention in 
contradistinction to the propositional identity foisted on him/her. For the 
Black person metropolitan wogging crystallises those values brought with 
and with which he/she confirms and maintains his/her identity. For those 
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first immigrants this might still be rooted in the geographical location of 
origin. "You are not wanted here" quickly re-introduces that travelled 
space between Black and white, imagined Empire and metropole. These 
values, sometimes underpinned by religious considerations might manifest 
itself in an overtly declared group identity, which in the absence of 
mechanisms for radical communicative discourse, ends up as being 
representational; open to appropriation and representation as propositional 
essentialised ethnic identity. At this stage such claims to group identity, as 
a counter to wogged identification, might entail a questioning of social 
institutions, but not a rejection of political ones, which structure the wider 
collective normative sinews of "nation". Substantive group identities, 
insofar as they depend on the reflexive identification of individuals therein, 
are not static; especially if, as is the case with over colonisation, the 
pressures on those normative underpinnings to individual identities are 
always under attack. Before we go on to the hybridisation of group 
identities, those sub-propositional ethnic identities, as opposed to the overt 
conventionalised wogged identities, i. e. the non-differentiating "they're all 
niggers" etc., might come to be accepted and even touted by Black 
individuals as oppositional representation e. g. the variations on the "we West 
Indians" theme. One thing is certain, such identities, as with white settler 
ones in third world countries, become themselves conventionalised 
exaggerated ethnic traps. There are two main fault lines that quickly 
appear in so-called group identities. The first is generational in which 
those born and socialised in the metropole are not burdened by 
considerations of physically being from out there. Wogging is far more 
likely to raise questions about the racist nature and acceptability of white 
society, and at the same time a questioning of their own allocated 
group/family norms which they might see as too accepting of unpalatable 
treatment. The use of the auxiliary verb "might" is indicative of the 
ambiguity and ambivalence of the process. Generational sub-group 
identities might revolve around cultural processes and manifest themselves 
in dramaturgical and poetical idiom, as in music or fashion. The extent to 
which these are substantive identities, i. e. they at least inform the normative 
structuring of the next generation, and not simply the manifestation of the 
need for the self to find its acceptance in a group expression (what makes me 
secure, feel good etc. ) is open to question. However given that there is 
little to no control over the media of its expression, these manifold identities 
have a short decay time, only to re-emerge in different form once the old one 
has been appropriated by white expertisation. On the other hand these 
generational sub-identities might find their overt socially constructed 
normative expression in fashion whilst still boundaried by religio-grounded 
cultural values, as Aziz shows in his description of "Yummies". 111 These 
new ethnicities are marked by their origins in an overt questioning by their 
Black participants, not only of the racism of conventionalisation, but also, 
the normative structure of their lifeworlds, probably as expressed through 
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their familial socialisation. This results, not in the move towards a post- 
conventional self-identification, as outlined by Habermas, but in the explicit 
social construction of etnikfied identities, as evidenced, for example, by the 
acceptance of one form of Islamic values by young Muslim women born and 
brought up in the metropole. These formations and reformations of 
individual and group identities are marked by the implicit and explicit claims 
made against their exclusion from the collective identity of the nation, and 
thus by the potential for a sub-collective identity which is characterised by 
the common experience of wogging, and which sometimes manifests itself in 
terms of the overt sub-collective identification as "Black". Over 
colonisation also renders those normative structures which consensualise 
gender hierarchies open to increasing question by women. However, it is 
not guaranteed that this will result in a rejection of those structures. 
Racialised conventionalisation, in its disengendered form, might, and does in 
some cases, result in women "preferring" the sanctuary of those structures, or 
reconstructing normative structures which whilst they might empower the 
male, are prioritised against white racism, as evidenced, for example, by the 
manouverings around the etnik construction of the "disempowered" Black 
Afro-Caribbean male and the "strong" in work woman/mother who 
understands the bases to the formers' now etnikfiedly explained, but not 
necessarily accepted, "philandering ways". It might, and in some cases 
does, on the other hand, pitch the identification around a restructuring of the 
family, pace those white feminists who maintain the permanence of 
patriarchy in the family structure, in ways that orient its processes towards 
radical communicative based gender equivalence, but also maintains an anti- 
racist normative input. In other words identities, as the Black experience 
in the metropole shows, are increasingly formed in the here and now, a point 
I made in the earlier paper. It might thus give rise to an individual based 
post-conventional self identification in which the individual maintains a 
critical reflexive performative attitude towards issues not only of gender and 
race, but also the wider contexts of, say capitalism and modernity. There is 
therefore, the potential for two sub-collectivities, "Black" and "women", 
both of which in their appropriaton by Black people/women, and their 
permutations therein, point to ways in which it is possible "to arrest the 
destruction of solidaristic collective life - in other words, life forms with 
possibilities for expression, with space for moral practical orientations which 
offer a context within which one's own identity and that of others can be 
unfolded less problematically and in a less damaged way. "' 16 
Habermas differentiates these symptoms of modernity two-foldedly in terms 
of defensive and offensive phenomena. Whilst he does this explicitly in 
relation to what he describes as new social movements, I take this distinction 
to apply too to the manifold manifestations of identity formation. I think 
this distinction, in the light of racialised conventionalisation, needs, refining. 
Someone like Ray does as well. However, his critique that Habermas' 
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distinction is too broad to pick up on the complexities of these movements, 
e. g. they are structured by complex layers of sectional interest and 
attachments to the past, misses the point that this distinction is abstract and 
thus necessarily general enough to encompass the intricacies I have 
illustrated above. I prefer the distinction, particularly in categorising Black 
social movements, of "inclusive" and "exclusive", where the process of 
including means as well practices aimed at removing the structures of force 
in communication, means therefore, practices which are not dominating, 
exploiting or promoting of inequality, means not being "etnik", means, 
finally, not conventionalising on the grounds of race. Utopianly it means 
being future oriented. It means being reflexively oriented so that problems 
experienced are new lessons learnt, and thus a new and better politics 
offered. Let me illustrate this by looking at what I regard as an exclusive 
Black new social phenomenon as expressed in the identification of Black 
with those of African and/or Asian descent, and in particular the frequent 
privilegising collapse of African into Black. The use of Black thus as a 
positive political re-signing process by those who, because of perceived 
pigmentation differences, are homogenised under racist "wogging", 
unintentionally masks a naturalling and etnikfying tendency in the "descent" 
suffix. Thus, for example, "of African descent" frequently speaks of a uni- 
linear bio- and ethno-historicising of cultural tradition which seeks to draw a 
distinction at a geo-historical terminus between the "Arabisation" of North 
Africa and the rest of "genuine" Africa. We are then left with an 
exclusivist anthropometric notion of "African" which is not that dissimilar to 
the Apartheid "Bantuisation" of "African", or for that matter the BNPs racist 
shadow caricaturing of so-called Black African features in their literature. 
I reject this essentialist Golliwogging of Africa with its unspoken invitation 
to witness and question those other non-negroised unAfricans in Africa and 
its licencing of an anthropometric template against which some latter day 
African diasporic "descendents" are permitted to privilege their claim to 
Africa over other inhabitants because certain phenotypical characteristics of 
their mirror image offer a closer symmetry. I insist however that within the 
time/space/language framework of migration and hybridisation that "of 
descent" is virtually meaningless and that the here and now of Black people's 
existence is far more important to the process of identity formation than the 
construction of suspect secondary source ethno-memories. Thus even 
Gilroy's, as presented in his "Black trans-Atlantici117, and for that matter 
Gate's "Colored People"' 18, attempts at rapping between the Scylla of a 
skewed imposed universalism and the Charybdis of multiple absolutist 
ethnicities, goes off key because of the trailing privileging baggage 
associated with his use of terms such as "African" and "diaspora". There 
is a strong sense in which Gilroy views Black as African as, therefore, a 
phenotypical construction. Of course the enslavement of some Black people 
from Africa is not epiphenomenal to modernism, but then neither is the 
enslavement of other Black people's from other parts of the world, or the 
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forced labourisation of others, or the genoicide of still others. At another 
level of analysis, as outlined earlier, it can be said that over-colonisation has 
led to a questioning not only of the normative basis to Black Afro-Caribbean 
and Black Afro-American group identity, but as well to the wider 
conventionalised normative content of white society. The result is an 
archeological tracking back in time to uncover and recreate via a 
historiography that is a mirror image of the white "great names in history" 
school, the authentic Afrikan heritage which will serve as the underpinning 
to a reconstructed Black/Afrikan identity. This past recreated utopia is 
incapable of dealing with the present. Afrikaanisation therefore presents 
not only an exclusivist, but also in some cases dominating, defensive, 
backward looking posture towards the problem of racism. ' 19 Thus for 
example, one Black Workers Group in a particular local authority, started out 
as inclusive i. e. open to all workers who regarded themselves as Black, and, 
and in a non-hierarchical participative way. In the authority it was 
perceived by both councillors and unions as a threat that was unpredictable, 
i. e. in this case not open to strategic manipulation. Over the years, 
however, it "evolved" into a hierarchical organisation i. e. officers mirroring 
the wider union and an executive group that took decisions outside of the 
wider forum. It also came to assume an Afrikan identity through the 
Farrakhanising of key figures on the executive group to the extent that its 
logo changed to include a shadow representation of an ancient Egyptian 
with, for want of a better description, "negroid" features. Two features of 
its political functioning went hand in hand. The first was the extent to 
which its officers became embroiled in orthodox union politics i. e. alliances 
and chasing union official positions to the detriment of the Black Workers 
Group's constituency's interests; and also courting the approval of 
councillors to the extent that for a while the group saw its interests and the 
ruling Labour party's as co-terminus. The other feature was the de facto 
exclusion of other Black workers, such as Black Asian workers, many of 
whom felt aggrieved, and the hot pursuit of this tactic through the inclusion 
of Black Asian workers in allegations of racism against Black "Afrikans". 
The similarity of these phenomena, and say that of Farrakhan's movement 
with its Afrikan Islamisist overtones, authoritarian organisational processes, 
and scapegoating of other groups, needs to be mentioned because both 
exhibit the hallmarks of an exclusivist movement which relies on fighting 
racism through a counter assertion that is based at the end of the day, on 
including criteria which, like those forces that exclude them, are "naturedly" 
falsely constructed. There is a sense then in which this eruption of multi- 
identity formations, which can be expressed in the overt formation of 
constructed "groups", and which analysts like Eade in his work with the 
Bengali community would celebrate as evidence of the post-modem turn, is 
in fact a very visible symptom of a modernity, that far from being exhausted, 
has still to run its full course. Thus someone like Bauman's120 theorising on 
the Holocaust, as the written watershed in his disenchantment with 
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modernism and thus subsequent fall into post-modernism, can be 
reconstructed if the Nazi experience could be seen as the terrible 
consequences of the first mass post-modem political movement i. e. a highly 
conservative racist authoritarian etnik construction of Aryan history and 
culture coupled with high technicism. Little wonder then, that the 
intellectual and political architects of Apartheid were, in their, younger days, 
interned during the Second World war for being overt Nazi sympathisers 
because the logic of that doctrine prefigured the multi-kultural claims made 
by latter day post-modernist theorists. The similarities are apparent - the 
social construction of bio-cultural hierarchies in which those at the lower end 
of the scale are propositionally interned in conventionalised racist categories, 
thus legitimating the subsequent enactment against them of operations 
through modernised bureaucracies which, together with their thing like 
status, exacerbated the indifference associated with large asymmetries of 
force in structures of communication. This finds a modern day echo in the 
post unified Germany where there is the conscious attempt by some to 
rewrite history through resurrecting the idea of a naturalled German ethnic 
identity which defines the collective "we" sans those "life not worthy of life" 
foreigners. The reclamation of Nietzche and Heidegger by the new 
German right as the philosophical underpinnings for such endeavours 
exposes the Janus face of so-called radical "leftwing" epistemologically 
similarly radixed post modernist theorists whose deconstruction of the 
problem is powerless to prevent, as one of the outcomes, the etnikfication of 
the solution. 
Before we get to the begged question of "what then is the solution? ", we 
should retrace to the bifurcation of the effects of racism on Black and white 
in order to flesh out white participation in the construction of racism. It is 
clear that I am arguing that one of the principal facets of racism for white 
people is the trans-epochal carry over into conventional based normative 
systems of anthropophagied notions of Black people. Unlike the effect of 
racism on Black lifeworlds, the colonisation of white lifeworlds very rarely 
touches those conventional racialised norms. If anything, one of the key 
effects, as evinced by the growth of Christo-religious fundamentalism in the 
States and the allied re-emergence of explicit bio-cultural hierarchicalisation, 
is the added crystallisation of these racialised norms. Access to processes 
which might facilitate "solidaristic collective life" in which "one's own 
identity and that of others can be unfolded less problematically", are often 
double blocked, not only by existing relations of force in communicative 
structures, but also, the racialised conventionalisation of these, leaving 
isolated pockets both of "intellectuals" based inter university public spheres, 
and trans- and co-racial friendship, love and collective action as the "ticking 
over" carriers of communicative discourse which can pose validity questions 
about taken for granted racist norms. This provides a framework as well 
for looking at the continuing debate between Black and white feminisms and 
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the former's charge that the latter, when talking about feminism, has failed to 
incorporate the dimension of race and racism, perhaps because the route to 
the post-conventionalisation of the white feminist's life-world does not 
include as well the questioning of racialised norms. Thus for example, van 
Dijk's121 work on discourse and the maintenance of racism provides a partial 
insight into the way one to one communication between Black and white can 
become malstructured to maintain the hierarchical distancing of white over 
Black because of taken for granted racialised norming. It reinforces 
Harvey's122 point that despite the modem-era of global interconnectedness, 
the forces of distantiation between Black and white are even greater. With 
slight representational licence it can be said for many Black people that the 
exchange between white and Black of- 
"Where are you from? 
"Tooting" 
"No. I mean originally. " 
-re-occurs in many forms. Thus, as a more concrete example, even at the 
height and heart of race `equalitating', a local authority Directorate's Chief 
Officer could counter at a council's senior management meeting to the 
Principal Race equality Adviser's recommendation that in race related 
disciplinary cases the burden of proof should lie with the employer, with the 
response that, "The Principal Race Equality Advisor should realise that in 
this country (my emphasis) a person is presumed innocent until proven 
guilty. 023 Those who in the light of the collapse of a productivist 
analysis of racism have likewise moved away from meso- and macro- 
theorising about racism into the realms of decentring the causes of racism, 
with the concomitant "there are many forms of racism" descriptions, and/or, 
being only prepared to specify the effects of racism, miss the point that the 
racialised normative bases to the cultural context in which racism is enacted, 
is composed atavistically of leitmotivs trans-epochally carried over, even if 
they are re-arranged continuously to present as new. These racialised 
conventions, which are not yet accessible to post conventionalisation 
processes, capture and re-present Black people, and by so doing, relativise 
(s)p(1)ace and presen(t)ce. The certainty of white racism has, as one of its 
counters for Black people, a reformulation of the Uncertainty Principle, in 
which because Black people's time and space are refused synchronicity, 
these can, in many instances, never be simultaneously captured. In these 
cavities, can grow counter resistances, such as Bhabha's "catachresis"124, or 
as I prefer neologisms, and even neo-metaphoricalness; except, in the latter 
two, I use these as a premonitory device within the wider context of 
"quotationalising". To "quotationalise" is not only, counter resistance 
style, contingent action to avoid representational ensnarement, but is, above 
all, to flag up those areas which still require communicative action based 
discourse aimed at consensus between Black and white. It re-writes the 
meaning of "signify" which then becomes more than the Derridean 
bracketing, as a deconstructive precursor, more than a signing of non- 
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essentialised difference, because it has in built a reconstructive dimension, 
which unlike the Foucauldian/Derridean, as an example, stating of the 
problematic with its limit at solutions residing in individual action, has 
implications for meso- and macro-type collective action. 
1.11 Towards a new anti-racist politics 
I want to outline the basis for this "third way" in anti-racist politics; or 
should I say `transformative way', given new right labour's Giddens inspired 
misappropriation of that term. In this I am joined as well by some post- 
modernist theorists on race, like Goldberg 125, who have belatedly come to 
realise that statements of difference do not guarantee equal and mutual 
acceptance of that difference. The fundamental point of departure is that I 
claim greater organic coherence between the approach I have adopted to 
move between the micro-, meso- and macro-levels of analysis and action, 
and the short term pragmatic based actions that flow from what Habermas 
has described as the philosophical opportunism of the latter. Let's deal first 
with the stock misinformed criticism leveled at Habermassian type analysis 
and which is that they are too idealistic with limited politico-practical effect 
other than that of critique. My reading of the texts, however, tells me that 
proper comprehension will arise only if distinctions are made between 
discourses, for example those of philosophy, politics, sociology etc., and 
that, therefore to hypostasize a concept like undistorted communicative 
action, with the counter about individual manipulation and/or the 
hierarchical realities of social inequality, is to indulge in the speciousness of 
eliding philosophical, political and psychological discourses. Undistorted 
communication does not assume an everyday extant symmetry between 
speakers, but instead, expresses the ideal that has to be aimed for. It 
therefore openly begs the questions about what kind of, say, politics would 
realise that goal, or what kind of "psychologising" would deal with the intra- 
psychic forces that prevent its attainment. Coupled with its concept of 
inter-subjective communicative discourse aimed at consensus, it throws into 
sharp relief those issues of the moral, ethical, normative and juridical 
frameworks that not only will enable this process, but reflexively as well, 
how "we" agree the constituents of those frameworks. 
Lets start the outline proper by returning to the two constituencies contained 
in my bifurcation of the effects of racism on Black and white people by 
looking first at the conditions for Black anti-racist politics. In so doing I 
shall make reference to the work on Social Movements as refracted through 
a key text by Eder126 who, within a communicative action context, reworks 
notions of the collective actor and of collective action. Prefatorily then I use 
"Black" not in any absolutist Manichean, or conflationary, or essentialist 
sense, but as a signifier of potential collective action, yet to be agreed by and 
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from those who, because of phenotypical, or ascribed phenotypical, 
differences, experience racism. 
1.12 Proposition 1 
The first proposition is contained within the outline of what I regard as the 
Black cathexis, which in political discussion amongst Black people might be 
underscored in semi-serious/humorous aside as "the Black person's burden". 
It is at one and the same time the flip-side that exposes the racist arrogance 
of Dr. Livingstone's civilisingly cathected African sojourn as the 
mythologised embodiment of the "white man's burden", just as much as it 
expresses the experience of Black people, within which is contained their 
universal utopian hope for better change. Thus Eder makes a similar point 
to mine which is that derationalization is also an effect of modernisation, in 
other words the learning processes that allow for domination etc. Thus 
rationalization cannot be defined via a postulated norm, but through the 
procedural norms necessary for that rationalisation. To go further using 
some of Eder's terminology to express again ideas similar to mine, there is a 
reciprocity between collectivities in conflict, e. g. exploited and exploiter etc. 
which at the same time contains contradictions that can initiate and/or 
continue communication. These Eder, maintains, are not only crucial to the 
generation of social change, but also to the development of collective 
learning processes, and thus to the development of modernisation because 
those at the one end of the reciprocal scale, those that are done to unjustly 
etc., contain within their "unofficial" vision, the re-enchantment of 
modernism. Blockage of communication, which Eder acknowledges as 
more often happening than not, causes regression. It is within this 
reciprocity of contradictions, if I might simplify, that I want to return to 
cathected change in order to chisel out some more features. These are that 
such changes must contribute to the development of collective learning 
processes reflexively within the "collectivity" of Black, and also in the 
redefining of "we". In other words Black anti-racist politics has to be better 
than that which maintains racialised force in the structures of 
communication. This sharpening of the con tours of the desire for change, 
makes possible the emergence of the beginning of an ethical framework as 
an entry point into moral questions to support procedural norms of action at 
different levels. Here I embrace the distinction between ethical and moral 
made by Habermas127 which is that whilst "ethical" relates to conceptions of 
the good life, the "moral" relates to questions about whether something is 
good for everyone. Thus, for example, at the micro-level, Todorov128 
expresses the problem simply and lucidly, when he describes his dismay at 
finding that his new companions in Western Europe lacked an ethical 
framework to their political convictions. Whilst not expecting sainthood, 
he was not prepared to accept "the fact that their professed convictions had 
no perceptible influence on their behaviour, " (or), "the discontinuity between 
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the way people lived and the way they talked" (lead on to representational 
politics versus signifying politics etc. ). The notion of the Black cathexis 
contains more then than the defensively oriented counter resistance to racism 
which intentionally and unintentionally ends up being unable to do more 
than celebrate, as evidence of the non-essentialised Black self, the hybridised 
individuation of action, because it includes as well in its focus the ethicizing 
bases for coagulating Black responses into a forward oriented collective 
action. 
1.13 Proposition 2 
The second proposition concerns the need for Black politics to move from 
that of being representational to that of being signifiable/significationable 
through reconstructed cognitive practices. What then is representational 
politics? Representational politics as refracted through Black people's 
experiences is engaging in political action which, whilst, in overall intent are 
aimed at removing the relations of force, end up reproducing them by being 
captured by those self same scleroses of communication. It is, if you like, a 
cross over of Foucault's notion of `discourse' with Said's one of 
`representation'. Representation, then, is the Black councillor at a local 
borough's Race Relations Committee meeting defending noisy parties on the 
basis that when Black people get together they like music with a beat. 129 
It's the demand by another Black councillor, newly elected, that the Town 
Hall catering section should serve "ethnic" biscuits with the coffee. 130 It's 
the excuse made in all seriousness by one white manager because it was told 
to him by a Black person, that the reason there were no Black Afro- 
Caribbean gardening apprentices in that council's parks section was because 
Black Afro-Caribbean people had an aversion to such activities due to their 
long ago slavery experiences on the plantation. 131 It is the homogenised 
"Black dimension" and its pursuit through self appointed Black institutional 
gatekeepers whose role it is to refuse entry to other Black "trouble makers" 
with which Black professionals in social work have slit their own throats. 
It is Modood's substitution of his representational "Black", with the equally 
representation of class cleavaged rich East African Asians. It is the 
numerous unaccountable claims made on behalf and for group constituencies 
which, in so doing, legitimate the conventionalisation of ethnicising and 
etnikfying processes through a mirror image reconstruction of operations to 
produce the good ethnic group identity as opposed to the bad white derived 
one. Time and space vectoring which is being attempted to be denied, is 
then simply re-introduced so that those marginalised are not included by a 
radical redfining of the borders, but are left there, only this time shouting 
louder and more garishly adorned. Institutionally it is the mimicry of the 
"chairman, secretary, treasurer" organisational syndrome, often in the name 
of good constitutional practice -a "see-we-know-how-to-do-it" - that re- 
enforces the hierarchicalisation processes which give rise to "leaders" 
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making unaccountable group claims. The separation between life world 
and system is maintained to the extent, for example, that Black male self 
proclaimed "leaders" can pursue radical societal goals through radically 
goaled institutions with claims to representing Black constituencies, 
political, intellectual etc., whilst carrying on malgendered private lives. 
Group identities are thus captured and hostaged against others "racist" 
misunderstandings, e. g. the "that is disrespectful to us Muslims, Rastafarians 
etc. " They do not arise out of new forms of collective learning as the 
underpinning to new forms of collective action, not even "strategic learning 
processes that use and instrumentalise moral arguments in rational-choice 
situations in a co-operative game" 132; a quote which is used to pre-empt the 
criticism that I am simply advocating mass participation as the antidote. 
The politics of signification, on the other hand, does not trade in the 
certainties of conventionalisation, either racist, or the misconceived 
representational re-equipping of the slave ships with which some Black 
people "bodily" make the symbolic trip "home". To signify is to symbolise 
that which has to be explored further through reconstructed cognitive 
practices; or to mint a phrase "signifying cognitive practices (SCP for 
short)". At the micro level then, the Black signifier indicates openness to 
communicative discourse about the claims he/she is making, whilst for the 
signified, the signs made are not an invitation to lapse into the imprisonment 
of that claim in iron-clad imaginings. Thus, for example, claiming the 
identity "Black", does not brook any mis-assumptions about an essentialised 
collapse into "of African, or Afro-Caribbean, or African Caribbean, or even 
Not-Asian descent". It can only define, instead an inclusive boundary of 
those "not being white", subject to the consensual participation of those 
within, that includes those who because of phenotypical or ascribed 
phenotypical characteristics, experience racism as defined earlier. It is at 
one and the same time, a statement, at a general level, about the commonality 
of the experience of racism, the individual problem analysis of which is open 
to discursive argumentation, a recognition that the general rationalisation 
process of that society legitimates an unequal Black/white split and therefore 
at the societal level an excluding "we", as well as an explicit or implicit 
desire for change, the details of which cannot be assumed from the problem 
definition, but have to be worked out amongst those individual and groups 
claiming Blackness. We have thus emerging the "third way" in anti-racist 
politics, which can be inclusive of the aesthetic dimension without the 
Gilroyian assumption of refugee status there in as the only option for change. 
In other words it speaks of new cognitive practices within the Black 
collectivity SCP is the bases then for a reconstructed Black Social 
Movement which includes, as I outline later, the emergence of a reflexively 
oriented collective actor making and made by collective action. I have 
introduced the notion of "social movement", made popular by theorists such 
as Touraine, though my use of the concept owes more to theorists like 
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Habermas and Arato and Cohen 133, because I believe that the higher level of 
eruptions between the lifeworld/system seam, which over colonisation 
produces in the Black experience, has to be garnered if the increasing pace of 
racist conventionalisation is to be arrested. Such a movement's overall 
characteristics are adequately summed up by the following quote from Arato 
and Cohen: 
"What we have in mind, above all, is a self understanding that abandons revolutionary 
dreams in favour of radical reform that is not necessarily and primarily oriented to the 
state. We shall label as'self limiting radicalism' projects for the defence and 
democratisation of civil society that accept structural differentiation and acknowledge 
the integrity of political and economic systems We do not believe that it is possible to 
justify this claim about what is new in movements on the basis of a philosophy of 
history that links the 'true essence' of what the movements 'really are' (however 
heterogeneous their practices and forms of consciousness) to an allegedly new stage of 
history. Nor does the theme 'society against the state' which is shared by all 
contemporary movements (including some on the right), in itself imply something new 
in the sense of a radical break with the past. On the contrary it implies continuity 
with what is worth preserving in the institutions, norms, and political cultures of 
contemporary civil societies. " 134 
It is, in other words, not an apocalyptic "seven times around the walls of 
Jericho, a blast of the trumpet, and wham! " movement, any more than it is a 
short termist "baby out with the bath water" WYSIWYG movement. 
Those eruptions mentioned earlier thus encompass the fragmented, fractured 
Black self made evident through the multi-faceted hybrid identity claims, 
many of them ephemeral, not only in terms of substance, but life-span as 
well, like fireflies slamming against the windscreen of a car on a motorway. 
"Otherness", used as a term to denote the continual othering process I have 
no problem with because I am part of that "other". However, amongst 
Black people, whilst what I have said before means that identity claims can 
only be radically authenticated by engaging in non-distorted communication, 
this acknowledgement cannot be conflated with any normative baggage that 
is in tow with that identity claim. Thus if, for example, someone lays 
claim to being a "Pakistani Muslim", that signification cannot at face value 
be pseudo-inflated through the signified's conventionalised representation of 
"pak"-(istan), and/or an unconscious symbolic rerun of the crusades. 135 On 
the other hand if the signifier makes further claim to the commonality of the 
general "other", e. g. the demand made by some for the banning of Rushdie's 
book and the MP Bernie Grant's support for this. In the first instance, this 
cannot be accepted simply as part of the "multi-cultural" fabric, but, because 
the invitation is built into the claim, has to be subject to discourse scrutiny. 
Likewise should the signifier focus the "otherness" by prefixing "Black" to 
the Pakistani Muslim category, this cannot be denied by some "others", e. g. 
the MP..... etc, because of a normative belief in Black which is as biologically 
fixated as those "anthropophagied" notions of "nigger". Both instances, 
within the sub-collectivity of "Black" attest to the "problem" of "how to 
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establish a complementarily equivalent and mutually respectful 
commonality.. " The concept that "more discourse means more 
contradiction and difference", is taken up by Eder in his notion that 
"contradictions are mechanisms that initiate or continue communication". 
The task of a Black politics of SCP is to (re)construct that social movement 
with internal frameworks, mechanisms and processes which can facilitate 
such forms of communication. Thus for example one Black Workers 
Group in a local authority defined its constituency on the widest possible 
rationalised basis, had open participatory meetings, a flattened hierarchy 
with only one recognised co-ordinator post, developed, on the basis of 
recognising that racism cuts across "white" socially contructed formal and 
informal boundaries, horizontal cross institutional networked relationships 
with local Black communities over issues of dispute with the council, and 
used this experience to get such initiatives accepted as practice by the wider 
branch. I have retained the sub-collectivity "Black" because it bears 
witness to the trans epochal contradiction which white over Black racism is, 
and which requires further communication between the collectivities of 
white and Black. Thus the Black cathexis is the motivational force for 
Black SCP catalyses, that which allows the boundaries of modernism to 
expand by generating new collective learning processes, i. e. a non- 
conventionalised "we", and thus to deracialise, but not dedifferentiate 
"Black". What we do not want is a continuation of the representational 
Black in which, because we do not have the political wherewithal to engage 
with those forces in communicative structures which nurture racism, we 
permit the opportunists, charlatans, intellectual mountebanks and crooks, a la 
Marion Berry, in our communities to assume leadership, or have it foisted, 
but never born with it, because we fear that open criticism, since it is beyond 
our control, will be captured and misused by those racist distorted 
communicative forces. 
I am trying to arrive at the position, through SCP, where we can talk about 
the "other" in terms of the collective actor, collective action and collective 
identity which cannot be conflated wholly with that collective actor's 
individual identity, or declared "ethnic/etnik" identity. Like Eder I agree 
that class as the rallying framework for "collective" is no longer applicable in 
modem Western society and that there is no historical "subject". However, 
I do think that whilst for the collectivity "white" some actors act in a space 
structurally defined by class, for the collectivity "Black", more often than not 
actors act in a space structured by race which overrides other vectors of class 
arid/or gender, though these do exert an influence, e. g. the position of Black 
professionals in Social Services, many of them women. In fact, as I have 
argued earlier, it is a cavity in which for race, space and time are vectored so 
that place and presence become relativised; far more so than would happen if 
a Black actor sought recourse to the collectivities of class or gender, though 
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these might be claimed. Thus the degree of solidaristic action with the 
white working class or sisterhood within their fixity of "home" can oscillate 
when, at the drop of a careless remark, the Black actor can be zapped into 
another time, another place. In developing the notion of the Black 
collective actor, I want to run with Eder's ideas on the constitution of the 
collective actor, though, as I pointed out earlier, reserving the right to change 
later whilst I reconstruct it. Hence I concur with the idea that it is not the 
collective actor that is the repository for collective action, but that it is the 
construction of collective action that allows for the emergence of the 
collective actor; and that what is paramount in this process is how consensus 
is mobilised. We are not talking here about the mass psychology type 
theorising in which social movements are explained by reference to people 
sharing "ideological and strategic visions of the world... " One of the key 
characteristics in the development of the collective actor is the process of 
defining boundaries between the collective actor and his/her environment. 
Racism does that to the extent that Black people can identify the problem. 
The other feature however, is the reproduction of that collective identity 
through cognitive practice processes. This is part of the new political 
terrain that Black people have to map out because the identities Black people 
claim for themselves, very often as an anchoring to normative expectations, 
are still locked into the ethnicised/etnikfied and/or the visible ephemeralities 
of aesthetic taste. Thus, let's say for example, that the social movement 
would be boundaried both by an aim for racial justice and equality and by the 
general political characteristics as outlined earlier. It is clear that it would 
be impracticable to talk about blow by blow, or even individual consensus 
without recourse to the traditional "vanguardist" tactics. It is however, 
possible to talk about the procedural norms of action which will facilitate the 
pursuance of consensus. In this Eder identifies two crucial principles that 
flow from a core universalisation procedure, which my experience shows to 
work. The two principles are equality and discursive handling of conflicts 
which are inherent in the procedure of impartial consideration by all 
concerned. Eder goes on to identify equality of communicative 
relationships best structure for impartial judgements. His definition of this, 
which is "the unequal distribution of chances to claim the universality of 
wants and interests within a process of collective discussion", I find 
deficient136. I prefer my own which adds to his the rider "which has in built 
the conditions to nullify those unjust forces in the structures of 
communication". This is a point picked up by Offe137 in his re-appraisal 
of the experience of participatory democracy based initiatives and the 
communicative force structures that emerge from the practice of "those who 
shout the loudest are heard". A good example of practice based on my 
definition were the procedural norms collectively agreed by one Black 
organisation which attempted to ensure both that women participants were, 
at the minimum, allowed the same right to speak freely and openly without 
any form of male arrogation of speaking space and that issues of 
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group/ethnic background did not enter unjustly into discussions or decisions. 
It is these sort of SCP which inform new collective learning processes and 
provide the context for reflexive i. e. the actors learn from the experience, 
reproduction of collective identities. This is the way in which "Black" 
should be used; not as the exclusive biologically colour graded property of a 
conventionalised group, but as an open signifier of "otherness", only ever 
fleetingly able to be represented collectively by phenotypical or ascribed 
phenotypical features, because "collective actors strive to create a group 
identity within a general social identity whose interpretation they contest". 
Collective learning processes are those then that thematize and change the 
normative context of co-operation, both strategically formed and collectively 
based ones. Moreover, for the Black collectivity these processes should be 
the reflexive context from within which demands to resolve the trans- 
epochal contradiction between Black and white, which is racism, are 
launched. Eder identifies three levels of collective action - micro, meso 
and macro. The micro defines that level at which individual activists' 
actions constitute the collective actor. The meso level that in which the 
collective action becomes formalised through organisations; and the macro 
level that in which collective action enters the public sphere through public 
communication channels. I think, however, that the micro and meso 
levels, for the Black collectivity, would be more of a continuum which, 
according to the logic of SCP would have organisational repercussions for 
those forms that facilitate and those that hinder reducing communicative 
force structures. Furthermore the public sphere on race equality and justice, 
in the absence of SCP constituted Black social movement is fragmented, 
dependent upon patronage based access to communicative media and very 
often limited to elitist coteries of "intellectuals" formally and informally 
clustering around various race related institutions at universities. Part of 
the process of developing a Black SCP based social movement would be the 
creation of a genuine public sphere that blurs the distinctions and enhances 
the communicative networks between universities, other organisations, 
media and the Black communities; and, in the clearing house debates in and 
amongst Black people about ethnicities etc, is reflexively resistant to any 
divide and rule instrumental action such debates might provoke from the 
white collectivity. This reflexive resistance is not, as I have argued 
earlier, tied to any notion of representationalised laagered mentality, but to 
reconstructed or newly constructed cognitive practices that engage with the 
wider contradiction. We should not seek therefore, to stabilise that 
oscillation of time, space and place by claiming respect for past oriented 
traditions, or the "recognised" limits of pragmatic practices, but should run 
with the forward oriented wave length of that oscillation to ensure that such 
practices are the incisive cutting edge not only to unravelling the social and 
institutional implications posed by the problem contained in the following 
quotations, but informs substantively as well the wider SCP. 
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"Can there be a politics of recognition that respects a multitude of multicultural 
identities and does not script too tightly any one life? " 
and, 
"............ it is hard to find a democratic or democratising society these days that is not 
the sight of some significant controversy over whether and how its public institutions 
should better recognise the identities of cultural and disadvantaged minorities. What 
does it mean for citizens with different cultural identities, often based on ethnicity, 
race, gender or religion, to recognise ourselves as equals in the way we are treated in 
politics? "138 
1.14 Proposition 3 
Part of the answer to this conundrum with trans epochal roots, lies in my 
third proposition which attempts to set the scene for the engagement the 
Black social movement has with the wider white collectivity through the 
institutional constructions, just as much as it attempts to delineate the bases 
for white anti-racists involvement in the fight for equality and justice. 
Apropos the latter, this is not a rehash of the white guilt trip politics. It is, 
however, an expression that the politics of anti-racism, if they are defined 
against the communicative forces of racialised conventionalisation, has to 
enable the Black experience to be heard equally. The third proposition 
therefore is that the Black social movement through SCP, should seek the 
goal of impartial judgement of the claims made by the Black collectivity. 
The rough con tours, thus, of a reconstructed constitutionality, one that 
begins to answer the questions posed, are contained in the third proposition. 
The details of this I'll leave for Chapters 6 and 7 which touch on the 
principled bases to this constitution. Built into this, as I have argued 
earlier, are the conditions which would realise equality of communicative 
relationships. This locks directly into questions about the structure of 
institutions and how the claims of Black participants there in are realised 
sans racist conventionalisation. They raise questions about how 
"participants clarify the way they want to understand themselves as citizens 
of a specific republic, as inhabitants of a specific region, as heirs to a specific 
culture, which traditions they want to perpetuate and which they want to 
discontinue, how they want to deal with their history, with one another, with 
nature and so on. " 139 The importance is the "how", because as that last 
quote from Habermas' recent work on multi-culturalism shows, whilst it 
suffices to paint the general tones of the question, it underestimates the effect 
of racism in suppressing the means to make such claims. Habermas in a 
dialogue and critique with and of Taylor's communitarian based attempt to 
answer the questions posed above, contends that democracies with a 
constitution and legal framework that focuses on individual rights is not 
incompatible with the collective claims made by groups. Against the 
communitarian contention that such frameworks have to guarantee the 
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"equal value" of that culture, Habermas, correctly, points out that "The right 
to equal respect which everyone can demand in the life contexts in which his 
or her identity is formed as well as elsewhere, has nothing to do with the 
presumed excellence of his or her culture of origin, that is, with general 
valued accomplishments. i140-Thus the Black Social Movement will not seek 
constitutionally, a la Taylor and the new etnik protectors, the pickled in aspic 
cultural outcomes of constitutionally "maintaining and cherishing 
distinctness, not just now but forever"lal. What it will seek is the 
constitutional principle that derives from the Black experiental realisation 
that `wogging' occurs not on the basis of one's religion, Caribbean island of 
origin, or `sari'-ed statements people make, but because our signifying 
differences are, through racialised conventionalisation, conflationarily 
homogenised into wog, nigger, Paki, or, as an example the liberal, "needs 
more training before.. " put down to Black career aspirations. Vis-a-vis 
race the impartiality principle focuses on racism as that which threatens the 
integrity of the individual legal person because racism attacks "the 
intersubjectively shared experiences and life contexts in which the person 
has been socialised and has formed his or her identity" 142. It allows for 
collective claims to be launched that will not allow the recourse to the "Ag. 
Siestog, we are the endangered cultural species with special needs" stockade. 
Habermas distiniguishes - correctly as I have argued elsewhere and as my 
experience ä la the Labour Party's racist re-attachment to broad equal 
opportunities shows - between "feminism, multiculturalism, nationalism, and 
the struggle against the Eurocentric heritage of colonialism" 43 on the basis 
that whilst they are related, they are not the same. Thus, "they are related in 
that women, ethnic and cultural minorities and nations and cultures defend 
themselves against oppression, marginalisation and disrespect and thereby 
struggle for the recognition of collective identities .... "1 . However, 
for 
example, according to Habermas, whilst feminism's struggles have the 
potential, if successful, to change the relationship between the sexes and the 
collective identity of women, for "oppressed ethnic and cultural minorities", 
the struggle for collective identities does not necessarily alter the role of the 
"majority" in the same way. That much I agree with, as I have shown 
earlier. But my argument, unlike Habermas', is that those Eurocentric 
colonial traditions do not merely manifest themselves at the world level of 
national disagreements, but are the conventionalised normative embedded 
bases to structural forces in communication which prevent the alteration of 
the role of the majority i. e. they permit moral questions to be posed and 
answered by the white collectivity about the Black actor and without his/her 
equal participation. So that the question is not so much whether or not 
such "minorities" raise claims for equal respect rather than equalization of 
conditions, but instead that such "minorities" raise claims about the forces 
which prevent their claims for respect and equality being heard and explicitly 
equitably dealt with. It is in this sense that my notion of the Black 
collective actor comes into play for the claims raised then are not so much 
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those of a non-uniform phenomenon dependent on the minority status, i. e., 
new or old immigration, or on whether or not countries have or do not have a 
history of immigration, but are focussed on the conditions which permit 
these claims to be considered reflexively. In meeting these conditions, and 
the how is the focus of the Black social movement, i. e. the wider society, this 
contributes to new collective learning processes both within the Black 
collectivity, and the white. Thus rather than talk about the multi-culturalist 
bases to society in the West, as Habermas does and which explains his 
impression of an uneven phenomenon, I want to sharpen that "relation of 
oppression, marginalization and disrespect" into the signifying Black 
experience of phenotypical or ascribed phenotypical based oppression etc 
which has anthropophagied trans -epochal roots and which structures 
distorted communicative forces. The Black social movement will then at 
the same time that it reflexively, within its constituencies, provide the 
political ethical framework for Black people to develop the space to stand 
back from over-colonisation so that they can confront their culture "and to 
perpetuate it in its conventional form or transform it, as well as (take) the 
opportunity to turn away from its commands with indifference or break with 
it self-critically and then live spurred on by having made a conscious break 
with tradition, or even with a divided identity"145, will also reflect on to the 
white collectivity the demands for such an ethical political framework so that 
the Black collective claims are equally part of the processes that transform 
white racialised conventionalisation that allows the white collective actor to 
turn away from these distorted commands self-critically and live on in the 
divided identity which is the substantive multi-racial "we". Therefore, as 
an example, we can tease out more concretely within the here and now the 
political focus such a movement should/might have via Cohen and Arato's 
arguement that new social movements articulate collective political action 
along three inter-related lines: a politics of inclusion focussing on ensuring 
that political institutions recognise "new political actors as members of a 
political society" thereby benefiting those whom they "represent"; a politics 
of influence "aimed at altering the universe of political discourse to 
accommodate new need interpretations, new identities and new norms (so 
that) the administrative and economic colonization of civil society, which 
tends to create new dependencies can be restricted and controlled"; and a 
politics of reform which seeks further democratization of political and 
economic institutions. 146 This is fine as a general over-arching definition 
of political action. My experience and research into the issue of race 
equality in local government suggests that on the issue of racism the above 
needs to be tightened, a move which fits with my thesis of over-colonization 
of Black people. My restructuring does not presume that it would apply 
equally to feminism, but rather that the con tours of collective political action 
might probably fit in with the general outline above. Thus it can be said 
that the realities of the politics of inclusion and influence vis-a-vis race in the 
local government context to date has seen a fleeting improvement which has 
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"reified" in the face of the whitelash to the extent that in many cases the 
"overgeneralised classifications of disadvantegeous situations and 
disadvantaged groups..... lead to 'normalising' interventions into the way 
people lead their lives, with the result that the intended compensations turn 
into new forms of discrimination and instead of liberties being guaranteed 
people are deprived of freedom". 147 Harken to a Liberal Democratic 
councillor defending the decision to shut a Social Services Directorate's 
Equality Unit on the basis that; "Forty percent of Lambeth Council's senior 
management, including two Assistant Directors are Black, and they are 
sensitive and aware of race issues ...... 
148 On the test of critical fallibility 
therefore, I would give priority to the politics of increased democratisation 
and create two broad fronts by conflating it with the politics of inclusion and 
influence so that influence and inclusion move out of "representationalness" 
into that of SCP based democratisation. Such collective action does not 
assume a position of de-bureaucratisation, though the current organisational 
trends, misleadingly described as post-modernist elsewhere, of flatter 
hierarchies in smaller units, is useful. Instead it presumes an aim of 
communicative action based control which might lead to deconstructing 
bureaucracies or might, as is most likely in the medium term, give rise to 
ensuring communicatively based control over formally organised units of 
strategic action, i. e. bureaucracies. Nor does it presume an aim of 
unfettered participative democracy with the attendant risk that the more 
organised or communicatively competent will come to dominate, but rather 
that its emphasis on the procedural norms for impartial consideration of 
issues will ensure that such communicative forces are attenuated. 
Likewise the scope of such collective political action, in confronting the 
"irrationalisation" of communicative force structures, does not rule out forms 
of action such as boycotts, civil disobedience, or even, under certain 
circumstances violence. 
1.15 Conclusion 
Let me therefore briefly summarise the intent of this chapter which is to 
reconstruct racism and anti-racism in a way that does not duck the old core 
concerns of objectivism and subjectivism, or for that matter discard reason 
simply because one particular instance has let "us" down. It proposes 
however that race and racism as a linked subject, in the manner that Arthur 
Miller could say that if it weren't for anti-semitism he would not have 
thought of himself as Jewish, has to be and can be a thematized major text 
within a universalist based theory which does not result in the subjugating of 
the resolution of the problems contained within the former to the supposed 
shortcomings of the latter where those shortcomings derive from an 
inadequately thematised universalism.. It goes further to say that a Black 
politics has to be explicitly normatively and post-conventionally based both 
internally and mediationally. Finally it sketches out, at this stage, a 
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political and research programme, which in the case of the latter is neither 
nomothetic or idiographic but methodologically eclectic with, given the 
normative underpinnings of the theory, the promise of getting to grips 
reflexively with fundamental questions about issues of power in researching, 
and in the case of the former, a forward orienting politics that seeks 
encounters with social and systemic integration through the mediating 
practices geared towards tackling the racialised conventional forces in the 
structures of communication. 
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Chapter 2 
Framing the Examination of Local Governance Theories 
2.1 Introduction 
Local governance studies have tended to languish in epistemologically 
boundaried discourses of public policy and/or politics only ever succumbing 
to partial trans-discourse analyses where these have been accompanied by 
their framing within an explicit theoretical approach which defies capture by 
these demarcations, such as Marxism. Notwithstanding that both, i. e. 
Marxist and non-Marxist, have exhibited, however, a form of naive realism 
either because there is the belief in the independent reality of empirical facts 
or, as in the case of Marxist type analyses, the objective "last instance" 
determination of independent realities. The inference of critical realism 
contained within the latter does not extend as such to meta-theoretical 
concerns, but more to a shift in the identification of the final locus of 
determining responsibility. This then might be the "economic", and/or the 
"state". Post-modernist analyses, if they do exist, where the post refers to 
a rejection of grand narrative theorising because of perceived irreconcilable 
inconsistencies within the narrative structure, are most likely to be social 
category, such as gender or race, inspired critiques of orthodoxies since the 
struggle against the exclusion of race and gender as prime considerations has 
been at the heart of questioning modernity's (in)difference. Now whilst the 
claimed anti-foundationalist bases to these have moved the debate into the 
arena of meta-theoretical concerns, their, sometimes unintended, analytical 
character has seen the re-introduction of an on tological naive realism which 
sanctions a WYSIWYG149 approach to research issues. Thus despite their 
avowed anti-positivist approach to theorisation, their empirical outcome has 
seen an unintended vindication of forms of empiricism. The reason for 
structuring the introduction to local governance like this is because I want to 
focus on the emancipative change potentials within such a sphere of study. 
These potentials are not the empirically observable accretions of change 
which one can discern in local government in the UK today and which has 
spawned interventionist based academic theorising i. e. the authors have in 
one capacity or another been contracted by relevant public agencies, though 
these do obviously enter into the argument at some level. '50 Rather they are 
the potentials for change which, in the case of race, point to the capacity for 
emancipatory practice in local government overall. The analyses of race 
within a modernist meta-theoretical approach, has been done in the previous 
section in which the argument has been based upon a reconstruction of 
Habermassian arguments that renarrativises the analyses of social 
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phenomena by recourse to greater abstraction. Such an approach, whilst it 
radicalises the vision of change, does not postpone the consideration of day 
to day concerns within this locale of study, and, therefore, will seek also to 
address the principal stake holder constituencies, i. e. elected representatives, 
employees, and communities without sacrificing the need for the explicit 
contextualisation of the change potentials. To achieve this therefore 
requires a meta-theoretical perspective not only to the review of studies to 
date, but as well, to the critical realist reconstruction of what "ought" from 
what "is. 
But first a look at the issue of meta-theory. The espousal of the need for a 
meta theory approach is, at one and the same time, not only inherent in the 
critical theory based methodology informing the study, but as well the 
recognition that this will provide the necessary "stand back" space to deal 
with the reality of the multiplicity of changes occurring to local government 
in the UK - evidenced by the fact that local government theorists have thus 
far only managed to analyse such changes by reference to crude heuristic 
categories. This will then provide a more abstract level framework within 
which it will be possible to address substantively issues, such as race and 
gender, within a core concern context of local governance that provides 
easily identifiable reference points to overlapping concerns, e. g. modernity, 
and post-modernity, as well as the change strategies, policies and practices 
that flow from this. Thus substantiating race within meta-theoretical 
concerns means treating it not as incidental, to conceptual structuring, but as 
an explicit categorical element internally related to other considerations. It 
is clear by the throwaway one-liners on equal opportunities and/or ethnic 
minorities that the majority of local government theorising in the UK still 
marginalises the issue, despite the existence in one form or another of 
explicit equality programmes in most large urban councils, and the existence 
of large Black populations in the UK. '5' That, on the basis of my 
definition, is a form of racism. As an exemplar, therefore, of what I am 
attempting, such marginalisation speaks of a form of universalism which 
subordinates the experience and needs of Black people to that of a larger 
constituency, e. g. citizens, local community, customers etc., by defining the 
parameters of such constituencies without explicit reference to Black people 
2.2 Meta-Theory 
Meta-theory as the Greek etymology of the prefix indicates, is the theory 
about theories. It looks at the presuppositions underlying theories. More 
formally, as Morrow does in borrowing from Ritzer, it is "the language of 
presuppositions through which a research orientation is grounded. " 52 It 
does not therefore seek to interrogate social reality through trying to explain 
specific social phenomena via a substantive theory. Instead it provides a 
core elements framework within which interrogative categories can be 
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generated thereby enabling travel trans- and intra-theories and discourses. 
An example will be the working out of a critical discourse on local 
governance with explicit categorisation of and internal linkage to, 
race/racism from a meta-theoretical based deconstruction of "orthodox" local 
government studies, coupled with that already done on racism in the 
previous chapter. To that extent I can prefatorily confirm that, as with my 
paper on racism, I am still engaged in reconstructing some of Habermas' key 
concepts. I do not therefore intend to decipher and critique existing 
theories of local governance/government one by one, which would occur if I 
were attempting an analytical based exercise. Rather, through a 
consideration of meta-theorising I want to generate key and core 
reconstructive categories within which such studies, where relevant, can be 
deconstructed, selectively reconstructively appropriated, or simply 
referenced. To begin with, therefore, meta-theory deals explicitly with 
those philosophical rationales with which we, very often unconsciously, 
ground our actions. Morrow identifies six philosophical sub-domains to 
notions of meta-theory: metaphysics, on tology, epistemology, logic, 
aesthetics and ethics. '53 For the purposes of de- and reconstructing local 
governance, especially reconstructing with the specific categorical 
imperative of transitivising race within these concerns, I am going to 
concentrate on three: on tology, epistemology and ethics. Theories of local 
governance, and my heuristic categorisation of them, I'll deal with in the next 
section. At this stage I want to invoke examples of social realties and their 
practice contexts to illustrate the limitations of the analytical theories 
implicitly or overtly used. Nearly all theories of local governance make 
on tological assumptions about the real-politik fixity of local government 
parameters. That is say, there are limits to what can be changed to the 
extent that probing these will provoke a bare bones type X-ray of an 
unwritten constitution, which, as I will show later, is white maled. For 
example, attempting to write a situation of race equality in a specific local 
authority within the historical context of a "white" hundred year plus evolved 
institution, and the then immediate context of the recent temporality of race 
equality in such situations, provoked responses which tried to show that such 
initiatives had done enough and that there was little that needed to be 
substantively achieved. '54 Very often this was a prelude to running down 
the race equality infra-structure in the local authority. One can rewrite this 
as the on tological assumption about the permanency of the white presence 
vis -a-vis the impermanency of the Black presence, or the permanency of the 
marginalisation of the Black presence. Theories of local governance have 
implicit epistemological assumptions not only about what constitutes valid 
knowledge, but as well, inter-relatedly, about how, i. e., the correct way, such 
knowledge should be constituted. The epistemological battles that raged 
around notions of racism and its validation in local government, together 
with the marginalisation of such issues in local government studies, thereby 
further reinforcing and fuelling the erasure of this from local governance 
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texts, attests to this. The dominant mode of knowledge constitution is 
positivistically framed empirico-analytical methods. That is to say the 
reliance upon descriptive and analytical reasoning which is honed upon an 
emphasis privileging "scientific" factual based knowledge constitution. A 
hypothetico-deductive model of causality which relies on a quantifiable base 
predominates.. A good example concerns a study into Black children in 
care in a London borough. '55 This was empiricistly framed and reinforced 
through the use of mathematical sampling and computer based social 
surveys. Attempts to resituate the results within a paradigm that 
theoretically contextualised them, and revalidated them hermeneutically via 
Black communities' spoken experiences, resulted in the final report being 
banned by the local authority on the grounds that it read as if it were written 
by someone totally alienated from that authority. 156 In other words a 
contestation about what and how racism is epistemologically constituted. 
Finally theories of local governance make ethical claims, that is they impart 
values to their positions. Most agree that local government is a good thing. 
Their vision of the good, however, varies so that for each theory there can be 
generated a series of sub-values. In fact it leads on to questions about the 
normative knowledges informing theories of local governance. Normative 
theories concern themselves with what ought to be. There is a direct link 
here with issues of utopia, a subject introduced in the paper on racism. The 
normativisation of local governance in the UK has developed immensely 
over the past twenty years, whether as exemplified in the explicit long term 
vision of local government of liberal market right wing theorists a la Ridley, 
or the temporally stunted mission and core value statements of individual 
local authorities. '57 The contradiction between an organisational culture 
giving primacy to empirical based knowledge, and the assumption of an 
explicit value framework which, according to the logic of the former cannot 
be subject to rational or empirical validation, gives rise to imposed 
authoritarian based systems, as I shall argue extensively later. Thus, for 
example, many of the local authorities which have explicitly normativised 
"equal opportunities" through their version of the "core value" programme, 
have, because of the circumscriptions to the on tological groundings and to 
the forming of the epistemological constitution of that value, dedefined 
racism and sexism in a way that allows, despite that normative overt 
expression, such dominating practices to continue. (Or, as one Black 
Workers Group put it - "Cor! Wot a load of porkies. , )158. The question 
provoked then is how normative values can be empirically and rationally 
interrogated, and, more importantly, what this process infers about the nature 
of political change and its ramifications through social and political 
institutions. 
To begin to answer that latter question, I want to go back to the earlier 
promise to develop a critical realist approach. Such an approach eschews 
the pitfalls of a empirico-positivistic juggling of statistical variables and the 
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tribulations of a purely subjectivist experientalist method, though in the 
practice of local governance the latter are only afforded any degree of 
primacy in areas like social work, but attempts a third way that allows 
questions of normativity, whether implicit or explicit, to be scrutinised. 
Thus a method like this, because of its recourse to meta-theory, seeks a 
critical path that not only makes bare relations of power, but more 
importantly, given the claims made for local government vis-a-vis serving 
local communities ipso facto Black communities as well, as I outline later, 
also critiques at the same time that it attempts a reconstruction of unjust 
relations of power. '59 I want to attempt a preliminary "working hypothesis" 
type definition through, first, a prefatory brief summary of Habermas' theory. 
2.3 Meta-theory and Habermas 
Part of the reasons for Habermas' reconstructive rejection of the orthodox 
Marx was because he detects within the body of Marx's theory a latent 
positivism. Habermas therefore proposes a categorical distinction between 
work and interaction with the latter being privileged as the medium through 
which symbolic and communicative practices are constituted in social life. 
On the basis of this Habermas develops an epistemological based theory of 
cognitive interests in which these interests are seen to under pin all cognitive 
practices in humans, whether conscious or unconscious. 160 Knowledge is 
therefore seen to be constituted by one or more of three interests: empirical- 
analytical, hermeneutical-historical and critical-emancipatory. Under this 
scheme Habermas sees empirical-analytical interest as rooted in the desire 
for technical control over external nature or social life. Hermeneutic- 
historical interest guides those cognitive interests which see human life 
processes as only being amenable to interpretation of meanings. Because 
Habermas views both the above as being unable to comprehend properly the 
issue of domination, he postulates a third interest, that of critical- 
emancipatory. In particular, given the primacy afforded to interaction, he 
sees values and norms are socially linked to the production and reproduction 
of social relations that are inherently unjust. To that extent Morrow can 
say that the ".. fundamental assumption of critical theory is that every form of 
social order entails some forms of domination and that the critical- 
emancipatory interest underlies the struggles to change those relations of 
domination-subordination. " 161 There are obvious problems of 
foundationalism which inhere in Habermas' assumption of Kantian derived 
anthropologically constant knowledge interests in humans. These 
transcendental structures of cognition are not open to empirical verification, 
but are assumed to be part of the deep structures of the human mind. 
Habermas himself acknowledges this. Hence his later move theoretically 
via a "linguistic turn" towards identifying and reconstructing "universal 
conditions of possible understanding"; or, as he terms it, universal 
pragmatics. 162 This theory of "communicative action is held to be 
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universal in the sense of constituting part of the deep structure of any 
possible form of society" to the extent that "even though processes of 
communication and interpretation may appear to be completely open and 
relative they are in fact grounded and made possible by the four implicit 
validity claims of comprehensibility, truth, truthfulness and rightness. " 163 
We have then the bases to reconstruct a theory of society and internal 
institutions in which the implied idealised possibilities that flow from 
universal pragmatics . i. e. that of non-distorted communication, can be held 
up as that against which societies that fail to realise or nurture such 
potentials can be "measured". In other words we can hold to scrutiny those 
societies, their inter, extra and intra-institutional frameworks and processes 
that prevent the attainment of inter-subjective communication. As Morrow 
correctly identifies, "such an ethic is communicative because it is grounded 
in an analysis of the normative imperatives built into the most fundamental 
features of human communication and linguistic understanding. '1164 His 
further observation that this allows as well for connecting social analyses 
with ethical drives is correct.. On tologically therefore, Habermas assumes 
a critical realist approach which, based on his work-interaction categorical 
dichotomy, permits analyses of systemic and social processes in which truth 
does not correspond to reality, as is the case with empirico-analytical based 
analyses, but is tied to the "identification of deeper causal mechanisms 
(based upon) a view of reality outside discourse even if it can only be 
known fallibly through it. " 165 Epistemologically Habermas grants 
nominalism and subjectivism partial validity, but ties its truth claims, in a 
unique third way, to a theory of argumentation. i. e. it is not factual 
verification etc. which grounds knowledge, but the recognition "that the 
unsettled ground of rationally motivated agreement amongst participants in 
argumentation is our only foundation... " 166 In the struggle amongst 
secondary commentators to describe such an epistemology, terms such as 
pragmatism and constructivism have surfaced. None of these, I think, do 
this justice. I prefer the term radical reconstructed cognitive practices. 
This not only captures the here and now of participants making unprivileged 
moments of history, but, as well, disabuses those realists who attempt to 
impute to a theory like this, the stock cliched criticisms they normally 
reserve for Marxist type theorising. Such an epistemology, therefore, is 
grounded in practices which are interventionist in reality. That is to say, 
because teleologically based historical subjects do not figure, practice is 
neither theoretically privileged against the uselessness of practical 
intervention, nor, aimed at the consciousness raising of such subjects as a 
necessary prelude to prioritised revolution, nor, if I can indulge in syntactical 
stretching, grants to areas asynchronous with the underlying substantive 
analytical theory, autonomy as a means of getting to grips with the problems 
of everyday reality still with the proviso of the "last instance determining 
economic. " This puts a different slant on Habermas' earlier attempts to 
construct a quasi-transcendental theory of knowledge interests in so far as no 
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form of knowledge in his later writings is anthropologically privileged. 
Despite that I want to adhere to his knowledge-interest distinctions as a 
heuristic device, particularly as a de-and reconstructive tool in the meta- 
theoretical scrutiny of local governance theories and their intentional and 
unintentional palimpsestic writing out of race. 
2.4 Race and Meta-theory 
By way of further contextualisation, I argued in the previous section that 
issues of race and racism, far from being marginal, a position to which it has 
normally been assigned within so-called "mainstream" considerations, is an 
inherent, intrinsic and ineluctable part of modernity to the extent that its 
irresolution has given rise to trans epochal unresolved problems the solution 
to which is one of the elemental keys to extending and pushing back the 
emancipatory boundaries of modernity. To that extend the fact of multi- 
racial/multi-racist Britain/world order, should be the added impetus, though 
the absence of Black people should not absolve the analyst from the 
consideration of race, for a more substantive, explicit internal theoretical 
categorisation and treatment of race and racism within theories of local 
governance. Its absence denotes in all theories of local governance an 
empirico-analytical dominance of the knowledge interest which 
perjorativises changes that go beyond certain boundaries. 
In an earlier discussion of "utopia" I distinguished between backward 
looking, present day and forward looking utopias, locating the critical- 
emancipatory interest in the latter. We can in fact extend that argument 
about utopia by running alongside my threefold temporal categorisation, 
Habermas' knowledge interest categories to realise a further elucidation 
which can postulate that where the hermeneutical-historical interest 
dominates, "golden age" backward looking utopian visions are likely to 
emerge, where the empirico-analytical dominates, a control of the present 
utopia emerges, and where the critical-emancipatory dominates, a forward 
looking utopia is likely. I want to deal first with that paradoxical notion of 
the present day utopia. The oxymoronic "present day utopia" is the 
performative contradiction based riposte to those who critique utopia on the 
basis that it is unrealisable by saying that even those who absolutise what is 
infer a vision of the technocratic industrial society as best. The critique of 
forward oriented utopia is not so much that of a questioning of utopia per se, 
but a particular form of utopia. This derives from a conventionalisation, 
that is to say, a representation that over a period has not been the outcome of 
discourse communication, about the so-called evils of socialism. Alongside 
this, as Apel has shown, is a trailing baggage of the socialist utopia being 
that of the "utopia of totalitarian planning and organisation". 167 It is a 
critique that forward plays a vision of utopia as a politically homogenising 
process that squeezes everyone into one ideological model, and whose 
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realisation is likely only ever to be obtained through terroristic means. 168 
As to the converse, i. e. that which is desirable, this is a neo-conservative 
position which is "a status quo notion held by so-called pragmatists which 
absolutises a norm of progress that is dictated to us by the so-called `factual 
constraints' of what is technically and economically feasible. " The current 
range of local governance theories, as a comment in itself on the inherent 
positivistic tendencies within them, and I include those neo-Marxist ones, 
e. g. post-Fordist based ones, have, in their response to systemically impelled 
changes to local government, occupied a spectrum of accommodation to the 
TINA169 syndrome, as opposed to developing a radical alternative. As an 
example of instrumentalised distorted communicative practices within local 
government responses to systemic crises, but which is reflected within 
theories of local governance, one local government political leader from the 
ruling so-called socialist party, attempted to channel the organisational 
response to national government restructuring by introducing private sector 
based neo-managerialist techniques. To this end a book extolling such 
virtues was held up as capturing the quintessential new managerial approach. 
In contrast, a rather thin booklet on co-operative/collective management bad 
practices in the voluntary sector was put forward as not the way to do it. 170 
The "dented shield" approach, i. e. an overt acceptance of private sector 
values in a democratic public sector institution, curtailed the range of options 
immanent in the ostensible party political values by accepting the present 
and perjorativising viable alternative visions. This provided the normative 
framework in which commitments to race equality could be technocratically 
transmogrified into those of local political legitimation as expressed through 
the unrealistic expectations of the "loony left" and thus into political 
representationalised questions about "justifiable costs". 
I raise the issue of the present day "utopia" in the above form because it 
provides the dominant meta-theoretical change sounding board against 
which to measure the extent to which theories of local governance can 
reconcile the claims made by Black people. It can be said at a general 
level, that, because of previous and continuing colonialism, imperialism and 
racism that Black people primarily make claims of justice, that underpin 
additional claims of equality and freedom which might also be made. 
These claims are made individually, institutionally, and, more importantly, 
under certain circumstances, collectively. These critical-emancipatory 
claims are made communicatively with the desire for agreement. They are 
claims about the truth of racial domination of Black people, about the 
rightness therefore of racial justice, and about the truthfulness of her/his 
experience as a Black person. These claims are made at the interface 
between the Black person's lifeworld and economic and political systemic 
intervention. These claims can be constituted at the interfaces of the 
polity, both formal and informal, the economic, and welfare, in the broadest 
sense of the word. Now whilst these claims arise because of a prticular 
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form of racial conventionalisation that is unique to Black people which 
means that such justice based claims are made more frequently than white 
people, though racial conventionalisation generally can apply to other 
situations, such as anti-semitism, and thus the conditions for their resolution 
apply equally to the other communities. In other words the force of Black 
claims, and within the context of local governance they are forceful, could 
and should be met with similar urgency not as a special need, but as the 
bases for pathfinder solutions to claims made by the wider communities. 
By this is meant treating race as an interlinked categorical imperative within 
theorising so that such theorising becomes race explicit without recourse 
necessarily to the marginalising process that sees it becoming a race specific 
discourse. But then this is but expressing the framework for the 
metatheoretical endeavours which seeks to acknowledge properly the 
realities of multi-racial/-racist societies and in so doing does not absorb race 
into the generalities of the exploitation contained within the valorisation of 
labour, say, or posts it on the boundaries via a cursory one-liner on equal 
opportunities. 
2.5 Categorising the `Meta' 
Upon these considerations I want to generate sets of scrutinising categories, 
which as a means of summary, can be cross-tabulated, but which primarily 
provide the means to interrogate meta-theoretically theories of local 
governance. Because such categories will be substantively racialised, that 
is to say they will explicitly deal with the race dimension without deriving 
race specific categories, they will provide the means to critique such theories 
where critique means deconstructing those theories to enable at a later stage 
the reconstruction of a race explicit theory of local governance. The key 
interrogative categories are derived from a consideration and reconstruction 
of Morrow's analysis of social science models. 171 These are: 
f meta-theoretical concerns refracted through sub-categories of 
epistemological, ontological and normative groundings 
and 
f implied, inferred and explicit agency 
The heuristic analytical categories of local governance theories will be 
outlined in the next section. However, each of these will be constituted 
through their consideration of democratic will formation in the local polity, 
the political and bureaucratic organisation of governance, and the 
organisation of welfare. Thus included in considerations of democratic 
will formation are both the formal and informal political processes, where 
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informal is inclusive of communities' relationships, whilst welfare is used as 
a generic catch-all to include all those services and benefits organised for 
and on behalf of such communities. We can therefore sum up for each 











Within the UK local government over the past fifteen years has undergone 
and is undergoing an accelerated rate of change politically and 
organisationally; changes which are reflected in the reaction from and 
development by theorists of local governance of theories which take it 
beyond the sterile knowledge of public administration in which it had been 
entombed. "Reaction" is one of the key operational words for it expresses 
the backward looking "why" inherent in theories only partially capable of 
explaining events, and not the "how" of forward looking quasi-predictive 
delineating theories which have greater explanatory and incorporating 
potential. Thus, the extent to which such theories and their substantive 
subject i. e. the changes, can be described as "radical", or "revolutionary", as 
the Audit Commission does, or even "trans-epochal", are open to question. 
More to the point their partialisation, as I have indicated earlier, and which is 
reflected in the miserable failure of local government to reconcile justly the 
claims of Black people and women to substantive participation within the 
practice and processes of actual local governance, is and has resulted in an 
inadequate theorisation - in fact an almost total lack of theorisation, of that 
fundamental issue. I have therefore identified two broad categories of local 
governance theories which are those of the left and those of the right, and 
from which are derived a number of linked variants. I want to concentrate 
on the left because whilst they speak of an implicit forward utopia, their 
whitened theorisation of the issue, effectively cheats on the changes possible 
and consigns it to the limitations of the present. As I shall argue later, the 
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glaring contradictions between their realisation of the class unspecific 
empirical realities of local government and the productivist theorisation with 
which they underpin their analyses, gives rise to a variant of the new realism 
school in which radical future alternatives are increasingly boundaried by 
acceptance of the present. That is to say, as I have indicated in the chapter 
on racism, we begin to look substantively at why self designated so-called 
positively oriented equality local government organisations, still consign 
Black people to the margins. Part of the reason for that lies in the theories 
which inform and frame actions as key elements of the dialectics of change 
in local government. More concretely, two of the theories, post Fordism and 
Localism, have been highly influential considerations in the debates deciding 
the changes being made to local governance by the Labour party. 
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Chapter 3 
Version 1- Post-Fordism 
3.1 Background 
I want to start with the Fordist/Post-Fordist theorisation of local governance 
which, whilst I would situate it on the left of the spectrum, does not, as other 
left theorists do, refuse or postpone engagement with the everyday practice 
realities, but attempts to derive from a substantive theoretical materialist 
based analysis the concrete change options within the political and 
organisational spheres of local government. 172 This version of local 
governance builds on the work done by the French Regulation School173 
which in turn is a Marxist economic theory that attempts to provide a post 
Keynesian analysis of the crisis of over accumulation and the uneven 
development of capital. So what is the Keynesian analysis? Basically it 
is the proposition that expanding fiscal and monetary spheres will absorb the 
products of surplus capital. However its discrediting occurred in the 60s 
to 70s transitionary period "in which expansionary policies stimulated 
escalating inflation alongside a squeeze on profits, the collapse of 
investment, and rising unemployment. 074 The New Right had a simple 
answer: price stability, restrictive monetary policy, and the removal of 
barriers to competition in labour, product and financial markets as the means 
by which the market could rectify such structural imbalances. Equally for 
left theorists there was a rethinking amongst some, like Aglietta, who 
thought that the Keynesian reliance on the market too simplistic. Instead 
sustained accumulation was seen to depend "on the development of 
institutional forms which could maintain the proportionality of the 
macrostructure of production and the distribution of total income, " 
'75i. e. a 
mode of regulation. For Aglietta therefore the development of capitalism 
this century has been marked by the development of epochal based regimes 
of accumulation. Thus pre 1929 and the "great crash" designates one 
regime of accumulation. Post 1929 to the early seventies periodises 
another. It is the latter with its emphasis on large scale Taylorist framed 
production methods which is designated "Fordist". Or, as one commentator 
puts it, from a period extensive accumulation pre-1929 to one of intensive 
accumulation post-1929. The crisis thus of the Fordist regime can only 
be overcome by the development of a new accumulation regime: the neo- or 
post-Fordist accumulation regime. Hence "the crisis can only be overcome, 
and accumulation sustained, if capital can find ways of increasing the 
production of relative surplus value to reconcile the requirements for the 
production and realisation of surplus value, particulalrly through the 
development of neo-Fordist production methods in the public sector, or, as 
others have suggested, such panaceas as flexible specialisation, the 
88 
Japanisation of industrial relations, the micro-electronics revolution, or the 
segmentation of the working class and the globalisation of production. " 176 
There is, however, some doubt as to whether or not Aglietta saw the 
possibility of a neo-Fordist regime of accumulation. Leaving that aside 
however, what is of importance is the way in which the state is theorised in 
Aglietta inspired analyses. 
Such theorisations of the state draw on what has been described elsewhere as 
Marx's second position and which is that "the state and bureaucratic 
machinery are class instruments which emerge to co-ordinate a divided 
society in the interests of the ruling class. " 177 Whilst that summation 
might appear crude, it does contain the core seed of the approach in which 
the state is derived from the nature of capital. Criticisms of this approach 
from alternative Marxist theorists, rightly, within the logic of such a 
materialist based analysis, are that it encourages a structural functionalist 
reasoning in which class struggle is suppressed thereby giving rise to 
voluntarism 178. More importantly, as one of the critics, points out, and as I 
have echoed earlier, but from a different standpoint, because "it seems that 
the objective laws of capitalist development have crushed the subjective 
struggles of the working class, it seems that the only option open to Marxists 
is to choose between lamenting the growth of capitalist violence and 
repression or to argue for accommodation to the new realities........ The world 
is closed, the future is determined. " 179 I introduce this because the 
criticism is partially true insofar as the utopian edge to such analyses is 
foreclosed, and foreclosed in a way that, whilst pointing to both the 
inadequacy of the post-Fordist type thinking and the more general capital 
based logic underpinning it and its critics, also forecloses the substantive 
theorisation of racism, and therefore marginalises Black people. In terms of 
local governance, local governmental arrangements are read as extensions of 
the national state. To that extent, the term "local state" can be used. Here 
post-Fordist based theorists of local governance find themselves in a cleft 
stick because whilst their analyses brings forth an indeterminancy of the 
future, and thus allows for a detailed examination of the various spheres that 
constitute local governance, the more they delve, the more the class 
unspecific nature of local governance becomes clear to the extent that it 
imperils the capital logic of their argument. Hence it is no surprise that, 
for example, one theorist of post-Fordist local governance, "ahems" and 
"ha's" through a number of introductory circumscriptions and conditions in 
one of his pieces in order to put a temporal distance between the 
developmental motorhouse of his argument, i. e. capital, and the socio- 
political changes it induces so that the charge of "economic reductionist" can 
be avoided. Thus "whilst economic restructuring begins in the economic 
sphere, narrowly defined, to be successful it must also extend to the socio- 
institutional sphere (i. e those institutions concerned with international 
finance, trade, redistribution, the nation state, the welfare state, the family 
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etc. )", there is "no inexorable logic" to these developments, but rather there 
are sets of choices, a market rationalised debureaucratised welfare state 
being just one ofthem. 180 Leaving aside therefore the nuances of the 
debate amongst orthodox Marxist theorists, about whether or not one can 
talk about post-Fordism, the adherents of this position claim that there is a 
congruence between the period of industrial Fordism, i. e. large scale 
production processes, and the post-Second World War growth in local 
government functions and organisational arrangements. The post-Fordist 
development thus of local government sees the deconstruction of these large 
bureaucratised Fordist arrangements of production and allocation of services, 
as one of the theorists defines local government activities, to the extent that 
four inter-related characteristics can be identified: '8' 
f marketisation and labour flexibility on the economic side 
fa purchaser and provider organisational split on the service side 
f down sizing of the extent of elected political control over functions 
f private sector based neo-managerialism. 
I want to resituate these four characteristics within the three heuristic 
categories I outlined earlier as a better analytical framework to release the 
information on the post-Fordist local state in order that they can then be 
subjected to critically racialised interrogative categories in the full matrix. 
3.2 Post Fordist Democratic Will Formation 
Within the substantive context of "democratic will formation" with its 
explanatory preface, located elsewhere in Habermas' texts, there is a clearer, 
more abstract framework to encompass the post-Fordist theorists critiques of 
democratic developments. Thus they are correct to identify the erosion of 
local democratic control of local government that has resulted out of the new 
right implementation of marketised pF strategies. For pF theorists there 
are two interlocked elements to this. The first is the centralisation of 
decisions and accountability of key local government responsibilities 
previously the provenance of the Fordist local government. A good 
example of this is the determination of local government finances which are 
now directi(ve)ly controlled through national government formulae coupled 
with local revenue raising responsibilities which includes an enlarging 
element of revenue obtained through charging for more and more services. 
The second is what can be described as the increasing quangoisation of local 
government covered euphemistically by such "nu-speak" terms such as "the 
enabling council", or "multi-agency" working. Quangoisation therefore 
covers all those processes in which increasingly responsibilities which 
previously were under control of a representatively elected body are 
apportioned to bodies where there is no form of local elected democratic 
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accountability. Included in this are those processes whereby 
responsibilities are shifted to institutions traditionally thought of as 
quangoes, e. g. the London Residuary Body, and processes which give rise to 
the contracting out of services to private companies and/or voluntary 
organisations. The pF analysis, as I shall detail and argue later, does not 
go far enough in outlining the extent of such forced de-politicisation of local 
government nor does it appear to realise that the contradiction between the 
claims made by the new right that such arrangements provide consumers 
with more control and the actual reality that the journey now made by such 
consumers from service interface to those identified as being democratically 
accountable is actually more torturously longer, goes to the very heart of its 
capital logic based argument. Thus there is a third element of de- 
democratisation which pF theorists have difficulty reconciling and which is 
located in the attempt to construct explicit past oriented normative based 
cultural and political value orientations as the expected and accepted belief 
framework to behaviour in the sphere of local governance. Such neo- 
conservatism is not the sole preserve of the traditional new right, and the 
Labour Party's dangerous espousal of communitarianism and its actual 
implementation in some "new model" Labour authorities is evidence of the 
extent to which inadequate theorisations of the crisis, and pFordism has 
intervened and is intervening in local governance through undemocratic 
channels of consultancies, unwittingly energises the neo-conservatist new 
realism. It is little wonder then that such analyses never ever seem to 
address explicitly issues of race and/or gender, other than by brief reference 
to equal opportunities. Issues of race have to be inferred, and here it is as a 
continuation and worsening of traditional patterns of discrimination already 
evidenced in equality audits of Fordist arrangements, i. e. contracting out 
affects Black people and women the worst in terms of employment 
especially, quangoes have an almost total absence of Black members etc. 
But then, this is but part of the growth of an underclass, "less racialised" than 
in the States, but "beset by processes of implosion and fragmentation" to the 
extent that "the common good is lost altogether amidst the uproar of 
defended groups, particular interests and incommensurable identities. "182 
However much the pF author of the previous sentiments contained in the 
quotation marks would probably deny the intention, it does reflect the 
inherent nostalgia in such productivist based analyses whereby the "common 
good" is code for the "good old white working class"; nostalgia which is 
being worked through with a vengeance in some Labour run authorities. 
Thus whilst solutions are sought by such pF theorists in the greater 
democratisation of local government - and here it is not clear whether or not 
greater democratisation is a particular response to the attempt at forced 
depoliticisation of local government, or whether or not it is in fact the 
emancipatory normative response to capitalism, it is a democratisation based 
upon collectivities which are ultimately class based derivatives of the 
capital-labour contradiction, and not new collectivities which, as I outline in 
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the chapter on race, are substantively inclusive of Black people. Their 
rejection of the consumerist/customer/client model of local democracy is 
right, as is their espousal of a civil society based democracy where political 
action is not confined to the issue of securing control of the local state 
through the party system. Where we part company is, as I outline later, on 
the organic impetus linkage between capitalism as an economic system and a 
thus derivative polity, because inherent in this sort of analysis is an exclusion 
of the full and proper reconciliation of the racist social construction of race, 
and therefore an exclusion of Black people. 
3.3 Post Fordist Organisation of Local Governance 
Within pF theory the organisation of local governance can be read as a 
functional derivative of the changing form of the regulation of capital 
accumulation mediated temporally as a "catch-up" mimicry of changes that 
have occurred in the private sector. It is thus, and in fact can only be, 
retrospective in its analytical direction. Whilst this apparent "quantum leap" 
between theorisation of capital accumulation and local governance is done 
sans any kind of "middle order" theory, this has not stopped pF theorists 
from attempting to engage with the details of the changes at the local level. 
But because this level of their engagement is referenced via a touchstone 
reflection of changes occurring elsewhere in the regulation of capital, these 
reflections end up mirroring the new right specification for local 
government. That is to say that, for example, a Ridley type model of local 
government is confirmed by pF theorists with the only difference being in 
the moral valorisation accorded these changes respectively, i. e. one says they 
are good, the other bad. Is reality in this post-Fordist, almost post-modern 
world really WYSIWYG? Is it capable, therefore, of dealing adequately 
with the politics of neo-conservatism? 
These then are the key characteristics of the evolving organisational 
framework both in the public and private sectors which post Fordists have to 
reconcile emancipatively with their theory. Overriding the sub-elemental 
details, is the recognition of what has been described as the core-periphery 
model. Within this scenario the crucial strategic, forward planning, 
horizon scanning functions of the organisation are gathered at the centre 
constituting the near permanent part. The actual operationalisation of 
those strategies is allocated to satellite components of the organisation via a 
devolved system with no guarantee of permanent membership of the overall 
organisation which means that such functions can be bought in from other 
organisations. The boundary that existed under the Fordist arrangement 
between intra and extra organisation therefore shrinks to the outer limits of 
the core. The most obvious example of this arrangement is the 
commissioning/providing split that has occurred in the health services and is 
occurring increasingly in local government to the extent that one local 
92 
authority which previously had all of its day nurseries in house, now 
contracts in those services from external organisations. 183 Whilst the core- 
periphery model reflects changes that have occurred in the private sector, it 
reflects as well aspects of the globalisation of capitalism in which the 
product development and design is accomplished in the metropole whilst the 
benefits of cheap labour are exploited by producing the product in the Third 
world. To what extent acknowledgement is made by pF theorists of the 
core-periphery framework that existed in colonial and imperialist studies 
long before the distinction could be made between Ford and post-Ford is not 
clear. 
Two inter-linked sub-elemental principles underpin the operationalisation of 
the core-periphery organisation. The first is that of devolution of 
responsibilities to the service interface. That is to say that an ostensible 
rationale sees the development of services more sensitive to the 
client/customer/consumer as residing in the ability of those who actually 
provide it on a day to day basis being able to have control over a range of 
decisions, such as finance. The creation of business units in some local 
authorities is an example of this. 184 Obviously linked to this type of 
development is the issue of flexibility in which organisational flexibility is 
organically related to labour flexibility. In other words the transformation 
of previous large highly stratified hierarchical bureaucracies into an 
accretion of smaller units, some not even "owned" by the parent 
organisation, as under conditions of competitive tendering, so that it 
becomes possible to talk about "flatter, leaner" organisations, or even more 
grandiosely "debureaucratisation". Labour flexibility therefore covers the 
substantive areas of requiring workers to be "multi-skilled" whilst expecting 
them to accept that the era of a "job for life" with attendant conditions over. 
However pF theorists seem to have difficulty distinguishing between the 
extent to which these developments are part of the developmental logic of 
capitalism, in which case one can then talk substantively about counter- 
reactions of collectivity based democracy, or simply the effects of a cost 
cutting withrawal of the state from areas of public life where previously it 
sought legitimation. Those of the pF schools appear to blur the difference 
between "multi-skilling" and deskilling, between "multi-skilling" and the 
requirement for public sector workers to work longer, for less and under 
worse conditions of service. For example the Leader of one of the new 
model Labour run authorities wanted, after there was a very severe gale, all 
workers in the council to be compelled to help in clearing up in the local 
borough. 185 Or another later Leader in the same council who could 
fatuously declare in response to questions about the flexibility based 
reorganisation of the council's refuse services, "I've thought about this for a 
long time, and I do think that making our dustman work four times as hard is 
a socialist act. ". These were the very same councillors who sought part of 
their justification for the actions outlined above from the criticisms made of 
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Fordist bureaucratic welfarism by certain pF theorists. 186 It is therefore, as 
I outline later, premature of the pF theorists to talk about or intimate the 
demise of the traditional "iron cage" bureaucratic form in the public sector. 
The evidence to be presented suggests that these smaller, flatter, supposedly 
more flexible organisational units are not predicated upon the devolution of 
total responsibility. Instead within local government at least, party political 
control has been increased through the establishment of new forms of 
bureaucratic accountability more directly linked to a streamlined and reduced 
number of representative democratic fora, i. e. the number and frequency of 
council committee meetings have been reduced in many authorities together 
with an increase, through departmental amalgamations, of responsibilities 
thereby increasing the "business" of committees and decreasing the ability of 
"outsiders" to participate. Part of this new bureaucracy has arisen in 
response to the need to have a monitoring and evaluation function 
shadowing the new managerialist accountability processes and procedures, 
e. g. quality systems. The legitimation problems that arise from the new 
formal democratic deficit are being dealt with through sleight of hand 
involvement exercises premised upon the promise of those participating 
actually being able to influence the elected representatives without 
necessarily having the right to substantive democratic participation. This 
process of administered "democratic" will formation requires differing forms 
of bureaucracy, e. g. a new Labour model borough which is establishing a 
"Community Affairs" department with the aim of enhancing local 
democracy' 87. Perhaps then, bureaucracy lives on, only slightly disguised. 
3.4 Post Fordist Organisation of Welfare 
However it is in the organisation of welfare that the substance of the pF 
theories come to the fore. In looking at these I am concentrating on those 
readily identified on the left, and thus whilst some commentators have 
wanted to distinguish between neo-Marxists and radical technologists, I 
regard this as too arcane, and tend to see both of these as falling within the 
purviews of neo-Marxism. There is thus a heavy emphasis placed on an 
analysis which privileges the productive forces in the public sector. To wit, 
"We can think of the welfare state as being concerned with two essential 
processes: ...... the production of goods and services and the maintenance of 
much of the physical infrastructure of society....... (and the)....... allocation of 
resources... which always enjoy a relative scarcity. i188 These are but a 
reflection of wider productive forces which are technologically driven as a 
result of complex capitalist modernisation processes linked ultimately to the 
regime of accumulation. These new technologies and techniques are 
evidenced in the organisation of welfare through its organisational, 
technological infra-structural and managerial changes. Under this schema 
it would appear that the welfare state, and within that local government, are 
driven by the manouverings in and around the productive forces and 
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allocation processes so defined. The state therefore is not simply situated 
within the relations of production, itself a superstructural reflection of the 
productionist base sited within the private sector, but becomes mongrelised 
as the part productive forces, part allocative forces, and by inference, 
because this is not stated or spelt out, part relations of production. Is this 
then an extension what was normally seen as productive forces, or is it a 
unique site? Whatever, it does though allow such pF theorists to engage 
with the minutiae of welfarism through their ideas about technologies and 
techniques. Thus for example the issue of "quality services" can be 
reformed, not reconstructed, as a valid technique providing the emphasis is 
on a more democratic model and not one that is solely technique driven. 
In other words it becomes possible to talk about new forms of control in 
which there is a convergence - the MBA convergence - between pF'ism and 
the new right about the essential elements, but divergence over its 
accountability basis. For example in looking at the emergence of neo- 
managerialism in local government, one pF theorist constructs a comparative 
F'ist and p F'ist template thus: 
Fist Management 
Structure Bureaucratic, hierachical, 
centralised 




Staffing Large fixed permanent 
corp of staff, centralised 
bargaining 
Superordinate Sound administration, 
culture legal and financial 
probity, professional, 
quantity in service 
delivery 
pF'ist Management 
Tight centre, broad, flat 
periphery, decentralised 
Performance targets, cost 
centres with tasks and 
teams, internal markets, 
hands off control 
Small core of staff, 




customer oriented, quality 
in service delivery 
The pF'ist column reflects accurately the idealised vision for local 
government that the both the Conservative and new Labour governments 
have, i. e. the new right vision189. The radical pF'ist vision, which has 
actually helped inform the Labour Party's new realist reconstruction of their 
local government programme, is part of a spectrum that appears not to have 
any epistemological break with the new right, and thus would still embrace 
these core idealised elements, but would seek to underpin them with 
identified openings for more democratic involvement. It is then a variation 
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of the "dented shield" approach which the apologists for new realist left 
politics withn the sphere of local governance have used to describe their 
approach. Not so much the transition from Fordism to postFordism, as the 
transition from Fordism to Nissan, with the self comforting consumerist 
aside of, "At least they are more reliable". Perhaps this does unjustly 
caricature the pF'st position, but then for all their circumscriptions and 
qualifications about "new forms of control" etc., their narrowing of the 
critical gap robs their argument of the potential for immanent critique, 
thereby pushing it into the on tological realms of positivism. 
3.5 Critique 
I want now to develop my meta-theoretical and agency critique of pF'st 
theories of local governance along the lines outlined earlier, i. e. a 
substantively racialised interrogation. My concerns with pF'sm's inability 
or lack of intention to deal with race, and for that matter gender, has been 
voiced as well by another commentator who sees the problem as residing in 
the emphasis on the forces of production as opposed to the relations of 
production. 190 It is within the latter sphere of theorising, the contention is 
put, that issues of race and gender within local governance can be properly 
addressed to the extent that the later Stuart Hall's celebration of difference 
can be incorporated. This is only partially true. It is true that looking at the 
relations of production will enable a theorisation of race, but at a cost 
because it still relies on an underlying grounding in the productivist logic 
underpinning the pF'st emphasis on productive forces. The extent to which 
this productive relations theorisation allows for a trip over into post 
modernist celebrations of difference, as this particular theorist claims, is 
doubtful since for the post modernist those differences rely on an 
incommensurable denarrativisation, and thus deuniversalisation, of their 
species being. In other words you can have your Marxist materialist cake 
but can't eat the various icings. There is, however, a sense in which both 
pF'st and the relations of production critique elide with post modernist 
musings on race. That is because the former two can, by the internal 
substantive logic of their grounding theory, treat race as being no more than 
epiphenomenal, and thus they and post modernism sanction the new forms of 
ethnicity, or etnifikation, as I have argued elsewhere - the former as 
ultimately marginal to "true consciousness", the latter as evidence of 
authentically grounded multi-contextualism. This charge against Hoggett's 
brand of pF'sm of acknowledging "race" through the diffractive prism of 
different cultures without grounding those cultures is thus partially 
vindicated by his later toe-dipping into the pool of developing post- 
modernist social policy, classified, as his article is, under the catch-all of 
"towards a post-modernist ... etc. etc. "191 But, then perhaps this elision of the 
distance between post-Fordism and post-modernity is not that unexpected 
since the prefix post- can only refer retrospectively, over the shoulder, to a 
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period that has passed, and thus despite the ultimate productivist teleology of 
pF'sm, the contradiction between that and its findings of a public sector 
world seemingly now "contingent, ungrounded, diverse, unstable, 
indeterminate (and with) a set of disunified cultures.. " pushes it over the 
edge into de-grand narrativising its origins. This is but a trend that has 
occurred before with other structuralist based Marxist accounts of reality in 
which the gap between the explanatory potential of the underlying theory and 
the evidence of reality is such that either greater or greater areas of the socio- 
, economic and political areas are given over to "autonomous" development, 
or the theoretical project breaks down into the denarrativised contingent in 
which reality is but a palimpsest not for Reality, but, well... for just reality. 
Is this what is happening to pF'st thinking on the public sector? To judge 
by this article by Hoggett, the answer would appear to be in the affirmative. 
Briefly then the paper attempts to contribute towards the development of a 
post-modern social policy by examining its contention that "existing 
compromises between universalism and particularism, equality and diversity 
have been unsettled. " which then requires that the "question of the 
appropriate balance between these values in the light of the issues post 
modernism raises"192. 
In terms of a meta-theoretical deconstruction of pF'st contsructions of local 
governance, it can be said that pF'sm's last instance referencing to Marxism, 
albeit of the Regulationist school, places it logically within the purviews of a 
critical realism as defined earlier. However the key question is whether 
pF'st local governance can make bare relations of unjust power inclusive of 
racism and, in performative synchronisation, critique as it attempts a 
recosntruction of such relations. As I outline below and as I have hinted 
earlier, pF'sm's last instance reliance on regulationist Marxism with its 
consequence that the state is read off as a functional derivative of changing 
forms of accumulation regulation means as well that there is a lacuna instead 
of a detailed argument showing how and why this should happen. On 
tologically therefore, whilst the adherence to Marxism as a grounding 
logically means that reality is not as it should be, i. e there is a deeper 
underlying reality, the pF'st argument is deficient when it comes to 
illustrating exactly how and why changing forms of accumulation regulation 
impact on political forms, and thus too, social relations of production. In 
the previous section I showed, via a Habermassian deconstruction of Marx's 
theory of commodification, how Marxist based analyses of racism 
marginalised Black people's struggles. 
There are fundamental weaknesses in such a theory which in sum add up to a 
teleological evolutionism the principal effect of which vis-a-vis Black 
experiences is a reductionist conflation with the white working class as the 
agents of human history, or dismissive epiphenomenonalisation. These 
weaknesses then underpin Habermas' contention that the concept of social 
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labour is not abstract enough to encompass the universals of human 
development. And, whilst as an example of this failing Habermas identifies 
the difficulties Marxists have with reconciling the welfare state with such a 
theory, I have included as well, and more importantly, the trans-epochal 
unresolved processes of unjust social differentiation, such as racism. This 
reprioritisation of other unjust forms of social differentiation over forms of 
differentiation of the "state apparatus", i. e. the welfare state, goes, as I show 
in my chapter on racism to the on tological heart of the social labour thesis 
and its derivatives which include amongst its ranks pF'st theories of local 
governance. Now whilst pF'sm, especially its forces of production variant, 
has eschewed any kind of engagement with race, what can be inferred from 
this regime of accumulation type analyses is a theorisation of racism that 
relies on a postulation of the fracturing of abstract labour. This is not a 
wild assumption, but rather is inferred analytically from the substantive logic 
of the Marxism upon which this brand of pF'sm is based. Under this 
analysis capitalists suborn their interests strategically to maintain the 
capitalist system, no doubt "voluntarilty" suborn, so that there develops an 
asynchronicity between political and economic interests as well as an impure 
form of community struggle, as opposed to class based struggles. To re- 
introduce that key quote, "a capitalism which can foresee its own overthrow 
needs to limit and contain accumulation in a way that it maximises its own 
life even at the expense of the law of value.... (so).... in South Africa the 
expansion of value, and so surplus value has been partially diverted by 
cessation to white workers of a limited degree of control over the process of 
extraction of surplus value from Black workers. " 193 Now because the 
medium of exchange is partially exposed, that is to say the process whereby 
concrete labour is transformed into abstract labour, or, in Habermassian 
terms, the relationship between lifeworld and system, this gives rise to the 
politicisation of white and Black workers. But, because the regime of 
accumulation is not "pure", i. e. the relationship between concrete and 
abstract labour is mediated via race and has therefore not run its full course 
to proletarianise all the workers, this politicsation expresses itself in the 
mongrelised fashion of white against Black workers, rather than that of all 
workers against the capitalist class. In other words the true reality is now 
overlaid by two other levels - an intermediate one of race, and an upper one 
that is expressed through the unalloyed medium of proper exchange value. 
The universalism of social labour around which such Marxist analyses pivot, 
because it clamps together too tightly the social with the system, allows 
judgement calls to be made against those forms of political expression which 
do not fit into its anticipated framework. Thus Black expressions of politics 
can occupy a lower form of political life because it addresses community 
issues rather than class issues. This together with the teleological 
evolutionism of such Marxist theories means as well that the experiences of 
the white working classes can be privileged both temporally, i. e. they are 
more advanced evolutionally, and on tologically. We can see therefore 
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that if the state is read off as a reflection of the regime of accumulation, then 
the state that discriminates on the grounds of race, and this includes the pF'st 
local state, has by the logic of the argument built into a fracturing of abstract 
labour underpinning it. Moreover it becomes possible to downplay, or even 
dismiss, attempts to change this as epiphenomenal wastes of political time. 
This is what I read into the pF'st aversion to race. On tologically 
therefore, Black people's experiences, if expressed through race equality 
politics that do not converge with class based moves, can be placed on the 
evolutionary backburner. They are on the edges of the totality, some of it 
falling into the true reality, i. e where race and class co-inside, the other part 
but an expression of that intermediate reality. Such critical realist theories 
therefore, whilst they create two "realities", unwittingly shadow a third 
intermediate one in which, on tologically the Black person is still temporally 
and spatially displaced. Now, whilst the progressive notion of racism as 
ideology allows for it to be condemned, the temporal/spatial displacement, 
because it arises out of an inadequately theorised universalism, allows as 
well the discretion for evincing reasons to be advanced for that displacement, 
reasons which can fall into cultural and/or biological determinism. That is 
to say that, as I have argued in the chapter on racism, since that form of 
social injustice's unique defining criteria, as against other forms of social 
injustice, are those of time, space/place and phenotype, then there is inherent 
in the social labour based argument the grounds for meeting all of racism's 
criteria. 
Perhaps it can be said that pF'sm and its forces of production variant, has 
been unfairly singled out since the critique outlined above applies as well to 
other Marxist analyses. This is true in part so that whilst the criticisms of 
someone like Williams of pF'st inabilities to adequately consider race arise 
out of their failure to give proper consideration to the social relations of 
production have some value, their reliance on a social labour grounding 
makes my critique equally applicable. In both pF'sm and Williams, race 
is a zero-sum game in which either the capitalists or white workers gain what 
the Black workers have lost. They therefore end up sanctioning 
etnifikation, the creation of ersatz ethnicities which I have outlined in an 
earlier paper. PF'sm achieves this through a process of multi-cultural 
epiphenomenalism in which such cultures are acknowledged but denied 
substantive on tological groundings, whilst critics such as Williams, in their 
compensatory celebration of diversity, should take care that the on tological 
groundings now accorded are, in their construction, able to differentiate out 
those voices of inauthenticity. On tologically, therefore, if the state mirrors, 
albeit on a temporal afterburn, the development of the particular regime of 
accumulation, then the situation of race in local authorities in the eighties 
can only be, according to pF'sm, in particular the variant in question, a 
diversion. Harken to Hoggett's ill informed damnation of those efforts - 
almost an accusation of "false consciousness" on the part of socialist 
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councillors - "... socialists have found it far easier to "throw money" at the 
problem of racism in local government by setting up race units, employing 
race advisory officers etc., than to come to grips with the entrenched 
institutionalised discrimination embodied in white professional career 
structures. " 194 As I shall show later, not only is his argument of a more 
substantive reality a nonsense, but his "facts" included in the quote are 
wrong. 
It would appear then that pF'sm, in this variant, wants to have its cake and 
eat it. If it runs with its productivist underpinnings then race becomes 
epiphenomenal. If, in seeking to address this, pF'sm trips over into post 
modernism, then it requires a denarrativisation in contradistinction to its 
teleology. In both cases Black people lose their on tological grounding to 
the extent that we are left with a homogenising assumption of heterogeneity 
comprised of essentialised cultural units. 
3.6 Summary and Conclusion 
By way of rounding off this section on pF'sm we'll return to the meta- 
theoretical matrix framework in order to generate summary data sets for each 
of the vacant cells. The meta-theoretical level was chosen as that best able 
to reconcile race and racism, given the earlier argument of it being an 
unresolved trans-epochal carry over into present day modernity. The 
contention then is that the meso-theoretical level at which pF'sm pitches its 
argument cannot deal adequately with issues of race. Thus whilst other 
critiques of pF'sm have also picked up on the fault lines of teleology, 
functionalism and technological determinism, these have been from an 
alternative Marxist perspective which in themselves either have not dealt, or, 
where they have attempted to do so, dealt inadequately with race and racism. 
The following matrix was proposed as the interrogative framework for 







Meta-theoretical 1 3 5 
considerations 
Agency 2 4 6 
In this the vacant cells are numbered as an aid to the summary remarks that 
follow. 
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It has been argued that the logic of pF'sm ties it into an Hegelian concept of 
totality in which the transformation of the participants' fortunes are tied into 
the transformation of the economic system; and, that this, because of the 
teleological evolutionism of such theories, gives rise to an implicit view that 
Black people's experiences, race equality wise if it does not equate with 
class based ones, can be put on the evolutionary backburner. It is also 
suggested, given the later flirtation with post modernism, that this might be 
because of the perceived increasing temporal and spatial distantiation 
between the economic core locus of pF'sm's dynamic and its actual effects, 
thus making it easier for it to be opportunistically ignored. This seems to 
have happened precisely because pF'sm was being taken to task over its 
inability to reconcile the issue of race and racism. The result in both cases 
has had the same effect. In the former the Black subject ends up doubly 
determined, which manifests itself in part in the epiphenomenal, and thus 
false consciously based expression, of cultural politics. In the latter now 
acknowledging the validity of such expressions is premised upon there being 
no subject, but rather the subject fracturing effects of a multiplicity of 
different discourses, discourses with material effects. This blending of post 
F'sm with post modernism might be described as syncretic if it were not for 
Hogget's attempt to retain some element of universalism; a universalism 
which does not arise out of an anti-foundationalist endeavour to create a 
post-modernist ethic but is still tied to notion, albeit a very background 
distant notion, of a historical subject. Perhaps it is not so much a blending 
then as an exercise in eclecticism. If this is to be the epistemological 
dynamic, with an on tologically ungrounded Black subject, then the implied 
normative framework repeats the effect of being overdetermined which the 
productivist version brings forth. That is to say tomorrow is but today is but 
yesterday.... In terms of democratic will formation and agency, (1 and 2) 
there are two options then: an empiricist pragmatism, and this probably 
applies to the Stoker variant of pF'sm, or an "offensive understanding of 
politics directed against the state apparatus", and this tendency appears to 
emerge from the Hoggett variant. For example in the few commentaries 
on race and local government, he rails against the inability of transforming 
large local state bureaucracies into non or anti-racist entities. In the 
publication done with Burns195 which examined the issue of decentralisation 
in Tower Hamlets and in his latest foray into post modernist social policy, 
both of which had to deal with race and racism, he appears to go all the way 
in wanting to deconstruct the local state into a multiplicty of smaller 
democratically controlled units. Is this but then not another version of the 
republican model of democratic will formation in which "society is from the 
start political society -societas civilis....... (and) democracy becomes 
equivalent to the political self-organisation of society as a whole"? 196 
This however still assumes a fairly homogenous culturally grounded 
consensus on the part of the citizenry which either exists or must be attained 
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through a philosophy of consciousness praxis. Whilst then the initial 
appeal of such an approach which asserts a need for new and more 
substantive forms of democracy as a remedy to the problems analysed, the 
actual way in which Black people and women will participate 
emancipatively in that process still throws up more questions than Hogett's 
pF'sm can answer. 
If then pF'sm's local governance ideal in either its attenuated form as 
exemplified by Stoker, or its radical form ä la Hoggett, is greater democracy, 
then it is reasonable to ask how this is to be achieved, and how, given the 
core concern of this paper, not to mention the implied normative framework 
to such democracy, Black people and others most marginalised by the 
current system, are to participate emancipatively? Some of the answers to 
this have already been outlined in the immediate preceding section on 
democratic will formation. Briefly then there appear to be two types of 
agency ensconced in pF'sm. The first relates to the critique voiced in this 
paper and by others that pF'sm licences a teleologically based technological 
determinism in which the changes to local government are and will be the 
outcome of changes in the mode of regulation of capital. The second 
emerges from the need, a need prompted by their "real world" work, no 
doubt, to engage with the reality of the meso and micro level of change in 
local government. Here there then appears to be a trip over into post 
modernist notions of voluntaristically based resistances, even weak 
resistances, which, and by the logic of the pF'st arguments can only, revolve 
around the issue of identity recognition problems because there is implicit in 
the central argument a common cultural background assumption. Is this to 
big a jump, in the reading of pF'sm? The answer is "no" when one 
considers in more detail the future desired local governance as sketched out 
in one of the key publications. In this Hoggett et al expand on their vision 
for a democracy without bureaucracy, a state of affairs brought about 
primarily because of the "innovations in information technology which have 
permitted new forms of organisational control. " These changes have 
resulted in the replacement of the bureaucratic pyramid by the core-periphery 
model. Their "vision for the future is therefore not one which sseeks a 
public sphere still dominated by an extended but now acountable state, (but ) 
rather.... one which is based upon a much greater plurality of democratic 
provider organisations and specifically ones that are collectively accountable 
or controlled. " This vision is prompted because of their analysis that "a 
new paradigm of production is presently emerging which combines extended 
operational decentralisation with enhanced strategic direction. " 
Consequently because, as they believe, "strong local democracy requires 
strong local representation", then "a political party committed to a genuinely 
democratic philosophy could greatly empower local government by giving 
emphasis to its strategic role at the local level. 9497 And what about Black 
people and issues of racism within this vision. That is no problem, 
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according to the proponents, if the conventional thinking about majorities 
and minorities is done away with and instead, reconceptualised in terms of 
the "fact" that "we are all at some time and in some contexts, minorities". 
In other words we are all "a part of a minority... part of a group which 
experiences discrimination and hence is denied the status of full 
citizenship. " 198 A distinction is thus made between "the majority" and the 
"general good" where, in contradistinction to the former, the latter has the 
"capacity to contain difference without becoming divided upon itself. " 
Upon this it is then claimed that "political leaders always have a choice" 
which is to opt for one or the other, i. e the majority tendency or the common 
good tendency. 
I have allowed Hoggett et co. to speak for themselves because their words 
confirm the earlier critique made. Firstly there is a strong teleological 
tendency that backgrounds their technologically determinist view of why 
local government is changing. Secondly such an approach reduces the 
possibility of immanent critique and can only provide for reality that agrees 
with what is, despite the evidence that the case for local government 
becoming decentralised is not backed up by the available empirical evidence. 
Thirdly, the logic of such an approach means that when the issue of agency 
over which people might have control is broached, it can only be done 
voluntaristically in terms, for example, of choices political leaders have. (A 
hint of Marxist rational choice theory perhaps? ) Fourthly, and this was not 
covered in the earlier critique, there seems to be a revisit to Millian 
representative democracy in their support for representative democracy at the 
local level and which can guide the development of good uses of resources, 
whilst for the local community democracy emerges in its republican format 
in the decentralisation of provider elements, dependent in the final analysis 
upon the statist strategy of a poltical party committed to democracy "seizing" 
power. Fifthly, racism and Black people now become one of but many 
equal value variables of difference struggling towards a Hegelian 
communitarian good. Behind this can still be heard the echoes of the "we 
are all one class" arguments, and which, in post modernist guise can emerge 
as "we are all different and equal". In the intermediate spaces, however, 
can be seen the shift from the race equality specific strategies of labour local 
authorities to the broad based equal opportunity ones of new right Labour. 
But then these are but the consequences of advancing a theory of local 
governance which does not deal with the issue of power adequately. Once 
again then racism is shifted on to the margins and Black people, within the 
sphere of local governance, become squeezed into a potentially oppressive 
common good. Questions remain, such as, for example, why should Black 
women regard white men as but another minority? How are these two 
constituencies going to work together? What if there isn't a political party 
committed to democracy -or are we to assume that this is the Labour party? 
103 
As far as the organisation of local governance and welfare is concerned, (3 
and 4, and 5 and 6), whilst the outline of the change tendencies and the 
future vision have been provided, the position of the Black person therein, 
not to mention the unresolved problem of racism. has not been provided. 
Under pF'sm the organisation of local government and of welfare can be 
read off as a delayed correspondence to changes in the sphere of production, 
particularly technological changes. The large bureaucracies of the "old" 
model local government are then reflexes of the Fordist regime of 
accumulation. These in themselves were/are a mass of inherent interests 
to such an extent that any attempt at controlling or altering these from an 
equality perspective, is doomed to failure. History moves on, and thus it is 
a "good" thing that the regime of accumulation has changed because it has 
brought forth a new organisational mode which makes it easier to realise 
local democracy. This will be a local democracy organised around new 
forms of the production of services. But then here is the major faultline 
which throws up in sharp relief the basic contradiction in p F'st accounts of 
local governance. If the intentions of such an approach is to move beyond 
the orthodox thinking on local government which is that it is simply about 
the efficient, effective etc. provision of services, to one that looks at local 
governance in terms of groups participating in a localised political process 
covering a range of issues greater than just services, then pF'sm is in a 
dilemma. The issue of race illuminates this dilemma. Leaving aside the 
implication that the struggles for race equality by Black workers within local 
government and by Black communities outside of local government were but 
epiphenomenal, it has to be shown by pF'sts that the new forms of 
production of services in their pF'st emancipated mode, i. e. democratically 
controlled, provide the answers to the problems of local Black communities. 
Does this not reproduce the utilitarian argument for local government in a 
different form because democracy is being conflated with production? What 
is to be the bases of the relationship between those groups which are not 
service groups, and the local state or with the now decentralised service 
groups? Are Black people to be served by Black self-organised groups? 
What about decentralised units that decide to serve whites only? What 
about the vast majority of Black people who have very little to do with local 
groups of whatever persuasion? How is there to be a distinction between 
those campaigning for genuine need and those which are etnikfied 
projections? More importantly, will those, especially if they are Black, 
who, say disagree with the vision of the "common good" because it 
downplays race equality, effectively be disenfranchised from the democratic 
processes? 
In sum therefore, approaching pF'sm from a meta-theoretical level allows us 
to show that as an emancipatory theory, and this is inferred from its analysis- 
of-capitalism underpinnings, it fails because, yet again, it can only resolve 
problems of racism by incorporating Black people, and for that matter 
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women, within a limited and limiting universalism which will compromise 
the claims for racial justice made by Black people. In this, as with orthodox 
Marxism, instrumental and communicative action is still conflated. The ill 
defined nature of its normative content, which has to be inferred, makes it 
open, to be charitable, i. e. I am not sure where Hoggett et co. stand on the 
issue of new right Labour and local government, to the types pf action 
mentioned in those those politician based examples mentioned earlier in the 
paper. The potential contained within the language of its vision - 
decentralisation, new forms of local democracy, difference etc. - whilst it 
cannot be realised by the substantive content of pF'sm, as its failure on race 
shows, does, however, provide a signboard of clues to the general direction 
in which local governance should be going, particularly in relation to Black 
people and women. 
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Chapter 4 
Version 2- Localism 
4.1 Introduction 
"In what public discourse does the reference to Black people not exist? It 
exists in everyone of this nation's mightiest struggles..... It is there in the 
construction of a free and public school system; the balancing of 
representation in legislative bodies; jurisprudence and legal definitions of 
justice. "99 
The opening quotation to this section by Toni Morrison, whilst it refers to 
the American experience, could as well, with the questioning addition of, 
"well why then has it been written out? ", apply to the current state of 
mainstream local governance theories in the UK. Over the past fifteen 
years it can be said that in the UK a general explicit discourse on local 
governance has arisen, compared with the implicit discourse of preceding 
years reflected mainly in the grey image of "traditional local government. " 
Whilst pF'sm occupies one notch in the range of the general spectrum of this 
discourse, and that of the liberal new right another, by far the largest space is 
inhabited by what can be described as the localised theories of local 
governance. Their prominence owes much to the empirical reality that they 
have been espoused by a new Labour now controlling much of the UK's 
large urban conurbations. PF'sm obviously overlaps and is informed by as 
well as informing these localised theories through the academic and contract 
networks surrounding universities, local authorities, public sector 
"expertisation", if, once again I could "quotationalise", agencies, such as the 
Local Government Management Board, and the new right Labour Party. 
Indeed one of the hallmarks of this new explicit discourse on local 
governance, has been the growth of "think-tank" like institutions within the 
sphere of the public sector which have fed into the networked momentum of 
this particular discourse. But, as I shall argue later, this, like localised local 
governance theories, is part of a wider redefining of politics, but not, as is 
needed a "re-invention of politics. " Local socialism, as encapsulated in 
the experiences of authorities like Lambeth and the GLC in the eighties, will 
not be dealt with in this critical examination of localised theories other than 
to sketch out the temporal con tours of its origins. It will, however, be 
explored in greater detail in the sections dealing with the empirical data of 
the research. The relationship that exists between local socialism and 
localised theories is not so much one of theoretical continuities, though in 
some areas can still be seen the faint shadows of some elements of the 
former's agenda, but of theoretical discontinuities and factual continuities. 
It is about deconstructing the Hodgian phenomenon200; about asking why 
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there was the great about face, a process achieved gradually in some local 
authorities and in others through what amounted to a political putsch within 
the local Labour Party. It is, in looking at the Hodgian phenomenon, 
asking why those councillors, and in some cases senior officers, could 
through some form of apostasy, happily migrate between the two eras. 
Above all it is, given the nature of this research, about asking how and why, 
in the practical emergence of localised local governance, there was at the 
same time the deracialisation of a previously positively racialised local 
socialism. 
4.2 Origins of Localism in Local Governance 
So, what then is this localised, or "localist" theory of local governance? 
To answer that I am going to rely on the chronological and empirical 
framework provided by Cochrane201 because it fits in with my own analysis 
of the period and covers , as well, the same supporting texts. However this 
does not mean agreement with Cochrane's critique which is premised upon a 
variant radical analysis of local governance that, similar to pF'sm, places that 
political site within the framework of a global analysis of capitalism. To 
that extent there are still serious deficiencies in Cochrane's analysis, 
deficiencies which, within the context of this section's meta-critique, are 
commented upon. Chronologically within the sphere of local governance 
in the UK there is a commonly identified watershed period shift associated 
with the election of the Thatcher government in 1979. The elevation of 
this new right Conservative party to government is marked out as the 
beginning of a centralising onslaught on local government the aim of which 
was and is to depoliticise local government, siphon off a range of 
responsibilities to authorities not directly accountable to the local populace 
and facilitate the emergence, growth and influence of market forces in local 
government. Whilst this popular conception of the "beginning of it all" 
still persists in the minds of many, the fact is that at the local level changes 
were already taking place in local Labour parties which predated the election 
of the national Conservative government, changes which were reflected in 
the political complexion of those Labour groups running inner city councils 
in the wake of the 1978 local elections, particularly in London. In some 
these changes were characterised by the conscious informal alliances forged 
between certain Black community groups and the local Labour Party in 
which demands for racial justice from the former were brokered by the 
promise of action by the latter if those groups could help in delivering the 
Black vote. Labelled by some commentators as the "new urban left", many 
of the class of `78 councillors were characterised by their journey through 
higher education and previous association or sympathy with Marxist extra- 
parliamentary parties. Others had cut their activist teeth through the 
optimism and then disillusionment of the post-Heath Labour government. 
This is mentioned not as a disparaging indicator, but merely as a rough guide 
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to some of the key theoretical influences underpinning not only the eventual 
reaction to the new right onslaught on local government, but as well the 
general programme labelled local socialism. 
As a prefatory summary of a more detailed examination in the empirical 
section, local socialism can be defined not so much as the outcome of a 
coherent ideology but more as the loose framework for a number of core 
concerns which thus in micro-detail produced respectively an uneven pattern 
of growth in different local authorities. Gyford's pithy account is right, 
and that is that "these characteristics would include; a concern for issues 
hitherto absent or marginal to conventional local government, such as 
economic planning, monitoring the police, women's rights, and racial 
equality; a disdain for many of the traditional ways of conducting local 
authority business; a view of local government as an arena both for 
combatting the policies of a Conservative government and for displaying by 
example the potential of grass roots socialism; and perhaps most 
fundamentally, a commitment to notions of mass politics based upon 
strategies of decentralisation and/or political mobilisation at the local 
level. "202 Cochrane identifies three crucial features of local socialism: 203 
fa need to demonstrate practically that there was an alternative to 
TINA 
fa need to demonstrate that there was an alternative to the 
corporatist Labourism of the Callaghan government 
fa need to extend and develop democracy at the local level 
substantively in a way that recognised that "democracy is more 
than the mere right to cast a vote at elections. " 
What these summaries do not adequately capture, however, is the degree of 
differentiation and differential development of those three strands even in 
those authorities which can be readily identified as having attempted to 
achieve the political goal of local socialism; differences which attest to the 
myriad forces which were counter to that goal. Likewise the large number 
of Labour authorities which did not follow that route is evidence of the 
ideological differences in the Labour Party both within its sphere of local 
governance and nationally. As I shall show, if there is one issue that 
fractured and fissured the local Labour left, it was that of race and racism. 
On the face of it that should not be that surprising. There is a similarity 
with pF'sm in terms of the productivist change locus underpinning both such 
that at the level of meta-critique the racialised interrogation would release 
kindred general fault lines. For example the numerous times the interests 
of the "general working class", as embodied in the manual trade unions were 
privileged over the demands of racial justice; or the espousal, tolerance and 
encouraged development of a multiplicity of "ethnic/etnik" minority claims 
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in counter to political strategies of anti-racism; or the degree to which race 
equality structures were always marginalised in officer and member 
structures. Running alongside the turmoils of developing local socialism 
were a number of initiatives informed by and informing each other and 
which coalesced into the one dimensional "localist" reality of local 
government today. At the national government level, spurred on to a large 
degree by the racist representation of inner city council race equality 
initiatives - and a side that is under played by current leading theorists of 
local governance - the Conservative government was pushing through an 
explicit discourse the notion of an "enabling council", by which was meant a 
depoliticised, de-democratised, greatly reduced co-ordinating structure 
which would facilitate the marketisation of council services and 
responsibilities. At the national level the Labour Party, smarting after the 
loss of the 1987 national election, accelerated the process of acceptability by 
initiating the exorcism of the race equality demons, along with other 
identified excresences, through the deliberate prima facie acceptance of the 
existent of so-called "loony left councils. " At the local governance 
informing network level two academic and practice strands were coming 
together under the aegis of organisations like the Local Government Training 
Board, AKA the Local Government Management Board( a very significant 
change in name). Both were focussed on attempting to secure changes in 
local government which would achieve a needs led orientation to services, as 
opposed to the bureaucratic service led arrangements. In crude categorical 
terms, one was an initiative from the new right, ä las Ridley's enabling 
notion, the other an initiative from the centre which placed an emphasis on a 
community empowerment basis to needs led services. Key to the 
realisation of the former was a battery of enacted legislation, such as the 
1990 NHS Community Care Act, the 1989 Education Act, the various pieces 
of Compulsory Competitive Tendering legislation together with a steady 
decrease in the level of central government funding, which forced the issue 
of developing a so-called needs led approach. All of these forces, including 
those discourses which are communicatively distorted, such as the racist 
conventionalisation of race initiatives, coalesced around the late eighties and 
early nineties to provide the engine house for the development of the localist 
variation of local government. Theorists, like Stoker, are correct in seeing 
this approach as the new ideology of local government 204 In fact, six years 
on it should be called the new orthodoxy. As an example of the effects of 
such an approach, one cannot turn a corner in a local authority, whether 
Labour, Conservative or Liberal run for tripping over a "mission statement", 
or similar declaration of "localism". To all intents and purposes local 
authorities which ten years ago would have had distinct political cultures 
linked to the complexion of the ruling political group, are now almost 
indistinguishable from each other. This MBA convergence, which harks to 
the increasing tendency of local authorities wanting staff with a private 
sector background or qualification, covers a narrowed range of local 
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governance clustered around slight variations of localism. In looking for 
the reasons why previous local socialist councils have ended up adopting 
such an approach, it could be easily read, as some have done, as the most 
pragmatic response - the "dented shield" approach - to the Conservative 
national government onslaught. In which case those constant actors, as 
exemplified by the Hodgian effect, end up as being opportunists, and given 
the down scaling of race equality, racist opportunists. Equally it could be 
read, as the pF'sts do, as the organisational outcomes of changes in the 
mode of regulation of capital. In which case those comparator actors 
become the dupes of history. But that is too easy and convenient. Race 
then becomes again a footnote carried along with wider more substantive 
changes. We need to look beyond such simplistic notions, including the 
forces of production-relations paradigm. This will be achieved by 
examining the optimal version of localism, as espoused by Stewart, even if 
the reality is that most local authorities, even those which ostensibly 
"facade" their policies in Stewart's direction, are in fact a hybrid of localist 
approaches. 
As a brief prefatory contextualisation prelude to the detailed critique, it can 
be said that localism developed not so much temporally sequentially to local 
socialism, and not, therefore as Stoker describes it as a displacement of the 
urban left by urban managerialists, but contemporaneously to local socialism. 
It can be said as well that, whatever the criticisms of so-called local 
socialism might be, e. g. ä las Lansley's apostate version etc., it at least de- 
and reconstructed the public sphere of local governance away from the and 
municipilism and towards one that became inclusive of constituencies, such 
as Black people, women, etc, which previously had been excluded 205 It 
helped re-energise empirically the growing seventies critique of academic 
orthodox public administration. Consequently local governance, for both 
the right and wrong reasons, and in particular the attempts to positively 
racialise and engender it, came to occupy as prominent a part as national 
governance in both the local and national media. It is therefore surprising, 
given the nature of the recharged public sphere on local governance, that 
when examining the texts on localism, the dimension of equality, whether 
women's or race, is so obviously absent, apart from the occasional briefest of 
nods in the direction of an amorphous "equal opportunities". It appears 
that this latest version of the palimpsest of local governance has been 
constructed in a way that writes down the previous underlying myriad 
explicit references to race. But then, perhaps, this should not come as that 
much of a surprise because localism, in contra distinction to the attempts to 
involve the communities in a collective movement, as say the GLC 
attempted, and in contra distinction to the logic of its own 
consumer/customer/citizen involvement tenets, came about from above - the 
academic, Labour party, quasi-intellectual think-tanks network - and not 
from below. Even if it is a very crude measure of its race sensitivity, it can 
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be pointed out that there isn't one Black person involved in the writing of 
localism's texts. But then those who can be identified as pF'sm's leading 
local governance acolytes are not exempt from this type of criticism. As 
part of the research underpinning this section they were contacted to 
ascertain why they had devoted so little time and textual space to matters of 
race and equal opportunities. In each case there was a Pilate type 
displacement of referring me on to "other people" who are, or might be, 
dealing with it. 06 
4.4 Optimal Localism 
What then is this optimal version of localism? This version runs with the 
new right notion of the enabling marketised local state and attempts to both 
subvert and invert it into that which is more community and collectivist 
based. This isn't so much a defensive reaction to Thatcherist local 
governance that attempts to maximise a position of disadvantage, as a 
parallel theory of local governance, which like pF'sm, ends up with a set of 
general anticipated end points which are coincidental to the marketeers. 
In general then, all three, new right, pF'sts and localists seek to achieve a 
needs led form of local governance by addressing three broad areas: 
f the organisation of local government 
f the management of local government 
f the democratic base to local government 
In the localised version being addressed in this paper, the organisation of 
local government was prefaced in the mid to late eighties via a trenchant 
critique of the then perceived inward looking, over professionalised, service 
interest dominated local government which, it was argued, had ossified into 
a structure that was too far removed and inflexible to meet the needs of the 
local community properly. The fact that internal to many of these councils 
were equality infra-structures voicing similar criticisms, but from a targeted 
equality perspective, seems, some how, to have been overlooked by the 
localists. In one local authority, as shall be shown in detail in the empirical 
section, this blindspot was deliberately used to argue, and push through, a 
more generalised community approach in direct opposition to the then race 
and women's equality programmes. The detail of the proposals for change 
built up by the radical localists over the intervening years, and they are 
proposals - their utopian vision if you like - because there is little evidence to 
show that any council has adopted this version in toto, are aimed at securing 
a form of local governance in which the polity, resultant politics and 
policies, are more sensitively and symbiotically attuned to the local 
community. Structurally, therefore, the overall con tours of local 
government are not that much different from the new right vision, i. e. a 
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decentred structure with an organising and co-ordinating core with multi- 
faceted needs sensitive antennae at the periphery. Substantively, however, 
because there is an accompanying explicit critique of the new right market 
co-ordinating approach, the differences between the two versions become 
clear when the accountability mechanisms are examined. The radical 
localist theory puts a premium, thus, on the necessary community, i. e. 
collective, bases to local governance stressing that institutionally what is 
being talked about is a political entity controlled by the people, and not a 
supermarket. So, where marketeers speak of customers, radical localists 
speak of citizen users, with the emphasis on the implied transitive nature of 
the latter. In terms of the organisational structure of local government, the 
vision is very much that which is in current vogue, and that is one which 
envisions an organisation that is hierarchically flatter, decentralised, more 
openly in touch with local communities, but still accountable in the final 
analysis, to democratically elected representatives. 207 This new responsive 
sensitivity to communities is to be achieved in large part by developing a 
management process that is outward looking, is pro-active and intelligent 
with regard to potential problems, is quickly responsive to a fast changing 
external environment, can forge new relationships with communities and 
elected members, and is dedicatedly service oriented, i. e. wanting to improve 
services in response to challenges and local needs. Like the new right 
theorists, management as an explicit process, is excavated from its implicit 
orthodox administrative entombment and placed centre stage. 
Management in the public sector as a distinctive discourse has arrived, as 
evinced by the increasing literature on the subject - so much so that leading 
bookstores now devote separate sections to it - and the emergence of specific 
post graduate degrees in the subject. Differences between the localist local 
governance camps on management occur around their respective positioning 
with regard to the private sector. Whilst the new right champions the 
private sector as a positive management resource for the public sector, one 
that has to be tapped and emulated, the radical localist school prefers that a 
distinctive public sector model be developed, one that builds on a community 
bases to accountability, rather than the market. The question of how 
successfully the latter has been achieved, has to be posed, especially given 
the announced intent of the previous "era's" equality programmes of trying 
to develop processes which would make local government better able to 
meet the needs of Black people and women. This can best be answered by 
putting another question which is that now the managers have been 
identified, what exactly is it that they are going to manage? All the localists 
are agreed that the core activity has to be the better management of the 
service process. Reading someone like Stewart's work on the sorts of 
changes necessary to improve local government services, one is struck, 
despite the fact that much of his theory is supposedly in opposition to the 
then Conservative national government's stance, by the extent to which it 
overlaps with what might be called private sector theories of service 
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improvement. 208 The dominant, in fact the only apparent recognised 
service improvement model in local government is that of the "quality" 
paradigm. This, derived from private sector models of improving 
industrial products, has, originally from America but latterly via Japanese 
manufacturing and management techniques, from very simple notions, 
assumed an autotrophic growth rate. Quality service management has 
produced an almost seamless means of transposition from the management 
of the private sector to the public sector. Needless to say that the various 
strains of "quality" - quality control, total quality management etc. - has also 
spawned a radical localist version in which the various review and planning 
points in the quality service cycle are targeted for ensuring that they include 
the community constituencies as a means of democratising the process. 209 
Again, in both looking at the literature on the latter, and in talking to some of 
the leading writers on the subject, it is clear that equality considerations were 
not built in from the outset. In one case where the author used to be a 
senior manager in the leading decentralising local authority, it is an omission 
that has to be questioned not only because of that authority's public equality 
stance, but also because of the author's dismissive description of the equality 
staff as the "thought police. "210 In the end, however, it is clear that up to 
now many local authorities, and their prime advisory resources, like the 
LGMB, have come to rely on an eclectic mix of management and service 
improvement techniques the sum of which, in its optimal mode, can no more 
than provide the hope for a slight attenuation of the forces driving the 
accountability processes in local government. Thus, for example, far from 
providing a means for the development of community based approaches, 
those local authorities which were previously identified as "local socialist", 
have actually seen an increase internally in financial accountability systems, 
a "harder" macho type management style emerging very often linked to new 
highly specified systems of employee control, and, if it is still to be seen as 
the co-ordinating bedrock of equality and fairness within an organisation, a 
diminution in the priority previously given to equal opportunities. 
Accountability is structured systemically through the development of 
technical auditing process which mediate the relationship with communities, 
and become an instrumental substitute for democratic political processes of 
involvement and participation. 11 
With regard to the issue of local democracy there is a convergence of 
interests once again between the new right and the radical localists. Whilst 
in the former this does not emerge directly in the form of participation in the 
determination of political direction as it does with the radical localists, it 
does, however, emerge in the form of influencing outcomes via the 
expressed desire to see various consumer consultative mechanisms 
developed in local government premised on the philosophical traditional that 
this facilitates consumer choice. Despite, therefore, Cochrane's212 
supportive observation that Stewart' critique of the new right and counter 
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assertions make a strong case for the development of a distinctive public 
sector democratic model, the radical localists', if one now includes people 
like Hogget and Cochrane, case for greater democracy at the local level as 
one of the emancipative bulwarks against centralisation does not 
substantively differ from that of the new right. This is because in the end 
both camps can only ultimately offer a form of democracy that in terms of a 
content which can participatively include Black people and women non- 
conventionalisedly, is little different from what's available now. Thus, for 
example, on an issue like race equality, one strand of equality work in the 
previous public sector configuration holds that much of the initiatives 
undertaken simply fine tunes bureaucracy to avoid discrimination and that 
substantive equality requires a deconstruction and radical reconstruction of 
such organisations. If we look now at Stewart's proposals for democracy 
there is, at first reading, an attempt to innovatively inject new life into the 13 
core issue of local democracy' . Stewart describes local democracy as 
operating according to an attenuated model. By this he means that the 
overwhelming emphasis is still on local elections being the main focal point 
for local communities to be involved in democratic practices. He proposes, 
not so much an instead, as an enlargement of representative democracy 
through the establishment of a programme of initiatives, such as "citizen 
juries, which cannot only enhance the involvement of local communities as 
communities of participating citizens, but also act as an everyday critical 
counterpoint to that of the professional "expertise" of the bureaucrats. 
There is, at prima facie level much to commend this because one can almost 
see an overlap with someone like Habermas' theory of deliberative 
democracy. However, as shall be shown in the next section, there is 
equally an- overlap with someone like Beck who contends that proposed 
exercises like Stewart's, because they still cling to representative democracy 
in its current form, amount to no more than "facadism"214. That is to say 
that it does not offer a "re-invention" of what is, but merely a fine tuning of 
emerging changes, because, if one re-appraises this from a Habermassian 
perspective, one which I think can be even more radicalised, Stewart 
emphasises the requirements for institutional stability without specifying the 
requirements of justice that will ensure "that the institutional arrangements 
actually are in everyone's interest. " The contention then is that Stewart's 
localist version of local governance, i. e. the most optimal one, does not 
contain within it the necessary refinements which will ensure that the 
institutional arrangements are in Black people's interests; that despite the 
general inclusive nature of its implicit normative statement. 
4.5 Critique 
Because the radical localist perspective of Stewart is not overtly situated 
within a wider epistemological framework as, say, p F'sm is, it would be 
very easy to subject it to the type of critique someone like Cochrane or 
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Clark215 does because such a critique is premised upon a theory of capitalist 
society which has a stronger immanence than Stewart's weak normative 
vision. Thus it becomes easy to talk, as Clark does, about the 
managerialist changes in local government signalling, not so much the 
emergence of an enlightened managerocracy, as the confirmation of new 
constellations of power and control, because at the base of his critique is a 
notion of the locus of change residing in a globalising theory of capitalism 
replete with changing forces and relations of production216. But then such 
a critique runs the risk of being just as incorporative of Black people as 
Stewart's theory of local governance because it does not build in from the 
outset the considerations of Black people's interests from a non- 
oppressively, non-exploitatively and non-exclusionarily perspective. It is 
thus far better to deal with Stewart, as with pF'sm in the previous section, at 
a meta-theoretical level. 
On tologically Stewart's radical localism shifts a little way along the naive to 
critical realist position. His adherence to too literal a representation of 
representative democracy as the apical goal to which ultimately democratic 
will formation and the organisation of local government and welfare focus 
means that if the limits to Black participation are identified in such 
institutional arrangements, then, in a matter of speaking "tough! ". This 
short circuiting of what exists as institutionalised representative democracy 
and what could be, i. e. the implied normative content of Stewart's intentions 
means that Black people's interests will inevitably still have to be tied to 
existing institutional arrangements where institution is used by him in its 
literal sense. What such an on tological position then foregoes is a notion of 
representative democracy where institutional refers more to a culture of 
representative democracy, rather than hypostasizing the present system. In 
such a form, i. e. the former, the refinements proposed by Stewart might 
begin to take on a more substantively radical content because the normative 
principle of representative democracy is not circumscribed by the reality of 
the existing system, which in itself relies on the norm of liberal democracy. 
For example Stewart cites the experience of citizens' juries in some 
countries as those which if adopted in the UK would enhance democratic 
practices, and thus inter alia, be more inclusive of Black people and women. 
However, citizens' juries, because their remit extends only as far as advising 
and influencing the existing representative system on the issue at hand and 
not on either the arrangements for advisory/quasi-participative mechanisms 
or on the accountability of the representative system to the advice given, i. e. 
on the substantive types of changes to the existing institutional arrangements, 
do not offer that much more than the sorts of consultative and participative 
strategies attempted within the equality sphere under local socialism. In 
fact the one attempt at using a citizens' jury so far in the UK, conducted by a 
local authority held up as the shining example of new right Labour local 
governance, shows that far more was achieved for the public profile of the 
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authority, capitalising on the novelty value of citizen's juries, than was 
achieved on deriving new opinions, or enhancing local citizens participation 
in the democratic process. 217 It was, to all intents and purposes, an 
exercise in "facadism". Or as one critical councillor on the ruling political 
group put it when seeing the final report: "We have spent £30,000 to produce 
recommendations we already knew about. "218 
The problem might be in the form and content of liberal representative 
democracy. Mehta, in an interesting decontructive critique, shows that J. 
S. Mill's "Representative Government" and "On Liberty" were quite 
explicitly not intended for the racially visible colonies, particularly India219 
Thus Mill's description of India as "impenetrable", "a chaotic mess" and 
impervious to "all logical inquiry", as some of the indices marking it out as 
unsuitable for representative government, finds an echo in some of the 
criticisms voiced by both the Conservative and Labour governments of the 
eighties inner city local government as justification for greater control over, 
and intervention in local government. However, in terms of the racialised 
de-racialising, so to speak, the Labour Party's distancing and, in relation to 
the 1987 election, actually blaming of London race equality initiatives stands 
out as well. The subsequent dismantling of the race programmes, the 
departure of large numbers of Black employees, and the overt attempts to 
manage `race' by the Labour Party, confirms the process and effects of that 
distancing. Likewise Dhaliwal's post-modernist critique of representative 
democracy, the sort that Habermas argues can be counter-steered, is correct 
in some ways when she writes that the exclusions of racialised subjects in 
such political systems "are implicated not as mere absences but rather as 
constitutive of, perhaps even necessary for, the formation of liberal 
democracies. " She makes use of and quotes Guinier's work in the United 
States to show that "voting alone does not signal fairness....; majority rule is 
not a reliable instrument in a racially divided society...; majority rule may be 
perceived as majority tyranny...; there is nothing inherent in democracy that 
requires majority rule...; (majority rule remains) unquestioned as long as the 
majority admitted a fair number of blacks to its decision making council. "22° 
The latter point, which `represents' to day the acme of thinking on race 
equality and liberal democracies, is problematic because "whilst black 
people may vote they do not govern (so that).. when the minority votes, it 
does not mean their interests will get represented. " 221 
On tologically Stewart's localism has an implicit communitarian basis in 
which Black people are incorporated in the moral "good life" vision of the 
community and the local authority functioning largely as one, only ever 
allowed a brief social on tology via the status of being an ethnic minority. 
The potential for a quasi-fascistic avenue occurs when the question is put 
about what happens when, say Black people, speak or act out against this 
supposedly shared notion of the ethical good, i. e. question that normative 
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value. What, as is pertinent now, happens to those Black employees within 
those local authorities who speak out against that constructed ethical good 
because it presumes a priority of the community wanting better services, 
even if the realisation of that means intra authority bad treatment of those 
employees. For example many of the London local authorities which 
previously might have had explicit employment based race equality policies, 
have embarked on more generalised human resourcing policies aimed at 
making the workforce a more flexible resource in the service of "services for 
the community. "222 The rate of haemorrhage of employees, in particular 
Black employees, from such local authorities is rising. Many of these local 
authorities would happily cite the new orthodoxy as a counter to the charge 
of reneging on their commitment to race equality; a new orthodoxy in which 
the community and local authority constitute the ethical good. With some 
local authorities there has been a dissolution of attempts at a Black social on 
tology by collapsing their previous recognition of ethnic minority 
"communities" into a recognition and valuing of "diversity". But then this 
is but the new homogeneity of the position that if all is diverse there is no 
real diversity. 
Epistemologically, therefore, in the absence of genuine discursive 
knowledge processes, this radical localism, whilst nodding in the direction of 
breaching the subjectivist-objectivist divide, and thus engaging in a critical 
dialectical perspective, i. e. "draws attention to the relations of power that 
shape social reality", simply ends up refurbishing traditional local 
governance objectivism. Thus it would appear that even in this version of 
local governance the voiced experiences of Black people is interpreted not 
dialogically, but through the ultimate authority of political representatives 
and/or the use of quantifiable "facts". In terms of democratic will 
formation, because the "common good" of quality services, where it is 
assumed that communities and the local political representatives speak with 
one voice, pre-empts the limits of the framework for action, idiographic 
accounts of injustices are unilaterally filtered in the name of that "common". 
Thus even the various participative mechanisms outlined by Stewart as a 
means as well to enhance citizenship, many in contra-distinction to the 
objectivist "survey of opinions", because they will operate in a system that 
must preclude will formation in the form of discursive solidarity, will still 
relegate Black people to the status of second class citizens. The potential 
for the realisation of emancipatory knowledge interests which Stewart's 
attempt to further local participative democracy promises, exists only at the 
general level, i. e. the level that more, not less, democracy is good. 
However, stoking that emancipatory potential, through for example the 
involvement of Black Workers Groups, or community groups which demand 
to be heard, as opposed to being invited to be heard, requires a procedural 
framework that facilitates distortion free communication, including in this 
the right of such potential participants to participate, and not the prescription 
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of the ethical good; otherwise once again Black people become incorporated 
into processes. For example in the one local authority which has run a 
citizen jury, one senior insider has commentated that for the council 
involved, "their only interest is ordinary Joe Public and not the activists. s223 
Race, or issues to do with the Black communities are a no-no because they 
are too contentious, and "Black people are seen as activists. s224 
As far as the organisation of local governance and welfare is concerned, one 
is hard pressed in Stewart to find anywhere a rationale for why the changes 
to local government are taking place other than as a reaction to national 
initiatives in this area. In his first agenda setting book of the eighties, "The 
New Management of Local Government", Stewart cites a range of external 
environmental pressures - the end of continual financial growth, clear 
explicit differences amongst the three main political parties on local 
government, community pressures etc. - as the main reasons for the 
organisation of local governance, i. e. the intra, inter and extra political and 
managerial processes, needing to change. 225 On tologically, therefore, this 
lack of any further grounding to the theorisation means that there appears to 
be a naive realistic approach in which local government corresponds to and 
reacts to the reality given. This correspondence oscillates at variance with 
the dominant determinant forces only to the extent that the weakly defined 
normative framework - its utopian vision - of a local governance polity in 
which local government becomes a political organisation in, for, with and on 
behalf of the communities, can be realised. However, the main agents 
charged with securing these changes are identified in those very same 
political representatives and professional bureaucrats that are directly and 
implicitly criticised. Stewart's writings are aimed at managers and local 
politicians, not communities, the other important actors in his equation, 
whose Damascene conversion is to be secured through the traditional, very 
limited, local governance network of influence, i. e. academic institutions, 
training networks, local political networks. In reality many of the localist 
ideas emerged in local authorities via the knowledge conduit of the internal 
training functions. Epistemologically, localism, with regard to the 
organisation of welfare and local governance did not venture out of the 
traditional knowledge sources, i. e. empirical and analytical. Even the 
hermeneutic sources, for in bringing communities into the fold the everyday 
experiences of local people should be on the agenda, are not used, and by all 
accounts are still not being used, in the construction of localism theoretically 
or in practice. There is, thus, very little to no immanent standpoint from 
which Stewart can criticise the changes in local governance, some of which 
have been done in his "name", changes like the watering down of race 
equality, or the shedding of large numbers of Black employees, or the 
introduction of worse conditions of service for employees, or the 
displacement of equality grounded community and service programmes with 
broad based non-contentious community ones etc., other than attempt to 
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introduce a focus on public rather than market approaches. The 
consequence of this is that because the on tological and epistemological 
bases to the broad sweep of local governance changes envisioned by 
Stewart's localism differs little from the new right, the outlines of the 
normative frameworks converge -a physically, but not politically, decentred 
local state, a flatter hierarchy, a bureaucracy reduced and more accountable 
to the local populace, and a de-emphasis on targeted equality initiatives. 
This weak immanently based theorisation of local governance, i. e. radical 
localism, cannot therefore prevent as well a methodological convergence 
within local government processes achieved primarily through a more highly 
refined quantifiable instrumentalism in which priority is given to 
positivistically based emprico-analytical forms of accountability where the 
small range of differences hinges on the degree of emphasis of financial 
factors, such performance related pay. The irony is that the differences 
over local government by the major political parties first highlighted by 
Stewart in the early eighties, differences made visible because of initiatives 
like local socialism, no longer exist. Internally there is little difference 
now between Labour and Conservative run local authorities in London. 
Whilst it can be said that these refined forms of control are but a 
continuation of paternalistic authoritarian processes linked to a backward 
looking vision of local government in Conservative authorities, in Labour 
run ones this has been achieved by shackling ever more tightly the 
workforce. It is clear that this new instrumentalism,, that is to say "means- 
ends action .... which is judged solely on the basis of its success in realising 
the "end" to which it is oriented, " especially in the aftermath of the 1987 
Labour national election defeat, was brought into London Labour authorities 
as a counter race equality initiatives. The perceived necessity for political 
representatives of one party being re-elected was tied into promoting a 
backward looking, narrowed vision of local governance in which the 
community as a whole would be promoted via ensuring that the focus of 
local government wasn't equality, or flying the red flag, or other symbols of 
"irrelevant" activities, but good, plain old better run services; and by better 
run was meant imposing new forms of instrumental and strategic control 
over the workforce. Internally the participatory promise of localism was 
short-circuited through the defining and narrowing of the organisations 
values, usually expressed in the form of that organisation's core values. 
Again this was achieved in most authorities by senior managers working 
with members. There was very little to no involvement of communities, on 
whose behalf this was being done, or employees, those so often "valued" in 
one of the core values This stark, quasi-fascistic prescriptive definition of 
the ethical good, served as a totalising lynchpin upon which was not only 
hung phalanxes of quantified accountability processes, e. g. targets, 
performance measures, industrial production techniques etc., but as well a 
philosophy of consciousness based educational programme against which 
employees degree of alienation could be benchmarked. Where as 
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previously when race was a priority, the beginnings, no matter how flawed, 
of a redefinition and recognition of the Black person's on tological and 
epistemological processes, in the local polity e. g. the debates in and around 
"Black", in and around racism in organisations, in and around accountability 
to communities contributed participatively to the emergence and defining of 
local governance norms, now the normative framework was once again 
imposed. The critical emancipatory thrust of those discursive processes 
around racism has been disarmed twofoldedly by either acknowledging 
racism, but in a form that denies its socio-cultural and political construction 
by reducing it to an administrative responsibility, e. g. the argument that 
diversity approaches are a progression from the equality ones because they 
fit better the business argument for equal opportunities, and/or a 
displacement of racism by arguing the everlasting nature of it and thus very 
little can be done about it. As an example of this one of the then Leaders of 
a council held up as the new model Labour authority, could contemptuously 
dismiss the different equality programmes and advisors as "misfits" and hold 
out to a Black councillor colleague that the new approach is better because 
"racism will always be about. "2 6 It can be said, therefore, that because 
Stewart's localism is so ill defined, it lends itself more readily to be used as 
rhetoric for politically instrumental ends. Thus despite its inherent promise 
of de-bureaucratisation, community participation, and accountability, 
localism where it has been given this ostensible legitimating role, has in fact 
been a "new coat of paint" job for a local government that has repositioned 
the hierarchy, is far less participative, and far more authoritarian. 
Compared with the "old" organisation of local government and welfare, the 
average Black user, if one uses that category of user as exemplifying those 
most likely to be in need, has in actual fact a greater distance to cover to get 
to arenas of decision making than she/he did before. Using the 
Habermassian knowledge categories as simply that, i. e. categories and not in 
any foundationalist quasi-transcendentalist way, allows us to show how local 
governance epistemologies have become more empirico-analytically 
organised, i. e. aimed at technical control over external and internal nature, 
and not less, as is held out in the claims made by its publicity handouts. 
This is not a further digression into meta-theoretical matters of epistemology, 
but a means of getting to grips with the early manifestations of a racism 
reforming itself within the provenance of the "equal opportunities" public 
sector which is distinct from previous scientific and cultural forms of racism. 
More importantly it is a form of racism that coincides within local 
governance with the emergence and attempted implementation of localism. 
The process of the emergence of this new form of racism will be illustrated 
by the empirical details contained in chapter 11. The key question for this 
chapter is the extent to which this co-incidence of localism is not that but in 
fact a more substantive relationship. That is to say that localism is being 
defined in practice deliberately against the previous era of local governance 
which attempted to build in an explicit space for Black people, and being 
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defined within an environment that no longer allows for anti-racists and 
Black people to contest the chosen means and resultant outcomes. Certainly 
if we look at the afore mentioned new model labour authority, one which has 
overtly used Stewart's theories and which is an influential element in the 
redefined network of influence on local governance in the UK, then a 
number of features can be mentioned. 227 It took on board the perceived 
need to make the authority a more flexible, more sensitive to the changing 
environment, and more accountable to the local communities organisation, ä 
las Stewart. It has initiated a series of quantitative and industrial 
manufacturing based internal management accountability systems, e. g. 
quality service programs. It has also embarked on a developing programme 
of community affairs ostensibly aimed at improving the level of citizenship 
in the borough and inter alia the level of feedback from the local populace. 
On the other hand it has also, in the name of a more general community, 
wiped out first its race and women's equality infra-structure, and latterly its 
replacement generic equality infra-structure. It has made employees more 
authoritarianally accountable to its internally defined core values to the 
extent that Black employees have been sanctioned for disagreeing with the 
newly defined equality disposition of the organisation. It has run down the 
level of consultative processes on race issues both within and without the 
council. In sum it has come to characterise the new form of racism, a 
pattern that is being repeated in other local authorities and which lies implicit 
in the new right Labour's communitarian stance on local issues. This is 
perhaps best summed up by one of that council's ex-Leaders who was 
overheard saying, after a heated debate at committee with race equality 
advisers, "What exactly do they want or expect? This is all they are going 
to get. "228 By the latter was meant that the Labour perception of racism 
and its solutions were the limits to change. At the local level, both 
internally within the organisation of local government, and externally for the 
"local communities" via national political parties' nascent election 
manifestos, rights and responsibilities are being defined, including 
citizenship rights which have attached expected duties. For example within 
local government one of the new internal control processes being initiated is 
the management led defining of a supervision policy in which are specified 
the rights and responsibilities of managers and employees in the supervision 
process; this being done in the name of better management in the public 
sector. 229 In one authority attempts to include within the policy a clear 
race and women's equality dimension, as would have been done a few years 
ago, were opposed by senior management and removed from the policy 
despite the large female and Black workforce. 230 Thus the responsibility 
placed upon Black employees in the policy "not to be late for supervision 
sessions" coupled, say, with the unspoken "public knowledge" of B(lack) 
P(eople's) T(ime), within a work environment that has seen the equality 
support infra-structure for Black employees wiped out, means that their so- 
called right not to be harassed in the process might exist only as a paper 
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right. Likewise the debate about responsibilities, a debate taking place 
without the participation of huge swathes of the population, particularly the 
Black populations, are throwing up "common sense" responsibilities which 
appear to stand in stark contrast to certain sections of the Black populations 
without actually saying so. It becomes another way in which the old 
unresolved anthropophargi are re-activated, maintaining the communicative 
dominating hierarchy. The emerging political consensus around the non- 
desirability of single parent mothers as the space inducing and temporal 
afterburner placing stick with which to beat the youmg feckless, 
irresponsible Afro-Caribbean women, is symptomatic of this new process. 
Might one call this "ethico-rational" or "ethical" racism? 
4.6 Summary and Conclusion 
It is not being suggested that this new form of racism can be laid at the door 
of theorists like Stewart, but rather that his general, non-specific on 
tologically grounded theory has facilitated the emergence of this racism in 
local governance practice possibly because it has become a convenient peg 
upon which local politicians could hang a less overtly positively racialised 
local government arrangement. As with post-Fordism, we can summarise 







Meta-theoretical 1 3 5 
considerations 
Agency 2 4 6 
At this level of analysis we have not sought to engage with the detail of a 
meso-theoretical approach, as say Cochrane attempts to do because that level 
of analysis, whilst it is adequate in providing an iempirical point to point 
contestation, is still not abstract enough to reconcile the issue of racism and 
Black interests, where the latter is used categorically and not essentially. 
However, this abstracted form of critique does provide the framework within 
which the meso details of localism can be accessed. For example, it will be 
possible, as I show in the next section which attempts to delineate a 
Habermassian perspective on local governance, to deal with an issue like 
"quality" which moves beyond the productivist type critique of managerialist 
techniques which someone like Cochrane indulges in. For the purposes of 
this type of critique empirical examples have been provided at key points to 
illuminate critical themes. 
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As far as democratic will formation (1 & 2) is concerned it has been argued 
that Stewart's radical localism is still on tologically not critical enough to the 
extent that he remains too tied to an orthodox notion of representative 
democracy, i. e. one that, even with his participatory embellishments, still 
relies on the existing party political power configurations. As a result the 
problems of race and racism, which under local socialism were explicit 
considerations, remain and are exacerbated because the avenues for Black 
political involvement, that is to say the conditions for non-distorted 
communication, become incorporated into general notions of the community. 
The danger thus is that because localist theorists, like Stewart, have not 
outlined the baseline parametrical principles, other than by alluding to them 
via liberal usage of key terms, like "democracy", "citizen", "community", 
etc. is that his outcome vision, which has the potential to be substantively 
radical, is short changed because the naive realism of the practitioners 
ensures that the minimalist path, which is ever present in a generalist 
approach such as his, is clung to. Epistemologically therefore, his theory 
allows for the hermeneutic, i. e. the expressions, values and experiences of 
communities, to enter the decision making arena, but because his grounding 
for his version of democracy does not cross over into what could be 
described as critical emancipatory, in other words his notion of 
representative democracy is conflated with existing institutional 
arrangements, it allows for so-called democratic enhancement initiatives, 
such as citizen juries etc., to be strategically hijacked. That is to say that 
even here the democratic interaction with others is dependent upon 
background taken for granted norms, and/or strategic power and money, 
rather than discursive agreement. It is thus the continuing basis for Black 
people remaining as second class citizens. 
In terms of the organisation of local governance and welfare (3 & 4, and 5& 
7) there is within Stewart's localism a glimmer of ideally what could be, 
emancipatively. The notion of more flexible, learning, possibly reflexive, 
democratic organisation providing local services with and for local 
communities via active citizen involvement has a distant resonance with the 
implications of a theory like Habermas' where emancipatory impulses can be 
seen to emanate from attempts to reduce the seams between lifeworld, civil 
society and the state. However in the latter case this is grounded in a social 
theory that seeks to reduce the structures of force and power in the 
relationships of communication. In Stewart no such critical ontological 
grounding exists. As a result the form of democratic politics in which 
public opinion becomes a form of "social-psychological variable to be 
manipulated" continues because at the end of the day dominant power 
relationships tied to party political interests ensures that it is not possible to 
"to create by means of public communication within these organisations" an 
open communicative structure. Little wonder then that internally within 
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local government in the UK there has been not so much an increase in "open 
discursive" communicative structures as an increase in non-communication 
action based forms of instrumental and strategic action processes designed in 
the first instance to re-assert newer forms of control over the workforce; 
controls which cut off their involvement, which they previously might have 
had, in the communicative processes of the organisation. For example in the 
boroughs being looked at in the empirical section it is noticeable how, in the 
first instance, the implementation of these processes were accompanied first 
by reducing the involvement of trade unions, then a worsening of employee 
conditions, then a reduction in the official time allowed for various self 
organised groups. At the same time the bases for the programme of 
community development, funding and participation changed to a more 
overtly instrumental based financial contract one. Epistemologically thus 
the knowledge bases of local governance and welfare has changed over the 
past ten years, not in the direction of more inter-subjective contingent 
constructions agreed between public and bureaucracy, but more in the 
direction of an increase in empirico-analytically arrived at quantifiable 
information which allows politicians and managers to exert more direct 
control over employees and the interface between the organisation and the 
local communities. For Black people we can summarise it by imagining the 
response from one of these council's legal departments, "You cry racism, 
and we can show statistically that we are a fair and non-racist organisation. " 
Finally if we look at the issue of agency across all three categories, we find 
that there is a common thread. This is that whilst Stewart outlines an end 
vision in his localist theory in a way that suggests he is talking, as Habermas 
does, about change through radical democratisation, the actual loose 
structure of his thinking allows the fulcrum of change to be sited with those 
self same managers and politicians who have most to lose by those changes. 
Change is to occur voluntaristically through attitudinal change strategies 
occasioned via such mechanisms as training. The role of local 
communities, at whom these changes are ostensibly directed, and in 
particular Black communities, remains relegated to that of being participants 
without substantive power or influence in a series of existing 
institutionalised councillor representative democratic fine tuning initiatives. 
The question thus of who exactly will put race on the agenda is pertinent. 
For example in one of the boroughs concerned in this study, the initial 
pursuit of Stewart inspired Public Service Orientation programmes was 
conducted quite distinctly and deliberately parallel to already existing 
detailed race and women's equality service programmes within a local 
political climate that favoured a more general "everyone-is-disadvantaged- 
community" approach . 
231 As shall be shown in the chapters on the 
empirical details, localists like Stewart, have unwittingly allowed themselves 
and their theories to be part of the process that has turned back the clock in 
local government on race equality. 
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Chapter 5 
Version 3- The Critical Theory of Habermas and its Implications 
for Local Governance 
5.1 Theoretical Overview 
Whilst both pF'sm and Stewart's localism have been critiqued as exemplars 
of current so-called progressive local governance theorisation that still omit 
from substantive considerations the reality of the UK as a multi- 
racial/cultural society, and thus omit this dimension from proper recognition 
in the political processes, there is another level at which these two variants of 
local governance theory can be compared. This is that whilst both 
advocate more democracy, though in different ways, as a solution to the 
regeneration of local governance, each in their own respective ways 
represent as well the two key categories of social theorising. In the former 
can be seen an objectivating attempt to ground local governance in a 
productivist teleology which ultimately has immense difficulty in reconciling 
the subjectivist experiences of those participating in this playing out of 
deeper level determining forces. In the latter can be seen an attempt to 
bring those subjective experiences into the equation, but by limiting the 
objective level to that of a communitarian horizon. In the gaps exposed in 
the critique provided above of these two, Black people fall through. It is 
thus apposite to try and outline a Habermassian approach to local governance 
because ultimately he attempts a radical communicatively negotiated third 
way in social theorising, as opposed to the speciousness of new right 
Labour's `Third way', one that avoids the pitfalls of previous philosophy of 
consciousness approaches. 
Whilst Habermas has not written specifically about local governance, he has 
outlined a detailed theory that attempts to link individual, and, under certain 
circumstances, collective agency, with wider structures and forces. There 
are thus within the greater purviews of his work, theories of the state, power, 
democratisation and individual and social on tology. Within this the 
contention is that there is the potential scope for the inclusive participation of 
smaller narratives without any form of deleterious incorporatism. I use the 
description "potential" because it prefaces and marks up, as shown in the 
previous chapter, the fact that in relation to the full recognition of Black 
people's existence, parts of his theory need greater refining. In summary 
then Outhwaite232 has pithily described his work in terms of that of being 
"modernity ... seen as offering a highly conditional promise of autonomy, justice, democracy and solidarity". Thus his project over the past 35 years 
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can be described as follows: "to reanimate in new and expanded forms the 
critical thrust and the practical impulse of Marxist philosophy and social 
theory, recombining theory and practice in a manner which can be defended 
in the modern world. "233 More pertinently the modem world is seen as 
that in which the democratic processes of the West are being severely tested 
by the problems of increasing social complexity, racial, cultural, class and 
gendered pluralism and the legacy of welfarism. In other parts of the 
globe where democratic impulses are increasing, the process of the 
conscious construction of democracy and law includes as well the choice 
between working with second-hand democratic institutions and processes, 
ones that are and have been under serious questioning, or seizing the window 
of opportunity to learn from these critiques, and embark on a radicalised 
democratic venture. In the latter regard Habermas has already addressed 
the area of Korea and the similarities and dissimilarities between the 
problems of reunification there and that of Germany. 234 One might add to 
this list as well the construction of democratic institutions, processes and 
post-apartheid law in South Africa as another area with significant potential. 
Nearer to home, but pertinent as well to countries like South Africa, Gutman 
puts the key question as: 
"What does it mean for citizens with different cultural identities, often based on 
ethnicity, race, gender or religion to recognise ourselves as equals in the way we are 
treated in politics? ' . 235 
To this must be put the crucial qualification, as was done in the 
`introduction', that these differences are often unjustly structured through 
racism and sexism. 
The goal Habermas is attempting to reach is summarised in his own words 
thus: 
"Even in established democracies...... the unrest has a still deeper source, 
namely, the sense that in an age of completely secularised politics, the rule of 
"236 law cannot be had or maintained without radical democracy. 
And that we can still talk about "socialism" if one conceives it 
"as the set of necessary conditions for emancipated forms of life about which 
the participants themselves must first reach an understanding, then one will 
recognise that the democratic self-organisation of a legal community constitutes 
the normative core of this project as well. 1,9237 
5.2 On the State 
How then is this vision of a radicalisation of democracy connect with his 
theory of the state? Habermas writings on the state have evolved over the 
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past three decades. There is thus a certain tension between differing 
emphases of certain elements over time. His theory of the modem 
European capitalist state emerges out of his reworking of historical 
materialism into that of an evolutionary theory of social development and 
social learning which is not teleological but simply attempts to provide the 
ideational framework in which underlying trends in different societies can be 
recognised. Within this framework the modem capitalist state can be 
understood in relation to internal and external aspects. Internally the 
modern state is the "result of the economic differentiation of an economic 
system which regulates the production process through the 
market .... (and)... organises the conditions under which the citizens as 
competing and strategically acting private persons carry on the production 
process. " 38 The state thus vouches safe the conditions - civil law, money 
system etc. - for the continuing existence of a depoliticised economic process 
free from moral norms and use value orientations. Externally, because of 
the nature of the evolution of the European state, the political autonomy of 
the state "is based on a reciprocal recognition that is sanctioned by the threat 
of military force... despite the agreement of international law... "239 The core 
problem for the modem state is that of legitimacy where this is understood as 
"the worthiness of the political order to be recognised . ))240 Legitimacy of 
the state is linked to the ability of the state to secure its social integrative 
responsibilities at the same time that it guarantees systemic integration. The 
three cardinal tasks for the state thus are: "shaping a business policy that 
ensures growth, influencing the structure of production in a manner oriented 
to collective needs, and correcting the pattern of social inequality. "241 
There is thus in built a substantive conflict or contradiction which is that the 
state has to perform all these tasks without "violating the functional 
conditions of a capitalist economy. " The main legitimation problem then, 
is that the accomplishments of the capitalist economy has to be represented 
by the state as the best way of satisfying generalizable interests, i. e. it 
obligates itself to "keep dysfunctional side effects within acceptable limits. " 
The success then of the state in aiding legitimation turns on the degree to 
which it can satisfactorily carry out its programmed tasks. Within the 
processes of the modem state there are two models of legitimacy - the 
technocratic and participation models. Sociologically these in turn devolve 
upon two types of legitimation; the empiricist and the normativist. In the 
former legitimation turns on "the belief that the structures, procedures, 
actions, decisions, policies, officials or political leaders of a state possess the 
quality of rightness, of appropriateness of the morally good and ought to be 
recognised in virtue of this quality. "242 However in the latter legitimation 
arises out of good reasons where such "good reasons" have been ascertained 
through "the performative attitude of a participant in argumentation and not 
through the neutral observation of what this or that participant in a discourse 
holds to be good reason. "243 This locks into Habermas' conception of 
power. Some critiques have erroneously contrasted what they perceive to be 
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his concept of power with that of Foucault via the twofold categorisation of 
power theorising as that of either being juridical or disciplinary. The 
former is based on viewing power as being possessed, flowing from a central 
source from top to bottom and primarily repressive. The latter views 
power as being exercised, coming from the bottom up, and not so much 
repressive as productive. The criticism of Habermas is that his model 
belongs more to the former and fails to take account of the implications of 
the latter. However as Outhwaite has pointed out, Habermas, whose 
concept of power is derived from theorists like Arendt where power results 
from the self-empowerment of a political collectivity, unlike Foucault, has a 
"model to oppose to that of the undifferentiated universality of power 
relations". 244 There is thus a distinction which can be made in Habermas' 
theory between authorial power, i. e. the exercise of power authorised as a 
result of processes involving participants in argument, and domination which 
is the exercise of unauthorised power. Whilst both were committed to the 
critique of power and the pathologies of power in the polity of the modern 
bureaucratised welfare state, it is only in Habermas, because his normative 
position allows for the potential of an alternative, that there is the beginning 
of an attempt to work out a more democratic control of state. This is based 
on his communicative grounded notion of rationality, where "rationalisation 
means extirpating those relations of force that are inconspicuously set in the 
very structures of communication and that prevent conscious settlement of 
conflicts and consensual regulation of conflicts, by means of intrapsychic as 
well as interpersonal communicative barriers,..... means overcoming such 
systematically distorted communication in which the action supporting 
consensus concerning the reciprocally raised validity claims.... can be 
sustained in appearance only, that is, counterfactually. "245 This of course 
links back into his categorical distinction made between purposive rational 
and communicative actions, between objectivating learning processes and 
those of moral-practical insight, between forces of production and social 
integration; and the prioritisation of the development of normative structures 
and new forms of social integration in social evolution which then make 
possible the development, deployment of productive forces. It is clear 
then that in Habermas' conception of power that purposive rational action, 
which encompasses instrumental and strategic action, of itself gives rise to 
domination and thus distorted communication; and that communicative 
action as the interactive process of inter-subjective communication, can only 
occur when their isn't an asymmetry of power. If new forms of social 
learning, social development and social integration can only arise out of 
communicative action which then make possible alternative productive 
forces developments, and by new Habermas here I think means better, where 
better is referenced to his ideal end goal, then the crucial question is how 
processes and experiences of intersubjective communication can, 
oxymoronically speaking, become dominant in democratic control over the 
polity. 
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To answer that means firstly putting more flesh on Habermas' thinking on 
the relationship between the market, the administrative state, the public 
sphere and individual lifeworlds. It is true, as Ray points out, that 
Habermas sees strategic action as being "stored" in markets and 
bureaucracies; though I would add that his view is that it is purposive 
rational action, i. e. both instrumental and strategic action that is stored. 246 
These, in the evolutionary path of modem capitalist society, become 
separated from the lifeworld which they "then retroactively colonise". In 
Habermas' second volume of his "Theory of Communicative Action", he 
appropriates Parson's concept of steering media to explain the development 
of money and power, exhibited through the market and state administrative 
apparatus, as the main forms of systemic separation from the lifeworld. 
The notion of storage derives from Parson's three defining criteria for such 
media: they can be measured, they can be alienated in specific amounts, they 
can be stored. These media co-ordinate social exchanges without the need 
for consensus. That is to say the form of exchange is no longer dependent 
upon linguistic interchange. The arguments against the use of systems 
theory will be dealt with later, suffice to say that for Habermas the notion of 
systematic steering is required in order that the complexities of modem 
capitalist society can be explained. In addition to which, unlike Marx who 
envisaged a "redemptive" return to societal structures favouring a direct 
unalienated control over labour processes by those involved, Habermas sees 
the advent of such steering systems as an evolutionary gain. Now whilst 
these media react back upon the lifeworld, they do not necessarily do so in a 
way that prompts a questioning of their normative anchoring. In fact such 
media are embedded in the institutional, social organisational and normative 
frameworks that criss-cross the lifeworld. They are, in other words, 
legitimated. For example the belief that local government generally is a 
"good thing" is one level of normative framing for people. However the 
actual institutional, organisational and extent of democratic content 
structuring is subject to various degrees of legitimation crisis prompted by 
the inherent contradictions of such media attempting to maintain systemic 
integration at the same time as satisfying the requirements for social 
integration. These questionings of the normative underpinnings of, say, 
power media, become more pronounced as more areas of the lifeworld are 
"colonised" by monetization and bureaucratisation. As an example of the 
latter, the intrusion into the lifeworlds of single parent families in inner city 
areas by housing department rules and regulations, latterly prompted by the 
racist constructions of morality of the conservative national government, 
increases the likelihood of there being a questioning by those groups of 
service users, of the way in which Housing departments work, or local 
government, or both. However, more often than not, it is the embeddedness 
of these media in normative frameworks that allows structures of inequality, 
domination and oppression to become invisible. Because of the inherent 
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nature of media in which social exchange occurs through purposive rational 
action they evade the need for the sort of justification contained in the 
validity claims of linguistic communication. Questions of legitimacy are 
either avoided, or, where they surface, "public relationed". 
Habermas' theory of lifeworld colonization was touched on in the last 
section. In his "Theory of Communicative Action", he uses the welfare 
state to exemplify his concept of lifeworld colonisation and in the process 
flesh out the types of relationships between the steering media and 
lifeworlds. A brief summary would be useful because it would be the basis 
upon which to go on to look at the earlier mentioned shift in emphasis 
between the earlier and later Habermas over the core concerns about the 
degree or extent of radicalisation of the representative democratic process. 
For Habermas the welfare state arises in order to fill the functional spaces 
left by the market and, Keynsian style, to offset the tendency of the rate of 
profit to fall. This results in a re-politicisation of the market and in so 
doing gives rise to counter demands from the beneficiaries and participants 
in welfare, trade unions, "clients", political parties etc., for more state 
intervention and planning. Two fault lines then begin to appear. Firstly 
because the welfare state does not "produce" but is reliant upon fiscal 
revenue, it becomes an area of contestation between those wanting more and 
those wanting less. At the same time that the expansion of the welfare state 
carries with it the capacity to meet certain needs, the power to intervene, in a 
dependency making way, into the lifeworlds of "clients". Social integration, 
one of the welfare state's primary goals, also results in lifeworld 
disintegration. This process of social differentiation can lead in three 
possible directions: individual pathology, e. g. mental illness or apolitical 
"career/familial privatism", a defensive reclamation of imagined pasts, e. g. 
the new moralists constructions of the "ideal family", or the individual 
and/or social questioning, through new discursive practices, of capitalism, 
e. g. new social movements. Important to the latter, and thus emancipatory 
politics, is the development of new autonomous, critical public spheres. 
These are important because they provide they provide the amniotic fluid in 
which the processes giving rise to the consensual resolution of conflicting 
validity claims can grow. They are therefore the seed beds for forms of 
democratic will formation arrived at through inter-subjective 
communication. What exactly is the public sphere? Habermas developed 
the notion of the public sphere via an examination of early bourgeois society 
"when the developing market economy extended beyond the bounds of 
private authority and constituted a sphere of public opinion where argument 
proceeded according to rules of public debate (as opposed to prejudice or 
custom). "247 There are two core concerns. Firstly there is the conception of 
the public sphere "as a sphere between civil society and the state in which 
critical public discussion of matters of general interest was institutionally 
guaranteed.... " Secondly there is the interest in the quality inherent in such a 
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sphere where communication was conducted on the basis of mutual 
acceptance of participants on equal footing. Habermas is aware, however, 
of the underlying contradictions notably that whilst such a sphere asserted 
that it was there for the general interest, the right to participate was 
constituted on the basis of private property. The homogeneity of cultural 
background of the permitted communicative participants, which, whilst it 
allowed more easily for the process of inter-subjective communication, i. e. a 
commonality of background values and normative frameworks, to occur, 
also excluded, the heterogeneous - women, nascent working classes, Black 
people, of which there were relatively many in 18th century London. 
However, with the advent of mass democracy whilst some potential 
participants were systematically excluded from the public sphere via a range 
of pseudo scientific reasons, e. g. the natural inferiority of women, or Black 
people, others, i. e. white working class men or those representing those 
interests, entered with demands for state intervention to cover the failings of 
the market. Thus we arrive at the public sphere of social welfare 
democracies which is characterised by competition among different 
organisations representing associated constituencies which enter into power 
broking agreements with the government, whilst excluding the public. In 
such a climate rational political debate is replaced with publicity 
machinations through which loyalty to political parties is achieved 
instrumentally. It is with the analysis of the latter developments that 
Habermas can derive the focus of his study as that of being about the 
transformation and disintegration of the public sphere. Despite the "fact" 
of the current state of he public sphere, there is a "norm" which can be 
critically revived within which citizens can debate the key issues of the 
democratic political process and thus influence the direction of political 
action. Leaving aside the implicit assumption of "cultural" homogeneity in 
Habermas' public sphere theory, about which, in any event, it is not clear 
whether or not it is a principled condition or merely a practical convenience, 
it can be seen how the "public sphere" comes to be an important 
intermediary in the development of a changing, flexible, interactive seam 
between the lifeworld and the political system. The extent to which 
influencing and guidance become actual "taking of decisions" remains an 
area of ambivalence in Habermas. Clarification of this, or a radical 
development of this, is important in the area of local governance, especially 
in relation to areas of constructed gender and racial inequality, for it begins 
to tell us how far it is possible to include as a reasonable demand, the 
democratic reconstruction of representative democratic institutions which are 
genuinely open to all. Thus the earlier writings of Habermas indicate that a 
radical, democratic and directly participative restructuring of representative 
democratic institutions is desirable. In other words "it might yet be 
possible to create by means of public communication within these 
organisations `an appropriate relation between bureaucratic decision and 
quasi-parliamentary deliberation"'. 248 Yet in his Theory of 
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Communicative Action, and in the subsequent debate over that piece of 
work, he had come around to the view that: 
"there is no longer much prospect of the democratic reshaping from within of a 
differentiated economic system by means of worker self management, in other 
words by switching from money and organisational power completely over to 
participation"249 
In a sense this is no more than a restatement of his thinking that 
bureaucracies because they are repositories of strategic and instrumental 
action, cannot be transformed into inter-subjective communicative action 
based organisations; or is it a surrender to systems theory of the sort Marxists 
did in the name of "political autonomy". Outhwaite attempts to state the 
problematic in terms of two possible hypothetical extreme interpretations of 
Habermas. These are; 
"Everyone affected by legal and political decisions should discuss them until 
there is complete agreement about them. " 
and 
"Legal and political decisions are complicated matters which 
"2so should be left to experts. 
The first equates to a form of radical anarchism, almost like that of 
Chomsky's. The second is associated with a form of politically 
conservative systems theory, such as that of Luhmann. Now whilst 
Haberman has been interpreted as meaning the first version, and his earlier 
work gives that impression, his later work actually demonstrates that he 
rejects that version on the grounds of practicality. As for the second version 
he rejects that on principle. This is an important distinction because it sets 
what I believe to be a continuum, rather than a rupture in his thinking, and, 
that therefore, the principle of the first version, which I think is contained in 
his theory, is the normative framework. Thus unlike Ray who, following 
Benhabib, describes Habermas' theory as "normative critique", which it is, 
as opposed to "utopian transfiguration", which is associated more with the 
earlier Frankfurt school. The former is oriented towards achieving what is 
promised by the official values of society, such as women's and race 
equality. The latter is oriented towards establishing "qualitatively new 
needs, social relations and modes of association" as the utopian prerequisite 
for emancipation. Habermas' theory is aimed at the politics of 
"fulfilment", i. e. "mature realism about attainable objectives and plural 
democratic practice, and not the politics of "redemption" involving 
"immature anti-modernist romanticism and totalitarian leanings towards total 
reconstruction". 251 This, however, is too caricatured a dual categorisation. 
Habermas' theory does contain a utopian element, even if it is one that 
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insists on participants constructing it in communication. It is certainly 
modernist and oriented towards achievable goals, but within a continuum 
framework that links it to greater inter-subjective communicative practice. 
Where one draws the definitive, demarcating line between the two ends of 
the spectrum is a matter of practicality, still to be discursively defined, and 
not principle. Outhwaite's assessment of Habermas' political stance, 
especially vis-a-vis socialism, appears to be "realistic" about his "realism"; 
and an encapsulation of this "realism" will serve as an introduction to his 
latest work. Thus Habermas' "politics were always reformist, rather than 
revolutionary, social democratic, rather than communist, .......... (contends 
that) ... modern societies cannot realistically 
hope to replace market structures 
as a whole without risking worse problems than those of capitalism 
itself.... defines socialism as radical democracy". 252 
Habermas' latest work, "Between Facts and Norms", is to date his most 
definitive elaboration of the theoretical and conceptual implications for 
politics and the state arising from the "linguistic turn" in his thinking. 253 It 
is also a work that at one level confirms Outhwaite's "realistic" summation 
of Habermas' direction, and yet, which, if held up to scrutiny against the 
internal normative framework of the project, must hold out for the possibility 
of a more radical outcome. The "linguistic turn" is premised upon a core 
idea that every normal act of language usage involves certain 
presuppositions, universal presuppositions, which are: 
f that what is being said is true 
f that what is being said is normatively correct 
f that what is being said is done so sincerely and authentically. 
This is a conception of communication oriented towards understanding. 
Of course other acts of communication, such as lying, jokes, commands etc. 
are acknowledged as forms of communication, but not forms which give rise 
to understanding. The latter, i. e. ones in which agreement is reached in 
advance of action, are identified as one form of co-ordination of action. It 
arises out of deliberation. The other form of co-ordination is post event. 
That is to say it co-ordinates the consequences of certain types of action. 
Habermas identifies, as examples of that, the market, legal and 
administrative political systems. Democracy, or more specifically 
"deliberative democracy", as shall be outlined further on, should be the 
determining co-ordinating mechanism, one that enables everyone having the 
opportunity to participate in decisions which affect and concern them. On 
the basis of this, and as a supplement, Habermas has developed a discourse, 
communicatively grounded theory of ethics which contends that agreements 
arrived at through deliberation are not only issues of fact but as well moral 
issues involving universalistic questions. There is a distinction made 
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between ethical considerations related to specific contextualised forms of 
life, and moral questions necessitating universalist reasoning. A discourse 
ethics, on the other hand, rides the tension between "the formal and 
communitarian traditions of ethical thought: moral judgments are neither just 
expressions of social conventions, nor reached deductively by individuals 
who are in principle isolated from one another and alone with their 
consciences. "254 In "Between Facts and Norms", Habermas applies these 
principles to the arenas of law and the political state; principles which can be 
attained through "deliberative democracy. 
When Habermas writes about the constitution he writes as well about the 
Western constitutional state embodying aa postconventional consciousness 
because the inhering differentiation between `fact' and `norm' requires that 
all legislation should be evaluated according to the normative principles 
underpinning the constitution. These precepts hold out the unredeemed 
validity claims that all citizens, in its broadest sense of living and/or working 
in that country, should be involved in the consensual formation of that norm. 
Constitutional democracy, or more accurately deliberatively discursive 
democracy, is thus also held up, as well, against those who argue not only 
from a religiously fundamentalist point of view which has inherent a 
conventional group and/or national identity, but as well from an essentialised 
notion of communities. The constitution, then is not held up as some form 
of social utopia, but as the "ideal projection of a concrete form of life. " 
5.3 On Democracy 
Deliberative democracy, as outlined in this work, is a coincidence both of his 
previous thinking and at the same time a response to legitimation deficits 
which afflict industrial democracies, and thus ultimately impinge upon and 
influence the world wide democratising movement. In general such 
notions of democracy, and there are other theories of deliberative democracy, 
e. g. Fishkin, "reflect a concern that citizens' participation in the democratic 
process have a rational character..... a process of thoughtful intercation and 
opinion formation in which citizens become informed of better arguments 
and more general interests. "255 For, Habermas, however, as evidenced in 
BFN, deliberative democracy is the practice of realising the legal, political 
and institutional implications of his earlier thinking. In his analysis of the 
law and the polity Habermas approaches it in terms of a tension between 
facts and norms because, in the case of law, say, it is "a system of coercible 
rules and impersonal procedures that involves an appeal to reasons that all 
citizens should, at least ideally, find acceptable. "2S In arriving at this 
position, whilst Habermas is indebted to Kant's notion of legitimacy, he 
realises that the growth of empirical science and other world views have 
rendered such grand metaphysical schemes implausibly untenable. One of 
the key consequences of this is that reason has become conflated with such 
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approaches and thus instrumentalised. The solution lies in adopting a post- 
metaphysical approach to reason, where "a post-metaphysical vindication of 
reason is possible only insofar as philosophy can show how the use of 
language and social interaction in general necessarily rely on notions of 
validity, such as truth, normative rightness, sincerity and authenticity. " For 
Habermas the idea of validity in communication and social interaction 
involves a recourse at some point to unconditionality, which I understand to 
be a universalising moment, that takes that claim to validity out of its 
immediate context. Or, as Rehg, puts it, "the tension between the strongly 
idealising, context transcending claims to reason and the always limited 
contexts in which human reason must ply its trade. "257 Now with regard to 
law, it has been pointed out that Habermas regards law as a co-ordinating 
mechanism post event, as opposed to communication which is pre action. 
Communicative co-ordination in Habermas' work assumes a "large 
background consensus on matters which are unproblematic for group 
members because it brackets off an assumptive context which other wise 
might be open to challenge. However in the case of law in modern 
societies resolution of conflicts must occur across a number of groups with 
different cultural backgrounds, and thus different shared assumptions. The 
conditions for reaching shared agreement is thus decreasing. Under such 
conditions strategic action assumes a greater importance in the medium of 
co-ordination, e. g. as in the case of the market. Modem law enters the 
realm of social co-ordination, thus, where "societal pluralisation has 
fragmented shared identities and eroded the substantive lifeworld resources 
for consensus and functional demands of material reproduction call for an 
increasing number of areas in which individuals are left free to pursue their 
own ends according to the dictates of purposive rationality. "258 Mirroring 
this internal duality, this tension, is as well, an external tension between the 
normative promise of the constitutional democratic legal order and the ways 
in which social power intrudes and disrupts the attainment of those goals. 
Habermas draws this out in an analysis of what he perceives to be the one 
sided approach of theorists, like Rawls and Luhmann, an analysis which will 
not be gone into at this stage. The crux of his argument is, however, this: " 
if an account of modern law is to be neither sociologically empty nor 
normatively blind, then it must incorporate a dual perspective... (which).... 
can ignore neither the participants' own normative understanding of their 
legal system nor those external mechanisms and processes that are accessible 
to the sociological observer. " To this extent then "the rule of law is 
internally related to deliberative democracy. "259 
But what then is Habermas' specific conception of deliberative democracy? 
His, as opposed to what Benhabib has described as "an agonistic" model, is a 
proceduralist view of deliberative democracy and politics. 260 This is 
developed in contra-distinction to the liberal paradigm and, not so much in 
contra-distinction as a refinement, of the republican paradigm. Briefly, in 
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the liberal view the democratic process programmes the government in the 
interest of society "where the government is represented as an apparatus of 
public administration and society as a market-structured network of 
interactions among private persons. "261 In the republican paradigm politics 
does not play a mediating role but is instead constitutive of society itself. 
"Politics is.. the medium in which the members of somehow solitary 
communities become aware of their dependence on one another and, acting 
with full deliberation as citizens. further shape and develop existing relations 
of reciprocal recognition into an association of free and equal consociates 
under the law. "262 Whereas, thus, in the liberal model, administrative 
power and individual self interest are socially integrative mechanisms, in the 
republican scheme of things, both solidarity and orientation to the common 
good, are a third source of social integration. Another distinguishing 
feature of the republican paradigm, compared with the liberal one, is that the 
a fore described "praxis of civic self determination" is predicated upon it 
being independent from the media of public administration and market based 
private commerce. Contained within these two paradigms are thus two 
contrasting images of the citizen. 
Within the liberal model the citizen is defined according to negative rights 
they have in relation to other citizens and the state. This entitles them to 
protection from the government so long as they pursue their private interests 
within the purviews of the statutory framework. Political rights, such as the 
franchise right, allow the private individual to influence political will 
formation through mechanisms such as elections which impact on elected 
government bodies. In contrast in the republican model, " democratic will 
formation takes the form of ethicopolitical self understanding.... (with 
deliberation relying)... on the substantive of a culturally established 
background consensus by the citizenry. "263 Political rights, such as those 
of political participation and communication, are thus `positive liberties'. 
This process of citizens' power produced communicatively imbues the state 
with authority and thus legitimates itself by institutionalising public liberty. 
In terms of the political processes of opinion- and will- formation, for the 
liberals, this amounts in the end to the competition between competing blocs 
of interests expressed through opinion polls and voting acts Politics thus in 
the republican sense depends upon dialogue, not the market, and concerns 
issues of value, not just preference. 
At face value there is much in the republican model that appears to overlap 
with Habermas' theoretical concerns. Indeed his argument with the 
republican model is not so much in terms of its substantive principles, since 
those still adhere to the original meaning of democracy, i. e. "the 
institutionalisation of a public use of reason jointly exercised by autonomous 
citizens , 264, as with the communitarian version of republicanism. This latter 
variant is guilty of an "ethical constriction of political discourse" by reducing 
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political questions to those of asking "who we are" etc with the aim of 
achieving a shared collective identity - shades of this perhaps in new 
labour's community neo-collective posturings. 265 This form of 
republicanism links deliberative democracy to one "concrete substantively 
integrated ethical community. " In other words the individual comes to 
know/identify him/herself in the public processes linking him/her to others 
who have the similar identities and traditions. However reflexive 
hermeneutic discourses in which citizens want to get a clearer understanding 
about themselves vis-a-vis the nation or locality etc., whilst they are 
important in politics, are quite distinct from moral questions which pose 
universal questions about justice. Questions about which norms individuals 
want to adopt to govern themselves, i. e. what is equally good for everyone, 
are not, and should not be, connected to specific forms of collective life. 
Discourse theory based deliberative democracy, on the other hand, steers a 
path between the two aforementioned democratic paradigms. It takes 
elements from both sides and integrates them in the concept of an ideal 
procedure for deliberation and decision making. The image of society 
therefore is radically different from that of the liberal and ethical republican 
models. The latter two both presume a state centred society either, in the 
case of the liberals, with the state guaranteeing the market society, or, in the 
case of the republican, with the state as the "self-conscious 
institutionalisation of an ethical community. " Both view the state as being 
separate from society. Normatively the republican model over invests in a 
vision of a political society where democracy becomes the political self 
organisation of society itself and in which politics is directed against the 
state. In the liberal model there is an under investment in the normative 
connotations of the state. Here the constitution tames the state apparatus 
through such mechanisms as basic rights, separation of powers and through 
party political election processes. On the other hand with discourse theory 
there is a normative framework that is stronger than the liberal model but 
weaker than the republican model. Like the republican paradigm, discourse 
theoretically based deliberative politics gives priority to the processes of 
democratic opinion and will formation, but also views the "principles of the 
constitutional state as a consistent answer to the question of how the 
demanding communicative forms of democratic opinion- and will-formation 
can be institutionalised. "266 The "success" of deliberative politics within a 
discourse framework depends not on action generated by collectivities of 
citizens, but on the institutionalisation of procedures regulating different 
avenues of communication. By this means is it possible to connect those 
marginalised and peripheralised elements and networks of the public sphere 
to the political system to release an image of society that is fundamentally 
decentred. Finally lets round up Habermas' idea of deliberative democracy 
through the following longish quote: 
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"Informal public opinion formation generates `influence'; influence is transferred into 
communicative power through the channels of political elections; and communicative 
power is again transformed into administrative power through legislation. As in the 
liberal model, the boundaries between `state' and `society' are respected; but in this 
case, civil society provides the social basis of autonomous public spheres that remain 
as distinct from the economic system as from administration. This understanding of 
democracy suggests a new balance between the three resources of money, 
administrative power and solidarity from which modem societies meet their needs for 
integration.... the integrative force of `solidarity' which can no longer be drawn solely 
from sources of communicative action, should develop through widely expanded and 
differentiated public spheres as well as through legally institutionalised procedures of 
democratic deliberation and decision making........ Discourse theory brings a third idea 
into play: the procedures and communicative presuppositions of democratic opinion 
and will formation function as the most important sources for discursive 
rationalisation of the decisions of an administration constrained by law and statute. 
Rationalisation means more than mere legitimation but less than the constitution of 
political power. The power available to the administration changes its aggregate 
condition as soon as it emerges from a public use of reason and communicative power 
that do not just monitor the exercise of political power in a belated manner but more 
or less programme it as well. Notwithstanding the discursive rationalisation, only the 
administrative system itself can `act'. The administration is a subsystem specialised 
for collectively binding decisions whereas the communicative structures of the public 
sphere comprise a far flung network of sensors that in the first place react to to 
pressure of society wide problematics and stimulate influential opinions. The public 
opinion that is worked up into communicative power cannot `rule' of itself, but can 
only point the use of administrative power in specific directions"267 
The above model of proceduralist deliberative democracy with its attendant 
societal image, I take to be Habermas' delineative sketch of the likely 
structures and processes that logically flow from his theory's normative 
content. It therefore provides the amplification to return to the questions of 
how positive law can be legitimated. The liberal model stresses that 
coercible law is legitimate insofar as it guarantees private autonomy whilst 
the republican model stresses public autonomy so that the legal medium 
issues from "citizens' rational self-legislation". Habermas, however, as 
outlined in his proceduralist model, attempts to avoid an over-investment in 
either too moralistic or ethical interpretation of law. To this extent 
legitimation is tied to his notion of the discourse principle which defines that 
norms are only valid if all who are affected can participate and agree to them 
in rational discussion. For law to be legitimate it therefore has to ensure 
that it can engage with the full range of different types of discourse, i. e. 
moral, ethical and pragmatic, inclusive in the last category the facility of 
compromise where consensus proves impossible. The relationship between 
private and public autonomies can therefore be recast in terms of five broad 
categories of rights which substantive demos' must specify and which 
"delineates the general necessary conditions for institutionalising democratic 
processes of discourse in law and politics. " These rights then are three, 
covering negative liberties, membership rights and due-process as a 
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guarantor of private autonomy, a fourth right guaranteeing political 
participation, i. e. public autonomy, and a fifth right, a social welfare right, 
guaranteeing the effective participation of citizens by ensuring that certain 
minimum material and social conditions are satisfied. 
Now, whilst these rights govern the relationship between equal citizens, the 
impact of state power causes a tension between that and legitimate law. 
The exercise of law by the state must be legitimated through an extensive 
process of discourse involving the citizens and their representatives. This 
requirement makes available the normatively based question about the 
relationship between the state and the public sphere(s). In other words how 
are the "informal discursive sources of democracy .. (linked)... with the formal decision making institutions that are required for an effective rule of law in 
complex societies. " 268 For Habermas law represents "... the medium for 
transforming communicative power into administrative power"269. It thus 
becomes clear why he views the constitutional state as being invested with 
the normative potential to convert citizen's communicative power into 
legitimate administrative activity. The "empirical facts" of the realities of 
everyday practices in constitutional democracies places, however, places a 
question mark over the achievement of that potential. The fact that the 
constitutional state is subject to forces is not, however, an excuse to abandon 
the everyday relevance of deliberative democracy which is contained in the 
acceptance by citizens that they can and should participate politically. This 
dual perspective underpinning the proceduralist concept of deliberative 
democracy means that whilst it is acknowledged that only the state as a body 
invested with decision making powers can act, it can only do so if the 
legitimation of its decision making is tied into "a discursive character that 
preserves under conditions of complexity the democratic sources of 
legitimacy in the public at large. "270 The political institutional implications 
of this are spelt out by Habermas: 
".. the discourse theory of democracy corresponds to the image of the decentred 
society, albeit a society in which the political public sphere has been 
differentiated as an arena for the perception, identification and treatment of 
problems affecting the whole society. Once one gives up the philosophy of the 
subject, one needs neither to concentrate sovereignty concretely in people nor to 
banish it in anonymous constitutional structures and powers. The `self' of the 
self organising legal community disappears in the subject-less forms of 
communication that regulate the flow of discursive opinion- and will-formation 
271 
This means that a very large normative responsibility for democratic 
processes is put upon those public fora, social movements etc. in which 
citizens can participate in debate, or voice concerns over relevant issues. 
For this to succeed requires as well a strong public sphere that is 
communicatively linked to civil society and its fora. Such communicative 
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linkage will rely as well on a range of initiatives such as responsibly 
restructured media, mechanisms for agenda setting on social issues etc. 
5.4 On Welfare 
Finally in Habermas' "BFN" he returns to the issue of the welfare state, as he 
does in TCA, to illustrate the superiority of the proceduralist paradigm of 
democracy and law over two other competing ones - the liberal one, and the 
social welfare one. The former relates to the notions of equality before the 
law, minimal government etc. whilst the latter relates to the use of law to 
realise substantive social goals and values, e. g. welfare provisions, social 
security etc. The key issues are highlighted via a reference to women's 
equality. Thus the call for equal voting rights conjures up the liberal 
paradigm of equality before the law, whilst the need for women specific 
benefits, e. g. maternity provision, relates to the social welfare paradigm. 
However, as feminists critiques have shown, a concern simply with formal 
equality ignores other social equalities that occur whilst state welfare 
programmes often over intrude into areas of private autonomy as well as 
reduce the potential for public autonomy. The proceduralist approach, on 
the other hand, requires that for such issues to be legitimate, that women 
themselves must participate in the public discussions that determine which 
gender issues are relevant to equality definitions. It therefore allows for a 
more substantive and critical relationship to emerge between private and 
public autonomy in the demos. Finally pace his earlier critique of the 
welfare state (TCA), Habermas suggests that a proceduralist approach 
demands a new way of thinking about the separation of powers, for example, 
a more democratic, participatory form of administration272 In sum 
therefore, the optimism of the will, paraphrasing Gramsci, in Habermas' 
earlier works led him to a philosophy of consciousness based espousal, i. e. 
too ethically framed, version of radical democracy, especially in relation to 
administrative power. His intermediate to later work, TCA I and II, gave 
rise to a pessimism of intellect in which the hope of radicalising the welfare 
state's administrative bureaucracy seemed beyond achievement. However, 
his latest work rides the tension between optimism and pessimism to proffer 
a deliberative concept of politics and democracy; one that provides more 
potential for a revitalised and radically more inclusive model of local 
governance. However, before sketching out the "fact to norm" framework 
on local governance which can be derived from his work, it is pertinent to 
ask where exactly issues of race and Black people fit in. 
5.5 On Race 
Habermas has only specifically addressed such issues latterly; and then via a 
consideration of multi-culturalism within the context of the constitutional 
democratic state. 273 Part of the reason for this is no doubt due to the 
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criticisms and promptings of both supporters and post-modernist detractors, 
such as Spivak274 and Said275. A substantive reason, however, is the 
empirical need to respond to this in the light of the racist manouverings of 
the conservative German government in relation to the status of 
"immigrants" in Germany and as well, in response to the increase in 
rightwing racist violence against Black people in Germany, especially post- 
re-unification. Normatively, apart from the obvious pressure such events 
place on a theorist upholding the still unfulfilled promise of modernity to 
address those empirical issues which directly or indirectly call into question 
the notion of universalism, there are as well the theoretical refinements and 
advances made by thinkers like Honneth276, one of his ex-students. 
Ultimately, however, there is the realisation that amongst critical theorists in 
America and Europe the fact of both being multi-racial and multi-cultural 
societies has to be conceptualised in a way, if pace post-modernism, that 
moves on from incorporative notions of universalism. How does Habermas 
then answer the question posed by Gutman earlier in this section, esppecially 
given my qualification with regard to unjustly structured differntiations . 
Habermas' thinking on race is very much framed in terms of culture. Two 
things are clear: the first is that this appears to emerge very much from the 
thought processes that have informed his latest work, BFN; and the second is 
that, as pointed out in section II, it requires refining. Thus for Habermas 
because "modem constitutions owe their existence to a conception found in 
modem natural law according to which citizens come together voluntarily to 
form a legal community of free and equal consociates", these "state 
sanctioned relations of inter-subjective recognition" are individualistically 
constructed" and thus it is pertinent to ask whether or not it can "deal 
adequately with struggles for recognition in which it is the articulation of 
collective identities that seems to be at stake °'277 Here there is the explicit 
acknowledgement of Honneth's work in which it is shown that the struggle 
for unredeemed claims of recognition in society, especially from those 
visible minorities, involves collective actors. Can these phenomena 
therefore "be reconciled with a theory of rights that is individualistically 
framed? "278 With reference to the political achievements of liberalism and 
social democracy, Habermas thinks that the answer is in the affirmative. 
Thus despite the fact that the struggles for recognition currently being 
waged, e. g. women, racial minorities in Europe, anti- neo-colonial struggles 
etc., the question is whether or not "some kind of collective rights that 
shatter the out-moded self-understanding of the democratic constitutional 
state which is tailored to individual rights 9279 need to be instituted. 
The answer to this is developed by Habermas in a critical response to 
Charles Taylor's solution to Gutman's question which is in essence that 
group rights are required. Taylor's "politics of recognition" thus assumes 
that the protection of group identities can come into conflict with individual 
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rights of equal liberties and that where this occurs, a decision has to be taken 
about which takes precedence. 280 Where the politics of difference clash 
with that of the universalisation of individual rights then the constitutional 
state can advance the rights of that group. This is put forward on the 
communitarian basis that the law is not ethically neutral. There is an 
argument made by Taylor, with specific reference to the situation of Quebec, 
which is that under certain conditions it would be just to curtail certain basic 
rights so that "the survival of endangered cultural forms of life" can be 
promoted. Taylor's logic derives from a critical reading of one version of 
Liberalism in which he recognises the principle of equal respect only in the 
form of legally protected autonomy; a form of autonomy that involves 
placing cultural and social differences on a level playing field - ceteris 
paribus. To this he proposes a second model of Liberalism, one in which 
group rights are recognised in principle and triggered in practice according 
to pragmatic criteria linked to situations where equal respect threatens group 
rights. 
To this Habermas counter poses and develops, with particular reference to 
racial and cultural minorities, his proceduralist model of law. Taylor's 
account of autonomy in relation to individual rights is described as 
"paternalistic" because it only accounts for half the picture. The other half 
would make clear that autonomy can only be realised vis-a-vis the law 
insofar as "those to whom the law is addressed.......... can understand 
themselves to be the authors of the laws to which they are subject as private 
legal persons. "281 The internal connection between democracy and the 
constitutional state has to be taken seriously so that "the system of rights is 
blind neither to unequal social conditions nor to cultural differences". In 
other words those with individual rights have identities which are, or should 
be, formed intersubjectively. This process of socialisation presumes a 
theory of rights that complements a politics of identity that "protects the 
integrity of the individual in the life contexts in which his or her identity is 
formed...... (and which)..... required .. the consistent actualisation of the system 
of rights. " 282 Whilst Habermas illustrates this with specific reference to 
women's struggles, 283 where the old dichotomy between individual freedom 
versus objectively guaranteed claims to benefit is being replaced with a 
proceduralist conception in which private and public autonomies have to be 
safeguarded at the same time, he is aware that there are differences, as well 
as similarities with other struggles for recognition, e. g. anti-neo-colonial 
struggles and those of Black people in Western countries. With regard to 
the latter those liberation movements, because they are tied into overcoming 
an illegitimate division of society, affect as well the majority culture's self- 
understanding. However, the effects of this are different to those that occur 
as a result of women's struggles because the social movements associated 
with, what Habermas describes as "multi-cultural" ones, are so multi- 
faceted. One of these facets which appears to be of particular concern to 
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Habermas is that which presents itself in fundamentalist form, presumably 
because it then places itself beyond the realm of democratic politics. 
However, as shall be argued in the next section, these are not limited to so- 
called "multi-cultural movements", as evidenced in the extreme right wing 
religious groups in the United States. Philosophically the questions raised 
thus go to the heart of the relationship between morality and ethical life. As 
the West and the globe unfurls within those discourses critical of 
universality, as those of a fragmenting and fractured society with its 
multitude of languages and contexts, the issues of universalist claims and of 
rationality within the purviews of the struggle for recognition, become, for 
Habermas, still open to debate. Despite this he is clear that Taylor's 
conceptions are substantively different. The rights of minorities are 
legitimately enacted and upheld when the criterion for autonomy, i. e. all are 
participants in their authorship, ensures that "the legislative processes are 
regulated in such a way and take place in forms of communication such that 
everyone can presume that the regulations enacted in that way deserve 
general and rational motivational assent. " 284 What multi-culturalism 
legally thus raises for Habermas, is the question of the ethical neutrality of 
law and politics where ethics is taken to refer to conceptions of the good life 
and the moral point of view to that which is equally good for everyone. For 
the communitarians, like Taylor, the version of liberalism which they 
critique, political questions of an ethical nature have to be excluded because 
they cannot be impartially regulated. They therefore propose their own 
version of liberalism in which the state guarantees the fundamental rights 
and in addition intervenes on behalf "of a particular nation, culture, religion, 
or of a .. (limited) set of nations, cultures and religions. 
s285 What they fail to 
understand, however, is that equality based politics, in pursuit of a system of 
rights, aim at ensuring that both general and collective goals are included in 
that system. Legal norms, because they are, or should be, the outcome of 
participants in communication, incorporate ethical perspectives. In 
arriving at the overall ethical perspective requires that a number of 
discourses are brought into the communicative sphere where communication 
is regulated by moral norms. Of course conflicts arise. But these are 
because of structures of communicative distortion, i. e. the underdevelopment 
or absence of appropriate norms guaranteeing that all can participate equally. 
The struggles for recognition are aimed at removing those barriers so that 
ethical notions can enter into the discussions equally. They are about 
inequalities. They are not about the inherent value or not of particular 
cultures, as the communitarians allege. In other words, "the right to equal 
respect which everyone can demand in the life contexts in which his or her 
identity is formed as well as elsewhere has nothing to do with the presumed 
... "286 Group rights based on the excellence of his or her culture of origin...... 
preservation of specific cultural and value structures as presented in one 
point of time amount to no more than attempting to preserve in aspic a 
certain construction of particular cultures. What this misses out are that 
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cultures are dynamic and change and that there is no necessary organic link 
between individual identities and ascribed cultural origins. In other words 
living in a multi-cultural society means having the right and opportunity to 
grow up "within the world of a cultural heritage.... without suffering 
discrimination because of it..... (having) the opportunity to confront this and 
every other culture and to perpetuate it in its conventional form or transform 
it; as well as the opportunity to turn away from its commands with 
indifference or break with it self-critically and then live spurred on by having 
made a conscious break with tradition, or even with a divided identity. s287 
There is a relationship, thus between private identity and declared public 
identity which cannot be conflated, or objectivated. Rather there is a 
process of identificationising (to neologise again) which is available only 
through inter-subjective processes. 
Finally with regard to race Habermas considers what he regards as the major 
issue in Europe today - immigration, and not just any immigration, but 
specifically immigration of Black people. The late acknowledgement of 
the centrality of race to Europe will be tackled later. Of more importance is 
the way in which Habermas theorises the particular issue of immigration and 
the just response. Singling out the effects in Europe of a "Fortress Europe" 
approach to immigration, and in particular, how this has been prompted by 
and reinforced in Germany a xenophobic approach to immigration, 
Habermas re-emphasises his earlier point, viz. ethically political integration 
that attempts to unite all citizens must remain "neutral" with regard to the 
"differences amongst ethical-cultural" communities. However immigration 
poses questions about the cohesiveness of maintaining the overall 
communities' loyalty to the state. Does this mean, as it does, say in France, 
that immigrants have to relinquish their cultural identity? The answer to 
this is provided by Habermas, not at the level of immediate action, but 
philosophically in the form of two possible approaches to assimilation. The 
first, which he dismisses, is the acculturation approach which requires that 
the immigrant divest her/himself of her/his culture, values, practices etc. and 
adopts the "indigenous" culture. The second, which he supports as the only 
possible level of "assimilation" requires that the immigrant: 
"assent to the principles of the constitution within the scope of 
interpretation determined by the ethical-political self-understanding of the 
citizens and the political culture of the country; in other words, assimilation 
to the way in which the autonomy of the citizens is institutionalised in the 
recipient society and the way the `public use of reason' is practised there" 
288 
Immigration is therefore not permitted to encroach upon the identity of the 
political community. However, as the "other" forms of life become 
established, so the context within which the constitutional principles are 
interpreted will also expand. Hence "a change in the composition of the 
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active citizenry changes the context to which the ethical-political self- 
understanding of the nation as a whole refers... "289 With this in mind, 
therefore, the right to immigrate is situated within the understanding that 
white immigration played, not only in the industrial development of Europe, 
by relieving the population burden, but, as well in the underdevelopment of 
Third world countries, through imperialistically sanctioned emigration of 
whites to conquered lands. There are therefore good moral grounds for an 
enlightened immigration policy in the west, such as: 
- people do not leave their country of origin for no good reason 
- the west, because of its imperial past and because of the inter-meshing of 
the global capitalist economy has an obligation to help 
For Habermas, therefore, "we must ... take 
into account the perspective of 
those who come to foreign continents seeking their well being, that is an 
existence worthy of human beings, rather than protection from political 
persecution'. 290 
5.6 Local Governance 
Having thus summarised the main thrusts of Habermas' thinking, it is now 
possible to delineate the implications of his thought for local governance 
even though he has not specifically addressed these issues. There are two 
inter-connected strands - the empirical reality of the here and now in the UK, 
and the normative outlines of what could be. In outlining the key 
empirical features of local governance in the here and now it will be 
necessary as well to indicate the changes and processes of change that have 
occurred over the past two decades; changes which it is claimed both pF'sm 
and localism have unsuccessfully conceptualised. There is in both a form 
of "presentism" in which the changed form and substance of local 
governance appears to converge with their respective analyses in what is. 
Because of this, what ought is relegated to a matter of practicalities. There 
is a substantive difference, however, in a Habermassian perspective because 
the latter provides a holistic framework within which to analyse local 
governance that keeps alive the critical dualism oscillating between the 
"facts" of the present and the "normative" potential for the future. 
5.7 Local Governance in the UK 
What then are the main features of local governance in the UK today? This 
can be answered through the interrogative framework used in looking at 
pF'sm and Localism, viz. the organisation of welfare and local government, 
and the processes of democratic will and opinion formation. With those as 
the key principled reference points, we can sketch the following scenario. 
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5.8 The `Facts' 
If local government is treated as a political institution, i. e. firstly and fore 
mostly one that is an integral part of the constitutional make-up of the 
country, either explicitly or in practice, then it can be said that the shape, 
scope and functioning substance of local government appears to have 
changed markedly from that which it was twenty five years ago. The 
relationship between central and local government has changed considerably. 
Whilst twenty five years ago it could be said that local government's enjoyed 
a greater degree of autonomy, the fact that most of their funding still 
depended on government grants notwithstanding, today there is a greater 
degree of centralised control over local government. And yet this is 
despite the explicit new right agenda of the Conservative government to roll 
back the state, to increase individual autonomy and control over their lives, 
and to decrease state interference. To begin teasing out this apparent 
contradiction means first looking briefly at three areas: why local 
government came to have the role and content that it did in the seventies, at 
the main factors influencing the rise of the new right in the seventies, and the 
substance of their agenda. 
If one backtracks temporally over the development of local government in 
the UK up to the seventies, then four characteristics are pertinent. Firstly 
there is the large range of services administered by local government. 
Secondly there is the key feature of local government being defined as that 
of its democratic nature, despite the actual practice which appeared to 
indicate that not many local people actually participated. Thirdly there was 
the degree of consensus between local and national government, and 
amongst local government units, about the scope and nature of local 
government. Finally there was, as is implied by the first three factors, the 
perception of local government and the provenance of local governance as 
being rather dull. Yet the evolution of a local government, as summarised 
by those four factors, lay in the laissez-faire period of nineteenth century 
industrialisation. A period which saw the urbanised concentration of 
people and parallel growth in poverty, health problems and lawlessness, also 
saw the saw the developments of social ameliorative initiatives, many of 
them locally based. These nascent social services, in the widest use of that 
term, were contained within the purviews of the locale and were only picked 
up by the nineteenth century state in the last instance. What is interesting is 
that such local, often political initiatives, were pursued when it became clear 
that private industry was incapable of policing the deleterious effects of its 
functions by itself. The beginnings of collectivist solutions, some of them 
state initiated or state sanctioned, to the social effects of capitalism occurred 
in the same period the new right today so glorifies in its backwards glances. 
Commentators, like Butcher, Law, Leach and Mullard attribute the local 
control of such services to three inter linked key factors: many of these 
146 
initiatives were local ones, even if they did have national consequences in 
some cases; the administrative structures simply did not exist at the national 
centre, and there was as well the ideological opposition to large 
bureaucracies, e. g. Disraeli; there were at the local level authorities and 
agencies, e. g. boroughs and counties, which could be adapted . 
291 There is, 
as well, a fourth key factor: many of these services were paid for locally 
through charges and rates and it was economically prudent for the national 
state to support a developing polity in which legitimation for national 
government was in part secured through initiatives paid for locally. On 
the democratic front the growth of social interventionist initiatives paralleled 
the growth of the franchise through parliamentary reform. It was thus not 
uncommon for localities to have a number of single purpose democratically 
controlled services, e. g. the School Board. Whilst in the beginnings of 
local democracies in the UK there was intense differences between political 
parties and social collectivities, the passage of time through two world wars 
saw a growing consensus developing between local and national government 
about the role and substance of local government. This intervening period 
saw as well the growing collectivisation of responses to what can be 
described as the asynchronous systemic effects of capitalism with many of 
these responses falling to local government to control. Any tension that did 
arise between centre and locales was primarily over those services which 
moved from local to national control, e. g. the utilities etc. However even 
then such losses were made up for by the accumulation of new services by 
local government. The praxis of local democracy still relied on that of the 
liberal democratic model a las Mill. That is to say the minimalist state vis- 
a-vis the citizens' private and public autonomy and which in return 
undertakes to administer such services, efficiently on their behalf. 
Constitutionally, whilst there is no direct writing in of local government, or 
for that matter a written constitution, and local government thus operates 
within the framework of a unitary state, the consensus that developed around 
local government amongst political parties meant in effect that such 
governmental institutions operated with a high degree of autonomy. 
The post second world war expansion of the welfare state saw the beginnings 
of a growing tension between national and local government; not one that 
disrupted this consensus, but one that took about thirty years to develop into 
a visible crisis centred primarily around the question of finance. By 1975, 
or thereabouts, the average central government grant to local government 
had grown to being twice that raised through the rates, a de fact o 
centralisation picked up by commentators at the time. Part of the solution 
to this was sought by national government in the attempts to reform local 
government in the early to mid-seventies. The bases to this reorgnisation 
did not include the area of local democracy itself, but, instead concentrated 
on attempting to improve the efficiency of local government. There were 
two key outcomes: the proposal and implementation of a restructuring which 
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saw the creation of larger local government administrative structures, e. g. the 
metropolitan authorities, and internal to local government, a managerial 
reshaping along the lines of corporate developments in the private sector. 
The reality was that the introduction of such technical changes as "Chief 
Executives", Chief Officers management processes and structures, neither 
addressed the rest of the organisation or, for that matter, the actual content of 
management, service development etc. in local government. The failure of 
these measures is evidenced by the growing tension over resources between 
national and local governments which actually prefigured the 1979 
Conservative government. But it was not only on that front that the 
consensus was breaking down. Within individual councils and amongst 
councils marked divergences were beginning to emerge. Butcher et al. 
point to the creation of metropolitan councils with their new mix of rural and 
urban populations and likely political representatives of different hues as the 
main cause of this dissensus. 92 In part this is true. For example the 
creation of Bradford metropolitan council in the early seventies saw dramatic 
new tensions develop within the council administrative structure, amongst 
politicians and between different parts of the new authority because of the 
grafting on of outlying rural areas on to the old Bradford City Council local 
governance structures. But that is far from the whole picture. There 
were other changes occurring as well. For example the seventies 
witnessed as well an increasing professionalisation of local government 
marked by the recruitment of more university educated people, many with a 
positive and sometimes radical orientation to public sector values. There 
was as well the development of new forms of NGOs in the urban areas and 
of new constituencies, such as women and Black people, making their voice 
heard from the outside. The so-called new left were, in many local Labour 
parties, displacing the old guard. An examination of local Labour 
councillors in one of the boroughs under study shows that in the `74 and `78 
elections that there was a rising number of university educated councillors 
displacing previous ones who had tended to come from industrial worker 
backgrounds. 293 Internally the complexion and outlook of the officer 
unions changed in many inner city councils from right of centre to very much 
left of centre. The agendas, thus, of many inner city authorities were 
opening out to embrace a host of issues previously not considered by local 
government. 
It can thus be said that Thatcherism, rather than cause the break-up of 
consensus, simply exacerbated the tensions. Certainly there was a time up 
to the 1987 election, when large parts of the national Labour party almost 
saw the attempts by local Labour councils to resist the national government 
onslaught, as a vicarious fight by proxy which they were themselves unable 
to carry out. Perhaps it can be said that what Thatcherism did, where that 
term is used not ad hominemly, but as a description of new right policies 
towards local government, including the current leadership of the 
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Conservative party, was, from its own political perspective, to develop the 
fissure to its logical conclusion. 
What then was and is the new right agenda? Obviously it is not possible to 
speak of a homogenous new right agenda in detail. There are, as other 
writers have pointed out, different groupings, perhaps broadly summarised 
under "liberal" and "conservative"'). 294 Nevertheless it is reasonable to 
point to overlapping general areas, which for the purposes of looking at local 
governance, will suffice. The prime target of the new right was and is the 
form of social democracy exemplified by many western European countries. 
This was "the existence of a democratic constitution under which all citizens 
enjoyed certain civil, political and social rights .... 
(and in which)... political 
participation was not restricted by property, birth, race or gender. " 95 By the 
seventies, however, there is a generally acknowledged crisis of social 
democracy which invited criticisms from both the left and right, particularly 
the new right. Whilst the cause of the crisis has been laid at the door of 
global capitalism by commentators on the left, the new right saw the problem 
as residing in the collectivist policies, practices and state institutions of 
social democracy. They undertook to achieve a new relationship between 
the individual and the state along the lines of the classical liberal model as 
outlined earlier. There are a number of key features to this remodelled 
world. It aimed "to discredit the social democratic concept of universal 
citizenship rights guaranteed and enforced through public agencies and to 
replace it with a concept of citizenship rights achieved through property 
ownership and participation in markets. " 96 The corporatist social 
democratic state, with its attendant weak notions of government was to be 
restructured into a strong state that would be a guarantor of the market. It 
was not simply a matter of rolling back the state. It was, however, a matter 
of changing the then existing state into something stronger, and I would 
argue, larger, even if the ostensible picture was that of decreased state 
interference. To achieve the new state required and still requires two 
increased levels of state activity - that relating to securing the 
implementation of the changes and that relating to the policing of the newly 
formed marketised areas of previous direct state activity, e. g. privatisation. 
Or, as Gamble puts it, ".. the state makes the protection of the free economy 
its priority ... all illegitimate functions and responsibilities are stripped from it 
... (making it) .. no longer the weak state of social democracy, overburdened by ever-widening responsibilities and infested by special interests... "297 On 
public welfare the new right launched an attack that had resonances with 
criticisms from the left. For them welfare services are not only expensive, 
but their collective nature make them less likely to meet the needs of the 
people they are supposed to help because they encourage dependency. 
Freedom and equality was to be "achieved through the daily plebiscite of the 
market and not the infrequent plebiscite in the political system. s298 - another 
variation, perhaps, of the decentring of the state. But there was as well 
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another side to the critique of the welfare state and that was the belief that 
social democratic liberal values were responsible for the moral degeneracy 
and decline in the west, exemplified by the breakdown in traditional family 
values and disrespect for the rule of law etc. Identified as one of the chief 
culprits in this decline is the new class of professionals, most from the sixties 
and seventies university output, that were seen to be infesting every sinew of 
the welfare state. This but "continues the critique of rationalism and the 
enlightenment which has long been a key theme of Conservatism. " 299 This 
technicised post-modernism, or counter modernity, shall be discussed, later. 
For the moment the key features of the new right together with the sketch of 
the key strands informing local governance up to the mid to late seventies 
provides the means to highlight the major changes to the structure and 
functioning of local government through to the early nineties. The detail 
of this will be dealt with in the chapter on the empirical findings. 
The effects of Thatcherism on local government, if it can be shorthanded 
thus, fits in well with the overall aim of the new right, viz. a strong 
interventionist and policing central state at the expense of a collectivised 
welfare state, and thus a protected marketisation process. Within this 
framework a broad twofold strategy evolved in relation to local government: 
a centralised control over local government expenditure and a pursuit of this 
duality vis-a-vis the state through a politicised depoliticisation of local 
governance. Interestingly, before pinpointing the main changes in each 
area, the 1987 general election in which local government played such a 
prominent part, was the watershed in the labour Party's approach, and the 
aftermath saw a process of rightwing shifts in Labour culminating, both in 
theory and the practice of Labour councils, in a new consensus with their 
Conservative counterparts over the form and substance of local government. 
In terms of centralising and controlling local government finances a number 
of initiatives over the years can be pointed to. These include altering the 
formula for allocating central grants, rate capping, changing the local tax 
system and base, e. g the infamous "poll tax", altering the rules governing 
local authorities distribution of grants, through statute defining what local 
government can legitimately spend its money on etc300. The politicised 
depoliticisation involves a number of sub-strategies which targeted 
employees, the local democratic control of key areas of local government 
responsibilities, and the cultural orientation of management content and 
substance. 
Local authority employees, more than any other category of public sector 
worker, because, in the UK, they were the interface between communities of 
service users and the welfare state, were seen as the culprits supreme, the 
"leffthliberal-entryist-subversion-of-public-sector-neutrality" scenario. They 
came under sustained attack through a number of devices: wage restraints, 
government orchestrated attacks on behaviour, opposition to officer trade 
150 
unions etc. 30' The desired end product, and towards the late eighties this 
was an explicit goal of some Labour authorities, was to both break the 
strength of the trade unions in the Town Hall and to make the labour force 
less visible, less vocal and more flexible. The former two desired 
characteristics were partially achieved through the report from the 
Widdicombe Committee, and the resulting 1989 Local Government and 
Housing Act. 02 which made it illegal for local government employees above 
a certain grade to hold political office in another local authority. There were 
other central administrative changes as well which bore on the attempt to 
quieten local authority workers, if not directly, then through effectively 
hiving off large service sectors to the `market' thereby threatening the terms 
and conditions of the people employed therein303. For example the rules 
governing section 11 money, money which funded most race equality type 
posts, was changed so that such posts were no longer eligible. Within a short 
space of time many posts like these no longer existed in local authorities. 
The communicative spaces which existed at committee level for non 
councillors, as well as the multiple access points to some form of democratic 
decision making, represented by the committee structure, were closed down. 
Part of the recommendations from the Widdicombe committee advocated 
curtailing the drastically the number of outside co-optees to council 
committees, whilst in 1991 Heseltine, as Minister for the Environment, 
published the Internal Management of Local Authorities in England. This 
set out his objective of promoting speedier, more effective and more 
business like decision making in councils, through amongst other measures, 
the adoption of a `cabinet' system of councillor decision making 304 Many 
of these recommendations have been uncritically adopted by new Labour. 
The extent to which this strategy was successful can be gauged by a brief 
summary of the changes that occurred in the primary authority under 
consideration. By the end of the eighties, the back of the officer union had 
effectively been broken by the ruling Labour group; that consensus between 
Labour and the town hall unions no longer existed. Most of their equality 
structures and posts were dismantled. New employee relations procedures 
and rules governing conduct were drawn up. Managers were given more 
powers to deal directly with a range of human resourcing issues, including 
the discipline and control of employees. This pattern was to be seen to be 
repeated in other London local authorities through the nineties. 
De-democratising local government by removing from orthodox democratic 
control large tranches of services and complementary levels of regional 
governance in the name of a stronger central state and greater individual 
market freedom, is still an ongoing process which has been well 
documented. An additional weapon, thus, in this particular armoury was 
the ostensible rationale of doing away with so-called unnecessary levels of 
regional governance by simply abolishing them via parliamentary legal fiat. 
The demise of the GLC and other metropolitan authorities comes under this 
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category. This sets the scene to pinpoint three important routes taken by 
the then Conservative government to remove services from local authorities: 
the establishment of appointed quangoes to run services, particularly those 
previously under the control of former regional spheres of governance, e. g. 
in the greater London region; consumerist led marketised democratic control 
of certain services, like housing and education where, in the latter, the 
emphasis is on schools with devolved budgets and responsibilities "getting 
closer to the customer"; and the privatisation of key local government 
services. All of these have not only had the effect of removing key 
responsibilities from local democratic control, but have also impacted on the 
other two strategies. Such practices have thus imposed a new regime of 
uncertainty, especially that related to the possibility of redundancy, on 
employees. 
Finally the content and orientation of management within local government 
has undergone a change that takes it away from adherence to the values of 
the intrinsic worth of local democracy and public services. Whilst 
criticism has been levelled at the management of local government from both 
Conservative, and, from the mid eighties onwards, Labour as well, on the 
grounds that there is an absence of explicit values and direction, at least this 
supposed vacuum contained within it an unspoken commitment to the public 
ethos. This now is being assiduously replaced or filled by a private sector 
notion of management tied into tighter control of employees, the 
prioritisation of financial performance parameters and a restructured 
relationship with the community via the marketised notion of the consumer. 
To this extent then, the criticism of Stewart that such a managerial model, or, 
at least the dominance of such a model, is inimical to the democratic 
interests of local governance is true. Nevertheless the "facts" are that there 
is within local governance a distinct school of management which is 
primarily private sector oriented, characteristics which mark it out from 
previous public sector managerial knowledge and practices. 
In sum then the "facts" of local government today in the UK show not only 
the emergence of a strong central state in relation to local governance, but, as 
well, the constitution of a new consensus. The reactive mode of the 
Labour party in response to the new right onslaught - humane Thatcherism, 
as Hall has described it - has meant that the once gap between the 
Conservative and Labour vision of local government has closed 
considerably. Both, for example, are agreed on the validity of the 
reconstituted content of local governance vis-a-vis the overall structure of 
local government - the enabling core-periphery model -; the status of 
employees - the flexible workforce -; and on the parameters of management. 
In fact there is agreement on the need to get back to a depoliticised intra- 
local government. The restatement and revalorisation of the positivistic 
notion of a neutral, but now supposedly more efficient, management, finds 
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an echo in the statement of one of the ex-Leaders of the Labour Group in the 
primary local authority in the research, who has opined that ideology and 
philosophy do not enter into the issue of management because it is simply a 
matter of ensuring that ratepayers money is better and more efficiently 
305 used 
Before embarking on what, logically would be a Habermassian type analyses 
of these facts, which is different to the normative vision, it is necessary to 
address briefly one other "fact" that runs throughout the various processes 
shaping local government in the UK today, especially in large urban areas; 
and that is the "fact" of race. I don't want to jump the gun on the chapter 
which deals in detail with that of race and local government in the target 
boroughs, but I do want to indicate three major considerations of race which 
run throughout the "facts" of local governance. The first relates to the 
increasing political and social visibility of Black people in major urban areas 
in the UK over the period leading up to the late seventies. Whilst these 
were expressed very often through local struggles and campaigns with some 
capturing the national spotlight, there were commonalities that emerged - 
those relating to the racism and its effects in key areas which impacted 
disproportionately on black people, e. g. criminal justice, education, housing 
etc.; those relating to the failure of action mandated institutions to do 
anything about the situation, e. g. political parties, welfare state bodies, 
including local government; those relating to the positive self identification 
of Black cultures and to the recognition of solidarity amongst Black peoples 
and communities. It is a fact, as other commentators have pointed out, that 
the development of urban policy in the UK from the sixties onwards by 
national governments, was substantively informed by notions, i. e. not fully 
worked out positions, of trying to manage the "race problem" in urban 
areas. 306 The second consideration is informed very much by he first 
consideration because it is to do with the re-articulation of the redemptive 
white nation by the new right; very much in opposition to the claims made 
for recognising the reality that the UK is and will be a multi-racial, plural 
society. Other commentators have pointed to the racist urges underpinning 
the new right's onslaught against their perceived moral decay of the social 
democratic welfare state, exemplified by that most audible and visible 
televised enunciation of Thatcher's "swamping" utterance. 07 The attempt 
to relegitimate political practice via a recourse to nineteenth century 
nationalism and unresolved anthropophagi myths from earlier periods will 
only be noted now and dealt with in more detail later. There is an 
addendum need to qualify this "note" by pointing out that the key difference 
between the new right era and previous centuries is that the accusatory finger 
was hardly ever directly pointed, i. e. no "look, a Negro" revisited. Instead 
practices were proscribed and others promoted which effectively defined 
away Black people's rights. The final consideration is obviously that 
which highlights the way in which anti-racism and race equality was taken 
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up by many inner city local authorities. However, it is not, as Gilroy has 
erroneously argued and has been uncritically borne aloft by fellow critical, or 
"not-so-critical", culturalists, the case that anti-racism relocated to the town 
halls. 308 It might have been interpreted as that, but the reality was different 
as the section on the empirical details of race equality development in the 
target boroughs will show. What will be clear from that exegesis is that 
the picture was, and is not, as homogenous as Gilroy attempts to portray - 
and here that might be the fault of him attempting to extrapolate from his 
brief foray into "real" work in the GLC - and that the claims made for race 
equality were local authority targeted specifically and not an attempt at 
putsch based take over of anti-racism by the denigratingly referred to "race 
relations professionals. " 
5.9 The `Norm': Social learning for Domination, or Social Learning for 
Emancipation? 
Having briefly set in place the main facts of local governance in the UK the 
main task now is to resituate this within an Habermassian level analysis. 
This can be, and should be, done within the same framework adopted to 
examine the pF'st and localist variants of local governance. That is to say 
attempting to generate the analytical contents which will enable the meta- 
theoretical matrix used in the examination of the other two positions to be 
completed from a Habermassian perspective. This will be facilitated by 
first predefining what might be the outcome of such an analysis by 
characterising it as centring on the notions of crises and legitimacy. The 
idea of "crisis" as pivotal to theories of society is not new obviously. 
Marx's theory turns on the concept of economic crisis. Variations on this 
include the Regulationist school, and inter-alia therefore the pF'st school, 
and their idea of crises in regimes of accumulation. Likewise Hall's et al's 
re-working of the Marxist crisis via the racialisation of the criminal justice 
processes in the UK of the seventies is another example. 309 The difference 
between those and Habermas' concept is that for the latter the crisis occurs 
both within the sphere of work and that of interaction. There is thus, as the 
clarification of the term legitimacy will show, a longer temporal framework 
to Habermas idea than is contained within the common notion of Marxist 
crisis, to the extent that the redemption promised in the "purifying" sudden 
overthrow of capitalism has perhaps to be surrendered - temporarily? 
If legitimacy is linked to the recognition worthiness of a political order, then 
his means that there are good arguments for a political order's claims to be 
recognised as right and just. Legitimacy is thus a contestable validity-claim, 
i. e. it is open to dispute. In the modem constitutional state, even with the 
institutionalisation of the opposition, legitimation in the practicalities of 
politik and in the theory of politics, is a permanent problem. For Habermas 
only political orders can have legitimacy. This is not the case for multi- 
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national organisations in the world marketplace. Legitimations within the 
political order serve to show why and how existing institutions should 
employ poltical power and how this will enable the identity of the society to 
be constituted. In other words these processes are linked to the "social 
integrative preservation of a normatively determined social identity The 
strength of these legitimations, that is to say the extent to which they shape 
motives, and thus are able to produce consensus, depends on the level of 
justification in any one situation. In modern times there is the normative 
expectation that justification is not based on myth or material principles, like 
Nature or God, but on the formal conditions of justification, i. e. the 
procedures and presuppositions of rational agreement themselves become 
principles. There thus are no ultimate grounds for legitmating forces other 
than the formal conditions of possible consensus formation. Habermas 
links the levels of justification to social learning in both core categories, i. e. 
objectivating thought and practical insight, and thus to social evolutionary 
transitions to new learning levels. What is important is that in the modern 
period such justification has become reflective. This is quite crucial as an 
insight into Habermas approach to on tology which can be characterised as 
critical on tology. That is to say that any notion of a grounding cannot be a 
priori but has to be locked into processes that enable all to participate 
equally, and thus makes the ontic fallibilistic. So, for example, in the 
matter of democracy, this can only be imagined "as the attempt to arrange a 
society democratically... as a self controlled learning process... a question of 
finding arrangements which can ground the presumption that the basic 
institutions of the society and the basic political decisions would meet with 
the unforced agreement of all those involved . s310 Democracy cannot then 
be equated with any one type of organisation, e. g. direct democracy, any 
more than it can be equated with the particular institutions that flow from 
that. This is quite different from localists like Stewart who are too closely 
tied to one particular form of democracy and to its institutions; that despite 
his attempt to enlist Habermas in looking at the public domain. This 
relationship between normative theories and empirical ones is important, as 
shown earlier, because the former should not "confuse a level of justification 
of domination with procedures for the organisation of domination 
This slight digressive introduction to a what a Habermassian analysis of local 
governance might look like gains importance because of the clarifications 
Habermas has made to his theory of communicative action which highlight 
again the tension between philosophy and sociology. It is thus necessary to 
spell these clarifications out because they link back to the a fore detailed 
background to Habermas' work. In a sense this refers to my interpretation 
that Habermas speaks of ideal situations, often philosophically 
parametrically set and within which framework a recourse to sociological 
accounts test the fallibilsim of the theory. For example his idea of non- 
distorted communication is often criticised because critics conflate the two 
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levels of analysis. Here fallibilism does not relate to some Popperian 
notion of falsification, but simply "to the fact that we cannot exclude the 
possibility of falsification even given the convincingly justified theories 
which are accepted as valid. " 311 With this in mind then further 
clarification can be given to concept of societal integration via two tension 
ridden but inter-related spheres of social and systemic integration; a concept 
that goes to the heart of the idea of legitmation. These two spheres have to 
be treated as analytically and categorically separate. Social integration 
refers to "consensus forming mechanisms" where as systemic integration 
refers to "exchange and power mechanisms". As far as their structures of 
action are concerned social integration is linked to action orientations whilst 
systemic integration go beyond action orientations and integrate action 
consequences. Now, both critics and supporters of Habermas' theory have 
assumed, wrongly, that the analytical distinction carries over into the 
empirical reality and have therefore concluded that both spheres have 
mutually exclusive action types, e. g. systemic integration is given over solely 
to purposive rational action, and social integration which can be tracked back 
to the lifeworld, is only communicatively action based. However, this is not 
the case. Of the four identified mechanisms of systemic integration, three 
are neutral in relation to action types, viz. segmentary differentiation, 
stratification, stratification and political organisation. It is thus only the 
steering media of money and power "that demand a strategic stance on the 
part of the actors. " That is to say that they are in an environment that is 
programmed strategically. It is not to say, a las some aspects of post 
modernist theorising, that they are constituted as an effect of organisational 
or money power. There is an avenue for communicative based opposition. 
This is important when looking at a phenomenon like local governance, 
especially in relation to the action neutrality of political organisation, and 
here I read this as saying it is open to both types of action, and in relation to 
bureaucratic administration and the scope in the latter for emancipatory 
change. It also forestalls one of the critiques I had based on my original 
reading of Habermas. The issue of clarifying social integration is equally 
significant because of the interpretation placed upon Habermas original 
concept by feminist critiques that it assumed a power free communicative 
action based context; critiques which, under that reading, could similarly be 
made from a race point of view. the clarification can be best put in his own 
words. "As the life world, however, by no means offers an innocent image 
of `power free spheres of communication', the presuppsoition for orientation 
toward reaching understanding are met without reservations, i. e. without 
deception and self deception, only if the improbable conditions of non- 
repressive forms of life prevail. Otherwise, social integration proceeds via 
norms of domination which sublimate violence, on the one hand and 
consensus formation in language which fulfils the conditions for latent 
strategic action, on the other. To this extent, social integration is also not 
allocated a priori to some specific type of action.. This links into the point I 
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made about over colonisation and Black identities in the previoussection. 
Finally there is a further clarification, one that provides a link to his latest 
work, "Between Facts and Norms", a clarification which expands on the 
communicative action side of systemic integration. It thus tracks back to 
the notion that with the advent of the capitalist system action domains 
differentiated out which are primarily systemically integrated. Hence, 
"these are now integrated only indirectly through the agency of consensus 
mechanisms, namely to the extent that the legal institutionalisation of 
steering media must be coupled to normative contexts of the lifeworld. " 312 
To this extent, therefore, the analytical distinctions made mean that the 
hurly-burly of the real world sociological investigations will reveal that there 
is indeed an intertwining and separation of two action types, but, that overall, 
the two spheres of integration can be associated with the two types of action. 
Thus it is no longer possible to talk, as Habermas had done in texts prior to 
TCA of "systems of purposive rational action". Within the revised contexts 
now the actor can switch back to his/her lifeworld context - important in 
considering action in bureaucracies, say, - even if the action bases to 
lifeworlds have lost their co-ordinating efficacy. Steering mechanisms of 
system integration are predisposed towards purposive rational action through 
processes like their specialised codes which have diverged - expertisation, 
"techniques" - from normal language. Media steered interactions results in 
an objectification of social relations in which ends and means become 
inverted.. Habermas goes on to conclude that unlike in his earlier version 
of purposive rational action in which media steered interactions "embody an 
instrumental... form of reason", he now thinks that these processes instead 
embody a functional form of reason 313 I think, as I shall argue later, the 
examination of local governance in the UK shows that functional reasoning 
embodies a large element of instrumentality. The problem facing 
emancipationists in the capitalist system is one "of how capabilities for self- 
organisation can be developed to such an extent within autonomous public 
spheres that radical democratic processes of democratic will formation can 
come to have a decisive impact on the regulatory mechanisms and marginal 
conditions of media steered subsystems in a lifeworld oriented toward use 
values, towards ends in general... (with a core).. task... (which) involves 
holding the systemic imperatives of an interventionist state apparatus and 
those of economic system in check and is formulated in defensive terms. "314 
What this expresses is his normative vision of a society in which there is the 
free interplay of the three culture-value spheres that, under conditions of 
modernisation, have become differentiated out, viz. moral practical, aesthetic 
and cognitive instrumental. The question then is whether or not functional 
rationality is the same as purposive-rational action. Some sympathetic 
commentators, in arguing that they are not the same, have concluded that this 
undermines the normative vision. The reason for this would appear to lie in 
their reading of Habermas that, because action requires some one to enact it, 
and that therefore purposive-rational action means that people behave in an 
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objectivating way towards each other - "participants in action instrumentalise 
one another as a means for their respective success" - that therefore 
functionalist reason, insofar as it "bypasses people's consciousness", can 
never be in a situation where there is an interplay with communicative 
rationality. 315 I think this is a misreading, especially when placed in the 
context of his comments on the key problems and tasks, as quoted above. 
The analytical use of functionalist reasoning is a refinement introduced to 
deal with what I think is an earlier anomaly. If action is directly linked to 
participants and the three spheres of reason are differentiated out from a 
lifeworld origins, then one cannot claim that there are systems of purposive 
rational action which reproduce themselves. That would be a restatement 
of Adorno's and Horkheimer's arguments, not to mention the close affinity 
with Foucault. Under such a system participants' actions would indeed be 
constituted in an ends-determining-means fashion with little prospect of 
being able to change it. I therefore read the introduction of the functionalist 
rationality clarification as rather confirming the normative vision. Thus 
systems of functionalist rationality which, if not under the control or 
substantial influence of democratic will formation, are likely to facilitate 
purposive rational action from participants. On the empirical side it 
accords better with both organisational studies, say, and my research within 
local government, where situations of communicative based functionality are 
possible and can compete with, or challenge the overall paradigm of 
purposive rational action even if the extent to which such challenges are still 
possible, in local government in the UK appears to be diminishing. 
Nevertheless, functional rationality expresses the processes whereby under 
capitalist modernity the "inversion of means and ends is experienced in the 
form of the reifying character of objectified social processes. "316 In other 
words, decisions are made, positions taken in one context, either the 
economic or administrative which have an internal logic, e. g. financial 
accountability, which can only be taken by participants consciously or 
unconsciously separating out the dynamic of the rationale of those decisions 
from the participants' lifeworld contexts; yet which, if applied to the 
decision takers own lifeworlds, might be perceived by them, as colonisingly 
intrusive. It is a question of whether or not use-values are democratically 
controlled or instrumentally subverted. 
We can now return to local governance within the intended Habermassian 
type analysis which revolves around the core issue of legitimation. Local 
government and legitimation is situated within the context of the following 
quote from Habermas on the kernel of the problem for the state in modern 
capitalist society. 
"Viewed historically, the state was from the beginning supposed to protect a society 
determined normatively in its identity from disintegration, without ever having at its 
free disposal the capacities for social integration, without ever being able, as it were, 
to make itself master of social integration......... The legitimation problem of the state 
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today is not how to conceal the functional relations between state activity and the 
capitalist economy in favour of ideological definitions of the public welfare. This is 
no longer possible - at least not in times of economic crisis - and exposure by 
Marxism is no longer necessary. The problem consists rather in representing the 
accomplishments of the capitalist economy as, comparatively speaking, the best 
possible satisfaction of generalisable interests - or at least insinuating that this is so. 
The state thereby programmatically obligates itself to keep dysfunctional side effects 
within acceptable limits. In this assignment of roles, the state provides legitimating 
'31 support to a social order claiming legitimacy. 
However, my reading of Habermas leads me to conceive of legitimation as 
being of two orders, along the lines, so to speak, of a "facts" and "norms" 
differentiation.. The primary order refers to the legitimating or 
delegitimating acts which support or call into question the very bases of the 
political order. The secondary order of legitimations refers to the emprical 
results of the continual politiking and jostling that is the feature of the in 
built legitimation problems of the modern capitalist state. These overlap 
with, but are slightly different to Habermas' notion of `empiricist' and 
`normativist' legitimations. In other words the latter refers to the 
experienced and visible effects of institutional politics. An example of this 
at the level of local governance is the way in which the realistic pragmatists 
in local Labour Parties, as opposed to the "Red-Ken-loony-left" type, 
pursued the strategy of the dented shield as the only viable local option to 
Thatcherism - an early attempt to promote and legitimate a labour version of 
the TINA approach which prefigured the uncritical embrace of capitalism by 
new Labour318. Further the process of legitimation is not homogenous. 
Whilst I take Habermas to be mainly writing about the primary order, the 
processes of the secondary order legitimation are unevenly presented and 
developed over time and geographically, especially in societies which are 
federalised or, like the UK, have local representative structures which were 
for a long time relatively autonomous. The outcomes of secondary order 
legitimation dynamics can be broadly twofold: a change of the dominant 
political party in government, used in it broadest sense to pick up on 
different levels of government, through institutionalised voting mechanisms; 
or, a questioning of the very foundations of governance, and thus a move 
into the realm of primary legitimation problems. 
The identified watershed period preceding the changes in local government, 
i. e. the seventies, is one co-identified by other commentators as being that 
which stands out as manifesting the symptoms of some form of deeper 
"crisis". This is evidenced in from both the analyses of the Marxist and 
new right varieties. Habermas has also analysed this period as marking a 
shift, but a shift that is substantively different from both the above mentioned 
types insofar as it operates at the primary and secondary level problems of 
legitimation. Where the UK stands out from other European countries is 
that, whilst in those European countries there were as well secondary order 
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legitimation type manifestations, it was only in the UK that this coincided in 
the seventies with a visible, dramatic volte face change of government; 
dramatic in the sense that the programme of that party attacked the very basis 
of the political consensus, i. e. the welfare state. The "radical" agenda for 
this type of shift appeared later in the USA in the early eighties, and latterly 
in France and Germany. What is clear is that these shifts, whilst they are 
symptomatic of the core problem of the capitalist system and state, as 
indicated above, give rise to the need to produce new forms of legitimating 
rationale which are both related to the requirement to underpin the secondary 
order political programme as well as the primary level political order; and 
these new legitimating practices in turn can recursively invoke an even 
deeper crisis in participants motivations to want to continue supporting and 
legitimating that political order. To illustrate this we can refer to Habermas' 
analysis of that watershed which he characterises as giving rise to the new 
obscurity. 319 
In the chapter on Racism and Black Anti-Racist Politics I attempted to re- 
introduce and reconstruct the notion of "utopia" as a necessary precursor to 
progressing to anti-racism. Interestingly Habermas in his analysis of the 
changing welfare state, an analysis I had not read at the time, also begins by 
re-examining the idea of "utopia". In the development of the modern age, 
where the latter designated period can be understood to have begun in the 
latter part of the eighteenth century, with its rapid rate of change, "the 
present is understood at each point as the transition to something new. "320 
Whilst thus utopian impulses have become fused with historical experience, 
ie. a devaluation of certain aspects of the past in preparation for a better 
future, these utopian energies are at the same time held in check by the past. 
At certain periods this control crossed over into perjoritivation of utopia as a 
form of epithetical short hand to denounce political ideas as being too 
abstract. For Habermas it was Bloch and Mannheim who rehabilitated 
utopia "as a legitimate medium for depicting alternative life possibilities that 
are seen as inherent in the historical process itself.... (as being) .... inscribed 
within politically active historical consciousness itself. "321 Today, 
however, where today is taken to be the changed world of Western 
capitalism, it would appear that all utopian energies have been exhausted 
because the horizon of systemic overload - under-development, 
environmental catastrophe, etc. - seems never ending. Such is the 
appearance of the new obscurity. 
Now the origins of the welfare state are seen as the outcome of compromises 
around the utopian ideas of society based on social labour. By that is meant 
that the demands of organised labour are partially met through the state as 
means to mitigate the worst excesses of class conflict. The social 
democratic variant, which has been adopted by most western European 
states, has been since the mid seventies, and is subject to a growing 
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awareness and action that is informed by interpretations of its limitations and 
yet has no idea as to the alternatives. For Habermas "the new obscurity is 
part of a situation in which a welfare state programme that continues to be 
nourished by a utopia of social labour is losing its power to project future 
possibilities for a collectively better and less endangered way of life. 9022 
The welfare state is legitimated at the secondary and primary level through 
elections, through using the power of the state to intervene in the economy, 
to push through welfare benefits and services legislation and, importantly, to 
oversee the implementation of the latter. Thus the "substantive side of the 
project is nourished by the residues of a utopia of social labour: as the status 
of the employee is normalised through rights to political participation and 
social ownership, the general population gains the opportunity to live in 
freedom, social justice and increasing prosperity. s32 Whilst the latter 
characterisation is aimed generally at the position of the wage labourer 
within the context of the pacification of class conflict, its serves as well as a 
particular palimpsest for those who work(ed) for and within the welfare 
bureaucracies, including local government. Thus whilst the financial 
remuneration in the public sector was regarded as being not too good, that 
was offset by the favourable terms and conditions and prospect of a "job-for- 
life". Contrast that now with the vulture-like dawn chorus of both Labour 
and Conservative councillors in local government who, in prefatory support 
of "rightsizing" welfare bureaucracies seemingly overstuffed with recruitees 
from the equal opportunity programmes, are heard to parrot in unison, "we 
are not an employment agency" 324 There are, however, two key 
substantive factors which have a direct effect on the legitimating potential of 
the social welfare state. The first relates to whether or not the state has 
sufficient power at its disposal and the means to use that power to keep in 
check the capitalist system. The second relates to the way in which such 
power is used to attain the welfare goals. On the first, Habermas sees the 
state as being too narrow a framework to adequately uphold its side of the 
welfare "bargain". Even if it is successful it becomes at the same time a 
victim of its success, particularly within a context of falling profitability, 
poor investment etc., as the UK was in the mid seventies. Under such 
conditions it becomes all too easy for the two areas to be falsely related in 
the mind of the public, especially if the public sphere is distorted through the 
dominance of biased communications media. As happened in the 1979 
election the social base of the welfare state decreases and "upwardly mobile 
groups of voters who received the greatest direct benefit from the welfare 
state development can develop a mentality concerned with maintaining their 
standard of living and may ally themselves with the old middle class and in 
general with the strata concerned with "productivity. " to form a defensive 
coalition opposing underprivileged or marginalised groups. °'325 The 
leitmotiv of the `79 UK election and the subsequent programmes of the 
Conservative government are well epitomised by the latter's quote with their 
spoken, hinted at and defined by exclusionary notions of spongers, bully-boy 
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labour unions, and swampers. In relation to the second factor Habermas re- 
emphasises the point that the attainment of the welfare state programme 
requires that the interventionist state draws on the full extent of the 
government's power. These prove counter-effective because "the legal and 
administrative means through which welfare state programmes are 
implemented are not a passive medium with no properties of its own.... they 
are linked with a practice that isolates individual facts, a practice of 
normalisation and surveillance.. (which) ... Foucault has traced the reifying 
and subjectivising power of this practice down to its finest capillary 
ramifications in everyday communication.. "326 This subtle form of 
deformation of the lifeworid is less obvious than open exploitation and 
means that the overall goal of the welfare programme cannot be achieved by 
the putting the means in an administrative and legal form. 
This dilemma facing societies in the West elicit responses, two of which are 
end parts of a narrowing continuum between neo-conservatism and 
conservative social demomocracy, in other words between the Conservative 
new right party and old Callaghan style Labour. As far as the latter are 
concerned they "are the true conservatives who want to stabilise what has 
been achieved ... (in order).. to find a point of equilibrium between the 
development of a welfare state and modernisation based on a market 
economy. , 327 This removes from the welfare programme that residue of 
utopia associated with social labour, but also fails to realise the over 
intrusive nature of the welfare state as well as the fact that the social base of 
that sort of welfare programme is slipping away. With the latter, i. e. 
neoconservatism, whilst it is also oriented to industrial society, it is at the 
same time extremely critical of social welfare, seeking change along three 
fronts. The first of these critical re-adjustments is related to the 
introduction of a supply side economic policy which will increase the 
valorization of capital, even at the risk of higher unemployment. The 
second re-adjustment is tied to removing large sections of the welfare state 
from public will formation in order to achieve two sorts of savings: a 
reduction in the provision of certain services and a reduction in the cost of 
legitimating services. Finally cultural policy is re-aligned to achieve the 
discrediting of intellectuals as those over encouraging a post material, 
unproductive, Enlightenment based critical valorization, and to achieve the 
backward looking resurrection of traditional culture. This certainly has a 
resonance with the previous Conservative government's cultural 
programmes and agendas, such as demoting the social "sciences", the 
narrowly conceived National Curriculum in schools etc. It is certainly true 
in the UK that neo-conservatism did "find a base in the bipartite segmented 
society"328 it promoted, as evidenced by the eighteen years of control of the 
UK government. To that extent the broad outlines of Habermas analysis 
appear to be borne out by the empirical evidence of the rise within the UK of 
the new right to power. 
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The question, however, is how local governance fits into this theoretical 
schema. In part the answer to that lies in the particular configuration of the 
welfare state and local government in the UK, a historical development far 
more pronounced than in other European counterparts, whereby local 
government has assumed responsibility for large tranches of welfare 
resources which have a direct material impact on the well being of 
communities within its purviews. There is another specific relationship 
linked directly to the election of the `79 Conservative government, and that 
is to do with the media distortion of the public perception of local 
government because of the "winter of discontent" episode. In reality, then 
in the run up to that election the "malconstruction" of social welfare, local 
government and irresponsible trade unions had become firmly fixed in the 
minds of large segments of the public. But local government, especially in 
large urban areas in the UK also came to express the confluence of a number 
of differing but related influences, as outlined before: The rise of new left 
activists in the Labour Party to first step political office as councillors, the 
growing influence of race and women's equality as pursued through 
community pressures, and, initially, the geographical fallback political space 
of a demoralised Labour Party in opposition. There is a sense then in 
which it can be said, especially if we look at the politically colour coded 
local government map of the UK, that within certain urban areas, particularly 
those in inner city areas with large Black communities, local struggles 
around the legitimation of a welfare project still nourished by a residue of a 
utopia of social labour, occurred. There is an element of truth thus in the 
media scaremongering of the "Red Teds and Kens" or the "People's 
Republic of Islington. " But in seeking local legitimation for the pursuit of a 
social labour imbued utopia of the welfare state, contra the national 
government, decisions were taken by the political leaders of the local polity, 
often strategic decisions, that this would require the engendering and 
positive racialising of that utopia, given the contiguous constituencies. This 
was not the seamless bases for new forms of solidarity, as envisaged by 
many local activists, but rather the scenario for debates, divisions, 
competition and, on the few occasions, allianced solidarity, within the sphere 
of local governance. In terms then of legitimation, the sorts of reasons for 
the fragmentation that occurred is exemplified by one of the then Labour 
leaders of a council who, in well intended but damning praise of his 
Principal Race Relations Adviser said, "At least he delivers the Black 
vote. " 29 There is, however, another substantive theorisation side to this 
depiction of local government. This is to do with the fact that the 
ascendancy of neo-conservatism in national politics is based on the 
consensus breaking exclusion of the marginalised who "have no veto power 
since they represent a segregated minority that has been isolated from the 
production process.... (to the extent that).... the established powers are less and 
less dependent for their own reproduction on the labour and willingness to 
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co-operate of those who are impoverished and disenfranchised. 9030 It can 
be said then that the new right national governments' policy of reducing 
public expenditure certainly was not threatened by these pockets of 
opposition; certainly not when measured against the power the state had and 
still has at its disposal. The threat lay more with the legitimation costs 
involved in attempting to secure support for national policies in a context 
within which there were still visible and vocal supporters of a labour based 
welfare. Incorporated in this oppositional space and voice were as well the 
realities of Britain as a multi-racial society, a vision that ran counter to the 
third aspect of neo-conservatism which is to do with recreating the white 
golden past. There is a linkage here as well with my own contention, briefly 
outlined in last chapter which derives from the Habermassian notion of 
social learning. This is to do with the contention that societies learn both 
technically and normatively in ways that can either progress or impede its 
development. Harking back then to the Arendtian conceptual linkage of the 
development of state bureaucracy, colonialism and totalitarianism 331, it can 
be postulated that the development of neo-conservative policies on 
democracy and the local state have a historical resonance with the colonial 
state. It is within that sort of conceptual framework that I shall want to talk 
about later, in outlining the general characteristics of a racially inclusive 
form of local governance, the post-neo-colonial city in the metropolis. 
Habermas as well seems to be hinting at as much when he writes that "the 
pattern of relations between the metropolises and the underdeveloped 
peripheral areas that have become established in the international arena 
seems to be repeating itself within the developed capitalist societies. "332 
New Labour then, despite its renewing democracy posturing, is still a 
defensive reaction to the changing constellation sans any utopian content. 
Labour has become part of the neo-conservative programme - "humane 
Thatcherism", as Hall so aptly puts it. 
Whilst during the eighties and nineties the accelerating neo-conservative 
programme of deregulating local government, alongside other sectors of the 
welfare state, aimed at reducing the cost of legitimation, there was in reality, 
an actual transfer of costs to new legitimation processes. At the level of 
secondary order legitimation areas previously under the control of local 
government were either removed or had put in place an intermediary 
accountability stage. Whilst these costs were thus no longer the 
provenance of local governance, they did not disappear in the ground swell 
of marketisation, which no doubt was the intention of the neo-conservative 
national order, rather they were absorbed into the national level of 
legitimation costs via new processes. In other words deregulation was not 
market inspired, it was politically inspired. Offe proposes a similar 
argument when he writes : 
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"In the name of increased economic efficiency and in the interests of 
an expanded freedom of economic action, the political theoretical 
demand for, and practice of, deregulation is directed at an alleged 
excess of state norms, rules and prescriptions....... There are 
theoretical-ideological affinities between arguments for 
deregulation.. the political positions of neo-conservative .. parties.. and `postmodern' cultural phenomena which on both political and 
aesthetic planes promote flexibility and an `indeterminate 
evolution. '.... In both cases the possibility of developing binding 
norms for action is disputed. "333 
Offe goes on to argue, correctly I think, that the politics of deregulation 
require a massive state intervention. Whilst he does not specify as such the 
level of intervention, it is my view that, given its comparatively shorter time 
span, e. g. in the UK about fifteen years compared to the thirty years of 
welfare evolution up to 1975, is probably more intensive and intrusive than 
that which supports the regulatory welfare state. Offe sees the differences 
between the two "regimes" as being that of between "commission" and 
"omission" where the latter "involves nothing more than the negative 
decision no longer to regulate the activities and life chance of citizens 
through `tutelary' prescriptions, prohibitions, price controls and decrees, and 
to do so instead through the contingent dynamics of market processes. "334 
However the surety with which the proponents of deregulation laud the 
efficiency of the market is undermined by the performative contradiction that 
the "failures" of regulation did not self-correct themselves because of the 
dynamic of the "efficient" market; rather it required a political solution. 
Offe, however, appears to overestimate the efficacy of such a programme. 
Political programmes require political legitimation. Deregulation thus has 
four defining components. The first is that it relies just as much as the 
welfare state programme on policies, legal and other regulatory instruments. 
The second is that what emerges is not the pure, pristine market, but a 
politically supervised market. The third is that the programme gives rise to 
new forms of legitimation processes which, in many cases, shift from the 
local government scene, on to the national scene. I am thinking here about 
the manifold "accountability" facades, such as the National Audit 
comparative tables of targets, or the school performance tables etc., with 
which the neo-conservative programme hopes to secure the support of the 
populace. The fourth is that the supervised market turns out to be, because 
of the tutelary aspect, in fact a quasi-market, whose guardianship costs, not 
to mention legitimation costs, undermine the original intention of reducing 
absolute expenditure. Those who have moved from being "service 
managers" to "commissioning managers" in the reshaped world of social 
services in the UK, can attest to the new forms of controls presenting as 
accountability systems and thus new forms of cost, which the deregulated 
regime requires. Performance "facts", the performance indicator (PI) 
syndrome, become the means by which the "quangoised" public sector in 
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general, and specific sphere of local governance become the ostensible 
bartering chips for national government legitimation as it seeks approval by 
measuring the performance of the welfare and public sectors against the 
standard of market efficiency. The state can hold up these one sidedly 
derived "facts" as a means to both point to successes and to spotlight areas 
that require further state action. Thus whilst between 1979 and 1997 the 
level of central government funding allocated to local government in terms 
of direct grant funding fell -a legitimation plus for them given there neo- 
conservative manifesto - the re-accrual of other costs via other means as the 
state assumed responsibility for policing deregulated areas means that the 
actual level of savings is small. In the absence of a written constitution, 
local governance is now, far more than it was in 1979, effectively constituted 
through a battery of centrally derived pieces of legislation all aimed at 
politically deregulating its areas of activity. Whilst, at the secondary level, 
because of the successive election victories of the Conservative Party, and 
latterly new right Labour, whose programme with regard to local 
government is even more centrally directed, a claim can be made for this 
state of affairs being legitimated, at the primary level this new central 
guardianship of local government, falls far short of having its legitimation 
claims redeemed. In terms of Habermas' theory of proceduralist 
democracy, "only the state as a political system invested with decision 
making powers can "act"... (Where).. its action is legitimate only if the formal 
decision making procedures within the constitutional state have a discursive 
character that preserves under conditions of complexity the democratic 
sources of legitimacy in the public at large. "335 Certainly as far as the 
national government's state action towards local government over the 
eighteen year period is concerned, this was not the product of discursive 
practices, other than those limited debates with various right wing think- 
tanks, but rather the outcome of parliamentary diktat. If the participants' 
views, an operational principle which under-girds Habermas' substantive 
discourse principle, is absent from the process of decision making over local 
governance, then it is even more markedly absent from the panoply of laws 
that have come to surround local government. Thus, "legitimate law must 
pass a discursive test that potentially engages the entire range of different 
types of discourse... (including)... moral and ethical 
discourses ... (and)... 'pragmatic' discourses in which alternative strategies for 
achieving a given aim are assessed.. "336 In other words the law used by the 
state must be legitimated through a "broader discourse of citizens and their 
representatives. " In the absence of the latter the state has to continually 
renew the built-in obsolescence of its instrumentalised legitimation 
programme, thereby incurring more costs. 
What then about those localised areas where, under the vision of a welfare 
state still imbued with the utopia of social labour, the variegated attempts to 
combine that with race and gender - the subject empirically of this research 
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project - as an opposition and alternative to the neo-conservative vision were 
being played out? This is a question made even more important in relation 
to a Habermassian analysis because it is in those localised areas, those where 
local issues of democracy and services inter-relate, that the development of 
the inter-face between lifeworld and system is enacted. A large part of the 
answer to that question resides in looking at the changes that affected the 
Labour party in that same period. 
If 1979 is the watershed year for the formal elevation to power of political 
neo-conservatism in the UK, then 1987 is the watershed year for the Labour 
Party in its evolution into a social democratic mimic of neo-conservatism. 
The so-called London Loony effect and its role as a media inspired 
misrepresentation of London Labour councils in the developing "narrative" 
of what the nation had in store if Labour won the election, appears to have 
been pivotal in allowing the new right wing in Labour to assume overall 
control. The "Loony" tag was a not so subtle reference for the equality 
priorities and initiatives of these councils, particularly race equality 
initiatives. 337 It cannot be said that the Labour party nationally was 
responsible for directing the changes at the local party and government level, 
though there is substantial evidence to show that a lot of arm twisting and 
ideological strait jacketing did go on, e. g. the imposition of Kate Hooey in 
the Vauxhall constituency. It can be said, however, that the "modernising" 
impetus the loss of the election gave to the Labour party allowed it to 
confluence with other related "progressive" processes all aimed at 
reconstructing new forms of legitimation for the state; new forms which are 
based on the technocratisation of political accountability. Whereas, thus, as 
I shall argue later, there was a window of opportunity provided by the 
equality era in local government to begin looking substantively at new forms 
of inclusive political legitimation for local government; forms in which the 
co-ordination of action could be achieved through non-distorted 
communicative processes, themselves deriving from reconstructing inclusive 
utopias and therefore recasting local governance structures, this potential 
was elided by the Labour Party through favouring an over 
instrumentalisation of the public sector, and, inter-alia, local government as 
well. What this amounted to was the abandonment of the utopia of social 
labour for the "new obscurity". 
Which other related tributaries formed this confluence referred to above? 
In the main these derived from the almost compulsory techniques and 
instruments that flowed from the new right legislatively based restructuring 
of local government. These techniques were, and are, management 
accountancy ones which, in their operation and development, shifted a 
poorly defined arena of democratic accountability in local government into 
that of a finely tuned financial accountability system. The previously 
differentiated and differently valorised spaces of the public and private 
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sectors were now converging with the latter model dominant. If we put 
this convergence under the general rubric of the "new managerialism", 
because that term has common currency with other forms of analyses which 
are attempting to make sense of the changes in the public sector, it allows us 
as well to enlarge on a Habermassian type examination of what I have 
already described as an over instrumentalisation of public sector processes 
and practices. Up to this point, as far as my research shows, the attempts 
to deal with this phenomenon in the public sector have, not surprisingly, 
been from a perspective that engages in a social labour based critique, and, 
thus by inference, hopes for a Lazarine resurrection of a social labour 
constituted new welfare system, even if the bases of that consensus is 
revitalised. For example the neo-Gramscian critique of Clark and 
Newman338, perhaps because of the limited bases to their analyses, rather 
states the obvious when they write: "The problems which the managerial 
state is intended to resolve derive from the contradictions and conflicts in the 
political, economic and social realms...... (resulting in)... the managerialisation 
of these contradictions: they are redefined as `problems to be 
managed'... (where).. terms such as `efficiency', `effectiveness', 
`performance' and `quality' depoliticise a series of social issues. "339 That 
much is true. The key question however is not so much why this occurs as 
how this occurs, since it could be argued that these "transmogrifications" 
occurred as well under the old set-up and thus it would be reasonable to ask 
what marks this depoliticisation out from what happened previously. 
The partial answer to that last question is contained within the following 
quote which stems from a post-modernist inspired analysis of current 
management thinking; an orientation which, as argued in earlier papers, at 
the general level identifies similar problems as that of critical theory but 
which, in terms of defining the solutions, differs markedly. 
"Recently bureaucracy has suffered widespread denigration as a model for 
management; whatever role bureaucracy might have played in the past, it is not an 
appropriate template for the future of modern management, whether for corporate 
giants or the small and medium sectors. Yet, formal models of bureaucracy such 
as Weber's always implied a highly developed liberal ethic of universal rights 
impartially applied without fear or favour. Bureaucracy always contained certain 
classically liberal guarantees, such as the promise of equality before the law. 
Bureaucracy, for Weber, was always a moral project..... The triumph of economic 
over political liberalism places rights crucial to the political liberal project on the 
defensive. The attack on bureaucracy.... has diminished rather than augmented or 
replaced core liberal values. 1,040 
This seems a better contextual framework within which the claims of the 
new managerialism can be assessed because it is referenced backwards to the 
positive aspects of the "old order", which can be stood against the 
modernisation and progress claims of the new processes and systems. The 
above quote can be re-aligned in Habermassian terms by noting that whilst 
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the bureaucratic mode was `inefficient' and did `intrude' into the private 
spaces of welfare participants, those areas labelled `inefficient' did at least 
allow in some cases for the communicative action based discourses around 
issues requiring consensus. For example, the dismissal under the new 
managerialist regime of equality based employment procedures on the 
grounds that they cause conflict and are inefficient. Further, as I have 
argued earlier by looking at Offe, de-bureaucratisation has not resulted in 
"de-controlling" or "de-organisational ism", but in follow up forms which are 
differently constituted. Thus Clegg and Palmer, in the post-modernist look 
at management cited above, go on to pose a series of questions: "What is lost 
in the dismissal and critique of bureaucracy? What are the ethical bases of 
that which replaces it? What are the consequences, particularly for public 
sector management, of this denigration of bureaucracy? "341 We begin to 
answer that by looking at a Habermassian based critique of managerialism 
and associated techniques, a critique which has been developed with 
reference to the private sector, but, which, with the colonisation, in 
Habermas' sense, of the public sector by such instruments, is far more 
pertinent and fecund than the critiques briefly introduced above. It also 
dovetails with, and begins to provide some of the detailed internal supports 
for my initial overall assessment that the new forms of control in the public 
sector rely not so much on traditional bureaucratic hierarchy and command, 
though these can also be called-up when necessary, but on value inculcating 
socialising processes that give rise to organisational totalitarianism. 
Continuing with the metaphor of colonialism and its related concept of 
imperialism, the importation of second hand ideological technologies into 
the public sector is similar to that of the inequalities that inhere in the 
knowledge relationships between the first and third worlds -a facet of the 
"think global act local" perhaps. Such technologies come garishly 
packaged with endorsements and the critical processes giving rise to them 
are omitted from the accompanying installation guides. Thus the increasing 
inventory of techniques - quality management, strategic management, human 
resource management etc. - have been taken up not only uncritically in the 
public sector but without much regard for the history of their evolution in the 
private sector. In opening their account of critical management theory and 
studies, Alvesson and Willmott comment, in relation to the private sector, 
that, "the last ten to fifteen years.. (have seen).. old certainties about `how' to 
manage... unsettled by a number of developments... (such as).... increased 
concerns about the `ethics' of business and management, the social and 
ecological consequences of economic activity, the widening application of 
information and communication technologies and, not least the commercial 
success of `new' [e. g. Japanese] philosophies and practices. "342 Within 
such an environment of uncertainty and potential for change, management 
`guru' texts, usually empirically challenged, ethically precarious and 
theoretically inconsistent, have tapped into a particular climate which has 
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resulted in massive sales of these products. The "In Search of Excellence" 
book published in 1982 and, six years later highly influential in the emerging 
neo-managerialist drive in local government, is a good example of this. 34 
Such texts promise(d) much in relation to new ways of thinking and doing 
management so much so that a subsequent book by one of the authors of the 
`Excellence" text entitled his follow-up endeavours "Liberation 
Management". 344 The reality however, is that despite the appropriation of 
critical words such as "empowerment" and "liberation", these works are 
"actually preoccupied with preserving established priorities and privileges. " 
Alvesson and Willmott note that the term `manage' is derived from the 
Italian word `maneggiare' which means to handle horses. 345 This 
etymologically rooted ambivalence about the object of such practices has 
carried over into the evolution of managerialism which, despite the fact that 
it is readily acknowledged that the most recurrent problems in this sphere of 
activity are people centred, has shown instead a proclivity for "identifying 
and legitimising technologies of management control. " Alvesson and 
Willmott go on to take apart critically orthodox notions of management 
noting that current theory and practice is based on a narrow conception of 
reason - instrumental reason. Other management theory commentators 
have identified a similar problem, viz. the consideration "of many deep- 
seated features of organisational life - inequality, conflict, domination, 
subordination and manipulation is neglected or suppressed in favour of 
behavioural questions associated with efficiency and motivation. " 
Whilst, as shall be shown, these and other deficiencies are prompting a re- 
think about the so-called "scientific" nature, and by implication, neutrality, 
of management, these techniques are being brought into the public sector on 
the explicit back of those latter "virtues" as the cleaner, more technically 
advanced managerial way of doing things. Very often there is the claim that 
these techniques are better than, and will sort out for managers, the "messy", 
"inefficient" bad old ways of doing things; a claim that has the narrative sub- 
text that managers no longer have to concern themselves with the old equal 
opportunity agenda of inequality, conflict, domination etc. What is being 
presented to the public sector then is a one sided notion of management - the 
"facts" of the new management, if you like - which in fact hides the actual 
"confusion and uncertainty about what management is. " Alvesson and 
Willmott are correct thus to say that management is being "presented as a 
technical activity" which is "blind to the social relations through which 
managerial work is accomplished, " and that this technical representation of 
management "creates an illsuion of neutrality. "346 This illusion not only 
masks, but contributes as well to the non-resolution of the substantive 
problems and challenges "associated with organising everyday tasks... where 
there are divisions of class, gender, ethnicity etc, between managers and 
managed" to the extent that it is not realised that "whenever communication 
between managers and managed is impeded and distorted by institutionalised 
forms of domination, co-operation is conditional and precarious. "347 
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How then is this relationship of distorted communication maintained by the 
prevailing orthodoxies of management? Two broad interlinked and related 
processes are seen to be underpinning this which in the end give rise to a 
fourfold characterisation of current management theorisation and practice as 
instrumental reasoning. This descriptive paradigm is seen to fit both the 
"hard" schools of management, i. e. those which see management as a 
"science", and the evolving "softer" ones. i. e. those who frame management 
in more "humanistic" terms. In relation to the two broad themes, these are 
seen to devolve upon the inter-related notions of "rational progress" and 
"expertisation" which can be analysed in managerial thinking. Both 
schools, but particularly the "scientistic" school make unredeeemed claims 
about the modernised and modernising ever more rational world we live in; 
claims which assume we live in a better managed, i. e. more efficient and 
effective, world. In this assumption the manager emerges as the 
"expertised" hero; the latter appelation because the first syllable is assumed 
to be the substantive reality in practice. As Alvesson and Willmott 
describe the scene, a description which captures the unfolding managerial 
narrative in local government, professional "managers ensure that the claims 
of all groups are effectively acknowledged, rationalised and satisfied" so that 
the needs of the organisation can be better met by the "replacement of 
amateurs by `professionals managers' who are in possession of the requisite 
expertise. " 348 Societal progress is too narrowly conceived in a way that 
conflates such vision with the advance of capitalism. Even within the 
more humanistic thinking on management where in some texts it is 
acknowledged that social and political forces operate within an ideological 
framework, the purviews of those forces are contained within the 
organisation. That is to say politics becomes reduced to the micro-politics 
of positioning within the organisation which of themselves still leave 
unquestioned the key problematic of "management for what? " The 
rationality thus employed is also constrained. Thus it can be said that 
when managers working within this conceptual framework "devise or adopt 
methods on the `rational' grounds that they are more effective or efficient, 
they implicitly endorse and legitimise a society in which it is acceptable to 
treat human beings as means rather than ends. " In other words it becomes 
acceptable to treat people who are managed as "objects" of management 
decisions who/which have no rights to participate in those decision making 
processes - not the "we" but the conventionalised "you" and "it". Research 
quoted by A and W show that the political and moral context to management 
decision making is still dominated by a propensity for technique rather than 
critical reasoning. This could equally be said of the new managerial 
techniques of local governance where, for example, improving services to 
the communities have become funnelled through the bottleneck of TQM 
techniques, techniques which are more at home in manufacturing, and which, 
very often by retrospective comparison with the "bad-old-efficient-days" - 
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for which read `equal opportunity times - are presented as a supposed 
advance on the community participative intentions of the equality 
programmes. Thus "the overriding emphasis upon seemingly impartial 
technique and procedure attracts support from shareholders, (and in the 
public sector politicians) because it seems to define the limits of managerial 
discretion.... (as well as securing).. the social position of management.... (as 
the)... impartial [apolitical] expert whose skill is deemed to be of critical 
importance for the maintenance of modem complex societies. "349 
Certainly the process of depoliticisation of employees in the sphere of local 
governance over the last decade is very much evident. On the other hand 
the managerialist cheerleaders can point out that these techniques, new to 
local governance, have been introduced replete with their accompanying 
claims of "empowerment", "leadership" not to mention "valuing" employees 
and welcoming "diversity". A and W are clear that these so-called 
`progressive' accounts of management actual seek to achieve no more than 
"supplementing and revising established means and recipes of management 
control... with the strategic re-engineering of employee norms and values in 
line with the `new concept of strategy' and the `legitimate problems and 
solutions'... (thereby giving rise to a process in which) a technocratic 
ideology of management is effectively reinforced, not challenged. "350 
These two broad dimensions of current management thinking and practice 
are the bases upon which to derive a Habermassian style fourfold 
characterisation of management - management as distorted communication, 
management as mystification, management as cultural doping, management 
as a colonising power. 351 A and W create these categories of critical 
management metaphors as a counterpoint to the prevalent metaphorical 
frameworks which are dominant in management theory. These usually 
allude to images of cleancut engineering processes, or to organicist notions, 
or to militaristic yearnings. The common thread is that all seek to achieve 
the "portrayal of organisations as robust, stable, unitary, apolitical and 
fundamentally conflict-free phenomena. " Habermas himself in his later 
clarification of TCA -a clarification that does not undermine the original 
intention of TCA which is to critique functionalist reason - notes that: 
With systems theory, the phenomena... are described in a manner independent of the 
language and self-understanding of the actors. The objectivating change in stance 
triggers off an alienating effect, repeated with each individual systems-theoretic 
description of a phenomenon previously grasped from the participant's 
perspective. "3SZ 
Management as distorted communication mirrors my own interpretation of 
experiencing the introduction of these management techniques new to local 
government; distorted insofar as the management that constitutes and is 
constituted by these, privileges instrumental rationality. The over attention 
to means, which, for example, is evident in the intensive investment in neo- 
172 
managerialist systems in local government, becomes and will become, an 
end in itself. The key point is not that instrumental action is of itself "bad" 
- its potential to organise resources is a positive - but that istrumental 
rationality in the absence of practical reason gives rise to the situation in 
which "the legitimation of managerial rationality through the dominance of 
technical interest necessarily produces systematically distorted 
communication insofar as all forms of discourse are made sense of via the 
interpretative template of technical-rational knowledge. "353 Habermas' 
four conditions of communicative action are certainly not met here. Thus 
despite the `progressive' claims made as well about such values as the 
"learning organisation" - very common now in attempting to fine tune local 
government - these forms of communication do not enhance the process of 
social learning. A and W perceive modern corporations, and to which I 
would add increasing larger parts of the public sector, as "proto-totalitarian 
institutions insofar as they assess the value and relevance of all contributions 
in terms of the monolithic template of technical-rational knowledge. "354 
The mystification of management and the creation of a managerialist 
mystique, itself a subtext of distorted communication, has gathered a 
constitutive momentum in the public sector, propelled by the inter-acting 
constituencies of local government, intellectual support agencies, such as the 
LGMB, politicians, and the `auto-momentumised' careers of newly 
constituted undemocratic "leaders" of management in the public sector. 
Management, then, is "an institution whose agents mould and influence 
people's beliefs, meanings, values and self-understandings. " ass The array 
of neo-mystifying elements that appear to undergird the developing symbolic 
orthodoxy in local government can be clearly seen in the manifold 
advertising literature which local governments appear to use to communicate 
with the internal workforce and local population; and in many instances 
these are acts of substantive communication insofar as they deal with areas 
that would be best handled discursively. But the two groups of addressees 
require respective legitimating discourses which are not necessarily 
complementary, and in many cases are contradictory. For example, 
employees are promised flexibility, creativity and flatter hierarchies, whilst 
the local electorate are siren songed with leaders and executive directors. 
However as A and W comment in relation to the private sector, but which is 
equally applicable to the public sector, this attempt to create order in a period 
of uncertainty for both employees and communities comes into conflict with 
the lifeworld expectancies of the individuals in those constituencies who 
bring into the pristine world of clear strategy notions of fairness, justice, etc. 
To this may be added that this is particularly so of Black people and women. 
Ultimately however hierarchy re-establishes itself through the de facto right 
of managers to "decide how and when people are truly themselves and what 
counts as being creative" 356 Nowhere is the critique of mysticism more 
pertinent than in the area of marketing. A and W point to the 
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`representationalness' of marketing insofar as it "represents itself as a 
technically rational apparatus for closing the gap between producers and 
consumers by identifying and satisfying the customers needs"357. Its 
uncritical transference to the sphere of local governance has meant that at a 
stroke previously transitivised users and community members had become 
instrumentalised customers with a uni-dimensional relationship with the 
local state with the implied brokerage via the medium of money. 
Marketing is now a required skill area for many local authority jobs both in 
relation to employees and so-called customers. Thus for example within 
one of the new technical orthodoxies, Total Quality Management, there is the 
attempt to "induce employees to identify themselves as customers within a 
supply chain........ Their intent is that employees should derive a sense of self 
esteem from the service given to the next person in the chain rather than 
from the intrinsic meaning or pleasure associated with the work they do..... In 
such programmes metaphors such as `team' and `customer' are mobilised in 
ways that mask and mystify more or less intentionally their embeddedness in 
and contribution towards relations of domination and control". 358 
The third managerial metaphor, management as cultural doping, gains 
greater prominence within the public sector if set against the developing past 
decade's tide of core values, mission statements - even up to the Foreign 
Office - which has swept over the various agencies of the public sector. 
These narrow band of values, invariably defined unilaterally by management, 
are the ones which the organisation attempts to socialise employees into. 
They are there to define the parameters of the employee's belief and 
orientation to the organisation. Increasingly then, and particularly so in 
local government, there is the attempt to extend the organisation's reach into 
the psyche of the individual so that a new form of control emerges. 
Despite the claims made for liberation, flatter hierarchies etc, and where, 
within that idealised context the notion of new values as a guiding template 
might gain some currency, very few local authorities have actually 
deconstructed their bureaucratic hierarchies. These imposed values, then 
come to rest on top of the existing forms of control; they in, effect, mediate 
the communicative space between managed and manager. In one local 
authority which has seen an accelerated development and implementation of 
these sorts of techniques, stress amongst staff has increased to such an extent 
that the council was forced to buy in stress counselling services 359 A and 
W point to the role marketing has in assisting the cultural doping 
phenomenon in the private sector because it is "involved in producing and 
governing people as their sense of personal identity becomes closely 
associated with, and dependent upon, what they own and consume. "360 
Likewise in local government the attempt by many to market the 
organisation and services to both the local communities and employees, an 
attempt to secure legitimation not through discursive practices but through 
the representation of efficiency and effectiveness, is done so with the aim of 
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socialising the target viewers and audiences into the values of the 
organisation. In two of the target local authorities, one of the phenomena 
that has occurred and which has been highlighted particularly by those who 
are managed, especially Black employees, is the increase in the number of 
white women senior managers, often displacing Black senior managers, and 
who are perceived to have got there through their involvement in relevant 
networks within the sphere of local governance, sometimes crossing over 
into that of the new Labour Party networks. What has been noticeable is 
the extent to which for these managers there appears to be the identification 
with the organisation through an implicit dress code which they adhere to 
and which has been tagged, by their underlings, "power dressing. " 
Finally. in presenting management as colonising power, I agree with A and 
W when they write: 
"Colonization describes the way that one set of practices and 
understandings which are strongly associated with instrumental reason that 
is dominant in the organisation and management of complex systems comes 
to dominate and exclude other practices and discourses that are present 
within the everyday cultural media of the lifeworld where human beings 
develop their basic sense of being purposive, wilful subjects with 
distinctive social identities. Instead of understanding social phenomena 
from the cultural perspective of the participants, instrumental reasoning 
represents these phenomena as impersonal interchangeable elements of the 
s361 system. 
The one classical example that springs to mind, and which is drawn from the 
principal authority in the empirical research, concerns the processes and 
machinations involved in the transformation of the then separate race and 
women's equality programmes into a broad based equal opportunity 
programme. Whereas the former two programmes had attempted to 
develop around them relevant public spheres comprising of constituents from 
Black people and women, both employees and from within the local 
communities, the latter was based upon severing those links and upon 
treating the differing equality strands as equal value interchangeable 
management determined priorities. In other words, as Habermas has 
pointed out and as A and W making use of that insight, write, "in advanced 
capitalist societies the lifeworld is too often regarded as an irrational 
impediment to the perfection of systems' properties, or ... as a resource for 
breathing new life into tired bureaucracies"362 Thus they conclude, with 
reference to the private sector, but which is of increasing relevance to the 
public sector, in particular local government, that colonisation occurs where 
"the current talk of `business ethics' and of strengthening corporate culture 
to facilitate empowerment, trust and teamwork can be seen as a- largely 
synthetic - `system' resronse to its own corrosive effects upon lifeworld 
values and practices. "3 3 
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In sum Habermas' theories have been used to attempt to derive both an 
analysis of local government and a theory of local governance - the facts and 
norms parameters - which unlike the critiqued pF'sm and localism, is, no 
more than should be expected according to the fallibilistic tenets of his 
discursive ethics, inclusive of the experiences of Black people. In so doing 
it has been necessary to look at local governance at three inter-related 
theoretical levels - the meta-, meso- and micro-levels. Continuities have 
been sought between all three by reference to the existence of, potential for 
the existence of, denial of, or absence of, a framework for discourse ethics. 
That is to say "those rules and communicative presuppositions that make it 
possible for participants in a practical discourse to arrive at consensus.. " 
The meta-level has dealt with the "stepping-out-and-looking-back" theory of 
theories examination of enlightenment derived critiques of modernity, and 
within this are included the productivist analyses of modern capitalism as 
well as the post modernist approaches. Within this abstracted framework, 
the meso-level has, through examining state and democratisation theories, as 
well as referring where apposite, to the relevant empirical "facts" sought to 
outline the intervening range of theorisation which links the meta to the 
micro. Included in this has been an examination of the increasing 
undemocratic technicisation of local governance; an examination that does 
not rely on a last instance determination link with social labour. Finally 
the micro-level locates the actor in a communicative framework where there 
is the potential for inclusively examining issues of race and gender within 
the analytical categories of identity, individual and collective agency, and in 
a way that does not privilege through incorporation, one particular 
perspective. This brings this attempt to sketch out a Habermassian 
approach to local governance to the point where it is necessary to hold it up 
to that benchmark, i. e. race, against which the other main theories of local 
governance were measured. The claim has already been made that this 
approach allows for an inclusive examination of race, i. e. one which more 
successfully walks the boundary line between universalism and relativism. 
How then does one bring race into a Habermassian type analysis of local 
governance? 
5.10 On Habermas, Race and Local Governance 
Earlier on in this part of the chapter I outlined Habermas' proceduralist 
model of the law, with particular reference to racial and cultural minorities. 
The discourse ethical principles underlying that hold as well, I contend, for 
the inclusive participation and co-determination of processes and outcomes 
by Black people in the democratic and institutional practices of governance. 
That is to say that any claim to authorial power, which implies therefore the 
right to act for people, which excludes Black people from having the equal 
right to participate in the practical discourse leading up to those actions, is 
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not valid and is, in fact, an act of domination. This is but a restatement of 
Habermas' meta-theoretical contention that the defining kernel of human 
experience is communication; a conclusion reached in a more abstracted 
rethinking and re-examination of Marx's idea of determinist social labour. 
In the section prior to this I, in an extension of Habermas' theory defined 
racism as "the maintenance of relations of force in the structures of 
communication through conventionalisation of biological differences or 
ascribed biological differences. " Logically it therefore follows, as 
outlined earlier, that conflicts arise within multi-racial societies because 
different discourses, testing the right to participate, face the 
underdevelopment or absence of appropriate norms and structures that 
guarantee their participation. The key problem is not that of the respective 
cultures and their values, or for that matter the identity claims made by 
individuals therein, but of inequality. 
At the meso-level, that is, at the level of the interlinking analysis of the 
institutional arrangements, the "race problematic" has been situated within 
the core problem of the modem state which is that of legitimacy. The only 
grounds for legitimating forces are the formal conditions for possible 
consensus formation. It was argued that, on the race front, two, possibly, 
three dimensions to legitimation could be traced. The first related to the 
then new right government's attempts to re-articulate the white nation and to 
use that as part of the centralising assault on local government. In deed 
management of the "race issue" was a core concern of government thinking 
vis-avis the management of inner city urban areas. The second concerned 
the pockets of local legitimation struggles taking place within local authority 
boundaries as the issue of race equality became a priority within many inner 
city councils. This was very much two legitimating forces clashing head on. 
The first finding expression through the government attacks on loony left 
councils, and in the case of the GLC actual action in the form of abolition, as 
well as through the distorted portrayal of race in local government through 
the right wing media. The second was expressed through the claims made 
for and on behalf of Black people by some local councils in that brief period, 
about the right to tackle racism. Whilst in the latter case there were a 
number of possible reasons for councils adopting race as a priority, as 
outlined earlier, by far the largest influence came about because of the 
collective claims made for racial justice by Black communities, claims which 
they wanted redeemed. Habermas, following Honneth, following the early 
Hegel, calls these claims, claims for "respect" where the converse, i. e. 
"disrespect" comes about because of structures and processes of 
communicative inequality. At this preliminary stage a number of 
redemptive spheres of action and re-action can be categorised, not 
necessarily in any order of priority, but simply as a heuristic accounting 
measure. It stands to reason, therefore, that the categorical distinction 
should not be read as an absence of inter-relationships between the action 
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areas. If these categories could be placed in any kind of order, then it 
would be that of those actions which fall under the area of secondary 
legitimation and those that come under primary order legitimation. In other 
words actions which are acceptable within the normative parameters of the 
liberal democratic state, and those which by their very nature seek to extend, 
or break those parameters. Obviously, as well, in ordering the actions thus, 
it is not intended to prefatorily infer that they can also be split into Black and 
white actions, but rather as shall be shown, there were any number of Black 
actions in the era under consideration which could not or did not want to, 
extend the boundaries of the given, and thus contributed as well to the 
demise of race equality in local government. 
The first type of race remedial action can be ideal typed around those that 
sought to extend and run to the full the "liberal ethic of universal rights 
impartially applied without fear or favour" which supposedly inheres in 
bureaucracy and which the formative development of race equality in local 
government promised. These actions, because they were often structured 
within the normative framework of the 1976 Race Relations Act, could be 
accommodated within the elasticity of secondary order legitimation at the 
local level. Whilst the ethical promise of racially fine tuning bureaucracies 
still had run its course, i. e. such actions had not yet exhausted the spaces 
available, the frothy wake of these local churnings could be taken as the 
result of claims for racial justice being redeemed. For example, in the area 
of recruitment and selection, racially anti-discriminatory organisational 
rights, which ultimately owed their legitimacy to the support afforded them 
through having been formally approved through the decision making 
processes of representative liberal democracy, were enshrined in mandatory 
written procedures governing most aspects of recruitment and selection. In 
many authorities the involvement of race equality advisers together with 
ensuring that the relevant aspects of key documentation, such as the person 
specification, had explicit reference to the anti-discriminatory elements to 
and responsibilities of the job, meant that in the actual decision making 
stages of that process, a communicative discourse around racial justice was 
possible, involving as well in the interview stage, the actual applicant. 
This is not to say that these discourses were non-distorted, certainly not 
within the context of the relevant line management having the final decision. 
However it is to say that within the grey area of managerial discretion in 
local government bureaucracies was the potential to create a space, 
boundaried by written rights, within which racial conventionalisation in the 
structures of communication could be challenged. This was relatively 
successful in increasing the number of Black people employed in certain 
councils, even if there was the underlying anthrophagii accompanying their 
sojourn in local government of "not being good enough" -a throw back to 
the less-than-human trans-epochal unresolved problem. Where, in key 
processes, communicative spaces were created which influenced decisions, 
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these were never translated across the whole of the local government 
structure. Consequently, thus, as an example of one of the counter 
tendencies, Black employees, especially managers were expected, or, as 
some of them did, actually vocally carried into the structure, the intention to 
dispense racial justice. This often led to the simplistic equation that Black- 
bums-on-seats (BBOS) to the nth power is directly proportional to the level 
of racial equality in the organisation. The folly of believing that if the 
structure were filled with Black decision makers then racial justice would 
ensue, is but part of the leadership managerial myth in which those with 
delegated power within the bureaucracy can individually de-hierarchicalise it 
through force of will without structural changes inclusive of disarming the 
constitutive power of such structures. Within the broad context of the 
utopia of racial justice, a utopia which in the early part of the race 
programmes in local government had to ride the tension between competing 
utopias of social labour and women's equality, the limited spaces available 
for communicative discourse around the subject, meant that often defining 
the problem became conflated conventionalisedly with the possible 
solutions. Thus as examples of the latter tendencies, representationalised 
claims to a homogenised "Black perspective" as evinced by the groupings 
and organisations of Black social workers, or to essentialised ethnic 
characteristics, such as the all-beating-Afro-Caribbean child-rearing process, 
were common as proffered solutions; often proposed for implementation 
within the same relations of force structuring communication 364. With the 
increasing rate of technocratisation of local governance throughout the late 
eighties and nineties, and consequently as the communicative spaces closed 
down - the depoliticisation of local governance - so the tendency to etnikfy 
increased. This, I would argue, is but one of the symptoms arising out of 
organisational stratification and the inter-relationship between that and Black 
social differentiation. Two areas need quick mentioning. The first is that 
of the converse of etnikfikation, which is racial conventionalisation. Of 
course the more obvious instances occur, i. e. those actions which are overtly 
racist. But these can be and are dealt with under the expanded written 
organisational rights which themselves are locked into the legal norms of the 
1976 Race Relations Act. The more subtle ones are those that occur, often 
without the participation of Black people, and which are logically justified, 
sometimes within the parameters of the organisations own equal opportunity 
policy, but which, if not directly having an adverse effect on Black people, 
set up the conditions for that to happen later. The increasing use of 
business, the "need" for more skilled or qualified staff, a more consumerist 
approach to services, types of arguments from the mid-eighties onwards, are 
examples of this. Within those contexts it was, and is, quite easy to 
circumvent the normative framework of the legal obligations. The second 
area relates to that of Black employees, especially managers being in 
situations where it is easy to make decisions which favour systemic 
integration, e. g. individual career moves, or strategic purposive rational ones 
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which undermine race equality, and still self-justify those and/or make 
appeal to adherence to racial justice principles, through recourse to etnikfied 
socially differentiated value systems. For example, one Black manager in 
one of the target boroughs had the most appalling record vis-a-vis women, 
especially Black women, made some very questionnable decisions in relation 
to the funding of certain Black groups, but also , within the organisation, 
made use of an "Afrikaanist" perspective to both ward off criticisms and to 
legitimate his actions to other Black staff and certain council members. 
One can see, therefore, why social integrative mechanisms, i. e. consensus 
forming, in this case around the issue of racial justice, have a critical tension- 
ridden interface with mechanisms of systemic integration, i. e. exchange and 
power mechanisms. One can begin to see the outline, as well, of the 
argument which seeks to analyse how systemic colonisation replaces the 
social integrative processes which are necessary to redeem the claims of 
racial justice made by Black people. It links back to the idea of functional 
rationality where the means of equalitating then, now become the empty ends 
of nineties local governance. It is possible for some local authorities to 
generate the virtual equality programme and profile without involving, 
where involve refers to conditions of force free, or reducing, communicative 
processes, Black people. The idea put forward earlier of "ethical" racism 
means that such organisations can create the ethical facade of respect for 
Black people which can, if necessary be tested, at relevant tribunals, and yet 
engage in acts of utter disrespect. Nevertheless, getting back to the idea of 
race remedial action which satisfied secondary level legitimation, there was a 
time in the early to mid-late eighties when, at the local level, such acts could 
be accommodated within the legitimating parameters of the local governance 
polity, the reactions of the media and national government notwithstanding. 
It is within this sort of framework that much of the empirical details arising 
out of the study of the target authorities can be analysed. 
The second category of race remedial actions can be located within those 
that could be seen to wanting a more deliberative democratic communicative 
discourse. These can be placed more readily within the border areas of 
secondary and primary legitimation. That is to say they had the potential to 
raise fundamental normativist questions relating to legitimation. Within 
this paradigm can be placed all those actions which sought to allow the 
participation or bring to bear the views of Black people in and on the 
functionings, including the decision making processes, of local governance. 
These would range from the simple co-options to various committees, 
through the conferences and seminars organised around race related issues, 
via the written right, in some cases, specifying that all consultative and 
participative council processes must include the different Black 
communities, to the development of the various Black worker groups in the 
council and local trade union branches. Now, whilst it is true that in 
raising the utopia of racial justice as one of the major unresolved 
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transepochal problems of modernity, that this either places or always has the 
potential to place, primary legitimation questions on the agenda, it is not true 
that this will always occur, unless one sees Black people as the new 
historical agents of societal change, which I do not. These sorts of action, 
however, always contained the normative principle that Black people should 
be the equal participants in legitimation processes where the reasons for 
actions are the outcome of consensus arising from "the performative attitude 
of a participant in argumentation. " Whether or not this was ever attained is 
another matter for the moment since what is important is that it is within this 
interplay of Black lifeworlds and the system of local governance that a 
nascent Black public sphere around race and the local state could be 
discerned. At this stage I will only outline the argument to be made that 
the window of opportunity for radically rethinking and reworking local 
governance along the lines of communicatively redeeming the claims of 
racial and gendered justice through a form of deliberative democracy existed, 
albeit fleetingly. Such a rethink, would as well have to re-examine ways in 
which the actual organisational structure could be made more democratic 
and accountable in recognition that "this mid-level range of institutions 
... links the 
lived world of actors to the broader structures of society. " The 
opportunity thus to test local government's truth, rightness, sincerity and 
understanding of racial equality and justice has never been achieved. In 
this sense, perhaps, can the decentering of the state be spoken about. The 
fact is that this utopia was deliberately suppressed in favour of an accelerated 
programme of economic rationality within local governance in order to 
satisfy short term secondary legitimation concerns, and thus in favour of the 
new obscurity. 
There is a possible third area of action which cannot strictly be described as 
remedial because it refers to the action undertaken in the neo-managerialist 
era of the nineties. This new scenario cannot be equated with the old 
bureaucratic set-up. Instead, as has been argued before, a form of 
organisational totalitarianism has displaced the old bureaucratic, hierarchical 
form of power in which ersatz value laden organisational beliefs come to be 
the medium through which explicit financial accounting based management 
processes are legitimated both within and without local government. The 
re-energised mythology of management coupled with the complete 
capitulation to capitalist rationality, has thus given rise, not to the more- 
locally-accountable-decentred local government, other than in the crude 
prima facie hive-off of key services to the private sector, but to the creation 
of managerial fiefdoms. Within this race equality is no longer a priority, 
ostensibly, according to local politicians and assorted experts because of the 
progress made in the eighties, and that despite the continuous weight of 
counter-evidence detailing the prevalence of racism. In reality the strategic 
decisions taken, not taken conspiratorially so much as gaining increasing 
secondary legitimating momentum in the networks of local Labour power, 
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were that the Black vote either was not that important, or would not collapse 
if race was de-prioritised. This has, in essence meant cutting away the 
moral bases to such programmes by removing the rights and avenues for 
communicative discourse that evolved from these programmes. For 
example in one of the target boroughs, apart from scrapping all of their 
equality structures and posts, the union Black Workers Group has also lost 
their right to have time-off for meetings; their equality based employment 
policies and procedures have been scrapped and replaced with greatly 
reduced corporate human resource standards which managers have, in a 
context in which such responsibilities will be totally devolved to them, to 
adhere to, but without any direct organisational means of ultimately making 
them accountable. 365 Yet this organisation can still make claims to an 
equal opportunity policy and to an internal equality information system 
which can deliver "facts" about its equality responsibilities. This is but 
part of a process which can be witnessed in other local authorities where, on 
the race front in both a confirmation of the neo-conservative implications, 
and yet a mockery as well, of post-modernism, diversity is celebrated in 
explicit contra-distinction to race equality. It represents a clear move away 
from recognising and dealing with the collective nature of racism. 
However diversity, because it addresses the individual by claiming to meet 
the needs of individuals through positively acknowledging the unique 
diversity of each person, fits in well with the economic liberalistic 
individuating thought processes that inform current thinking on human 
resourcing, both in the private and public sectors. This is quite distinct 
from the individuation arising out of postconventionalisation. There is no 
longer recourse to arbitrating organisational rights or influencing fora, for 
Black employees, or for that matter recognition of group wrongs and 
experiences. The relationship between manager and employee, mediated, 
or "facaded"366, by the narrow band of organisational values, themselves 
supported by an array of new techniques, e. g. appraisal and supervision 
procedures, thematic focus groups etc., is all. In a sense this part of the 
implosion of the social labour, race and gender utopias in local government 
where the rights of employees, including their participative rights, have been 
suppressed as their increasing commodification - flexible working, sold off 
to private companies who win tenders etc. - renders them almost totally 
instrumentalised. One can well understand why, therefore, at the virtual 
level of reality, diversity fits in with the new talk of "liberation", 
"empowerment", "can do", and "thinking the unthinkable", because, like 
those terms, it time warps to the future by holding out the promise, in reality 
an empty promise, of a new one to one relationship of equals. The 
previous central drive on equality in local government has been replaced 
with an ad hoc, piecemeal approach given over to "fiefdoms" sometimes 
pursuing one-off projects, enough to keep the secondary level legitimation 
needs of the local state vis-a-vis race ticking over. The moral argument 
for race equality, seen by leading human resource institutes and race bodies 
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as leading to conflict, has been replaced by the business argument in which it 
is clearly stated that "diversity is good for business". But then, as other 
organisational studies have shown, conflict is actually good for organisations 
because, amongst other benefits, it demonstrates the communicative 
processes therein. We have moved, therefore, from actual remedies to 
virtual remedies because, in the latter case, the solidaristic grounds that make 
it possible "for participants in a practical discourse to arrive at consensus", 
have been done away with. At this level, perhaps it can be argued that 
legitimation for local governance is increasingly secured via the advertising 
and marketing techniques which were previously the sole domain of the 
private sector. 367 For example the CRE has instituted an annual local 
government set of awards for innovative race equality projects. These 
"certificates of race equality worthiness" are widely advertised locally by 
local authority winners and are prized visible legitimation bartering chips. 
There are similarities with the profile of the "society organised through the 
primacy of administrative power ... (which).. must exhaust itself 
in a self 
defeating effort to control the discursive sources of legitimation". 368 This 
nascent model of defining and controlling totally the organisational culture 
and values as a key component of directing the legitimation of the local state, 
comes to be repeated at national level in the late nineties with new Labour 
winning control of the government. 
Is there a vision, therefore, a normatively based outline, of a racially 
inclusive model of local governance? The answer is "yes", but only 
tentatively in the positive because of the critical on tological groundings of 
this type of analysis in which it is only possible to specify the impartial bases 
for inclusive communicative discourse. This might be best dealt with in 
the following two sections which both meta-critiques certain aspects of 
Habermas' thinking, as was done with the other two theoretical models of 
local governance, and tries to move the argument forward. 
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Chapter 6 
The Critique of Habermas 
6.1 Introduction 
Habermassian based critical social theory has been proffered as the best 
epistemological framework within which to develop a racially inclusive, i. e. 
racially non-exploitative and dominating, concept of local governance; 
certainly in contradistinction to the social labour based and localist versions 
which have gained the status not only of orthodoxy amongst leading local 
government theorists in academia, but, also have an underlying resonance in 
the policy and operational thinking on local governance in new Labour, both 
at the local and national levels. This postulated superiority has been, as 
well, affirmed through conducting a meta-level debate with the 
epistemological and on tological groundings to these theories and with post 
modernism, and, importantly, the way in which the two areas appear to 
overlap. However, in upholding such critical theory as providing the 
better bases for inclusivity, does not mean that it cannot, and should not be 
critiqued. Unlike the two other ideal type versions of local governance 
critiqued earlier, such is the breadth and many levels of Habermas' theory - 
philosophical, sociological and political - and thus the ambitious potential, 
even if he himself has said it is but a modest goal, it has inevitably carried in 
its wake the necessary targeted criticisms of other thinkers that there are 
substantive critiques from both supporters and opponents. Within these 
notions of race, and, more generally "difference", have been both implicitly 
and explicitly raised. As was done with the other two theories, these can be 
critiqued, although in the case of tlabermas using a slightly different format, 
as shall be explained further on, utilising the same meta-critical matrix as 







Meta-theoretical 1 3 5 
considerations 
Agency 2 4 6 
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Since it is the intention to use the summary and conclusion part of the 
section on Habermas to explore developing a more critically honed inclusive 
Habermassian based argument, the substantive detail of each numbered 
element of the matrix will be unfurled and unravelled in this section through 
a de- and reconstructive examination of some of the key supporting and 
opposing critiques of Habermas' theoretical endeavours, drawing out the 
necessary race and local governance implications. Key to this, and it is as 
well the pivotal axis around which the practical versus the principled racially 
inclusive emancipation struggle plays itself out, is the extent of Habermas' 
concessions to systems theory. My contention is that addressing questions 
of race substantively as a core concern, and not marginisingly, means that 
any concessions have to be minimal. Since it has been posed, with regard 
to gender, by theorists like Fraser and Cornell, it can also be asked in relation 
to race, whether or not Habermas' universalism is universalist enough. If 
the criticism from feminist theorists is that the androcentric subject369 is 
brought unwittingly into Habermas' communicative ethics and democracy, 
mainly because he apparently perceives feminism as `particularistic', then 
there is the same fear that lurking in his theorisation, as well, is the ethno- 
centric subject. The latter issue is tackled head on by sympathetic 
commentators, like Young, Fraser, Honneth and McCarthy. However, as I 
argue, both the hare and the hounds share a similar problem. This is that 
their over culturalised theorisation of race leads either to the re-introduction 
of essentialised group identities, or the intimation that there can only ever be 
a heterogeneous, singular subject other. In so doing they underestimate and 
overlook the conventionalised forces of racism and the interim collective, 
but contingent, subject of `Black'. They, therefore, it can be argued, 
unwittingly reproduce the fault they accuse Habermas' of, i. e. `race' 
becomes particularistic. There are twelve crucial areas which are discussed 
below. 
6.2 The Spacing between `Fact' and `Norm' 
6.3 Is a Discursive Rational Offensive Against the System Possible? 
This can be examined in more detail by looking at the critiques of Dryzek 
and McCarthy both of whom, whilst they are highly sympathetic to 
Habermas' project, nevertheless feel that the original overall radical thrust 
has been blunted of late. 370 Dryzek, whose work Benhabib rates as one of 
the best exegeses of what discursive democracy in practice would mean, 
begins by drawing a parallel between Habermas' bifurcating notion of 
communicative action as residing in the lifeworld, as opposed to 
instrumental reason and the systemic world, and Arendt's idea about 
authentic politics contrasted to the concept of "social category. " - Both 
dichotomies either directly, in the case of Arendt, or implicitly in the case of 
Habermas, argue for a separation of the two. Pace this, Dryzek seeks to 
185 
establish a theory of discursive rationality that "should be expanded into 
things "social" and "systemic" to the extent that he does not seek "to defend 
the lifeworld against further `colonisation' by the system but to conduct a 
counter-offensive by taking discursive rationality to the heart of the 
`enemy's' domain. , 371 It is clear that Dryzek thinks that Habermas' 
distinction between social and systemic integration, and inter alia the 
different types of action associated with it as having been drawn too rigidly; 
that despite Habermas' insistence that it is but a categorical distinction made 
for heuristic purposes. However, in Habermas' analyses in TCA, it is clear 
that the distinction appears to be invested with some on tological reality 
since at that stage Habermas seems to be pessimistic about the possibility of 
democratising the administrative systems of the welfare state. Thus in 
posing the question of whether or not discursive democracy "can.. be a 
material force for emancipation in a hostile world", Dryzek assesses 
Habermas' theory as being too liberal insofar as his ideas have been 
"assimilated" by liberals. Thus, "the standards of communicative 
rationality advanced by Habermas"... (are used by liberals)... to justify not 
radical alternatives to liberalism but a liberalism of participatory dialogue, 
civic virtue and public responsibility.... (so much so that even)... Habermas 
himself eventually found it hard to resist the liberal embrace. "372 Dryzek's 
critique picks up on my own slight apprehension at reading Habermas' work 
and which is that at a first glance it can lend itself to a reality level 
interpretation. This is particularly so in his latest work - BFN - in which he 
appears to be arguing for model of constitutional democracy that is too close 
to the liberal model. It is little wonder then, that local governance theorists, 
like Stewart, can appropriate his work "inappropriately". The core 
question is whether or not there is something substantively inherent in 
Habermas' analyses, particularly his distinction between social and system 
integration, a distinction that goes to the heart of the major Western 
philosophical and sociological problematic by keeping alive the 
reconciliation leit motiv, which either lends itself to this interpretation, or, 
more tellingly, means that it can offer no more than that. 
This, then, is the subject of McCarthy's critique of TCA, and particularly the 
degree to which social and systemic integration are, as he reads TCA, 
theorised as almost mutually exclusive. It would be as well to detail 
McCarthy's critique because it will serve to both preface Habermas' then 
immediate response to it and also, to offer a critical template against which 
to assess the extent to which Habermas in his later, BFN, actually accepts the 
validity of that critique. McCarthy's position, certainly as the producer of 
one of the most sympathetic and detailed pre TCA introductions to 
Habermas' thinking in the English speaking world, 373 is not that dissimilar 
from Habermas' overall position. If anything he is more daring in his 
emancipatory vision. He starts by drawing out Habermas' intention in the 
second volume of TCA which is to re-evaluate and re-integrate Weber's 
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analysis of rationalization into a Marxian framework and by so doing 
"develop a more adequate version of the theory of reification. "374 Unlike 
the earlier Frankfurt school theorists of Adorno and Horkheimer, who in 
their later work, presaged the post modernism of Foucault by abandoning the 
"emancipatory potential of modem rationality, Habermas views the current 
sociopathologies as being due to "the peculiar nature of capitalist 
rationalisation .... 
(and therefore)..... treatable through transforming the 
capitalist relations of production. The three core aims of TCA are, as 
McCarthy sees it, to move away from a philosophy of consciousness, and the 
the notion of a historical subject, to a theory of communicative rationality, to 
"go beyond the action-theoretic conceptualisation of rationalisation in Weber 
and his Marxist heirs, back to Marx, in order to recapture the systems- 
theoretic dimension of his analysis of capitalist society", and, to reconstruct a 
critical theory of society "which reconceptualises reification as a 
`colonisation of the lifeworld' by forces emanating from the economic and 
political subsystems. " It is with the latter two aims, especially the extent to 
which they appropriate systems theory, that McCarthy detects weak spots 
which detract from the declared emancipatory potential of Habermas' theory 
by circumscribing the mutability of systemic action areas. In his earlier 
writings Habermas had been concerned to "dispel the spectre of a 
cybernetically self-regulated organisation of society". In TCA, according to 
McCarthy, Habermas comes to terms with this ghost by negotiating a pact 
with it which, unfortunately, "cedes too much territory to systems theory" 
leaving "critical theory in an unnecessary defensive position. "375 McCarthy's 
tack, in criticising certain aspects of TCA, is to contrast Habermas' position 
in that work with the one perceived to be emerging in TCA. On the basis of 
this there are two important areas of social analysis which are identified as 
conceding too much to systems analysis, viz. organisations and the political 
system However against this unlike Habermas' earlier view in 
Legitimation Crisis of the normative potential, the realistic utopia, of 
lifeworld agency determining systemic agency, McCarthy identifies in TCA 
Habermas' insistence that "however fluid, fleeting flexible action in 
organisational settings may be, it always transpires `under the premisses of 
formal regulations which can be appealed to by members; " that is to say 
"members act communicatively only `with reservation... because they `can 
have recourse to formal regulations'... (and therefore).... they are not obliged 
to achieve consensus with communicative means. " McCarthy correctly 
draws on the work of organisational theorists who, from phenomenological, 
ethnomethodological and symbolic interactionist perspectives, have shown 
that "the formal aspects of social organisations - the rationally ordered 
systems of norms and roles, rules and regulations, programmes and positions 
- are only one side of the coin... (the other being the informal).... concrete 
norms and values, rituals and traditions, sentiments and practices that inform 
s3 interpersonal relations within the organisation. 76 The key question then 
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can be re-iterated and which is why should Habermas insist on the 
imperative of action being systemically co-ordinated within organisations? 
Secondly similar arguments are raised by McCarthy with regard to 
Habermas' notion of the political system, and which in essence, is that the 
categorical distinctions between system and lifeworld, which Habermas 
himself regards as a heuristic device, is, within TCA, invested with too much 
of an on tological reality. For McCarthy the broad outline of Habermas' 
notion of the political system has six components. Firstly Habermas refers 
to the political system only within the context of social-welfare state mass 
democracies. Secondly the areas of the state administration or 
administrative system, are outside of this context. Thirdly, this seems to 
dovetail with systems theorists' narrow distinction between administration 
and politics. Fourthly this differentiates out a restricted notion of the 
political as that being associated with the elective functions, and the 
administration as that being associated with the appointed elements. Fifthly 
this ends up as a picture of the political system in which there is an 
"administrative bureaucracy responsible to elected officers .... (standing)... 
in 
relation to other parts of society via the interchange of inputs and outputs. " 
Sixthly the political system is substantively different to the public sphere 
insofar as the latter belongs to the lifeworld and is thus oriented to mutual 
understanding, whilst in the former "interaction is systemically integrated, 
formally organised and media steered". Even allowing for the 
circumscriptive notion of the political system which Habermas seems to 
favour, McCarthy is right to ask whether or not "interaction within large 
administrative bureaucracies (is) co-ordinated via functional effects rather 
than via the orientations of actors? "377 Indeed Habermas himself in TCA 
has drawn the distinction, as a means of illuminating the difference between 
communicative and strategic action, between normatively authorised and 
simple imperatives. Thus it is reasonable to logically go on to theorise, as 
McCarthy does, pace Habermas' contention that organisational members act 
communicatively only with reservation, that there are circumstances where 
authority can only be exercised under conditions of co-operation and mutual 
understanding. The point of this part of the critique is to bring to the fore 
the fallibility principle of Habermas' theory which depends on real empirical 
investigations. Thus, again, whilst it can be conceded that economic and 
administrative processes and mechanisms are required in complex societies 
which do not require consensus, as is the requirement in some circumstances 
for representative democracy and allied public administrative apparata, it 
cannot be concluded that the requirement for these formal organisations 
therefore mean a systemic imperative for the whole of these areas. In other 
words can it be argued that Habermas, in TCA, has taken over so much of 
systems theories that he runs the risk of a teleological prescription of what 
ought - i. e. as asked earlier - which rules out the full emancipatory potential 
of his own theory? McCarthy holds TCA up to the promise of LC and 
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elsewhere in which Habermas voices the oft declared option for some form 
of participatory democracy noting that "if self determination, political 
equality and the participation of citizens in decision making processes are the 
hallmarks of true democracy, then a democratic government could not be a 
political system in Habermas' sense- that is a domain of action differentiated 
off from other parts of society and preserving its autonomy in relation to 
them while regulating its interchanges via delinguistified steering media like 
money and power. , 378 The key feature is not to attempt to prescribe the 
forms this democracy might take, but to re-emphasise Habermas' own 
contention that "this is an open question that can be decided only through 
learning processes that test the limits of the utopian elements of our 
tradition. "379 Thus for example on the issue of democratising the 
administrative planning process, as exemplified in the work of 
Forrester. 380.. McCarthy indicates that even if it is less effective in an 
instrumental sense, one of the crucial alternatives being denied in the neo- 
managerialism of local governance, "it may be favoured on other grounds. " 
Increasing complexity of the system is not the only measure of progress, and 
to try to impose this must run in the opposite direction to "Habermas' own 
principles... . (that system complexity)... 
be subordinate to communicative 
rationalisation of life as a measure of progress. " Finally the nub of 
McCarthy's critique is contained in the last two sentences of his piece. 
"Habermas once criticised Marx for succumbing to the illusion of 
rigorous science, and he traced a number of Marxism's historical 
problems with political analysis and political practice to this source. 
The question I want to pose here is whether in flirting with systems 
theory he does not run the danger of being seduced by the same illusion 
in more modern dress. 99381 
The last question echoes my own concerned question earlier about whether 
or not Habermas his latest work, BFN, actually constructs the gap between 
normative potential and liberal democracy too closely to the extent that the 
full range of emancipatory alternatives are effectively censored leaving us, as 
Dryzek thinks, with an a priori liberally shaped constitutional democracy. 
Does this occur, therefore, because of what McCarthy has described as the 
seducements of systems theories? The questions become even more 
pertinent when placed in the context of race and women's equality, 
especially within the wider milieus of local governance and the public sector. 
Black people and women bring into organisations validity claims for racial 
and engendered justice which require redeeming within the responsibility 
remit of the organisation. In so doing they open up the prospect of re- 
enchanting and re-moralising the instrumentalisation of action. Some of 
these claims are anchored in the rights and obligations accruing from 
legislation. Some, however, are based on those organisations' own publicly 
posted claims to treating their members - and here members is used loosely 
to refer to both employees and wider members of the public who have cause 
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to come into contact with that organisation - properly, i. e. non-oppressively 
and/or non- exploitatively. In fact it can be argued in the case of the public 
sector that there are inherent in the role and function of those organisations 
over arching ethical and moral claims, which more so than the "formal 
regulations", are likely to be appealed to by both non-authoritively framed 
employees and service users. However, these claims, which in reality, a 
reality established through empirical means, are hardly ever fully redeemed, 
and, as the daily struggle in the public sector over these shows, can only ever 
be redeemed under conditions of members acting communicatively. To 
subscribe, therefore, to the prognosed limitations on such actions in a 
systemic setting, as Habermas does, is to give veracity to those who claim 
that the technicised substance of policies, like equality ones, reflect the pre- 
ordained limits to such initiatives, i. e. as one councillor in one of the target 
boroughs put it, "You are not going to get anything further. " There is 
almost-an air of Foucauldian Sisyphian pessimism about the perpetual 
hierarchies of power. Habermas' then response to McCarthy's critique can 
be read as disappointing, especially when he concludes that: "The normative 
criticism which McCarthy, Honneth and Joas make of what they presume are 
the conclusions to be drawn from my diagnosis of contemporary society 
proceed from a counter-model based in praxis philosophy... . (which 
adheres)... to the untenable premise that it must be possible to conceive of the 
autonomous self steering of a complex society as self consciousness on a 
large scale. "382 That is not the substance of McCarthy's critique. On the 
other hand even in response Habermas, as McCarthy points out in his critical 
paper, "grants the premisses, but resists drawing the conclusions. "383 Thus 
Habermas views the "borrowing" from systems theory as a pragmatic issue, 
and not as one of principle. Finally apropos McCarthy's critique, 
Habermas contends that for empirical reasons alone, he does not hold out 
hope of the possibility of organisations, whether private or public, being 
solely democratically reshaped from within by means of worker self- 
management. But then neither was McCarthy. The thrust of TCA is not 
to provide a "defence of the capitalist labour market", but to lay the 
framework for dealing with the core problem "of how capabilities for self- 
organisation can be developed to such an extent within autonomous public 
spheres that radical democratic processes of will formation can come to have 
a decisive impact on regulatory mechanisms and marginal conditions of 
media steered sub systems in a lifeworld oriented toward use values, towards 
ends in general... (to the extent that it will involve defensively)... holding the 
systemic imperatives of an interventionist state apparatus and those of an 
economic system in check. " 384 So, for empirical reasons the task is not to 
transform those systems, but to control them. However, this does not, if 
one runs with the normative potential of the principle, i. e. the transformation 
of "capitalist relations of production", to put it crudely, as Dryzek announces 
he wants to, rule out seeking where empirical analyses demonstrate this to be 
feasible, the communicative rationalisation of those systems. What then are 
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these "empirical reasons". Two main ones appear to be behind Habermas' 
defensive formulation of the key tasks of critical theory in TCA. The first 
relates to the overall level of complexity of modern capitalist societies which 
makes the aim of a fully participatory democratic polity, if one then extends 
the notion of "workers self management" into this sphere, totally unrealistic. 
The other major reason relates to the stultifying effect the welfare state 
compromise has had on class conflict. With regards to the first one, it has 
already been shown that supportive critics like McCarthy do not envisage 
any kind of Leviathanic democratisation of the political and economic 
systems, but merely that the possibility of pursuing this goal where 
opportunities arise, should not be ruled out from the outset. With regard to 
the second, this compromise, which in any case has been wrenched asunder 
by the new right, and now new right Labour, did not necessarily include the 
dimension of race and gender. In fact, as I argue in the chapter on race and 
racism, it has fed into the anthropophagied transepochally unresolved 
representations of Black people. Racism, which Habermas does not 
mention other than in reference to the extreme neo-Nazi right, is not simply a 
matter of cultural disrespect. There are two related elements: one that can 
be labelled generally "abuse", and that term is used loosely to include the 
mis-Representations of Black people from casual to extreme levels. The 
other is where "abuse", consciously or unconsciously, is discriminatingly 
related to actions which deny rights and resources, although it is recognised 
that the first one is a denial of the right to be treated as an equal human. 
The crucial point about racism, then, is that it is extremely difficult to 
separate out the socio-cultural aspects of action from the materiality of 
action, making the need, say, for example, in organisational settings, the 
transformation of systemic action through communicative rationalisation 
even more paramount. This immediacy of lifeworld and systemic clash, in 
Western democracies, might not be the case for class differences and 
exploitation, though the boundaries of the focus of class needs to shift from 
the national to global levels to obtain a better picture of the saliency or not, 
not to mention hue, of class conflict and exploitation. Thus one can 
understand why a more radical assessment of the possibility of transforming 
administrative and economic rationality slips from the horizon for empirical 
reasons. What is required is a re-assessment of such an empirical 
generated "realism" from a race and gender perspective because overlooked 
and incorporated in that compromise were, and are, inequalities of difference 
which, if systems are only to be influenced, will persist. To that extent 
McCarthy is right to remind Habermas about the blurred identities of 
seemingly triumphal systems, which, in contradistinction to the seemingly all 
powerful "system", can presage as well, an actual collapse, or at least a 
substantial attenuation. 85 
It is worth examining this point in more detail, i. e. the differences, and in my 
view commonalties of communicative and systemic actions through the 
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critique of another theorist who can be described as sympathetic to 
Habermas. The purpose to this is not only to attempt to enhance Habermas 
in relation to the analyses of, and emancipatory potential for agency in local 
government, but more immediately to critically assess BFN in the light of 
these critiques and Habermas' own earlier work. Hans Joas, professor of 
sociology at Berlin Free University, has developed a critique of Habermas 
which is encapsulated in his description of TCA as "the unhappy marriage of 
functionalism and hermeneutics. "3 6 Joas in an exegesis of action, 
postulates a third model of action, over and above the predominant ones of 
"rational" and "normative" action, which he calls "creative action". 387 
Creative action is seen as over-arching the former two and is "only 
inadequately expressed in the models of rational and normative action. " 
Since both models appear to allocate the largest part of human action to this 
residual category, it is as well to simply define human action as creative. 
Within this context Joas, in dealing with Habermas, focuses on his trenchant 
critique of praxis and the production paradigm and which is based on 
Habermas' concept of the labour paradigm as being too limited because it 
cannot take into account the inter-subjective dimension of human 
experience. Joas identifies four main arguments which Habermas uses 
against the notion of praxis and the production paradigm. These are: 
f that the labour idea is characterised by a romantic idealisation of 
artisanal activity 
f that praxis philosophy rejects structural differentiations which 
cannot be brought into the acting subject's horizon of orientation 
f that the normative postulates contained within praxis cannot be 
justified 
f that for empirical reasons the production paradigm is outdated. 388 
Joas synthesises Habermas' critique into three conceptual strands: the 
empirical, the normative, and the action-theoretic. On the empirical side, 
rightly I think, Joas questions the validity of assuming the end of the 
production paradigm, especially if capitalism is put on a global scale. With 
regard to the normative aspect, Joas agrees that normative claims can only be 
validated discursively. However, even if the production paradigm, or 
"creativity" as Joas puts it, has a normative content which "cannot be 
brought to bear merely by establishing discourse which are justified by 
norms..... the lack of normative clarity in the concept of action as used in the 
philosophy of praxis tradition is (not) an action theoretical reason for not 
taking into account the definition of action on which the tradition hinges. "389 
Finally on the action theoretic account, the differentiation between 
instrumental action contra objects and contra people, and between 
instrumental and communicative action, which Habermas makes, is not a 
sufficient basis upon which to make this distinction because these "do not 
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blur the differences between instrumental and communicative action, but 
instead set out to identify the characteristics common to all kinds of action, 
both instrumental and communicative. " There is a sense then in which Joas 
is asking whether or not the differentiation Habermas makes between the 
two types of core action as one of the main means to ensure that social 
differentiation is not, often, reductively simplified, does not end up, because 
the demarcation line is drawn too harshly, dedifferentiating types of action 
itself. Within the context of race and local governance where public 
administrative systems, their normative potential, Black lifeworlds and 
racially discriminatory conventionalisation coincide, this question does 
appear, from an emancipatory perspective, one that requires greater 
clarification. To do this requires that we examine the way in which Joas 
uses his preliminary critical insights on Habermas' theory as a means for 
raising substantive queries about Habermas' use of Luhmann's system 
theory. In so doing Joas prefatorily makes a salient point, one which 
accords with my own unease at what appeared to be Habermas' downplaying 
of the possibility of democratising the state and market in TCA, that despite 
the subtitling of TCA as "A Critique of Functionalist Reason", the work in 
question still comes over as being too functionalist; and no more so than in 
Habermas' follow up clarification where functionalist rationality which 
operates over and above actors' consciousness is given some credence. In 
looking at Habermas adoption of some of system theory, Joas pinpoints the 
kernel of Habermas' reasoning which involved being convinced by 
Luhman's thinking on the limits of all sociological action theory. Thus: 
"Given that the collective subject of a meaningfully constituted lifeworld, a 
concept borrowed from transcendental philosophy, has shown itself to be a 
misleading fiction, at least in the context of sociology, the concept of system 
provides a promising alternative. Social systems are units which can solve 
objectively presented problems through meta-subjective learning 
processes. "390 
This dismissal of the collective subject tout court is perhaps too premature. 
Whilst in its essentialist from it is probably true that the collective subject is 
but a fiction, there still exist the case for using the notion of a collective 
subject in its critical form, as I try to delineate in the previous section with 
respect to the critical reconstruction of "Black". A similar argument can be 
put together regarding the category and substantial content of "Woman". 
One wonders, therefore, whether or not when developing his theory 
Habermas paid too much attention to the apparent empirical reality of the 
vanishing working class as a collective subject, though even here, this might 
not necessarily be the case as Western societies, and theorists, now grapple 
with the reality of global capitalism; an increasingly racialised imperialism. 
That aside, Habermas, according to Joas, more out of pragmatic 
considerations rather than principle, sought to resolve, by partially adopting 
systems theory, the following problematics: 
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f to move away from the notion of a history of a developing specied 
human subject 
f to cope with the implications of the normative utopia which were 
aimed at the participatory democratization of all social processes 
f to disavow the legitimation of super-subjects. 391 
With TCA the aim became more modest and which was to ensure that 
systems are under the control of the lifeworld. In so doing, whilst 
McCarthy has already argued that Habermas might be seen as arguing 
against any attempt to democratise the economy and the state, Joas, in 
similar vein, maintains that though Habermas has not jettisoned his "radical 
democratic convictions..... he confounds the general justification of the need 
for methods and techniques of social steering in the economic and political 
arena with establishing boundaries between lifeworld and the 'monetary- 
bureaucratic complex. "092 Part of the reason for this is because the 
distinction between lifeworld and system is expected to cover so many 
different levels of logic: between the participant's perspective and that of the 
observer, between orientation to action based social integration and 
consequences of action based system integration, between symbolic and 
material reproduction... In TCA, as Joas identifies it, Habermas works with 
a "critical", as opposed to analytical, use of functionalism, and which Joas 
re-labels essentialist. Either way systems are seen to exist; they are 
endowed with on tology. The purpose of a critical use of functionalism is 
then, accordingly to "to express both the pathos of Marx's critique of 
reification and simultaneously the radical break with a praxis conception of 
society which has become completely transparent to itself. 9393 In 
contradistinction to this, and noting that Habermas appears to have more in 
common with Giddens, Joas proposes that an analytical approach is more 
acceptable so that it is possible to develop "a social theory which is based on 
action theory.. (and).. does not conflate functional analyses and causal 
explanations, yet contains the benefits of a controlled use of systems 
models. "394 In other words there is implicit in what Joas conceptualises 
the notion that systems are more permeable, flexible and open to change than 
Habermas allows. This argument is substantiated by Cohen's similar 
rethinking on discourse ethics and the implications for political forms 395 
As shall be shown, the work done on local governance and race bears out 
both Joas' and Cohen's direct and inferred criticism of Habermas' approach 
to systems and change in TCA. That is to say that the scope for 
transformative change within bureaucratic administrative and political, in the 
restricted sense that Habermas uses the latter term, systems is greater than 
perhaps Habermas anticipated. In running with this part of the critique of 
Habermas' TCA, my own thinking, especially as it relates to race and local 
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governance and the relationship between those two, can be briefly 
delineated.. 
I want to propose the following, therefore, which I do not claim that 
Habermas does not intend, but merely that it is not clear why there should be 
his TCA pessimism of likely outcome given the potential of his base 
propositions. The proposition is supported, in part, by the solidaristic 
critiques of theorists like McCarthy, Joas and Cohen. The nub of this 
contention is that whilst one can talk of an uncoupling of system from the 
lifeworld, that the separation is at the categorical level, and that, thus, the 
actual "distance", which Habermas' implies grows with time, ebbs and flows 
critically to the extent that the everyday reality throws up an interwoven 
spectral range rather than two opposite poles. Beck is right, therefore, to 
talk about dedifferentiation as being one of the possible outcomes of 
capitalist modernisation which, I would further contend need not necessarily 
be regressive. 396 In other words bringing the system, or elements of it, 
under the control of communicative action might suffice if the differentiation 
levels are taken as given. On the other hand transforming the system, or 
elements of it, could possibly, with regard to the system, dedifferentially 
extend the domain of communicative action. This scenario which I think 
bears out the linkage between communicative and systemic action, i. e. 
purposive rational, attests as well to Habermas' own contention that the 
system arises out of the lifeworld. 
6.4 Transformative Action, or Action for Influence? 
In TCA Habermas relates the uncoupling of the lifeworld and system as 
being in theory unproblematic and that the problem develops because the 
rationalisation processes of the modem world have in actual fact led to the 
colonisation of the lifeworld by the system. This, as Cooke, correctly points 
out, Habermas regards as paradoxical because as modem societies develop 
so the lifeworld becomes increasingly rationalised; that is to say "the actions, 
practices, and interpretations of its members have become increasingly 
detached from established normative contexts and increasingly reliant on 
action oriented toward understanding. "397 In summary then Cooke identifies 
three modes of action: communicative action which is oriented towards 
participative understanding and is internal to the lifeworld, strategic action 
which is also internal to the lifeworld and is oriented towards success insofar 
as participants instrumentalise each other to achieve such success, and the 
functional regulation of action consequences which are neutral in relation to 
actors values. There is a further qualitative differentiation that can be made 
between communicative and strategic action which relates both to their 
respective structural characteristics and the attitudes of the individual agents 
concerned. Thus whereas participants in communicative action have a 
performative attitude which is related to one of three possible conceived 
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worlds, i. e. rightness, sincerity and truthfulness, those in strategic action 
foreshorten these to just one; that of an objectivating attitude to an objective 
world which is solely concerned with the aspect of validity to do with 
propositional truth and efficacy. Are there any further clarificatory 
differentiations that can be made? 
The answer is in the affirmative, especially as far as strategic action is 
concerned. Habermas appears to use the terms "purposive rational", 
"instrumental" and "strategic" interchangeably. Within TCA the further 
differentiation out of functionalist reason from the broad spectrum of 
purposive rational action means that if, as is the intention of this part of the 
critique, we want to look at the transformation of such action, then it is 
important that a greater degree of precision is arrived at. For that purpose I 
propose, as Habermas and other commentators have, that purposive rational 
action "is important for material reproduction which takes place through the 
medium of goal directed interventions into the objective world. "398 
Furthermore this form of action can be sub-differentiated into instrumental 
action, which refers to actors working on material things, as in production, 
and strategic action which refers to actors taking an objectivating attitude 
towards other actors, and by that is meant that ends determine means. 
Functionalist reason refers to those conditions under which the strategic ends 
become the rationale for the means, i. e. it is a re-inversion of the ends-means 
relationship. This can only take place within the system and in one sense 
can be understood as heavily ossified strategic action which has been 
completely uncoupled from any communicative contexts. Such a 
refinement allows Habermas to argue, almost as if it is a re-enervation of the 
concept of reification, that such reason as the bases to regulating action 
consequences, bypasses actors consciousness. 
McCarthy and Joas have criticised Habermas for being too cautious in 
anticipating the potential of his theories; and one can gain a sense of this in 
Habermas' circumscription about action consequential co-ordination only 
being norm free in the last instance, a claim which belies his pessimistic 
assessment of radically norming such systems. Is it because Habermas 
bases much of his empirical observations on the situation in Germany, a 
country in which the bureaucracies of the national, regional and local states 
exhibit a high degree of stability, almost perhaps akin to the pre-crisis 
situation in the UK? In any event, despite Habermas' denials, his work 
does imply, as Honneth as critically noted, that there is somehow an almost 
natural and painless transition from communicative action to strategic action 
systems to functional reason based co-ordination of action consequences. 
Honneth is correct in highlighting the absence of motivation in all of this. 399. 
For that reason I want to introduce two new types of action which both 
imbue the transitive sense of the word "to act" as well as the reifying sense 
of "being acted upon". These are transformative action, a term used by 
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McClaren400 in his critical assessment of Habermas and counterpointed 
critical support for Freire's radical pedagogy; and ossifying action, a term 
I've coined to try and capture the slippage and distancing of strategic action 
from communicative action, and functionalist co-ordination of action 
consequences from strategic action. If a further categorising clarification 
is carried out on organisational types, in a way that underpins my earlier 
query about the possible circumscribed nature of Habermas' underlying 
empirical observations, then the way is left open to outline a scenario of 
potential actor driven change within organisations, especially those which 
are directly linked to democratic processes. Pace, therefore, the current 
trend in public administrative studies in the UK to want to blur the 
distinction between public and private organisations, I want to maintain that 
distinction, as does the localist school. Further there are sub-distinctions 
which can be made within the two global private and public categories which 
are linked to the respective distances organisations have to the capitalist and 
democratic processes. On this basis we can then begin to say that capitalist 
multi-nationals, for example, are more likely to have action systems that are 
functionally co-ordinated, i. e. action systems which present and are accepted 
by those who are stakeholders, as norm neutral even though, in so doing, 
they actually mis-represent a highly technicised, instrumentalised vision of 
society. We can move on now to Habermas' intimation of the 
organisational aspect of local governance as being within the categorisation 
of an administrative sub-system; especially, in my view, the contentious 
notion that "the public opinion that is worked up into communicative power 
cannot `rule' of itself, but can only point to the use of administrative power 
in specific directions. "401 My argument would be that this is too rigid a 
demarcation to make and that there is a continuum between administrative 
power and communicative power within a scenario of localised deliberative 
democracy, which makes it possible to talk about communicatively 
transforming non-communicative action. In fact there is a need to tease out 
fully the implications of Habermas 1987 TCA observation that "if all 
processes of genuinely reaching understanding were banished from the 
interior of organisations, formally regulated social relations could not be 
sustained, nor could organisational goals be realised. ), 402 This then would 
be to agree with Alvesson that we should analyse "organisations as structures 
of communication", but also add the necessary caveat that some categories of 
organisation have more potential to realise the "fundamental conditions of 
human communication, "403 i. e. those which are linked to democratic 
processes, flawed as these might be. 
This particular argument can be best illustrated by looking at the 
phenomenon of "institutionalised racism". A work-a-day definition, one 
that has probably emerged from the eighties equality era in the public sector 
and which in part owes some of its origins to American based work on 
organisations and racism, would be "those processes, practices and structures 
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in institutions which wittingly or unwittingly discriminate and oppress 
people on the grounds of race. " Whilst such a definition might do as a crude 
race based scanning device to use on organisations, its broad brush stroke 
means that it can be, and has been, held hostage to all sorts of possible 
solutions, the dominant one of which has been the liberal BBOS (Black- 
bums-on-seats) one, i. e. pack the organisation with as many Black faces as 
will be allowed. This quasi-essentialist definition does then provide some 
degree of truth for critics, such as the governmentality theorists, who 
attribute a metaphysical quality to it, and, counterpointedly in their insistence 
on empirical facts, confirm a "real politik" environment which downplays 
issues of race inequality in organisations. However if this is redefined in 
terms of communicative action, in a way that is an adjunct of my earlier 
definition of racism as "the maintenance of relations of force in the 
structures of communication through conventionalisation of biological 
differences or ascribed biological differences", then it is only necessary to 
add "in institutions" after the word "communication" for there to be a better, 
and more specified definition. For example the attempts in various local 
government contexts to derive a more explicit and equality based recruitment 
and selection process were met by attempts within those organisations to 
justify the then current practice by an inter-related twofold naturalling 
argument. The first "justified" the practice as best and working, even 
though the evolutionary decisions governing the development of that practice 
could hardly ever be made explicit. The other, when it came to trying to 
deal with the obvious fact that the absence of Black employees meant that 
the system was not working, tagged on to that "justification" the racialised 
representations of "falling standards", or "they don't apply", or "I know from 
a friend who is Black that Black people don't want to do this sort of work" 
etc. What the first element of this "justificatory argument" shows is the 
extent to which in administrative systems, the structural legitimation of 
communicative distortions is not just, as Alvesson and Forester contend, 
about the "monopolistic distortion" of communicative exchange and "the 
ideological creation of needs"404, but also about the sedimented histories of 
previous communicative decisions where the ways of doing and the reasons 
for so doing have over time become detached from communicative 
processes. Likewise the second element demonstrates how 
communicatively unresolved trans-epochal racist conventionalisation, when 
allied with other forms of institutional structural communicative distortions, 
can "empower" those "disempowering" practices. It might be said, in other 
words, that the validity claims made by those practices, because they had 
remained unchallenged for so long, became "naturalled. " The changes 
brought about in the recruitment and selection processes in local government 
were, especially in the target local authorities under investigation, part of a 
wider response to the pressures brought to bear on the democratic processes 
by the local Black communities. If one looks at the remedial action 
undertaken in the R and S processes generally it can be seen that there were, 
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and in some cases still are, three main elements; firstly a series of explicit 
rights against which validity claims of equality justice can be determined, 
secondly key communicative fora in which it can be said there were spaces 
for communicative action, e. g. interviews governed by conditions of 
communication, appeal mechanisms etc., and finally accountability stages all 
the way up to committee, or political level. As Alvesson puts it, there is 
the attempt "to open up a space for increased communication action with 
regards to beliefs, consent, trust, thereby challenging and reversing the 
tendency of work organisations to devalue, corrode or appropriate the values 
of the lifeworid. " Moreover the example outlined above demonstrates, I 
think, the extent to which instrumental action, i. e. consequential action 
deliberately undertaken by an actor or actors which distorts communication 
and functionally co-ordinated action can be brought back into the 
communicative fold. In this, especially within formal democratically 
bounded organisations, like local government, there is a continuum of 
potential action from "strong" versions where the truth, legitimacy, sincerity 
and clarity of statements can be discursively tested to a "weak" one where it 
is possible to get rid of all communicative distortions, but more realistically 
only open up spaces for more communicative action. The motivation to 
seek such spaces is, I contend, stronger where the closure or lack of such 
spaces, is maintained solely or partially by racist conventionalisation. 
What the example and sub-examples outlined above attempt to demonstrate 
is the way in which it is possible to talk about transforming strategic and 
instrumental action. In fact if one runs with the notion of organisations as 
structures of communication, then it can be said that administrative systems 
in the public sphere are structures, in many cases, of sedimented, i. e. 
ossified. communicative action. This is because they direct, develop and 
control services, very often communicative action based services, like social 
work, through having the monopoly of socially constructed formal and 
informal knowledges, in themselves, contingent arrangements of regulations, 
rules, expertised language, and unspoken behavioural codes. Moreover, 
unlike Habermas' apparent belief, there is not so clear a boundary line, 
action wise, between political and administrative systems, especially in the 
area of local governance. In fact it is only if the two are run together as a 
continuum of action is it possible to talk about democratising the 
administrative system. In this way, perhaps, similarly to Joas' idea of 
creative action, it might be possible to communicatively reframe the idea of 
praxis. 
6.5 The Constitution and the Boundaries of Social and Systemic 
Integrations 
A question can be posed about whether or not Habermas in upholding 
constitutional democracy as the social context for democracy was 
199 
unnecessarily foreshortening the critical distance and tension between facts 
and norms. This reveals a further meta-level question: was this but a 
symptom of a greater fault line in his TCA theory in which his avowed 
pragmatic appropriation of systems theory in fact veered too much in the 
direction of principle thereby foreclosing on certain types of action? The 
critique I have sketched out so far seems to answer the latter question in the 
affirmative. However, before confirming that it is necessary to re-look at 
Habermas' latest work, BFN, to ascertain the extent to which he, in line with 
the fallibilistic principle underpinning his own work, has actually taken on 
board some or all of the criticisms of TCA. 
Firstly on the question of the idealisation of constitutional democracy 
Habermas is clear that "the constitution taken as a project is neither a social 
utopia nor a substitute for such .... (but)..... ust the `opposite 
from the utopia in 
which collective reason and secularised impotence are unified and 
institutionalised in the state: rather it implies the idea of civil society and its 
capacity to regulate itself in discursive processes and through clever 
institutionalisation. "405 In giving greater weight to a system of rights and 
the public political sphere Habermas attempts to address what he regards as 
the scarcest resource in complex societies which are "neither the productivity 
of the market economy nor the regulatory capacity of the public 
administration..... (but)... the resources of an exhausted economy of nature and 
of a disintegrating social solidarity .... (where in the latter).... the forces of 
social solidarity can be regenerated in complex societies only in the forms of 
communicative practices of self determination. "406 (A rather `neat' 
encapsulation of why new Labour's strong regulationary approach to the 
public sector is wrong. ) If a system of rights underpins the involvement 
of the polity, then what are the form and content of this system? 
Habermas criticises the welfare paradigm of law for reducing justice to 
distributive justice when in fact the key normative value is not well being, 
but autonomy. That is to say that "in a legal community no one is free as 
long as the freedom of one person must be purchased with another's 
oppression. " Equally rights cannot be consumed, and can only be 
enjoyed "insofar as one exercises them. " Rights then, are relationships 
not things. Thus "injustice... can express itself in discrimination that 
withholds from the `oppressed' and `subordinated' what enables them to 
exercise their private and public autonomy. s407 
What then about Habermas' previous pessmism about democratising 
administrative bureaucracies. In BFN, as in his previous works, he argues 
the normative principles whilst at the same time exhibiting a caution about 
extrapolating too radically in real practice. Thus, whilst he comments on the 
proceduralist model of law, it applies equally, I contend, to the relationship 
between citizens and local governance since that interfacial relationship is, in 
many instances, mediated consciously and unconsciously by law, so that "the 
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vacancies left by the private-market participant and the client of welfare 
bureaucracies are filled by enfranchised citizens who participate in political 
discourses in order to address violated interests, and by articulating new 
needs to collaborate in shaping standards for treating like cases alike and 
different cases differently. , 408 This calls for a democratisation of the 
administration. The forms this would take are, because it is "a domain so 
prone to interference and dependent on efficiency........ a question of the 
interplay of institutional imagination and cautious experimentation. "409 
The question already asked before can be put again, which is where in the 
scheme of things are Black people? 
6.6 ConstitutionalIncorporatism? 
Modood, in a critique certain of Habermas' thinking on constitutionalism, 
epitomises the institutional response to eighties anti-racism - his thinking on 
diversity appears to have been prompted by his brief sojourn as an equality 
adviser in a minor outer London borough - which is to 
misRepresent(ationalise), in the Hall sense of "represent", and homogenise 
the actual "diversity" of anti-racist approaches in local governance, as well 
as deny the validity of using Black as an overarching architectonic 
framework in any form41° Modood attacks Habermas' use of the value 
"constitutional patriotism" as being the only one to which immigrants should 
show allegiance, as against, for example, the nostalgic, mythologised, 
backward looking, Tebbitised golden age patriotism through which 
neoconservatives seek to assimilate Black migrants. However, since 
Modood wrongly reads Habermas one dimensionally, he attributes to 
Habermas by assuming that such a value is inimical to "diversity", the very 
self same skewed universalism which Habermas is actually attacking. There 
is, of course, the substantive issue of whether or not any one existing 
constitutions of Western democracies do or do not discriminate against the 
full inclusion of immigrants to those countries, particularly Black 
immigrants. But Habermas is not talking about these, other than as 
empirical markers in the process of establishing the fallibilism or not of his 
underlying thesis. There is the meta-theoretical issue, which Habermas is 
addressing, of whether or not constitutional democracy, as the linguistic 
expression of the normative potential of a political system that still has to run 
its course, is universal enough to ensure the emancipatively, i. e. free and 
equal, participation of all the citizens. To understand Habermas' use of that 
term is not only to understand his developing core thesis, but also to 
comprehend the specific empirical context which gave rise to the use of the 
term "constitutional patriotism. " The context was, and is, informed 
twofoldedly: first by the debate with the neo-conservative historians in 
Germany, who, in the interregnum covering the unification gestation, put 
forward arguments to try and secure a homogenised conventional national 
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identity. By this is meant it is not a post-conventional identity where an 
individual can evaluate moral convictions without recourse to particularism. 
Secondly his argument emerges against the back drop of the rising tide of 
racist violence against Black people, itself partially fuelled by the re- 
emergence of an explicit blood and somatic definition of the true German 
national. When Habermas writes about the constitution he writes as well 
about the Western constitutional state embodying a "postconventional form 
of consciousness insofar as the inherent distinction between "law" and 
"right"... ("reality" and "norm") mandates that all concrete legislation be 
evaluated in light of universal normative precepts embodied in the 
constitution itself 'a11. These precepts hold out the unredeemed validity 
claims that all citizens, in its broadest sense of living and/or working in that 
country, should be involved in the consensual formation of that norm. 
Constitutional democracy, or more accurately deliberatively discursive 
democracy, is thus also held up, as well, against those who argue not only 
from a religiously fundamentalist point of view which has inherent a 
conventional group and/or national identity, but as well from an essentialised 
notion of communities. I don't think Modood argues against constitutional 
democracy per se, only what he mistakenly perceives to be Habermas' 
unwarranted universalist assumptions, themselves, in reality, a fictitious 
product of Modood's misreading. In so doing an important opportunity is 
missed to enquire whether or not the fallibilistic principle underpinning 
Habermas' thesis that only the conditions for consensus can be specified, is 
actually compromised by what could be read as an over prescriptive 
universalisation of constitutional democracy. Or is it, on the other hand, a 
shortening of the critical tension distance between fact and norm which 
recognises, as Outhwaite has pointed out, that the radical democratic 
implications of Habermas' theory have to be circumscribed by practicalities 
in real life? However Modood's limited critique prefaces as well a counter 
proposal which is based on a constitutional recognition of a diversity of 
communities. There are three regressive features to this proposal. First, 
whilst, belatedly, tacking on a post modernist based defence of "diversity", it 
at the same time ends up essentialising Black communities, epitomised by 
the confused categorisation of Black people in his PSI research. Secondly 
it merely echoes Taylor's views that "the protection of collective identities 
comes into competition with the right to equal individual liberties"412 and 
that thus there should be constitutional recognition for collective identities. 
Thirdly such a view of collective identities cannot help but foundationalise 
"communities" unnecessarily and in the process of so doing in confuses and 
conflates the right to equal respect, which is a legal matter, with the 
presumed excellence of a particular culture. What is interesting here is that 
the critique put forward by Modood within its assumed mantle of post 
modernity - and in this perhaps it can be classified as an attempt at a post 
modernist based public policy on race and citizenship - has already been 
dealt with by Habermas. Wolin is right to point out that Habermas 
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attempts in the eighties and early nineties to explore the interchange and 
linkages between neo-conservatism and post modernism, which he has 
described as the young conservatism. 413 Neo-conservatism accepts the 
development of the learning potentials of systemic integration, i. e. the 
economic and technological aspects whilst trying to suppress the 
development of normative learning within the sphere of social integration. 
In this there is thus an adherence to trying to preserve a conventional 
collective identity. For Habermas neo-conservatives "wish to preserve 
one-sidedly the economic, technical and managerial achievements of 
modernity at the expense of its ethical and aesthetic components.... the 
bureaucratic colonization of the lifeworld is a positive development... popular 
or democratic inputs with regard to governmental decision making having 
their origin in the life world are perceived as an unnecessary strain on the 
imperatives of efficient political management. "414 There is an extent to 
which the latter quote almost neatly encapsulates the stance to date of new 
Labour in government - their interventions on draconianising the supervisory 
state vis-a-vis uncontrollable youth, for example - whilst at the same time 
flagging up the likely contradictions that will flow from their rhetoric of 
"more democracy. " On the race front the "clean", "objective" over 
instrumentalised interventions into social areas with a heavy racial sub-text 
can be justified via management accountancy systems as well as balanced by 
their espousal of recognising diversity and celebrating difference. 
Modood's rewriting of Black communities into many differences also writes 
away the liklihood of conscious solidaristic social change for such 
communities. Whereas the vocabulary of the language of the eighties 
equality programmes had within it the word "emancipation", even if it only 
bubbled sub-textually slightly below the surface, Modood's nu-speak 
substitutes this with "diversity". These "celebrations ofjouissance serve as 
a kind of `releasement' from the hyperrationalised lifeworld of late 
capitalism (where) such celebrations ultimately have a system stabilising 
effect insofar as they provide outlets for frustration while leaving the 
technical infra-structure of the system itself essentially untouched. "415 
But what of the core concern raised earlier about whether or not Habermas 
brings too closely together fact and norm in upholding constitutional 
democracy as "the social context required for democracy. " His articulation 
of that position has been described as "drawing out the legal, political and 
institutional implications" of the Theory of Communicative Action. 416 
These concerns are raised within the specific context of race, racism and the 
equal participation of Black people in the polity. Is this too conflationary an 
over prescription of a particular system that is now being invested with a 
universalistic value which, in it self, is more exclusionary than is admitted? 
Should these concerns be given extra weight when one looks at Habermas' 
own thinking on the relationship between immigrants and democracy within 
the specific framework of constitutional democracy? Thus he writes that, 
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"democratic citizenship... regardless of the diversity of different cultural 
forms of life .... does require that every citizen be socialised into a common 
political culture.. "; and further, that, ".. one must expect only that immigrants 
willingly engage in the political culture of their new home without 
necessarily abandoning the cultural life specific of their country of origin 
immigrants (since) the political acculturation demanded of them does not 
extend or to the whole of their socialisation. "417 Admittedly those thoughts 
are written against the particular backdrop of his interventions in the 
increasingly racist constructions then being put on the nature and substance 
of national identity in the unification period in Germany and thus it might be 
easy to read into this more fact than norm. Nevertheless the criticisms of 
post modernists, like Goldberg, that Habermas' notions of universality are 
"incorporatist"418 seem to have some validity on first reading. One could 
legitimately ask why this condition should be put on immigrants, especially 
when it is clear that the immigrants Habermas is referring to are those from 
outside the EC, i. e. more likely to be Black immigrants. More to the point, 
what about those "indigenous" citizens who reject the existing political 
culture? At a more substantive level is there an inherent circumscription 
on agency and action in Habermas' theory which is thrown into sharp relief 
when it attempts to illuminate the relationship of Black people to the 
Western polity in a way that cannot escape the charge of logocentrism, i. e. 
does it stray too much into the arena of "a single dimension of validity - that 
of propositional truth and theoretical reason"?. 
But it is not only just that the logic of the performative standard - the "keep- 
in-the-forefront" universal moral claim that can be made - attached to 
communicative discourse in the legal and political elements of the polity 
means that Black people have to be included in the participative processes of 
such discourse. To keep it at this is to admit only of ceteris paribus as the 
prime motivation, and, thus, backhandedly, to affirm that there is a naturally 
evolved, indigenous ethical community and permeated institutions in the 
metropole. This seems to be implicit when Habermas refers to the 
American and French constitutions. I want to argue, instead, as others have 
done, that this particular ethical concentration, and the nature of it, is as 
much, if not more, the result of processes of excluding those who were not 
perceived to be part of the "universe", i. e. mainly Black people. To that 
extent the evolution of the explicit constitutions in the USA and France; the 
informal constitution in the UK, and the post second World War constitution 
in Germany with their universalist principles and claims were shadowed by 
what one commentator has called the "double register". 
"The double register introduced into the heart of the new political legitimation a 
basic contradiction that had a brilliant future before it: a universalist system that 
bases the rights of individuals on the unity of the human race coexists alongside 
a tacit and informal system that based the rights (and duties) of certain groups, 
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constructed as homogenous categories, on a hierarchical evaluation of 
° `differences' between them. '419 
Varikas argues that and the negative evaluation of these differences, 
especially in relation to Black vis-ä-vis white, once they had lost the grounds 
for any theological justification, came to be justified through the racialisation 
of science; a correspondence between Habermas' categorisation of the on 
tological and epistemological. The concern then is whether or not the 
radical inclusive potential of the inter-subjective linguistic turn, can be 
achieved if the exclusionary forces in the development of the `indigenous' 
ethical community and allied political institutions is underplayed, or not 
properly understood and appreciated. Tracking the history of the Jewish 
people in France at about the time of the French revolution and making use 
of Arendt's notion of the pariah she notes that it illustrated the "tension 
between the universalist principle of one general law for all which founded 
the nation-state and emancipation, and the real discrimination encountered 
by Jews in European nation states. "42° Further the term `pariah', with its 
Indian origins, had been known from the sixteenth century onwards, but only 
gained pertinence when the "one general law for all had discredited the logic 
of caste and privilege. " At this point however, towards the end of the 
eighteenth century, "the metaphor of the `pariah', which had been 
disseminated by the literature of the Enlightenment........ connoted a critique 
of absolutism and arbitrary power and, at the same time, astonishment, 
perplexity, or even resignation at how difficult it was to include certain 
categories of individuals (servants, Blacks, Jews, and women) within the 
principle of citizenship that was beginning to emerge. s421 The solution 
was not to ensure that the 1789 Declaration of Universal Rights included 
everyone, but, as the example of the Jewish people in France at that time 
shows, to confirm their emancipation through "a sequence of `decrees, 
`rulings, and particular `decisions', most of which renewed the letters patent 
which, since the time of Henri II, had granted certain Jewish communities 
certain privileges and then gradually extended them to all Jews. "422 It was 
the beginning of what I have called the additive solution. A similar 
strategy, this "double register" was adopted towards Black people in the 
French colonies where, in May 1791, a decree put forward as emancipation 
did not include Black people within the scope of the Declaration, but in 
effect renewed the provisions of the Code Noir, i. e. ratified the rights of the 
mulattoes and the continuation of slavery. A similar argument can be 
advanced, as others have, about the origins and nature of the American 
Declaration of Independence, and the "disastrous and lasting repercussions 
of the `primal crime' that excluded Indians and Blacks from the founding 
contract of the American res publica. "423 The general ethical framework 
for what Habermas has approvingly cited as an example of "constitutional 
patriotism" which can allow all citizens to participate, i. e. the American 
Constitution, has been criticised by Lazare for its suffocating consensus. 424 
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In Germany constitutional development in the early twentieth century, in 
particular the 1913 nationality law, was carried out with reference to the 
position of the position of Germany's colonial subjects. The carry over of 
much pre second world war legislation, including that nationality law, and 
the emerging context of gast arbeiters in post Second World war Germany, 
means that these debates about the plural and who was to be included in the 
singular were there, as in the development of other constitutional 
democracies, from the outset. Similarly in the UK, even without the 
reference point of an explicit constitution or contract with its people, the 
debate about the extension of democracy to its colonial subjects took place 
within the political institutions of the polity. The result of course was the 
decision that those Black peoples who were colonial subjects were not yet, 
civilisation wise, ready for democracy. Instead they were deemed apt 
`subjects' for bureaucratic colonial administration by the white `man'. In a 
sense these political debates and decisions seeking to "whitewash" and 
justify the universalism of the Enlightenment were prefaced and presaged in 
the internal, intra- and contra- arguments of the Enlightenment's main 
philosophers. The point about highlighting and drawing to attention the fact 
that these debates are not new to the domain of the moral resolution of value 
conflicts in constitutional democracies is not so that they can be dismissed, 
as Habermas appears to do, as historical contingencies. Rather it will be to 
argue that these justifications for the maintenance of a single ethically 
permeated polity were constantly renewed, and are constantly being 
renewed, throughout the history of, to pose it at the general level, the 
relations between Black and white. What this has done is to establish a 
paradigm of technical learning strategies, as counter posed to normative 
learning processes that advance evolution in the Habermassian sense, 
designed to maintain the racialised communicative distances in the political 
culture and institutions of the metropole. These learning strategies within 
the political culture and institutions are not metaphysically or `genetically' 
programmed to racially exclude Black people. Rather they are based on 
systemic processes which favour the singular, rather than the plural, and 
around which can be easily crystallised those culturally learned 
`anthropophagii' which then justify and/or reinforce the suppression of the 
plural, i. e. an argument which will hold for the differing con tours of race 
and sex discriminations. I am arguing then that, far from this being a recent 
phenomenon in Western constitutional democracies, i. e. the `adding on' of 
minority cultures, this issue was there from the outset in the unfurling 
arguments and developments of those constitutions and political cultures. 
Hence my preference for the abstracted level of discursive principles because 
the debate about the principles, substance and form of constitutional 
democracies in a plural world has been effectively deferred since their 
inception. In the concluding section of his response to McCarthy, 
Habermas, on the continual question of difference and consensus, notes that 
because decisions must be made under time pressure "we cannot wait forever 
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for constructive ideas to arise.... (and hence.. . in such normatively hopeless 
situations we would operate with the (generally valid) premise of `one right 
answer' merely as a promissory note or bill to be paid at a later date. "425 I 
would argue that within the moral promise of inclusion which attaches to 
Western universalism, and particularly within that of Habermas' discursive 
principles, that there is a promissory note of racial inclusion in constitutional 
democracies the payment of which has been postponed from their inception. 
To that extent I would agree with McCarthy that the constitution cannot be 
exempt from questioning, especially where in its principles and accumulated, 
previous communicative decisions, it violates the discursive principles. 
Varikas argues, and I am sure Habermas would agree with her, that "the 
universality of rights can be realised only through the meanings given to 
them by public speech through which citizens reveal their humanity by 
revealing the plurality that defines them.. . because it is through public speech 
that individuals reveal, reformulate and introduce into their shared lives both 
their diversity, or their reality as members of the group, and their 
singularity. ' 26 However, from the outset, as I attempt to argue, the 
constitutional democracy, its universalism and attendant political culture, has 
for black people always had a structuring and preceding struggle which is 
"the right to have rights. " I repeat then my contention made in the 
preceding paper that race is the transepochal unresolved problem the solution 
to which is the key to the fulfilment of modernity. Any "in the end" 
consensus must be fully inclusive from the outset. For it to do so, in terms 
of my meta-theoretical concerns, means that the inter-subjective bases of 
such consensus must be critically grounded, that is to say that the 
epistemological and on tological anchorings of such discursive practices are 
always being placed under critical scrutiny, but within the standards of the 
discursive principles. Further if, in the processes of discursively based 
democratic opinion and will formation, Black ethical communities do not 
enter into the moral arena as "within-themselves" solely evolved 
communities and making claims on an equitable one to one basis, but have 
their communicative processes mediated by unfairly structuring racially 
distorted communicative practices, i. e. the transitivised not having the right 
to have rights, then there is the need for a counter critically, deconstructive 
mediating force. I have put forward the argument for a new Black social 
movement and a new politics of anti-racism in which Black does no more 
than signify the wrongs done to and does not conflationarily prescribe the 
solutions to ethical claims made by its constituencies. Rather it seeks to 
use the critical collectivity of "Black" as the mediator for ensuring that the 
"right to have rights", whether or not these are formally legal or political 
rights in the "facticity" of Black people's experiences in the polity, or 
implied rights of inclusion and participation that accrue from the discursive 
principles, and, from the universalism grounding constitutional democracy, 
so that ethical communities and/ or individuals from them can make their 
own claims without fear of misrepresentation. Varikas captures some of 
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what it might mean when she describes and analyses the struggles of 
`immigrants' - read Black people in the general sense - to obtain full 
citizenship rights. 
`By irrupting into the public space and literally `seizing the word', they have 
broken out of the homogeneity in which the collective imaginary wrapped them; 
they have revealed to eyes of public opinion the diversity of the collective 
histories and fates that led them to seek asylum, but also the individual 
multiplicity of their status, needs and aspirations..... Where we once saw, or 
thought we saw irreducible ethnic communities, we are seeing the presence of a 
political collective constituted in and through the intentional and concerted 
"4Z' actions of the multitude. 
Habermas has described the constitutional project as not being that of a 
social utopia, where utopia is defined as "the ideal projection of a concrete 
form of life. " Rather he sees the constitution of society, following Preuss, 
as being that point "when it is confronted with itself in suitable institutional 
forms and normatively guided processes of adjustment, resistance, and self 
correction. "428 At this general, principled level of a fallibilistic based 
vision of "constitution", which to all intents and purposes is a "utopia", not 
as Habermas has defined that phenomenon, but as defined in my book, there 
can be little quarrel. The framework is inclusive enough to include fully 
the realities of a multi-racial society. However it is in working out the 
finer details of what it means to explicitly introduce race into the processes 
of determining "suitable institutional forms" and "normatively guided 
processes" etc. that one begins to realise that the degree, rate, and scope of 
change might be higher than seems to be implied in Habermas' work to date. 
This is certainly the case if Habermas' contention, one which I believe is 
true, that the scarcest resources in the democratic processes are neither the 
productivity of the market nor "regulatory capacity of the public 
administration", but the forces of social solidarity which, in complex 
societies can only be regenerated "in the forms of communicative practices 
of self-determination" -a good enough lead into re-introducing the notion of 
emancipation into the working parameters of "agency" and democratic 
opinion and will formation. My critique to date can be read as saying that 
perhaps Habermas has jumped the gun and that there are conditions of 
inclusion that need to be fulfilled, especially in relation to race and gender, 
before we can talk about "a political culture", or "constitution". I am not. 
In the complex societies we currently exist in fulfilling the participatory 
principles, as outlined by Habermas, and changing the structures that 
maintain the forces of distorted communication can be, and should be read in 
many instances, as part of the same process, especially in relation to those 
racialised forces of communication. 
The question then is what does it mean for the modern multi-racial society 
with its still unresolved (my contention) problems of race and gender to be 
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constituted properly? This raises moral questions and Preuss recognises in 
the general sense the need for a moral dimension to constitutions at a time 
when progress is increasingly being measured in neo-liberal market terms, 
e. g. the new right Labour `modernisation' programme. Thus: 
".. progress is no longer driven by moral rhetoric but by the naked fear of 
becoming unable to compete in world markets. The task today is thus for 
freedom and progress to regain their moral dimension. Without it we must live 
with the latent danger that constitutional democracies will be defeated by the 
destructive and regressive dynamics of capitalist markets. "4z9 
This is a recognition that the contradictions and conflicts facing societies 
cannot be sufficiently understood in terms of "traditional liberalism, `the 
individual versus the state', or in the social and economic categories of class 
conflict and the social question", i. e. the welfare state. These conflicts 
include "the relationship between sexes, between various ethnic groups.. ". 
Preuss sees this prognosis as a calling for a "morally reflexive 
constitutionalism" which recognises that these problems cannot be solely 
solved by the traditional means of the modern constitutional state, viz. 
power, law and money, but does allow for the productive tackling of such 
problems through "recalling the procedures of their treatment . "43 This 
would, unlike traditional constitutions, open up the space for "non- 
traditional, non-transcendental politics. " Governance, under such 
arrangements puts a premium on institutions of unfettered communicative 
discourse and, as Habermas notes, these "rest on the shaky ground of the 
political communication of those who by using them simultaneously interpret 
and defend them. " Combining the principle of constitution, as spelt out, 
with the transitive notion of governance, and bearing in mind the Fanonian 
turn I given to the state further on, provides us with a picture that is almost 
captured by Preuss when he writes the following: 
"Such a constitution establishes no political centre in which society could 
recognise its own collective identity; it sees neither the state, the people, nor the 
nation as potential categories for a politically united will that could then impose 
itself as a homogenising force on a diverse society. This is intended neither to 
trivialise nor to deny the problem of political power; a reflexive understanding of 
a constitution still requires that processes of power be organised and that 
parliaments, governments and courts exist to make binding decisions. But 
ideally power serves not as an instrument for imposing a specific idea of the 
correct and progressive course of social development; rather it should create 
room and institutions for society to develop its moral and intellectual resources 
and to use them to force experiences with itself, that is, to treat itself as a kind of 
risky experiment. A constitution that makes this possible would take the idea of 
progress back to its original roots, to the idea of the `improvement of mankind' 
to strengthening mankind's moral competence to govern itself ')-A31 
In the sentence lead up to the above quote I say "almost" because, whilst I 
think it is implicit in what Preuss says, I believe that certain things need to be 
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more clearly spelt out, certainly if the race dimension is to be built in from 
the outset. These are that the organisation of power, particularly as this 
relates to creating institutional space, must, in a multi-racial society, include 
the deon tological rules for ensuring that unjust racialisation does not 
structure those spaces; and that the `institutions' spoken of are not only those 
of the state, i. e. political, in the restrictive Marxist sense, and administrative, 
but also those whose `home-turf is the market. 
6.7 The Hidden Context to Discursive Rationality 
Overall then, it can be said in relation to the use of systems theory by 
Habermas and the restrictions or not that places on agency, especially in 
relation to the inclusive participation of Black people, that whilst the 
principled framework appears to be in place, that there are still refinements 
that can be made. To date the critique has focussed primarily on the 
systemic side, in particular that of lifeworld determination of change, with 
the underlying criticism that perhaps the critical on tology is not critical 
enough. This throws up one of the fundamental questions about 
Habermas' discursive project which is whether or not the universalistic 
framework is till an extension of excluding meta-narratives. This applies 
not only to Habermas, but, as well, to the other deliberative democracy 
theorists, some of them positively critical of certain aspects of his theory, 
like Benhabib. The question she poses generally about democracy, viz. does 
it rest on a homogenising model of identity, applies equally to her theoretical 
variation of Habermas 432 For example with regard to deliberative 
democracy she insists "that the practical rationality embodied in democratic 
institutions has a culture transcending validity claim., -A33 Is a universalistic 
pragmatic testing of the truthfulness, rightness and sincerity of validity 
claims context transcendent? 
There are three ways to begin to answer this. Firstly there are the strictures 
made by post structuralists that the assumption, as they think, of an 
autonomous single subject belies the contradictory and diverse discourses 
and practices that constitute the subject, and that therefore, the 
communicative process will simply impose a new set of disciplinary 
conditions. Perhaps, but then as Dews points out, "... Habermas' work does 
not hold up a mirror to contemporary experiences of fragmentation, loss of 
identity and libidinal release, in the manner which has enabled post- 
structuralist writing to provide the `natural' descriptive vocabulary... but 
neither does it pay for its expressive adequacy and immediacy with a lack of 
theoretical and historical perspective., -A34 Apart from which I think that 
more telling critiques have been made by those sympathetic to Habermas' 
project. The cardinal issue of the performative contradiction underpinning 
the post modernist project has been made in the previous sections. 
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6.8 From the `Margins' 
There is, however, an allied, and yet potentially more damaging, line of 
critique which has been made by certain African philosophers. Here 
African is understood not in any biologically reductionist sense, or in the 
way of a representation of an imagined ethical community of Africans, but 
more as a philosophical interrogation of Africa and Africans in the 
development and critique of Western philosophy. It is not therefore a 
simplistic upholding of "all intellectual and discursive productions 
elaborated in Africa and considered philosophical", or the intellectual 
practices and legacies of "persons of a dispersed race", but, more 
circumscriptively, the thematization of philosophy through the prism of "the 
-brutal encounter of the African world with European modernity" - though in 
the latter case the qualification of a specific form of modernity needs to be 
added. What is being sought in this particular school of philosophy is a 
critical, deconstructive interrogation of enlightenment philosophy, in 
particular the work of Immanuel Kant. Whilst the philosophical 
grounding of Habermas' work in Kant is notable, and, thus too the likely 
implications of any race based critique, it must be remembered as well that 
leading post modernist theorists, like Foucault and Derrida, are similarly 
philosophically indebted. And yet, in reading the African philosophers 
there is undoubtedly a coincidence of enlightenment critiques with the 
aforementioned post modernists. Eze thus asks how it is that the ideals of 
the enlightenment can be understood against the backdrop of slavery and 
colonialism and whether or not it is simply a matter of attempting to separate 
out the ideals from the reality. 435 This type of argument echoes that of the 
interrogation of Heidegger's philosophy - and inter-relatedly Derrida's 
appropriation of that and subsequent ill thought out defence - and his 
relationship with the Nazis 436 Eze's view is that ideal and implementation 
are inextricably linked and that, therefore, "Africa's experience of the `Age 
of Europe' ... (is).. the cost of Occidental modernity. 
"437 By this Eze means 
that within Western philosophy moment and negation are always 
dialectically related so that the "reason" of such philosophy is in fact a 
defining interlacing of human understanding and understanding of the 
human to the extent that "Europeans originally introduced the notion of a 
difference in kind between themselves and Africans as a way of justifying 
unspeakable exploitation and denigration of Africans. "ý38 
The essential point of Eze's critique of Kant is that this was not simply a 
common expression of enlightenment period philosophers' ignorance 
because of the poverty of knowledge and information about Africa but that 
there is within the structure of Kant's theories "a singular and incisive 
Occidental model of man" that resurfaces within modem philosophers' 
works, such as Heidergger and Habermas 439 He cites, in support of his 
judgement of Habermas, "Habermas' wilful typologies of Africa and African 
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world view in his two-volume Theory of Communicative Action. " 
However, a careful examination of the latter, i. e. TCA, will show that 
Habermas does not make any utterances on Africa or African world views. 
What he does do is attempt to critically engage with other writers, such as 
Evans-Pritchard, Horton and Winch, who use their and others' 
anthropological field research in certain parts of Africa to further the 
relativist-universalist debate on the notion of rationality. Within this 
Habermas attempts to create a non-judgemental and temporally non-linear 
and non-teleological societal evolutionary model in which the claims of 
communicative rationality are limited and subject to "by the empirical- 
theoretical fruitfulness of the research programmes based on it.. " This does 
not mean, however, that Habermas' work is exempt from the criticism of 
being unsympathetic to the "Other". For example, Stephen White, an author 
of one of the more sympathetic secondary texts on Habermas' work, puts 
forward an arguement that proposes a "marriage of Habermas work with that 
of Heidegger who is seen as being more sympathetic to the "Other". 
Whilst there are contradictions and inconsistencies in Eze's critique, the key 
question posed is the extent to which Habermas' theory is inclusive of all 
voices. In other words even if the principle of Habermas' work is denied, the 
actual reality and the pragmatic hope tinged implications of Habermas' work 
makes it a realistic change option. I argued, for example in the previous 
section, that it is possible to talk about intermittent systemic penetration of 
the lifeworld in the Third world so that it becomes possible for those 
normatively framed spaces to become a refuge, even oppositional base 
against and from system domination. From this perspective it is thus right 
to ask whether or not Habermas' notion of discursive rationality is 
sympathetic enough in the procedures governing reaching understanding, not 
so much to "Other" voices, but to the way they make themselves heard. In 
attempting to address this issue, then, within the structure of this critique, we 
move from system to the other major categorical distinction in Habermas' 
work i. e. lifeworld; for it is within the latter that Habermas sites the major 
communicative resource which can underpin the substantive democratic 
project. 
6.9 From the `Centre' 
Some of the most promising engagements with this key area have come not 
from the post modernists who have tended to reject universalisation tout 
court, but from those sympathetic to Habermas; and if not that, at least 
attempting parallel and similar democratic projects. In one of these, a 
collection of contributions to the debate about democracy and difference, 
Benhabib points out that there is within the world today a democratising 
momentum which is characterised, almost contradictorily, by major 
assertions of national and ethnic difference both at the level of the metropole 
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and within the "peripheral areas ., 
440 A major, but crude, distinction 
between the two politico-geographical areas latterly referred to is that the 
politics of difference emerging in the metropole, or liberal capitalist 
democracies, is marked by "negotiation, contestation and representation of 
difference within the public sphere of liberal democracies, the politics of 
ethnonationalisms seek to redefine the constituents of the body politic and 
aim at creating new politically sovereign bodies..... (in many cases)..... by 
eliminating other and differences". 41 This value of searching for identity, 
however, and this applies to both shades of difference politics, "includes 
differentiating oneself from what one is not. "442 At another level these 
politics indicate, as Habermas has pointed out, a shift from "issues of 
distribution" to that of emphasising "the grammar of forms of life" 443 With 
this as the backdrop context, Benhabib then poses the crucial defining 
question, "Does democracy rest on homogenising models of identity? "444 
There is, then, within this question, a faint echo of the concerns raised by 
Eze. This shall be referred to later in the answer to the question posed. 
First, it is necessary to point out that the contributors to the democracy and 
difference debate referred to above concentrate on two of the so far 
identified four models of democracy: deliberative democracy, an example of 
which is that outlined by Habermas, and what Benhabib refers to as the 
fourth model, viz. agonistic. Agonistic democracy rests on a distinction 
between the political and politics where, in the case of the former, it is "an 
expression of the idea that a free society composed of diversities can 
nonetheless enjoy moments of commonality through public 
deliberations... "and in the case of the latter it refers "to the legitimised and 
public contestation, primarily by organised and unequal social powers over 
access to the resources available to the public authorities of the 
collectivity. "445 Thus "politics is continuous.. " whereas the "political is 
episodic, rare. " For the purposes of this critique I shall concentrate on the 
deliberative model, with particular reference to Habermas and those who 
espouse a similar model but wish to see Habermas' one expanded in some 
areas, and with a background eye to the agonistic contribution. Thus 
Habermas' model envisages a decentred society in which the political system 
is but one of more action systems and is not the apex of society in any sense. 
Legitimation then is based on a "higher level inter subjectivity of 
communication processes that flow through both the parliamentary bodies 
and the informal networks of the public sphere...... (to)... constitute arenas in 
which a more or less rational and opinion will-formation can take place. 446 
Within this Habermas distinguishes between ethical discourses on collective 
forms of life from political discourses which involve "both moral questions 
of justice and instrumental questions of power and coercion. "447 The core 
question on democracy and identity/difference can be transposed over 
Habermas' model and answered by examining the contributions of Benhabib 
and Young, both of whom are sympathetic to Habermas' model without 
necessarily accepting every aspect of it. 
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For Benhabib, therefore, "Habermas cuts political processes too cleanly 
away from cultural forms of communication"448, whilst for Young it is not 
necessary to build a "cordon sanitaire around political discourse such as to 
block off the articulation of issues of collective identity and visions of the 
good life.. " 449 I want to outline Young's argument first because Benhabib, 
whilst she seeks to expand Habermas notion of democratic discourse, also 
upholds much of his substantive argument and, in so doing, attempts to rebut 
the criticisms of theorists like Young. The con tours of this sub-debate 
throw up not only the strengths and weaknesses of Habermas' approach, and 
thus of a deliberative model of democracy, but, more crucially, in line with 
the tentative conclusions that can be gleaned from the debate around race 
and local governance, point to shortcomings in both Benhabib and Young's 
approaches. 
Young, whilst she endorses "a discussion based ideal democracy", finds that 
there are two underlying assumptions which, if not confronted, might lead to 
an unnecessary exclusionary model being developed. These are that there 
is firstly the assumption "culturally biased conception of discussion" because 
democratic discussion is restricted narrowly to critical argument. Secondly 
there is the assumption that reaching understanding in discussion requires "a 
shared understanding or .... a common good as a goal. 
"45° Certainly this 
ambivalence is there in Haberman' solitary condition of acceptance of the 
political culture of the "host country" by immigrants. Young's support for 
deliberative democracy over interest democracy, which is correctly seen as 
underpinning current liberal democratic models, is that it "promotes a 
concept of reason over power in politics. "45' The five "rules" of 
procedural/discursive communicative practice, as outlined by Habermas, 
revolve around the key one of equality of access and treatment for 
participants. That is to say that participants can criticise and agree to 
proposals put forward on the basis of the "force of the better argument" 
because there is the equality of opportunity to propose and criticise as well as 
the guarantee that the speaking situation is free from domination. 
However, it is Young's contention that the conditional guarantors of freedom 
and equality in the deliberative process, i. e. removing economic and political 
oppressive and exclusionary factors, is too limited. What is missed out is 
the domination that comes from "an internalised sense of the right one has to 
speak or not to speak, and from the devaluation of some people's style of 
speech and the elevation of others. "452 This hidden, exclusionary element 
in the main proponents of deliberative democracy models is purchased 
through a model of communication that socio- and politically historically 
specific. Its derivation from Greek and Roman philosophy and praxis 
means, according to Young, that "their institutional forms, rules and 
rhetorical and cultural styles have defined the meaning of reason itself in the 
modern world" to the extent that "since their Enlightenment beginnings they 
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have been male dominated institutions and in class and race differentiated 
societies they have been white and upper class dominated., -A53 She 
therefore concludes that "the norms of deliberation are culturally specific 
and often operate as forms of power that silence or devalue the speech of 
some people. " There is a resonance here with examples that can be brought 
forward from the empirical work on local government and race, especially 
with regard to the dominant language of legitimation in such institutions and 
the pattern of conflicts that emerged with the increase of employees with 
differing forms of English. 454 The crux of Young's argument about the 
nature of deliberation, as conceived within the deliberative model, is that 
such deliberation is in fact competitive in which middle class ways of 
expression and argumentation are dominant to the detriment of speakers 
from other backgrounds. Normatively such forms of deliberation, apart 
from the competitive element, also "privilege speech that is formal and 
general" and "dispassionate and disembodied. "455 In other words 
"differences of speech correlate with other differences of social privilege. " 
Young goes on to ground her argument in not so much empirical justification 
- and here no sources are quoted - so much as assertion about the differences 
between middle class, white male "speak" and that of women and racial 
minorities where the latter "tends to be more excited and embodied, more 
valuing the expression of emotion, the use of figurative language, 
modulation in tone of voice and wide gesture. "436 Now, whilst one must 
guard against the essentialistic exoticising of certain social groups, which I 
think Young might do in her characterisation of racial minority speaking, 
there is an argument for including such forms of speech in discursive 
processes. On the basis of her criticisms Young goes on to propose what 
she designates a "communicative democracy" in which difference is seen as 
a resource for public reason rather than "divisions which public reason 
transcends", and in which critical argument is supplemented with three 
further deliberative elements: greeting, story telling and rhetoric. The 
validity of Young's further specification of Habermas' universalisation is 
still to be tested. However, what is important for now, is that the gist of her 
argument is understood. 
Benhabib, however, within the spirit of the debate amongst supporters of 
deliberative democracy, provides a model of such action which is both 
critically supportive of Habermas as well, in parts, a critical riposte to 
Young. Thus whilst she claims that her model defends that of a "decentred 
public sphere", she distances herself slightly from Habermas by arguing that 
hers, unlike Habermas', does not "follow... (the) sharp distinctions among 
ethical, political and moral discourses. "457 Her model can be summarised 
by the following definition she proffers. 
"Democracy, in my view, is best understood as a model for organising the 
collective and public exercise of power in the major institutions of a society 
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on the basis of the principle that decisions affecting the well being of a 
collectivity can be viewed as the outcome of a procedure of free and reasoned 
deliberation among individuals considered as moral and political equals. "4S8 
This definition has sharp affinities with Habermas' formulation; certainly 
insofar as they share the "assumption that the institutions of liberal 
democracies embody the idealised content of a form of practical reason. "459 
On these bases she then articulates a model which attempts to ride the 
tension between the universalism it lays claim to and the plurality of value 
systems it has to accommodate. Firstly, as we have shown earlier, Benhabib 
insists that "the practical rationality embodied in democratic institutions has 
a culture transcending validity claim" because, bearing in mind Habermas' 
five principles of discursive rationality, "articulating good reasons in public 
forces the individual to think of what would count as a good reason for all 
others involved. "460 This inherent procedure does not control or define the 
content and from of the argumentation. In other words such models of 
rationality are "undetermined. " Such a model thus does not rely on the 
argument that numbers determine majority rule, but that all affected by 
matters should be involved in the deliberation about the final outcome. To 
this Benhabib adds three more additional and important points. The first is 
that such a model assumes a condition of value pluralism where "agreements 
..... are to 
be sought not at the level of substantive beliefs, but at that of the 
processes, procedures and practices attaining and revising beliefs. "461 
Secondly it assumes as well a condition of interest conflicts; but one where 
"the proceduralist model of democracy allows the articulation of conflicts of 
interests under conditions of social co-operation mutually acceptable to 
all"462 Finally Benhabib argues that "no modern society can organise its 
affairs along the fiction of a mass assembly carrying out its deliberations in 
public and collectively .... (because)....... the procedural specifications of this 
model privilege a plurality of modes of association in which all affected can 
have the right to articulate their point of view... (and thus)... it is through the 
interlocking net of these multiple forms of associations, networks, and 
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organisations that an anonymous `public conversation' results. 
Within this framework of her model, as set out above, Benhabib seeks to 
confront critics, such as Young, who exemplify what she describes as "the 
feminist suspicions towards deliberative democracy. " Yet, this is in fact a 
partial misnomer. It is not only feminists who have criticisms of the 
deliberative model, as expounded by Benhabib. There is equally a critique 
which can be mounted from a race equality perspective; in fact a critique 
which also encompasses Young within its scope. This is not one, as I argue 
later, that subscribes to post modernist anti-foundationalist "principles"; but 
one that seeks, as do the aforementioned theorists, a deliberative model 
which is racially inclusive. Nevertheless to return to Benhabib's criticisms 
of Young, she accuses her of three errors. Firstly Benhabib feels that 
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Young conflates the institutional with the conceptual; or, as I read it, the fact 
with the norm. Thus whilst Young rightly is critical of the Enlightenment 
version of the public sphere with its evocation of a concrete collective 
assembly, this, according to Benhabib, should not be read as that which 
deliberative democrats are advocating. To that extent the distinction 
between deliberative and communicative democracy which Young makes 
should be taken as being more apparent than real because at the end of the 
day Young must "be able to distinguish the kind of transformation and 
transcendence of partial perspectives that occurs in communicative 
democracy from the mutual agreements to be reached in the processes of 
deliberative democracy. "464 To do so therefore requires "standards of 
fairness and impartiality in order to judge the manner in which opinions were 
allowed to be brought forth, groups were given chances to express their 
points of view etc.. "465 Further, Benhabib argues - and here argues 
contentiously, I think - that the additional communicative elements Young 
wishes to introduce, like story telling rhetoric etc., are "informally structured 
processes of everyday communication among individuals who share a 
cultural and historical lifeworld. " Not only, therefore, can these not be 
formalised, they, according to Benhabib, should not be formalised. That is 
to say they cannot become the public language of institutions because "to 
attain legitimacy, democratic institutions require the articulation of the bases 
of their actions and policies in discursive language that appeals to commonly 
shared and accepted public reasons. "466 'Mere is in this last line of 
reasoning an obvious echo of Habermas' notion of the acceptance of a 
common political culture for, in addition, Benhabib thinks that the 
introduction of such linguistic practices would introduce an element of 
arbitrariness into the process by undermining the principle of impartiality. 
For example, she asks what would happen if other participants did not 
understand the story. Thus "what is considered impartial has to be `in the 
best interests of all 9, )-A67 The solution to this lies perhaps, according to 
Benhabib, in Fraser's notion of "subaltern counterpublics" which 
characterises a heterogenous public sphere seeking to derive opinions which 
can influence public policy making, thereby maintaining the required 
distinction between informal and formal language. 
In a sense Young and Benhabib outline two related models of the way in 
which the lifeworld should interact with the system within the overall 
deliberative framework, as developed by Habermas. Whilst both attempt to 
flesh out what it means to articulate a universalist based notion of democracy 
within a context of value pluralism, both, from a race equality perspective, 
still require further critical clarification; in particular Benhabib who is not 
only wrong in her interpretation of Young, but also wrong, certainly in 
respect of her positive valorisation of value diversity, in her conflation of 
impartiality with the fact of current linguistic structures of public discourse. 
The problem with Benhabib's model, more so than Young's, is that which I 
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think also emerges from the way in which Habermas articulates his model in 
BFN. That is the critical distance between `fact' and `norm' needs to be 
rigorously maintained if the full potential of deliberative democracy is to be 
realised. This is especially so where there are still domains of trans-epochal 
unresolved problems, such as racism, as I have argued in the earlier chapter, 
because not to do so, i. e. maintain that critical distance, means that in 
detailing the universalistic based practices, like enacting the procedures for 
deliberative democracy, could result in an element of unintentioned 
incorporatism. Habermas himself in a later clarification of BFN seeks to 
elucidate a clearer perspective on what can be termed "idealisation". Here 
idealisation does not mean envisaging "a final consensus and.. assumptions 
regarding communication in an ideal communicative society.. " but it does 
refer to "the idealising content of the inescapable pragmatic presuppositions 
of a praxis from which only the better argument is supposed to emerge. "468 
If Habermas does use the notion of an ideal communication society it is as a 
"methodological" device in order "to make visible the inescapable elements 
of social inertia. " In other words maintaining the critical distance requires 
adherence to the principle of discursive fallibilism, something Benhabib 
sometimes omits to do in her vision of a deliberatively democratic society 
and her defence of a public language which is of itself a particular socio- 
cultural and political construction. However, before looking at those latter 
points, there are certain elements of the main deliberative democracy 
argument which cut across all three theorists mentioned and which, in the 
light of reconciling the race dimension, need, briefly, to be re-examined. 
The first of these relates to what Habermas has described as the move from 
the politics associated with distributive justice to that of the struggles around 
the garmmar of forms of life. Benhabib puts it thus: "The struggles over 
wealth, political position and access that characterised bourgeois and 
working class politics throughout the nineteenth and first half of the 
twentieth century were replaced by struggles over abortion and gay rights, 
over ecology and the consequences of new medical technologies, and the 
politics of racial, linguistic and ethnic pride.... (from).. political parties ... to 
movement politics.. "469 This picture of new social movement politics is 
not quite accurate. If there is to be the appellation of new social 
movement, then it is that which should be affixed to the struggles for race 
equality over the past two centuries, a struggle which, whilst it certainly 
wasn't bourgeois or working class, was, as the civil rights struggles 
demonstrate, about distributive and political justice. In fact the civil rights 
movements could be said to be the precursor for many of the new social 
movements in Western democracies. Notions of racial pride emerged out 
of the denial of distributive and political justice, and not autogenetically. 
In fact political and distributive justice, which in relation to race can be 
called racial justice, are still germane and cannot be separated from, as is 
implied by Benhabib's analysis, deeds of denial, discrimination and non- 
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recognition. In this case the politics of difference and presence cannot be 
simply constructed socio-culturally. But then this relates to my notion of 
unresolved trans-epochal problems of race which, in this case, includes still a 
very large, unresolved issue of access to societal resources. This 
maintenance of asymmetrical force in the structures of communication 
through racial conventionalisation means that the equality of opportunity for 
Black people to raise validity claims in the communicative processes of 
deliberative democracy are intertwined with those of distributive justice, 
perhaps far more so than those, say, of the gay and ecology movements. 
There is the extent, then, to which the heterogeneity of the Black 
communities, now positively acclaimed, should be cross referenced by class 
in order that those practices which are now being claimed to be superseded, 
such as collective discussions through formal assemblies, are not thrown out 
altogether.. 
But this is inter-related to the second area which needs further explication; 
and that is the notion advanced of the decentred state. Habermas puts 
forward the idea that in complex societies, the state becomes but another 
area of action and is not the apical be-all of political struggles. That is to 
say that the goal is not the "conquest and destruction of state power", just as 
the idea of radical democracy is not "a form of self administering socialism. " 
Instead there is the idea of the public sphere, even the heterogeneous public 
sphere, in which political and will formation processes are plugged into the 
communicative channels that rub through and around the state. One can 
see then why Benhabib, in dismissing part of Young's model, can talk of 
replacing "the general deliberative assembly found in early democratic 
theory., -A70 I take Habermas to be talking not in the sense of an ideal 
communication society, but in the sense of putting forward an argument 
drawing on the inherent potential in liberal democracies and on his empirical 
investigations, i. e. "idealising the inescapable pragmatic presuppositions.. " 
It is appropriate, therefore, to flesh out slightly more the still current role of 
the state in Western democracies because when one brings into the frame the 
issue of race equality, there is an argument for an enlarged role for the state 
in the interim process of moving to a position of decentring. The state at 
the moment, particularly the local state, is still the focal point for the control 
of and/or access to, resources which have a material affect on people's 
positions in the constellations of communicative power. That is to say, 
factors of social welfare, environment, housing and even the advocating, 
supportive role a political institution like local government can have, have a 
direct bearing on the equality of opportunity constituents have to participate 
in communicative processes, particularly black constituents, notwithstanding 
the increase in the numbers of students in and graduates from higher 
education establishments from those communities. Now, one has to 
differentiate between the current process of "decentring" which is based on a 
conscious effort to depoliticise parts of the state because of the dictates of 
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instrumentalised legitimation needs, i. e. costs, by removing it from 
discursive political practices, and that, which should be implied by 
Habermas, and which is the outcome of discursively informed devolution 
and decentralisation of state powers. If therefore, Habermas' 
acknowledgement that "struggles for recognition in the democratic 
constitution state possess legitimate strength only to the extent that groups 
find access to the political sphere.. "471 is to be realised, then apropos, 
particularly Black, communities, his related support for affirmative action, 
including quotas, as part of the action required to ensure symmetry of power 
in discourses, will mean an enlarged role for the state. In fact both within 
the administration of the state, i. e. the employ, and in the influence of the 
state, and in the communicative processes with the public sphere, the need, 
for example of collective discursive assemblies, can be seen. It is therefore 
slightly disingenuous of Benhabib to suggest that there will not be the need 
for collective assemblies. In fact even if this were the case, ultimately the 
different voices within the public sphere will have to talk with and to each 
other in the recognition that agreement over an issue that effects them will 
need to be reached; and, thus too, with the recognised "parliamentary" 
bodies in the polity. This, even though it lacks the concrete form of a fixed 
geographical site, is still an assembly in the most general sense of the word. 
Where the state, in particular the local state, can act as a guarantor for 
realising equality of opportunity in the communicative processes because it 
is a repository of remedial power through the resources at its disposal, then 
the need for discursive procedurally guided interface sites between the state 
and lifeworlds is greater, especially those lifeworlds who are most affected 
by the asymmetries of power in the communicative processes. Perhaps 
Benhabib's position arises because her model of deliberative democracy is 
based on that envisaged in Habermas' TCA; a model he himself has 
superseded. 
Habermas refers to his two models as that of the "siege" model, which can 
be attributed to TCA, and that of the "sluice gate" model, which can be 
attributed to BFN. The former has in mind "the image of a `siege' of the 
bureaucratic power of public administrations by citizens making use of 
communicative power.. s472 But this formulation is too defensive and 
defeatist because it cedes to such powers the right to apply decisions without 
discursive reference. Habermas thinks that today matters of regulation have 
to be grounded rather than applied and that, therefore, the implicit 
legitimation requirements includes "different forms of 
participation..... (because).... a part of the democratic will formation must 
make its way into the administration itself, and the judiciary that cerates 
subsidiary laws must justify itself in the wider forum of a critique of law. "473 
In other words there is an expectation in this model of a far greater degree of 
democratisation than in the "siege" one. What Habermas has in mind is 
an inversion of the centre-periphery relationship so that the communication 
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forms in civil society "along with the communicative stream of a vital public 
sphere... chiefly bear the burden of normative expectations. s474 That is to 
say it requires the intervention of utopianly energised social movements. 
In interrogating Habermas, one questioner puts the core question thus: "In 
order for citizens to influence the centre, that is parliament, the courts and 
the administration, the communication of influences has to pass from the 
periphery through the sluices of democratic and constitutional 
procedures....... law (then) is the medium through which communicative 
power is transformed into administrative power. "475 However, there are 
intervening structures of the state, at the regional and local levels, where the 
relationship between communicative lifeworids and system can and does 
move from influence to change. In fact in some areas, such as race and 
women's equality, new social movements span a continuum from national to 
local public spheres to seeking the resolution of raised validity claims within 
the administrative structures itself. Habermas' intimation of the need for 
changes such as these in his BFN possibly comes about because of his lack 
of attention to the actual details of public bureaucratic administrations. 
Other theorists, like Alvesson and Forester, have, on the other hand, made 
use of Habermas' deliberative model to demonstrate how it is possible to 
transform intrumental based action in the public sector into communicative 
action. Forester, in particular, conceives of the planning process in the 
public sector in terms of communicative action, rather than instrumental 
action. Thus "contributions to planning discourse should be 
comprehensible, sincere, legitimate (given the individual's role, e. g. as a 
planning professional), appropriate to the context and topics under 
discussion, and truthful" 476 On the basis of this Forester can, as Habermas 
suggests, use the ideal speech situation methodologically to compare existing 
planning practices and then reconstruct, based on the idealising presumptions 
of a process informed by ideal speech, a communicative based planning 
process. Such a process would "involve careful listening, community 
education about the process, the cultivation of poorly organised groups 
etc. "ý'7 To this could be added as well the maximisation of participation in 
planning decisions, the right of all affected to be heard and to deliberate 
before decisions are taken, the right of all sections of the communities to be 
heard in their own voices etc. Dryzek designates such processes "discursive 
designs" which "then operate as `worms in the brain' of the administrative 
state, advancing democracy at the expense of hierarchy. "478 The essential 
point is that, following Dryzek again, we can talk about a continuum of 
democratisation of the state, against the state, and despite the state, all of 
which will have recourse to collective assembles either in its idealised 
Benhabibian public sphere communication stream assembly mode, or in its 
concrete collective assembly mode. 
This notion of radical democratisation, but also the issue of language, 
political discourse and the multi-cultural society is highlighted further in 
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McCarthy's critique of BFN and Habermas' response to that critique 
McCarthy's critique seeks, to undertake a historical review of Habermas' 
theory of legitimacy with particular attention to the way in which Habermas 
has had to come to grips with the notion of a multi-cultural society. In short 
McCarthy's overall summary, and conclusion, whose intention I agree with, 
is that whilst Habermas has been criticised for apparently wanting to defend 
a "discourse theoretical version of the `general will' as the key to democratic 
legitimacy, whatever the cost", the problems implied in such criticisms "can 
be addressed without surrendering the discourse approach to democratic 
deliberation., -A79 Now whilst Habermas warns against constructing 
collective will formation as if it were the sum of individual will formation, 
McCarthy feels that his undifferentiated use of the pronoun "we", at that 
stage in his thinking, makes him come very close to that position. That is to 
say if moral questions are to do with the regulation of interpersonal conflicts, 
then the assumption of a shared life world raises the spectre of a 
homogenous "we". Thus whilst, as McCarthy points out, Habermas takes 
note of the pluralism of modern life, he writes in the singular about `the form 
of life, self-understanding and collective identity of a legal-political 
community... "480. McCarthy's argument is that Habermas should be talking 
about the plural nature of the forms of life etc, and about the core 
problematic which is how, under such conditions, consensus on such matters 
can be achieved, or more fundamentally, whether or not the `final decision', 
which consensus implies, is desirable in all circumstances. 
Within such a context, then moral disputes, as opposed to ethical disputes 
which are more _rooted 
in their own individual contexts, "requires that 
participants detach themselves from the interpretive perspectives of their 
particular groups and try to reason as members of `a socially and spatio- 
temporally unlimited communication community, ', 481. McCarthy, as he has 
voiced before, sees this strict separation of political and legal justice from 
ethical concerns as problematic because he, McCarthy, can perceive of 
situations in modem multi-cultural society where it would be hard to 
separate out ethical considerations from moral ones. This is a point I made 
earlier where, in what has been categorised as "struggles for recognition" by 
Honneth and Habermas, the denial of the right to exist for `minority' ethical 
communities is at one and the same time a breach of Habermas' 
communicative discourse participative principles. However my argument 
is that it is the act of denial, which contains in it often the false creation of 
ethical identities because of representation, which is important, and not the 
`worth' of certain communities, which is implicit in both McCarthy's and 
Habermas' liberally framed usage of the terms culture and community. The 
reason for critically highlighting this aspect now is because the way in which 
both theorists thus use culture, particularly when it is used as an unspoken 
substitute term for Black `minorities' in the metropole, a term which I have 
therefore "quotationalised" pending further discursive redemption, means 
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that such cultures are shorn from their socio constructive processes, and also 
their histories. Black cultures therefore become minority cultures and their 
relationship to the "majority indigenous" culture becomes additive. 
McCarthy poses a valid critical question which is "why we should expect 
political culture in a pluralistic society to comprise a common interpretation 
rather than a conflict of interpretations"482 because "different sub-cultures 
might defend different interpretations of the `same' constitutionally 
embodied system of rights. " However, McCarthy's proposed solution to 
this problematic of whether or not the common political culture based on 
constitutional patriotism involves an "in the end" quality which grounds 
consensus, is unsatisfactory because of, I suspect, his limited, liberal 
understanding of culture, particularly the position of Black people in relation 
to culture, racism and the polity. McCarthy puts forward the idea that in a 
multi-cultural and multi-racial democratic society disagreements in principle 
which do not involve consensus, is perfectly in keeping with Habermas' own 
ideas on the necessary qualities of tolerance, recognition, respect etc for 
democratic culture. 
Habermas' response turns on elaborating his initial assessment of 
McCarthy's argument which is that it has taken an "anti-universalistic" turn, 
and which he, Habermas, thinks is an extension of criticisms made before by 
both McCarthy and other commentators, viz. that the sharp analytical 
distinction made by Habermas between the ethical and moral spheres are in 
practice "two interdependent aspects of the same problem, namely `which 
norms citizens want to adopt to regulate their life together. "' In pursuit of 
this Habermas repeats that which he has said before, that within 
constitutional democracies there are two means of normatively resolving 
differences, or ensuring that they do not matter. These are the guarantee of 
an equal right of co-existence and the procedural securing of legitimation 
through procedures 
Whilst I think that Habermas is, unfortunately, taking McCarthy's critical 
points to the_extreme, there are questions relating to how differences are to 
be judged, because it is not possible to tolerate all differences, especially 
where these breach the principles of communicative discourse. On the 
other hand the assumption of an indigenous value consensus, which is not a 
principled observation but one relating to the Western democracies, is 
fallacious, as I shall argue later. It underpins, perhaps Habermas' earlier 
principled assumption of the acceptance of the constitutional state. 
Nevertheless Habermas proceeds to develop his counter-argument by 
highlighting what he regards as three areas of partial misunderstanding 
which have been made by McCarthy. These are that McCarthy fails 
adequately to distinguish between national and subnational levels of ethical 
integration, misunderstands the process nature of collective identity, and 
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overemphasises the ethical permeation of a country's legal order. Finally 
Habermas views McCarthy's notion of mutuality as taking forgranted that 
which Habermas thinks is necessary for constitutional democracy in a multi- 
cultural society. That is to say that "the expectation of tolerance itself 
requires a normative justification... (which)... must satisfy the claim that the 
legal protections governing the peaceful coexistence and mutual integrity of 
"483 forms of life are fair, i. e. are rationally acceptable to all sides. 
But there are, as shown above, arguments, which need to be taken note of, 
surrounding the racialised origins of key western constitutions, particularly 
the USA's, which Habermas illustratively uses, as well as arguments about 
the racialised nature of their legal systems, for example those advanced by 
the Critical Race theorists484, which require that these elements of 
Habermas' arguments should always be open to empirical fallibility testing. 
Related to this there is as well the argument, which I advance in the chapter 
following this, that legitimation procedures, if they are to reflect the 
substantive reality of what being `fair' means for a fully inclusive `we' in a 
multi-racial, racist society, have to include that of `non-closure'. 
6.10 The Linguistic Turn - Language or Languages? 
Finally, we can now turn our attention to the issue of whether or not the 
impartiality of procedures demand a common public language, and, inter- 
relatedly, whether or not, Habermas' requirement of a common political 
culture actually means this as well. Firstly, with respect to Benhabib's 
first criticism of Young, I do not think that Young is conflating the 
institution with the norm, but rather arguing that the concept of "assembly" 
is built into deliberative democracy at all levels, and implying, as I also 
think, that the validity claims of the most marginalised demand the format 
which links communicative action directly to achieving systemic change. 
Secondly, Benhabib appears to operate with an almost ahistorical, 
essentialist notion of public language. Such language has not remained 
unchanged over the years. Very often changes in the language have come 
about directly out of public pressure for it to be less obscurantist, and more 
open to use by all. Moreover within administrative systems and political 
systems there is both the informal and formal use of language, especially in 
political fora. At the local state level these can range from formal 
committee meetings to community based fora. What emerges from this, 
very often in the form of written documents, is done within the structure of 
formal public language. What goes into its formation, in terms of its oral 
origins, is very often informal language. Within the context, say of a 
consultative, involving forum with affected constituents this is achieved 
within the impartiality structures of everyone, in theory, having the right to 
speak. However, it is true as Young contends, that in some circumstances 
the expected protocol of such gatherings and the confidence of some to 
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exploit and use those fora, i. e. mainly white, middle class, can induce silence 
in others. Moreover, within the administrative set-up, the unnecessary, over 
rigorous insistence of a standard spoken and written public language has 
been, and is, used to control and oppress Black employees, as shall be shown 
in the empirical section. But these are shortcomings which can be overcome 
by defining more rigorously the rules of impartiality in debate and the rights 
of employees . In contradistinction to both Young and Benhabib, therefore, it can be said that the potential for polyphonic voices to be involved in 
deliberative communicative discourse can already be demonstrated by 
empirical evidence. However, even if this were not the case, and pace 
Benhabib, there is the principled argument, contained within the logic and 
spirit of Habermas' own theory, for the necessity of this. Even if we do not 
accept Young's communicative additions as the necessary ones, but merely 
as examples of forms of speech that should be included, then these are still 
speech utterances with the universal claims to sincerity, rightfulness and 
truth. What matters then is not that they are uttered in that form, but that 
they are understood by the participants in the speech process, and vice-versa. 
If we as participants need to put ourselves in the speakers position to 
understand her/him, then this cannot only be done on the bases of a common 
language or shared lifeworld, but because language and language structure is 
so related to lifeworld, must be done on the bases of translatability and 
transmutability. Benhabib's positive valorisation of plural values cannot 
have a cut off point at the moment of communication oriented to 
understanding and agreement, for to do so would be to impose an 
ethnocentric speech condition. Certainly what comes out of such 
communicative moments can be articulated in the common public language, 
but always recognising that such a language will change over time within the 
process of dialogue with other languages. Likewise it cannot be assumed 
that the so-called informal ways of speaking share a provincial lifeworld 
horizon. These, in themselves, even if it can be shown that they are 
limitingly constructed socio-culturally, will, in the processes of deliberative 
communication, change. Neither these nor public language is fixed in 
aspic. Habermas notes that "philosophical hermeneutics makes it clear 
why intercultural understanding can be achieved only under conditions of 
complete symmetry ... (and that)..... it 
is implicit in the concept of mutual 
understanding that each side must be open to learning from the 
other... (thus)... Europeans can also learn from Africans.... "485 Such 
conditions of symmetry, I contend, do not arise from the imposition of a 
common language, but the effort that needs to go into achieving mutual 
translatability and transmutability, where in the latter case this might well 
mean transfiguring public language into an emancipatory medium. 
Benhabib conflates unnecessarily, thus, input, i. e., what is brought to 
communicatively discursive instances, with output, i. e. the form in which the 
results of such practices are communicated. There is an analogy here with 
the experiences of Black bi- and sometimes multi-lingual school children, 
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who often act not only as interpreters for their parents, but also as griots for 
the latter's experiences with the educational system, and the assessment 
made by schools of these children as being suitable for treatment under the 
Section 11 programme because their language at home might not be English. 
There is a sense then in which the inferences of someone like Young's 
position that the polyglot languages that enter into discursive communication 
and the public language in which it comes to be expressed, requires a bi- or 
multi-lingual competency on the part of the participants, also requires that 
the asymmetries of power between public language and "native" languages 
be addressed, if the criticism of language/cultural relativism is to be avoided. 
Perhaps it can be said, and here the question of agency emerges, that what is 
required is in fact not an acceptance, as Benhabib recommends, of public 
language, but a transformation of it. Are the conditions of Habermas' 
public culture acceptance requirement broad enough to include such a 
transformation or do they circumscribe it? 
We can address this issue by taking on board Habermas' observation that 
"Europe produced more than.. colonialism and imperialism... (but also a 
rationalism which)-produced the cognitive positions that allowed us to take 
a self critical attitude towards Eurocentrism"486 and refracting it through 
Fanon's analysis of language in the colonial context. The time has come 
not only to return to Fanon, as Bhabha has claimed, but also to rescue him 
from the latter's, and others of similar ilk's, post modernist clutches to 
whose debilitating cultural particularity and difference/-ance differentiating 
intellectual backwaters he has over the past decade or so been consigned. In 
so doing it is as well a rescue from atavistic geographically inspired, at times 
biologically reductionist, claims of ownership, i. e. the Caribbean, or 
"African" diaspora etc. Apropos Bhabha and other colonial discourse post 
modernists, Sekyi-Otu, correctly in my view, notes that their "commitments 
result in the evisceration of Fanon's texts: they excise the critical normative, 
yes, revolutionary humanist vision which informs his account of the colonial 
condition and its aftermath.... (and)... deprives us of the weapons with which 
to confront some of the urgent questions of the post independence world: 
questions of class, ethnicity, gender, of democracy and human rights.... "487 
Bringing Fanon into the equation within this context, brings as well then race 
forcibly into the centre-periphery imagery which Habermas uses, and also 
provides an additional means to examine the critique of theorists like Young. 
To do this I am going to rely both on Sekyi-Otu's reading of Fanon as an 
overall dialectical dramatic narrative and on my late '60s-early '70s notes on 
Fanon. With regard to the specific issue of language, what emerges is an 
early echoing of a person's relationship to language that parallels Habermas' 
own concerns about the "pathology of language" and communicative action. 
Sekyi-Otu refers to Fanon's "This is the Voice of Algeria" in a Dying 
Colonialism to illustrate how language, as an imposition of colonial 
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modernity, and here he is referring to the official use of French, can be 
interpreted as an "artifact of instrumental reason" which within the 
"institutions of communicative action" is "salvaged from .. (its)... original 
violence, made available for the constitution of an autonomous social being 
and citizen, and thereby compelled to undergo... a `dialectical 
transcendence' ), )488 For Fanon, as is made clear as well in his Black Skins, 
White Masks, the imposition of the colonial "Master" tongue is a narrative 
about the communicative relationships between the colonizer and the 
colonized in which the latter's experience of language is as well "a measure 
of their human status in the world.... such that `the person who possesses a 
language consequently possesses the world expressed and implied by that 
language... "' Sekyi-Otu finds this very similar to Habermas formulation, 
viz. "through its structure autonomy and responsibility are posited for us. "489 
However the colonial situation creates a cognitive interactive situation that is 
far removed from the normative possibilities of language and which 
suppresses the principles of universal pragmatics hinted at By Fanon and 
proposed by Habermas. It is distorted communication par excellence, for, 
on tologically it reifies a subject-object relationship between colonizer and 
colonized to the extent that a subject-subject relationship is almost pushed 
over the horizon of possibilities. And yet Sekyi-Otu discerns in Fanon's 
"This is the Voice of Algeria" that he was aware of "the inherent 
contradiction of language (and instrumental reason) in the colonial context, 
yet implicit in its language game, to the possibility of an objective truth and a 
common good in the face of manifest antinomy, in the face of absolute social 
dichotomy that divides and separates the colonizer and the colonized as 
knowing, speaking, judging and acting subjects. "490 Further there is 
within Fanon's theory a critical programme similar to Habermas' which 
Sekyi-Otu refers to as "a political pragmatics of the sign". There are four 
elements to this which are not so much a mirror image of Habermas' 
pragmatic principles as a contextualising complement which might fulfil the 
requirements the types of critique someone like Young is attempting to 
develop. It might also begin to fill some of the theoretical lacuna in my 
attempt to arrive at an argument for transformative action. The first, then 
of these elements, is that it "identifies the specific historical conditions that 
render the potential virtues of the instrumental technique, the thing in itself, 
inaccessible", without necessarily throwing the baby out with the bath water. 
The second element relates to showing that the experience of language in a 
colonial situation by the colonised is that of a "violent invasion" in which 
"the dominated society never participates in this world of signs. "491 At 
another level it challenges the "context innocent rationalism of formal 
pragmatics" which Habermas says "promotes the fiction that Socratic 
dialogue is possible everywhere and at any time. " Thirdly Fanon's 
pragmatics refutes the cultural relativist arguments which attempt to explain 
the refusal of the colonised to speak French by recourse theories of "counter- 
acculturation" -(shades of the sari as a sign of resistance argument). Thus 
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"cultural relativism obscures the culpable power relations which thwart the 
autonomy and responsibility of social agents in communicative and 
instrumental transactions.... (and)... disallows the critique of 
domination... (and)..... discounts the possibility of... 'radical transformations in 
this domain' 492 Fourthly Fanon thus is able to envisage "the original 
appropriation by post colonial humanity of a legacy which an invasive 
modernity has bequeathed. " For the colonised what matters is not the 
racial origin of the French language but that it becomes part of their 
experience in participating in a freely constituted linguistic community by 
"robbing the master of exclusive proprietorship of the work of his 
Word..... (in order).. 'to tell a story about itself and to make itself heard. "' In 
so doing the language does not remain neutral in terms of its structure and 
usage but through the process of the relationship of a "post colonial nation's 
unifying discourse to local understandings" changes. Bringing this 
extended analogy back to the issue of public language in discursive 
democratic practices and the relationship of Black participants to it, it is 
worth noting, as Sekyi-Otu does in relation to post independent Africa, that 
"a decolonization of human existence will hardly occur if the people are not 
autonomous agents in building them. "493 Further McCarthy in a discussion 
on the multi-cultural dimension to the pragmatics of communicative reason 
agrees that a genuine new world order, as opposed to an end-of-history 
Fukuyama order, requires a post-imperialist "recounting of the 
interdependent pasts, presents and futures of Western and non-Western 
worlds. "494 This recognises that the representations and one dimensional 
universalist claims exist because colonized people have been prevented from 
participating in the conversation on an equal footing because of powerful 
inequalities. Apropos this, "when previously subordinated groups can 
speak in their own voices, there are marked changes in the very construction 
of texts dealing with them.... (which).... can assist in the formation of new 
"495 forms of public discourse. 
6.11 Autonomy, Context and the Collective Actor 
There is a further area of clarification needed, which relates to the role of 
collective action and the collective actor in the process of agency. 
Habermas' theory pitches agency at the level of the autonomous individual. 
Yet there are within other deliberative democratic theorists, like Young and 
Fraser, intimations of collective action. In the previous section I attempted 
to reconstruct Black anti-racist politics in terms of signifying cognitive 
practices and within that the Black collective actor by reference to Eder. 
Pulling Fanon into the area of language helps crystallise the issue of conflict 
inherent in even deliberative democracy which the latter's theorists, in the 
oscillation between fact and norm, i. e. the attempts to realise in everyday 
practice the conditions for "the idealising pragmatic presumptions of a praxis 
from which only the better argument" can win, unintentionally give the 
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impression of it being a painless transition. The questions then are what 
motivates people to want to enter into discursive practices, and how are these 
to be expressed? 
To begin answering the question, it would be helpful to outline briefly the 
argument put forward in the last section- Reconstructing Black and Anti- 
Racist Politics -for the reconstruction and use of the Black collective actor. 
In this I had argued, using Eder, not for a return to the notion of an 
essentialised collectivity and identity, as is contained in the arguments of 
people like Taylor and others who argue for group rights, but for a critically 
defined, contingent, collectivity whose boundaries are constantly defined and 
redefined through signifying cognitive practices. That is to say that 
collective identities arise not because of any naturalised inherent 
characteristics lying dormant waiting only for social injustices to ignite them, 
though that is often the interpretation placed upon them by the regressive 
etnikfying tendencies, but because of social wrongs done to "imagined 
groups" by others. Collective wrongs provoke collective responses which 
can either, even when the intention is to oppose such wrongs, affirm the 
representational identity, as in the case of the "Afrikan", or transform it, and, 
in the latter by so doing, both maintain the struggle to reduce blocking 
powers in the structures of communication and contribute to normative 
learning processes. If these "struggles for recognition", as they are now 
commonly termed by critical theorists, arise out of wrongs done to, and 
therefore they speak of motivation towards justice, the question therefore is 
what precisely constitutes the moral grammar of such struggles. Does it 
denote, as Benhabib and even Habermas, seem to imply, a move away from 
notions of redistributive justice to one of recognition? Does it move, 
therefore, beyond issues of class? If, as I do, I hold that race is one of the 
keystone unresolved problems of modernity, then examining race within the 
framework of answers to the questions posed, should provide greater clarity 
to the issue of motivation and the relationship between the "justices" of 
recognition and redistribution as well as bringing into sharper focus the 
initial impetus for this particular line of enquiry which is the question of why 
potential participants in communicative structures should be motivated to 
engage in discursive practices aimed at consensus. 
A partial answer to this was provided earlier on in the section on Habermas 
and local governance, partial in the sense that it was noted that Habermas' 
thinking on race is very much framed in terms of culture. Here in lies the 
problem, I think; a problem that seems to be echoed by those who seek to use 
his work in looking at issues of race and culture, like Benhabib, Fraser and 
Young. Habermas' answer to whether or not the articulation of collective 
identities that arise out of the struggles for recognition require some form of 
collective rights, is that rights and identities are, just as the private and public 
are, complementary so that "those to whom the law is addressed., can 
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understand themselves to be the authors of the laws to which they are subject 
as private legal persons. " 496 For Habermas multi-culturalism, not so much 
race, raises the question of the ethical neutrality of law and politics where 
ethics refers to conceptions of the good life and morality to that which is 
equally good for everyone. Critical supporters like Young argue that 
Habermas, and this is a criticism developed out of examining the conditions 
for multi-culturalism in the West, cuts too cleanly the ethical political 
processes from the moral political processes. For Habermas then: 
"Ethical political discourses must satisfy the communicative conditions for 
achieving hermeneutic self-understanding on the part of collectivities. They 
should enable an authentic self-understanding and lead to critical revision or 
confirmation of a disputed identity. The consensus issuing from a successful 
search for collective self-understanding neither expresses a merely 
negotiated agreement, as in compromises nor is it a rationally motivated 
consensus like the consensus on facts or questions of justice. It expresses 
two things at once: self reflection and resolve on a form of life. For ethical 
political discourses this would ideally require that the conditions of 
systematically undistorted communication be satisfied, thereby protecting 
the participants from repression, yet without tearing them from their genuine 
contexts of experience and interests. s497 
Moral discourses presuppose conditions under which "each participant can 
adopt the perspective all the rest..... (so that all)...... must be able to assume 
that certain pragmatic presuppositions are sufficiently fulfilled, that is, that 
the practice of reaching understanding in public is universally accessible, is 
free of external and internal violence and permits only the rationally 
motivating force of the better argument. "498 
There is a sense in which certain features of Habermas' idealised description 
of how ethical discourse should be constituted mirror the key elements I've 
outlined in my attempt to describe the cognitive signifying practices 
underpinning the constitution of a contingent Black collectivity. But 
Habermas is not exactly talking about that. The ethical discourse he 
outlines corresponds to what should be the communicative lifeworld 
processes. Now whilst he makes these distinctions between ethics and 
morals heuristically and acknowledges, as he has done in response to 
feminist criticisms, that the two are intertwined, nevertheless there is the 
implication that the motivation for such discursive practices are internally 
generated through the soft force of socialisation and ego development. 
Hence, perhaps, the emphasis on culture, even if Habermas perceives culture 
not as a static aspic pickled phenomenon, but as one that is constantly 
changing either through greater individuation or through the shoal fishing of 
represented collective identities. Counterpointedly then Habermas' taking 
into account of "minorities"' struggles for recognition focuses almost 
exclusively on culture fuelling the Benhabian type conclusions that the 
grammar of claims for justice has shifted from distribution to recognition. 
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But is this true? Certainly with regard to race and conceptualisations of 
racism, the meld of moral and ethical discourses in the creation of identities, 
not to mention the materiality of such discourses, i. e. the issue of distributive 
justice cannot be so easily pushed to the backburner, means that the critical 
distance between those categories needs to be foreshortened. The 
immorality of certain moral discourses and their relation to the formation of 
collective identities for Black people needs to be explored further, but in a 
way that strengthens the case made in my second section that collective 
identities and actors still have a role to play in the securing and exercising of 
rights, without necessarily this being achieved by the establishment of group 
rights. 
I want to explore this further via a look at the work of Honneth which will be 
prefatorily referenced by outlining Fraser's argument on the nature of and 
relationship between distributive and recognition justice, and the critical 
rejoinder by Young as an end note. Fraser encapsulates the mood, a mood 
she is critical of, thus: 
"The `struggle for recognition' is fast becoming the paradigmatic 
form of political conflict in the late twentieth century. Demands for 
`recognition of difference' fuel struggles of groups mobilised under 
the banners nationality, ethincity, `race', gender, and sexuality. In 
these `post socialist' conflicts, group identity supplants class interest 
as the chief medium of political mobilisation. Cultural domination 
supplants exploitation as the fundamental injustice. And cultural as 
the fundamental injustice. And cultural recognition displaces socio- 
economic redistribution as the remedy for injustice and the goal of 
political struggle. °94" 
However her critical circumspection towards such an approach derives from 
the awareness that struggles for recognition are being played out in a world 
which is witnessing ever increasing levels of material inequality both within 
individual countries and between the West and the rest. The task then for 
critical theory is not to minimise the notion of recognition struggles, but to 
develop "a critical theory of recognition, one which identifies and defends 
only those versions of the cultural politics of difference that can be 
coherently combined with the social politics of equality. 00° In other words 
justice requires both redistribution and recognition. Fraser goes on to 
develop an analytical theory of redistribution and recognition justice; 
analytical in the senses that she deploys categories in the same way that 
Habermas does, i. e. they are heuristic devices. Within the context of the 
decentring of class and the rise of new social movements which appear to 
put a premium on identity claims, as opposed to those of redistribution, 
Fraser identifies the two key fields of injustice as that of socio-economic 
injustice which is rooted in the field of political economy, and cultural or 
symbolic injustice which is located in "social patterns of representation, 
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interpretation and communication. " Whilst recognising that the two are 
often intertwined, she constructs at the analytical level a spectrum of 
injustice with socio-economic at one end of the range and cultural injustice 
at the other. Concentrating on race, then Fraser argues that it resembles class 
because there is a clear racial division of labour the differences between 
levels and access to which is structured by and through race considerations. 
On the other hand it also has a "cultural-valuation dimension" which is 
maintained through what she identifies as Eurocentrism and cultural racism. 
Addressing such injustices requires action in both the redistribution and 
recognition spheres. However to do so risks running foul of the dilemma 
Fraser earlier flagged-up. Fraser's answer is to propose that remedial 
action aimed at tackling the two injustices can be either "affirmative", and 
these sorts of action are dilemmatic, or "transformative", in which case such 
dilemmas are overcome. It follows from this that affirmative remedies are 
those "aimed at correcting inequitable outcomes of social arrangements 
without disturbing the underlying framework that generates 
them.. . (whilst). .. transformative remedies .. 
(are).. aimed at correcting 
inequitable outcomes precisely by restructuring the underlying generative 
framework. "50' There is nothing radically new in this sort of proposal. 
As shall be shown, in the empirical section, the race equality policies in one 
of the target boroughs was defined by its principal architect in terms of two 
levels - the first level described as "fine tuning the existing organisation" and 
the second as those actions aimed at fundamental restructuring once the 
limits of the first was reached and recognised. Whilst in Fraser's proposal 
there is a sense in which it can be read an apocalyptic one - all for the 
revolution and nothing else -, this is not what she means, i. e. it is not a 
"gradual versus apocalyptic change. " In sum the potential range of 
remedies to such injustices is encapsulated in a change matrix which is 
reproduced below because even though Fraser has been critical of Habermas 
in the past, the key cell in this matrix is very much closer to Habermas, 
probably because both still have a vision of socialism as the next societal 
paradigm. 
Redistribution Liberal welfare state Socialism 
Surface reallocations of Deep restructuring of 
existing goods to existing relations of 
groups; supports group production; blurs 
differentiation; can generate group differentiation; 
misrecognition can help remedy some 
forms of 
misrecognition 
Recognition Mainstream multi- Deconstruction 
culturalism Deep restructuring of 
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Surface reallocations of relations of 
respect to existing identities recognition; blurs 
of existing groups; supports group differentiation 502 
group differentiation 
For Fraser the transformative column provides the framework to the solution 
because it outlines an "over-arching programmatic orientation capable of 
doing justice to all current struggles against injustice. " 
If there is a criticism, it is that analyses of this type can lead to a pessimistic 
reading of what is actually potentially radical. I take Fraser to be referring 
to an approach which is similar to Habermas' attempt to put forward a 
critically contingent notion of group and identity as the context within which 
struggles for recognition can be validated through the communicative actions 
of autonomous individuals. What, however, I think both have not done so 
far, i. e. Habermas and Fraser is distinguish clearly enough - that is argue 
through the entanglement - the imposition of a lopsided (a)(im)moral 
political discourse, racism, on the contexts for an ethical political discourse, 
culture. Only by so doing will it be possible to differentiate between 
collectivities and identities which have a "legitimate" role in the discursive 
practices against such injustices, but also the limits of such collectivities in 
those processes. 
We can begin to sketch out the form of that differentiation within a 
communicative framework and by so doing begin to put more flesh on the 
issue of motivation which is not that fully developed in Habermas, as 
Honneth has pointed out and up to now in the works of Fraser and Young are 
implied as a general reaction to the provocation of the injustices. This 
might achieve, then as well, the distinctions between motivations towards 
discursive communicative practices, and thus towards those that advance 
normative learning processes, and those which, like Habermas' fear of the 
fundamentalist part of the "multi-cultural" struggles for recognition, are 
regressive. In reading Habermas' normative account of what ethical 
political discourse should be like, there is almost the sense in which 
collective identities are developed endogenously and critically maintained or 
changed in the self referential hermeneutic processes of a cultural group. 
This is posited almost as a prior stage before individuals from such groups 
make claims that require redeeming in the moral political processes and in 
which in the process of the communicative based testing of such claims, the 
implication is that these collective identities might for those individuals 
concerned, undergo change. I think the separation of ethical and moral 
political discourses helps at the categorical level, but only as a device for 
illustrating the two areas and contexts of communicative discourse. The 
reality is that they are intertwined, and the key question is whether or not it is 
legitimate to normativise these two as distinct possible ends. In other words 
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should these as distinct areas be a keep-in-the-front-of-the-mind guide to 
action around collective identities and actors? As indicated earlier I think 
not since it is far better to envisage it as a continuum of action. Fraser, as 
Young has summarised her, has contended that Habermas "separates cultural 
norms from social processes that reproduce bureaucratic... institutions". 
That same danger appears to lurk in the work of Fraser because she locates 
recognition and misrecognition in the area of culture so that collective 
identities, especially transformative collective identities are given a 
predominantly cultural slant. Can the inference be drawn from this that 
logically the notion of group rights might also be inferred? 
I want to approach this from another angle by examining how the distinction 
I made earlier between defining the problem and working on the solutions in 
relation to race, racism and Black collective identities is the key 
differentiation that should not be conflated. Whilst I have defined racism 
as the maintenance of relations of force in the structures of communication 
through conventionalisation of biological differences or ascribed biological 
differences, this is taken to encompass those practices of the representation 
of group characteristics through naturalising them thereby putting them 
beyond the scope of communicative discourse. There is another way to 
describe this process, and this is that it is the imposition of im/a/moral 
political discourses on ethical political discourses which are supposed to 
underpin collective identity formation. This conventionalisation has a 
dedifferentiating, homogenising, reductive blocked communicative 
character. In other words it has as well a collective character. This 
intertwining of certain moral political discourses and ethical discourses 
raises questions of collective identity which can never be simply framed in 
terms of ethical processes because they are at one and the same time those of 
who am I in relation to my socialising mores and who am I in relation to this 
imposed "malidentification" of me. It is the latter which always has active 
or latent a political discourse based on blocking or being able to impose 
blockages in the structures of communication, especially structures of 
communication linked to material resource allocation, which, if I can indulge 
in some analytical categorisation, might manifest itself sixfoldedly: a 
defensive exaggeration of group values and characteristics which ossifies 
ethical communicative political discourse, and might be the bases to 
fundamentalism; the total collapse of such ethical discourses, i. e. group 
collapse; the assumption of the imposed identity, though this is more likely 
to be manifested in individuals rather than groups, i. e. historically there is 
little evidence to show that oppressed groups took on the collective identity 
foisted upon them; individual psychical collapse, most memorably diagnosed 
in Fanon's work; and a critical interplay between political and cultural 
collective identities. It is the last one that I want to concentrate on because 
it occupies the ground upon which theorists like Fraser can talk about 
transformative remedies to injustices, or those upon which it is possible to 
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talk about differentiating out those claims and remedies that advance 
normative learning processes and those which do not. This collective 
political identity which is imposed through "wogging" sets the framework 
within which those who otherwise might not have had any basis for coming 
together, can collectively recognise themselves as those wrongly done to 
collectively and thus one of the motivational possibilities is the development 
of what Fraser has described as transient solidarities and collective identities. 
In another way it runs with the proposal put forward by Eder that collective 
action constitutes the collective actor, and not the other way round. The 
evolution and use of the term "Black" as a political construct and recognition 
factor can be used to illustrate this further. Normatively there should be a 
twofold critical dynamic: between "Black" and the constituting coalition of 
groups and individuals, and between "Black" and the collective identity 
demands made for remedies. The former will reflect the communicative 
moral and ethical discourses, which can only be inclusive, but which under- 
write the collective identity of "Black". The latter because "Black" is at 
one and the same time an expression of communicative blockage through the 
imposition of a collective identity, i. e. being wogged, as it is a positive 
expression of recognition of collective wrongs done to, cannot make 
conflationary collective claims for all those who define themselves as Black, 
but can and should only make collective claims that those wrongs be undone. 
In other words these remedial claims are about the removal of those unjust 
forces in the structures of communication which impose collective 
`malidentities' so that autonomous individuals can enter into moral political 
discourses in the wider society on an equal footing and with equal respect. 
These claims can never and should never be about the comparative worth or 
value of a group. These then are claims for racial justice which since race 
and racism are social constructs, envisage remedies in which socially 
constructed race will not play a part. They are about deconstructing false 
collectivities. Racial justice can be disaggregated into its two primary 
components - distributive and recognition justice - but only as a learning 
tool. In reality, especially since misrecognition and positively 
discriminated distribution of resources to the white collectivity reinforce and 
maintain each other, it is hard to separate the two. At this level then one is 
not talking about the positive recognition of cultural claims to recognition, as 
Fraser and Young do, and to some extent Habermas, even though Fraser and 
Habermas, each in their own way seek to qualify that by theorising about 
critical group identities and boundaries as opposed to essentialised ones, e. g. 
Fraser's affirmative and transformative multi-culturalism. To put forward 
the recognition claim of "Black", or "not being white" in the transitive sense, 
is to put forward a claim that the equality conditions governing 
communicative discursive practices, as Habermas sets out in BFN, are still to 
be satisfied. It should follow then that whilst non-distorted communicative 
practice is the "keep-in-the-forefront" guiding principle, the use of other 
forms of action to overturn those forces in the structures of communication, 
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provided such decisions have been arrived at discursively within the 
collectivity of `Black", are also options. To attempt a more detailed, 
specified course of action, such as constructing a culturally oriented claim to 
recognition, and thus "need" under the broader architectonic collectivity of 
"Black" would be to confirm the criticism of the new "diversityphiles" that 
such a general categorisation reduces and conflates multi-faceted claims to 
distinctness. To return to the specific issues of collectivities and 
motivation, what is being argued, in a refinement of Habermas' and Fraser's 
positions, is that racism imposes on ethical political discourses "immoral" 
political discourses such that the achievement of Habermas' normative 
vision of moral political discourse, still requires an intervening level of 
collective identity, action and actor, but without the need for group rights. 
Does this provide sufficient insight into the area of motivation towards 
discursive practices, especially in relation to race? Motivation against 
injustices, in this case recognition and redistribution injustices, give rise to a 
number of possible motivations, as I argue above, not all of them oriented 
towards communicative practices. 503 One of the better and theoretically 
more advanced arguments around the issue of recognition and justice has 
been put forward by Honneth, himself a former student of Habermas. Whilst 
Honneth argues that Habermas has not given the issue of motivation in his 
communicative theory sufficient attention, his work can be read very much 
as a communicative based supplement to Habermas'. In his book "The 
Struggle for Recognition", a summary introduction is provided by the 
translator thus: 
"Honneth situates his project within the tradition that emphasises not the 
struggle for self-preservation but rather the struggle for the establishment of 
relations of mutual recognition as a precondition for self realisation.... his 
approach can be understood as a continuation of the Frankfurt School's 
attempts to locate the motivating insight for emancipatory critique and 
struggle within the domain of ordinary human experience (and where as) 
the Frankfurt School suffered from an exclusive focus on the domain of 
material production as the locus of transformative 
critique,.... (Honneth) ... proposes an alternative account situating the critical 
perception of injustice more generally within individuals' negative 
experiences of having their broadly moral expectations violated "504 
Honneth derives his theory from a re-examination of Hegel's early work in 
Jena in which Hegel proposes that "full human flourishing is dependent on 
the existence of well established ethical relations - in particular relations of 
love, law and `ethical life' - which can only be established... through a 
struggle for recognition. "505 Like Habermas, Honneth then uses Mead's 
work to identify the intersubjective conditions for individual self realisation. 
Honneth then derives the core of his theory which is that for an individual 
identity formation, i. e. realising ones one's needs and desires as an 
autonomous person, is dependent upon the development of self confidence, 
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self respect and self esteem. These means of relating practically to one self, 
require intersubjective processes based on being recognised by others whom 
one also recognises. These necessary relations of mutual recognition 
include not only the obvious elements of friendship etc, but as well legally 
institutionalised relations of respect and autonomy and networks of solidarity 
and shared values within which the particular worth of individual members 
of a community can be acknowledged. Such relationships derive from 
social struggles which are not interest based, and thus are moral struggles 
because "the feelings of outrage and indignation driving them are generated 
by the rejection of claims to recognition and thus imply normative 
judgements about the legitimacy of social arrangements... (to the extent 
that)... the normative ideal of a just society is empirically confirmed by 
historical struggles for recognition. " 506 
Honneth's elaboration of the inter-subjective conditions for identity 
formation frame his conception of the ethical life understood as a "normative 
ideal of a society in which patterns of recognition would allow individuals to 
acquire self confidence, self respect and self esteem necessary for the full 
development of their identities. "507 The "moral grammar" to such claims 
for recognition can be read off from the logic of the ethical life which 
envisages a greater and equal inclusion in society. In other words the 
internal logic of social struggles and normative theory mutually illuminate 
each other. There is in Honneth's approach the assumption of a continuum 
between ethical political and moral political discourses as opposed to 
Habermas' theory in which there is a sharper distinction between the two. 
To that respect, my own approach has more in common with Honneth's. 
Further to that and the distinction I think should be made between 
recognising the problem and defining the solution, Honneth argues that 
"because the key forms of exclusion, insult and degradation can be seen as 
violating self confidence, self respect, or self esteem, the negative emotional 
reactions generated by these experiences provide a pre-theoretical basis for 
social critique .... (so that when).. . these experiences... 
(are).. shared by many 
others , the potential emerges 
for collective action aimed at actually 
expanding social patterns of recognition. "508 The only rider I would add to 
this is that many forms of non-recognition can be regarded as constituting 
collective action because they seek to homogenise and reduce differences. 
Honneth is therefore right to claim that it is the doing away of such active 
processes of non-recognition - more "malrecognition" - which is important 
as the precursor to non-distorted identity claims. 
In seeking to examine the relationship between motivation and discursive 
practices, it would help to look in more detail at Honneth's arguments 
surrounding disrespect and resistance. As we have seen, Honneth regards 
the recognition spheres of self respect and self esteem as containing the 
"type of moral tension that can set social conflicts in motion.... (because 
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they).... represent a moral context for societal conflict... (by relying)... on 
socially generalised criteria in order to function. s509 Honneth argues that 
individual experiences of disrespect are read as typical for an entire group. 
This however needs qualifying. What is experienced as disrespect, or 
non/mal recognition, if one looks at racism, is the act of being "wogged", i. e. 
it does not matter whether or not you are born in the West, or come from one 
of the Caribbean islands or are recently arrived from Bangladesh, you are 
essentially one wog under the skin. It is this negative moment which is 
intersubjectively recognised. There is, according to this formulation of 
disrespect and potential social conflict, a neutral perspective with regard to 
the "solutions" by the participants. It is "left entirely open whether social 
groups employ material, symbolic or passive force to articulate and demand 
restitution for the disrespect and violation that they experience as being 
typical" slo In other words it accords with my view that the "problem", 
however it may be framed, cannot in that process of "framing" presume 
conflationarily, the "solution" as well. 
Honneth, in a way that at one level parallels Frasers categorical distinction 
between distributive and recognition justices, but actually in a way that goes 
beyond it, differentiates struggles for recognition from other utilitarian 
explanation for social resistance and rebellion on the basis that the former 
"are formed in the context of moral experiences stemming from the violation 
of deeply rooted expectations regarding recognition. " Where such societal 
acts of disrespect occur the hurt feelings generated can become the bases for 
collective resistance only within an intersubjective framework of 
interpretation which can show that it is typical for a whole group. These 
languages, thus, "open up an interpretive perspective for identifying the 
social causes of individual injuries. " There is as well, according to 
Honneth, a secondary motivation other than recognition and which is that 
such acts of political collective resistance serve as well to tear out the 
victims of disrespect "from the passively endured humiliation and helping 
them .. on their way to a new positive relation to self. , 
511 Certainly, as 
shall be shown, there is a theoretical resonance with the empirical details of 
the experiences of Black Workers groups in the target boroughs. 
Returning to the earlier distinction made between moral and utilitarian 
causes for social confrontation, Honneth correctly argues that not all social 
conflicts have a moral framework formed around notions of disrespect and 
recognition. There are others which are interest grounded where "interests 
are basic goal directed orientations that accompany the economic and social 
circumstances of individuals if only because individuals must try to obtain 
the conditions for their own reproduction. "512 The collective action that can 
stem from the common recognition of this are those that can trace the 
development of such "social struggles back to attempts on the part of social 
groups to obtain or enlarge control over certain opportunities for their 
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reproduction. 013 However the key difference between the two types of 
struggle, i. e. one over scarce resources the other over the unjust denial of 
social recognition, should not be read as an argument that seeks to replace 
one with the other. Instead Honneth argues that recognition theory can 
extend interest based struggles. Perhaps this should be the other way around 
because such interest based struggles always require a moral grammar within 
which to sustain the solidarity required to develop collective acts. 
Sometimes the moral grammar of such solidarity resonates in harmony with 
other forms of collective solidarity, such as in the Grunwick dispute or the 
'80s miners' strike where there were the coming together at certain points of 
the collectivities of class, race and gender. However, when the key source 
of the constitution of class collectivity is done away with, for example the 
closure of the mines, forms of solidarity and collective action dissipate, 
perhaps because it is primarily interest based collective action. On the 
other hand, as I have argued, race and gender have within its development 
the constant constitution of collective actors through forms of distorted 
communicative representations to the extent that societal acts of disrespect 
and non-recognition structure access to scarce resources far more so than in 
class. We begin to see why, therefore, Honneth's distinction goes beyond 
Fraser's one of distribution versus recognition, where the two categories are 
almost put on an equivalent basis. Using both Thompson's and Moore's 
studies as supporting evidence, Honneth goes-on to put forward the notion 
that in many arenas of white working class struggle, it is "the jeopardising of 
the possibility for collective self respect that generates broad-based political 
resistance and social revolts. "sla If, motivationally, recognition structures 
interest in social struggles, then the question arises, one that Honneth feels 
theorists like Thompson and Moore have not properly answered, as to how 
such struggles are to be evaluated in the development of that society. 
These are no longer just motives for action, i. e. disrespect and non- 
recognition, but must "come to be examined with regard to the moral role 
that must be attributed to each of them in the development of relations of 
recognition. "sls In other words, "in order to be able to distinguish between 
the progressive and the reactionary there has to be a normative standard that, 
in light of a hypothetical anticipation of an approximate end state, would 
make it possible to mark out a developmental direction. 016 We begin to 
see here an overlap with Fraser's other categorical differentiation between 
affirmative and transformative remedial action. More importantly, we begin 
to see the bases for the development of criteria by which such judgements 
can be made. They are similar to the distinction made by Eder between 
collective action and social movements which can retard and those which 
can progress communicative action. Such a formulation also ties in with 
my contention about race being one of the key unresolved problems of 
modernity the inclusive solution to which pushes back the overall moral 
learning processes in society. Thus, to finish with Honneth for this section, 
he envisages these collective forms of resistance appealing to normative 
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structures via a shared language of unjust treatment and which is oriented 
towards expanding inclusively the relationships of recognition. This 
expansion of the relationships of recognition is not measured simply in terms 
of "stages in a conflictual process of formation", but "the significance of 
each particular struggle is measured in terms of the positive or negative 
contribution that each has been able to make to the realisation of undistorted 
"sl7 forms of recognition. 
Both Honneth and Fraser cover similar territory, but where Honneth is 
superior to Fraser's attempt to situate recognition struggles in a critical 
theory, is that, without posing it in terms of an either or choice, as can be 
read into certain aspects of Fraser's categorical formulation, he re-asserts the 
primacy of the need for a communicative based programming of recognition 
struggles as a framework within which to settle aspects of distribution 
justice. Moreover, Habermas in attempting to ride the tension between fact 
and norm via deliberative politics outlines a normative vision of discursive 
constitutional democracy, but does so without fully accounting for the reality 
of multi-racial Europe in his "facts". If, anything then, theorists like Fraser 
and Honneth in deconstructing and reconstructing key parts of Habermas' 
overall theory, so that crucial aspects of race and gender can be included, 
point to the need that if, as Habermas contends, all who are affected should 
be able to participate in the communicative processes affirming and re- 
affirming constitutional democracy, then there should be some indication of 
the interim communicative channels that are required to achieve such 
equality of access and participation. That is to ask, how will these struggles 
for recognition, which arise specifically out of the denial of such access, 
enter into the equation. It is within this specifying of the "interim" that the 
continuing relevance, and circumstances of that relevance, of the collective 
actor and of collective identities become apparent. After all, for Habermas 
the political processes are supposed to step in where the normal problem 
solving processes, such as "the co-ordination patterns operating through 
values, norms and routines for reaching understanding" are overtaxed. 
How then are the social problems of racial injustice put on the agenda within 
Habermas' schema? Both Honneth's and Fraser's outlines of recognition 
struggles argue for a direct participation of those experiencing such 
injustices in both the framing and pursuit, including change pursuit, of these 
problems. But do these, despite their communicative based or sympathetic 
to, theoretical articulations square fully with Habermas' account? 
Habermas, in BFN, is aware of Fraser's criticism and does attempt to 
respond and incorporate some of her insights. To answer this properly, 
however, requires a slight detour through Habermas' thinking on the public 
sphere and its relationship to the key systems, political, administrative and 
economic because this relationship since it defines the limits of control 
and/or transformation of such systems, still appears to differ to Honneth and 
Fraser; and its a difference -a communicative space, as Habermas would put 
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it - through the nexus of which race and gender might still fall. In many 
ways it raises yet again the sharp differentiation Habermas makes between 
ethical and moral discourses. On the other hand covering this now will serve 
critically to highlight the key relationship between the two major areas of the 
critique so far covered, i. e. system and lifeworld, and adds another key 
categorical variable to Fraser's matrix of affirmative or transformation, one 
which is implied in Habermas' approach, but which might not be sufficient 
to satisfy his own discourse principles of equality, i. e. that of "control. " 
6.12 Context, Collective Action and the Public Sphere 
There are three critically defining questions which can be asked? What, for 
Habermas, is the public sphere? How does it operate? What is its 
relationship to the political system? In his book the "Structural 
Transformation of the Public Sphere" Habermas sought to show how the 
development of the bourgeois public sphere in the eighteenth century 
become corrupted away from its potential as a communicative structure 
which could link citizen's lifeworlds with the political system 518 At that 
point his criticisms were not translated into an exposition of what the public 
sphere should be. In BFN, however, in the almost thirty year wake of TPS 
and numerous secondary critical commentaries, Habermas provides a more 
detailed outline of what the public sphere should be like. In terms of what 
it is then the public sphere is: 
".... a communication structure rooted in the lifeworld through the 
associational network in civil society.... (it is).. a sounding board for 
problems that must be processed by the political system because they 
cannot be solved elsewhere.... (and thus)... the public sphere is a warning 
system with sensors.. sensitive throughout society.... (which can)... not only 
detect and identify problems but also convincingly and influentially 
thematize them in such a way that they are taken up and dealt with by 
parliamentary complexes.. "519 
However the public sphere is neither an institution nor organisation; not even 
"a framework of norms", but a "network for communication information and 
points of view.... (where)... streams of communication are, in the process, 
filtered and synthesised in such a way that they coalesce into bundles of 
public opinions .,, 
520 All that is required is the "mastery" of a "natural 
language. " The public sphere's communication structure is distinguished by 
communicative action's third feature which is that it "refers neither to the 
functions nor to the contents of everyday communication but to the social 
space generated in communicative action. " That is to say that persons in a 
communicative encounter adopt an inclusive, open second person attitude 
which reciprocally attributes communicative freedom to each other - i. e., a 
communicative space opens which is invitationally open to other potential 
participants. Such spaces mirror on a smaller scale the public infrastructure 
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of larger assemblies. Habermas, however draws a distinction between the 
changes in participants opinions and preferences that can emerge from such 
communicative encounters, and, especially with regard to political questions, 
from actually putting those "dispositions into action". He argues that "the 
communication structures of the public sphere relieve the public of the 
burden of decision making" insofar as the these are (better? ) made by the 
"institutionalised political process. "521 Such public opinion is to be 
judged qualitatively, and not quantitatively, as survey based opinion polls do, 
so that what is important are "the rules of a shared practice of 
communication. " It is the near exhaustive rational process of information 
garnering and provision and accompanying reasoning which normatively 
determines the degree influence the public opinion has on the political 
system. However, as Habermas repeats, "political influence based on 
public opinion can be transformed into political power only through 
institutionalised procedures. "522 Concomitantly, because the public sphere 
is rooted in the lifeworld experiences of participants - to whit, "problems 
voiced in the public sphere first become visible when they are mirrored in 
personal life experiences" - the public sphere cannot be `manufactured' to 
order but can only thematize social problems "insofar as it develops out of 
the communication taking place among those who are potentially affected. " 
Logically, therefore, the development and maintenance of the public sphere 
is dependent upon the existence of an active, and vitalising civil society. 
In this brief outline of what can be described as Habermas' idealised version 
of the public sphere, and in the body of the text in BFN he states often 
enough to the effect that the `fact' of everyday civil society and public sphere 
is far from this, there can be discerned three potential faultlines which are a 
reflection of some of the key problems outlined in the structure of this 
critique. However, it should be acknowledged that within this updated 
version of Habermas' public sphere that it is possible to theorise where 
recognition struggles fit in, and to some extent it is also possible to draw 
theoretical inferences about racism and gender inequality, especially in 
relation to his observations about the life world experiental bases to the 
public sphere. Nevertheless, despite this, there are still three broad areas of 
concern with Habermas' account of the public sphere. 
The first relates to the motivational question of how the transition to his 
extrapolated `norm' of the public sphere from the `facts' of everyday 
practice in the West is likely to take place. Notwithstanding the non- 
teleological nature of his theory, and the elevation of social movements, 
post-conventional morality and increasing individuation as forces for the 
achievement of such, it is difficult to see how, within the framework of 
global capitalism, the idealised public sphere can be striven for if the 
relationship between it and the political system is cast solely in terms of 
"influence". All this does is reinforce the arguments of people like 
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Honneth that Habermas appears to imply a painless, evolutionary transition 
to the `norm', even though it is acknowledged that Habermas is not talking 
about some form of "end state". It leads as well into the second 
problematic area which is that Habermas maintains his strict categorical, 
even on tological, separation between the lifeworld and system with his 
insistence that the public sphere influences the political process and that only 
the political system can act. There is an action lacuna, something Joas 
contends, between "influence" and political "change" or political "action", 
which, given Habermas' fallibilistic principle, cannot really be maintained 
and should be subject to empirical validation. Perhaps at the heart of this 
is his wish to avoid the Republican trap of theorising the self constitution of 
an ethical community which he does not reject so much out of principle as 
practicality. With that in mind it should be possible to conceive of the 
critical interface between public sphere and political system as giving rise to 
areas of communicative action directed political action, i. e. participatory 
decision making. In other words whilst it might be desirable, on pragmatic 
grounds, to rule out a total participatory transformation and constitution of 
complex society, it severely limits, and empirically cannot be sustained, if, in 
so doing, all circumstances where such forms of transformational action can 
occur, are also excluded. Is this separation then but a symptom of the third 
area of concern? This is that Habermas talks about the "general public 
sphere", and in some cases only acknowledges a related "political public 
sphere". By the latter I take him to mean the public sphere most closely 
related to the political system and which includes the forms of parliamentary 
assembly. Is this realistically so? Even though he recognises the 
inequalities of the "fact" of the public sphere and the malstructured nature of 
it with manufactured public opinion etc., he does not speak about the 
existence, even antagonistic relationships between, numerous public spheres 
which are unevenly distanced from and structured to the political system, a 
system which in its actions perpetuates such inequalities, but, on the contrary 
seems almost to insist on the need for one general public sphere - no doubt because it satisfies the overall idealisation of all participating in the 
discursive, democratic control of the political system. Yet it is within such 
a scenario of multiple public spheres that one can talk more realistically 
about the nature of the struggles for recognition, even distribution, and the 
way in which these interact with the general public sphere and political 
system. This third critical aspect of Habermas' conception of the public 
sphere is one that is tackled by Fraser in her critique and reconstruction of 
that concept. In broad terms Fraser agrees with Habermas' contention that 
the public sphere is "the space in which citizens deliberate about their 
common affairs. " However Habermas' idealisation of the liberal public 
sphere as the unfulfilled normative, or utopian, potential of the bourgeois 
public sphere which was never, and is not, realised in practice rested on 
assumptions which were not backed up by empirical realities. These 
assumptions, as outlined in Habermas' original work and some of which 
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continue in his BFN defining of the public sphere, are that the public sphere 
is a communicative structure for making states rationally accountable to the 
citizenry, that access to the public sphere is open to all, that private interests 
were inadmissable, that inequalities and power were to be "bracketed" such 
that participants were to deliberate as peers. Leaving aside, for the moment, 
the criteria of "private interests" which Habermas has tackled in BFN, Fraser 
goes on to deconstruct the other assumptions in order to show that the 
bourgeois public sphere was actually restrictively discriminating in terms of 
access and participation so much so that some critical commentators have 
described it as "an ideological notion that functioned to legitimate... the shift 
from a repressive mode of domination to a hegemonic one. "523 Now, whilst 
Fraser does not hold necessarily to the extremity of that view, she does 
argue, using various sources, that the bourgeois public sphere was structured, 
partially through its own rules of discourse, i. e. the substantive content of 
Habermas' assumptions, on the exclusion of women in Europe, and, on the 
exclusion of both women and Black people in the States. In part this bears 
on the those sections of the critique raised earlier about the nature and 
content of "discourse" both in the public sphere and political system. At 
another level it links in with Honneth's ideas about recognition struggles for 
Fraser goes on to show and argue that the general public sphere contained 
either on the outside, or internally, a number of public spheres, many of 
which, given that they were excluded in some way or another, were in a 
relationship of conflict with the general public sphere. Fraser calls these 
"subaltern counterpublics in order to signal that they are parallel discursive 
arenas where members of subordinated social groups invent and circulate 
counter discourses. "524 These are not separatist in the sense of wanting to 
dissociate from the general public sphere, which might be the reason 
Habermas insists on the primacy of the general public sphere, but denote the 
fact of their exclusion and have inbuilt in their idealisation their eventual 
inclusion. To that extent they function as the cutting edge to the inclusive 
development of the general public sphere. For Fraser then, in stratified 
societies, "the discursive relations among differentially empowered publics 
are as likely to take the form of contestation as that of deliberation. "525 
She goes on to argue that even in egalitarian multi-cultural societies, i. e. 
ones not structured by class, race or gender, that because such public spheres 
also enable participants to construct and express cultural identities, i. e. they 
are culturally specific institutions, that there will still be a need for numerous 
public spheres. I am not so sure. Such public spheres come about 
through denial of recognition, not the positive acclaim of cultural identities, 
which can be construed as essentialising collective identities. The ideal 
should be, to use a term she herself uses in the same piece of work, for a 
condition of "multi-cultural literacy" within a general public sphere. 
However this contestary "imbrication of public spheress526, as a more 
appropriate description of the "fact" of the public sphere, serves to flag up 
my own contention that the relationship between the state and the public 
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sphere in the interim processes cannot only be expressed through the general 
public sphere which in itself might be preventing all voices from being 
heard. It is therefore feasible and desirable to conceive of subaltern public 
spheres, as was the case in some areas of local governance around the issue 
of race, establishing their own relationships with the political system. I 
have argued earlier that the state as a collective resource which can be used 
to secure full communicative participation must still be a consideration in the 
interim "factual" phase. In which case this strengthens the argument for 
transformational action. In other words the sharp separation between civil 
society and the political system cannot be maintained, as Habermas tries to 
do. Fraser expresses it succinctly: "any conception of the public sphere that 
requires a sharp separation between civil society and the state will be unable 
to imagine new forms of self management, interpublic co-ordination, and 
political accountability that are essential to a democratic and egalitarian 
society. "527 In fact it is not so much "imagine", as Fraser thinks, since it is 
possible to intellectually pre-construct those arrangements, but "create" those 
new discursively democratic forms of institutions. The imagining should 
refer then to conceptualising the agency, that is the capability to do, because 
it is that which I think falls through the under developed theorisation of the 
nature of the interface relationship between lifeworld-public sphere and 
system; gaps that are thrown into sharp relief when race enters into the 
debate. 
We can return then to the question posed earlier which prompted this 
diversion via Habermas' concept of the public sphere, which was to ask how 
the social issue of racial justice is put on the political agenda. For 
Habermas the public sphere is the main communicative structure which 
should programme the political system. It is clear that Habermas in BFN 
provides more detail to his original implied conceptualisation of what the 
"ideal" public sphere should be like; but does so within the pragmatic 
principled preference for constitutional democracy. Within this framework 
the outline of the public sphere is developed by oscillating between `fact' 
and `norm' so that the `norm' becomes the detail of the shadowy potential of 
the `fact'. However because, as Fraser and Honneth imply, and as I also 
think, his `fact' does not take account properly of the realities of multi-racial 
Europe, in fact the reality of the white `minority' globally, the contestary and 
conflictual origins of, and still current nature of the public spheres, as 
opposed to `a' public sphere, is not full appreciated. Consequently getting 
race on to the agenda in the interim does not only mean getting into the 
realm of the general public sphere. It does mean, and here the notion of 
recognition struggles comes into play, first tackling those forces which 
prevent it becoming accepted as a genuine social issue through, for example, 
the development of a contestary, oppositional public sphere. This might 
mean as well seeking to bypass the general public sphere through enlisting 
the remedial resources of the state using the potential of the norms implied 
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by the legislation, constitution and legitimation promises of political parties. 
Thus it is possible to imagine a continuum based relationship, even 
oscillation between the three constituent elements, of influence, 
change/transformation and programming which comprises the 
lifeworld/public sphere and political system interface under such conditions. 
This then helps unblock the distorting forces in the structures of 
communication preventing the acceptance of the issue in the general public 
sphere. Perhaps what this points to is that Habermas' strict separation of 
lifeworld and system, of ethical and moral discourse, leads him to downplay 
the transformative potential of envisaging at a general level the need for a 
communicative based directing of systems, by pitching this `directing' in 
terms of influence and control. The key questions are twofold. Firstly 
does he in his outline of normative, constitutional discursive democracy 
prescribe too closely the parameters of constitutional democracy so that he 
ends up foreclosing on other forms of discursive democracy which might be 
more inclusive of Black people and women? And, relatedly, probably 
more importantly, is this because of the nature of his lifeworld-system, 
ethical-moral, separation so that in practice he cannot help but come out with 
a form of democracy which, as Dryzek points out, can be appropriated by 
liberals. My tentative answer is "yes"; but tentative in the sense that I 
think the radicalness of his overall theory can be rescued. 
6.13 Summary 
I am going to summarise the main points of the critique according to the 
interrogative matrix outlined on page .... as a precursor to the very final 
section which attempts to sketch out the normative framework for a racially 
inclusive local governance. That is to say that, with an eye slightly skewed 
to the "facts" of race and local governance, the empirical details of which are 
contained in the next chapters, this will be a sketched hypothesis of the 
idealisation of those "facts" in way which seeks to ensure that the 
participatively inclusive radicalness of Habermas' theory does not have any 
unintended exclusive racial boundaries. 
We can thus summarise the critique of Habermas by refracting the core 
issues through the critical matrix ensuring that the category of race is a 
constant interrogator. 
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6.14 (1. ) Democratic will formation and (2). Democratic agency 
This should have been entitled "democratic opinion and will formation" 
because Habermas draws a related distinction between the two, reflecting as 
it does not only the ways and means of opinion and political will formation, 
i. e. discursive democracy, but also the key need for the `periphery' of 
opinion to be transformed into `political will'. It is as well Habermas' 
summary statement of the old clarion call "the people shall govern", but 
without the recourse to a republican constitution of an ethical community, a 
problem well exemplified by France's inability to conceive of citizenship 
other than in terms of its revolutionary traditions. Yet, whilst there is a 
similarity of "oughts", Habermas casts his question in relation to modern 
complex society, which is how the periphery under such conditions of 
complexity can programme the centre. Rehg and Mayhew, two theorists 
who make sympathetic use of Habermas, pose the same question thus: 
"What constitutes the moral basis of co-operation? In the late twentieth century 
this question has taken on an immediate, indeed overpowering worldwide 
relevance: even as a growing plurality of national groups presses for sovereignty, 
networks of international exchange and interdependence continue to grow and 
thicken. Thus the conflicts that arise both within and between nations pose an 
increasingly acute problem of co-operation... (involving) human rights or questions 
of freedom, equality, fair treatment.. "528 
and 
"The complexities and intricacies of modem society are disturbing and 
perplexing... how is cohesion possible in societies that can no longer be integrated 
by uniform adherence to conventional norms... as citizens we search for public 
policies that can effectively include diverse people with disparate interests in a 
single societal community.... (to the extent that)... we are tempted to 
conclude... that the centre cannot hold. 99529 
To which can be added the further qualifying question, implied in the two 
quotes above, of how such social integration and co-operation is to be 
achieved whilst there are still those racialising, unequalising, forces in the 
structures of communication. In other words what are the conditions for 
ensuring that Black people are able to contribute according to Habermas' 
own discursive principles, in opinion formation, and how can such opinion 
be transformed into will formation that programmes the centre. On 
tologically Habermas' idealisation of the public sphere as that structure in 
which lifeworld based communicative action ensures the development of 
consensual opinion from the bottom up, describes the general conditions for 
a reflexive, critical grounding of social integrating action which is not 
teleologically tied travelling towards a forces of history determined utopia. 
On the other hand the utopia is more `realistically' derived from the deon 
tological procedures governing the development of communicative action 
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oriented towards genuine communication, i. e. communication without force. 
Habermas situates the motivation towards such communication in the view 
that integration in the modem complex world can only be on the basis of 
consensus on post conventional norms. This is a rational consenus 
employing dialogue in which arguments involving the proffering of good 
reasons are subject to validating discourse. As Rehg says it "leads to a 
notion of `rational motivation' as explaining the force of validity claims: the 
speaker's validity claim exercises a `motivating force' on the hearer 
precisely because the claim refers the hearer to the `fact' that there are good 
reasons for accepting the claim. "530 The role of language in such 
argument, as Habermas emphasises, is important, no more so than in a 
society where there are many languages and where the `official language' as 
in "standard English" has been used, and is used, as an inequitable 
differentiating force in key social processes, including political processes. 
As shown above, theorists such as Benhahbib and Young, have adopted 
differing stances on this, the former insisting on the `unity' of political 
language and culture. and the latter, on the reality and need for diverse 
voices and means of expressing those. My own position is that the plurality 
of input should not be conflated with the output, which can be `unilinguistic' 
since what is important is that the process of argumentation should include 
the criteria of translatability and transmutability. Whilst Habermas has 
stipulated conditions of accepting the "political culture of the host country", 
and in relation to the position of Black people in Germany such, in terms of 
acceptable race equality language, an archaic formulation is understandable 
at one level, it does appear to imply a common language condition as well. 
Such a conclusion seems to be supported by his underpinning of the public 
sphere as being rooted in the lifeworld experiences of the participants and 
thus in the consensual formation of opinion stemming from communication 
informed by common cultural background contexts... This should not be 
taken to be an argument about the supposed ability to use of standard 
language forms by Black people. Rather it is an argument that recognises 
that the impetus for the maintenance and sustenance of standard language 
forms in metropolitan countries have often been the symptomatic expression 
of wider, sometimes subtle, but ultimately nation defining, attempts to shore 
up a perceived crisis in the legitimating fabric underpinning the current 
political control of the state. This might, though not inevitably so, take the 
form of an ethnically pure form of defining the nation and those who qualify 
for inclusion. On the other hand it might be expressed, as it does under the 
present Labour administration, through the lens of "raising standards in 
education", with the not so subtle sub-text of the ills wrought on education 
by the anti-racists and multi-culturalists of not so long ago days of yore. In 
any event the effect of both is that these processes become a punitive 
differentiating one against Black people. Further Black people, as in the 
case for example of Black children in the educational system, are very much 
bi- and multi-lingual both inter and intra- the standard language, a quality 
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seldom acknowledged. The use of standard language forms in contexts like 
these is often strategic in a way that supports the translatability and 
transmutability proposal because it requires of Black participants the ability 
to move from one language form to another, if not for themselves, then 
certainly for others in the communicative constituency, as in the case where 
children or other standard language exponents act as griots. Cornel West 
expresses well the everyday linguistic experiences of many Black people in 
the metropolitan countries thus: 
"I am continually caught in a kind of `heteroglossia', speaking a number of English 
languages in radically different contexts. When it comes to abstract theoretical reflection, 
I employ Marx, Weber, Frankfurt theorists, Foucault, and so on. When it comes to 
speaking with the black masses, I use Christian narratives and stories, a language 
meaningful to them but filtered through and informed by intellectual developments from 
de Tocqueville to Derrida. When it comes to the academy itself there is yet another kind 
of language, abstract but often atheoretical, since social theorising is mostly shunned. ""' 
In the light of what can only be described at this stage as the beginning of the 
argument about the glossolaliac skills of the Black outsider, we should return 
to the tentative conclusion reached about Habermas' point about the 
"acceptance of the political culture of the host country" which implies that 
there is within his theory still a dominant form of universalism, and ask 
whether or not it is a fair comment. There are, after all three major claims 
made for Habermas' theory, either by himself or by his supporters, which are 
put to the test by this conclusion since it amounts to a ratification of 
Goldberg's "incorporatist" criticism. Firstly language comes to play the co- 
ordinating role in a social integration achieved through the rationalisation of 
the lifeworld and thus involving consensual achievement as a result of the 
better argument. It is also, secondly, the grounding for hoping, in terms of 
the reconnection of the lifeworld and system, that this will involve a 
determinant role for the former over the latter, which can be taken as the 
principle. The pragmatic though, is expressed in Ritzer's summary of 
Habermas' theory's aims thus: 
"The hope for the future clearly lies in the resistance to the encroachments on 
the lifeworld and in the creation of a world in which the system and lifeworld 
are in harmony and serve to mutually enrich one another to a historically 
unprecedented degree. 132 
Thirdly the above serve to reinforce Habermas' meta-theoretical claims that 
inter-subjective based communicative discourse marks a philosophical 
paradigm shift which, unlike previous paradigms, retains a universalism, but 
one for which the deon tological framework because it guards the rights of 
all to participate, is not excluding. For Habermas these paradigms, which 
in their development, roughly correspond to historical periods, though that 
does not stop them being still in force today, are on tological, 
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epistemological and linguistic. Habermas' linguistic turn involves nothing 
more than putting the on tological and epistemological under permanent 
critical scrutiny through deliberative communicative discourse. But, if the 
conclusion reached above is to retain some sense of validity then it is being 
argued that Habermas' theory retains residues of on tology and epistemology 
which effectively places Black people still on the back burner of the 
rationalised forces determining the societal resistance to system colonisation 
and to the shaping of the future. It also cancels the key discursive principle 
that all who are affected should have the right to participate on equal footing 
in such deliberations. This ties in with the point made earlier about the 
apparent fore-shortening of the boundaries of acceptable oppositional 
practice. This has to be distinguished from the neo-on tology and 
epistemology of, say, new Labour and its so-called "third way" in which, 
despite claims to wanting further democratisation, their practice in 
government entails requiring of people a leap of faith to believe in their 
programme, accompanied by a TINAsauraus approach to that programme's 
epistemological basis. Nor is it the same as Foucault's declared on tology, 
almost a WYSIWYG reality, which drives out immanence in favour of the 
weak resistance that derives from a regenerated ethical self. However, it 
raises again the substantive criticisms made by post modernist theorists 
against Habermas, many of whom themselves can claim to have taken the 
"linguistic turn", that his meta-universalism masks the incommensurable, 
plurality of mini- and macro-narratives-in-their-own language, and by so 
doing, prevents people from being heard. There can be then, not a final 
vocabulary of closure or reconciliation, as some believe is implied in 
Habermas idea of consensus, because that would still reinscribe the old 
relations of domination. The question that this poses, because it is there 
implicit in Bhabha and other similarly minded post colonialists and 
modernists' reading of Habermas, is whether or not Habermas' notions of 
communicative discourse grounded consensus in today's societies, both at 
the national and inter-national level contain hidden statements of linguistic 
assimilation, domination and imposed meanings.? On the other hand, the 
obverse question can be put, in anticipation of looking in more detail at what 
Habermas actually says, which is to what extent is Bhabha's notion of 
continual differential slippage between cultures another way of framing 
Habermas' idea, and my labelling, of contingent communicative consensus. 
That is to say that no communicative moment of consensus is for ever stable 
because the participants to the debate, and others who might be post 
agreement affected, can always place the issue back on the agenda, so to 
speak. 
Dallymer, in a summary introduction to communicative or discourse ethics 
points out that the ethics in question is "indissolubly connected with 
language and communication. "533 Further he defines it as a "cognitive 
ethics of language" which "relies on insights garnered through participation 
" 
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in communicative or discursive exchange.... (in themselves)..... social or 
inter-subjective exchanges. "534 Wellmer takes it further and claims that 
Habermas', communicative ethics "presupposes that every being capable of 
language is recognised as a potentially rational being.. "535 The question 
now becomes whether or not communicative ethics, which I take to be as not 
incorporating a vision of societal good, but laying out the behavioural 
principles for participation, that is it is not about grounding norms but about 
the "grounding of normativity itself', contains an implicit language 
condition which is inimical to what Habermas has categorised as "ethnic 
subcultures. " Prefatorily Habermas seems to answer his critics over this 
issue when in BFN he writes that ".. (a).. political culture in the seedbed of 
which constitutional principles are rooted by no means has to be based on all 
citizens sharing the same language or the same ethnic and cultural origins 
... rather the political culture must serve as the common denominator for a 
constitutional patriotism which simultaneously sharpens an awareness of the 
multiplicity and integrity of the different forms of life which coexist in a 
multicultural society. "536 However the question still remains about 
whether or not this common political culture denotes an implicit single 
language requirement for its business of political discourse. There are two 
temporally connected routes to excavating this further, both of which relate 
to Habermas' qualifying responses to criticisms made of his two recent 
major works, viz., TCA and BFN. In TCA in response to Taylor's 
objection to Habermas' explanation of communicative rationality in terms of 
cognitivist ethics, Habermas defines the areas in which consensus is to be 
sought. Thus: 
"In my opinion communicative rationality precisely does not amount to the sum of its 
moral-practical components. Everyday communicative practice covers a wider range 
of validity; claims to normative correctness constitute merely one of numerous 
validity aspects. It is only when conflicts of action are to be resolved with the 
consensus of participants in terms of this one aspect that moral issues arise. "(My 
emphasis)537 
For Habermas, as I shall argue later, this with reference to Black people in 
the metropole, it appears to mean that claims from the ethical good of their 
lifeworlds which clash with the national ethical good, i. e. the national 
culture, cross over into moral validity claims because it raises questions 
about normative correctness. These should be redeemed discursively. 
When Habermas lays conditions therefore of "acceptance of the political 
culture", he can only refer to the acceptance of the cognitivist ethics, and not 
of the national political culture. In so doing one can, then only talk about 
the language of cognitivist ethics, that is, the political language. This cannot 
be taken at the empirical level of that which constitutes the everyday 
formality of political communication, but must be taken at the more abstract 
level both as laid out in the discursive principles and thus in the capacity of 
every capable language speaker to be rational. In other words the 
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conceptual structure of making and redeeming validity claims is not the sole 
preserve of the national language medium. 
For sympathetic commentators like Benhabib, on the other hand, this has 
been interpreted, and conflated, with her requirement for the use of formal 
political language. But to do so would give credence to the criticism made 
of Habermas from some quarters that the Habermassian `ideal speech 
situation' reads too much "of a multitude of academics smoking pipes 
around a table and arguing some point by means of undistorted 
communication. " If what I have surmised above about Habermas' 
acceptance of the political culture condition not necessarily meaning one 
language, then it would appear that the only pragmatic issue would be that of 
translatability. It would not address the other requirement I outlined earlier, 
which I regard as essential when one comes to examine race within a 
Habermassian context, which is transmutability. Whilst I thus agree with 
much of what McCarthy has to say, and this is but an extension of his earlier 
foray into Habermassian theory and the multi-cultural/-racial society, both 
operate conceptually with what I regard as a regressive, liberal notion of 
"multi-culturalism" which effectively masks the unequally structured 
relationships between Black people and the rest. This apparent taken-for- 
granted quality of ceteris paribus leads both, but Habermas in particular, into 
a circular, and/or sometimes, an unnecessarily culturally conflationary 
argument, and/or, particularly here in McCarthy's case, into an argument that 
borders on irreconcilable `ethnic' differences. There are thus, elements of 
Bhabha's critique of multi-culturalism and diversity in the latter two's 
arguments. However, whereas Bhabha appears to be arguing for the 
incommensurable residue of Black cultures as the bases for resistance, I want 
to argue for the explicit acknowledgement of unequally structured, socially 
constructed races, and within that cultures, which disrupts the assumption of 
ceteris paribus to the extent that if this is not dealt with in communicative 
discourse, then the substantive principles, as outlined by Habermas, of such 
discourse are violated. 
My view is that the argument between McCarthy and Habermas has a slight 
element of the differend in it in which both are arguing about the same issue, 
yet both are, at key points, arguing past each other because there is, in my 
opinion, insufficient acknowledgement of the contribution made by black 
people to the development and constitution of the constitution in the West. 
The attempt to summarise the issue of democratic will- and opinion- 
formation, as refracted through race, echoes this insofar as the insufficient 
attention paid to the facticity of race, as opposed to culture, means that 
Habermas norm of consensus might still retain elements of an essentialist 
universalism. Thus the public sphere, crucial in the area of public opinion 
formation, has been reconstructed in terms of a multitude, and at times 
hierarchicalised, number of spheres in which Black and race equality public 
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spheres assume subaltern positions. The crucial osmotic fluid, which I 
take to be the democratic culture, that regulates and permits the creation of 
legitimacy through catalysing the crossover from opinion to will-formation, 
therefore not only has to allow for the realities of a multi-cultural and -racial 
society, but also the realities of inequalities which presently accompany the 
position of those `minority' cultures. To that end I have argued that the 
question of language cannot be reduced to the requirement of a single formal 
language, but must permit many languages in the processes of 
communicative discourse in which consensual overlap relies on 
translatability and transmutability. To do other wise, as Benhabib proposes 
in her support of a single political language, is to push Habermas back into 
the epistemological category. If an interpretation of Habermas permits then 
of many languages, what exactly does he mean by requiring of `immigrants', 
and here I have taken this as a clumsy shorthand for Black people in Europe, 
that they accept the political culture of the country they migrate to. It 
cannot be the acceptance of the reality of the political processes and systems 
of that particular country at a certain point in time, i. e. the `facticity'. 
Habermas himself, in other related contexts, talks about the principle of 
constitutional democracy, and about the universal moral principles, which 
can be redeemed, embedded in the legal and political norms of such 
countries. In relating the critique of, and counter-critique from, 
respectively, McCarthy and Habermas, the nuances of the key issues 
surrounding this debate have been drawn out. For McCarthy the ethical and 
moral are in reality so intertwined that any plural constitutional democracy 
must permit of mutuality, in effect a stand-off defined by `agreeing to 
disagree', especially since the democratic state is permeated with the ethical 
content of the `indigenous' culture'. For Habermas, permeation or no, there 
are still universal moral principles which can be redeemed so that any 
consensus is not an `in the end' one, even those that are grounded in the 
reality of majoritarian decisions, but a consensus for the moment, thus 
allowing the issue to put back on the agenda. Where my contention of the 
`differend' comes in is that whereas McCarthy, because he does not specify 
the how and why of the conditions which permit of mutuality, can be read, as 
Habermas mischievously does, as sanctioning an `anything goes' scenario, 
i. e. Habermas' anti-universalist point. Habermas, on the other hand, 
because he does not specify the how and why of the conditions under which 
ethical differences, especially when it comes to those from "minority" 
cultures, i. e. Black people, evolve into moral issues - from what is good for 
me to what is good for all - can be read, when he insists on consensus, even 
contingent consensus, as saying that the force of the better argument does not 
contain a neutral, deon tological structure, but an epistemological one with 
traces of western rationalism. Whilst I actually agree with McCarthy that 
the ethical and moral are intertwined, as illustrated by Black people's 
experiences, I also agree with Habermas that differences that speak of what 
is good for all, and this can be direct claims for redemption or indirect which 
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relate on the face of it to specific ethical communities, are moral ones. 
Even if, as Habermas proposes, the nature of the differences are such that it 
needs a greater level of abstraction, a resolution will need to be grounded in 
the political and/or legal processes, involving a normative standard. Now 
because both Habermas and McCarthy treat ethical communities and cultures 
in a liberal way, that is to say the issue of majority and minority becomes a 
quantitative and not qualitative one so that solutions become additive rather 
than deconstructive, an assumption can be made that all ethical differences 
have the potential for conflict. I want to propose, rather, that this gap can 
be filled by sketching out the details of the `how' and why' as it relates to 
Black people in the metropole. This is done, not because it relates simply 
to the contingent, historical "facticity" of their experiences, but because I 
hold that one of the crucial unresolved problems of modernity is that of race. 
Thus what will sketched out is saying that what is good for the consensual 
inclusion of Black people in the processes of democratic opinion and will 
formation in the metropole, is good for all. Let me start by saying that the 
performative standard for sorting the wheat from the chaff, so to speak, is 
contained in Habermas' own conditions and principles governing 
communicative discourse, and by definition thus if one or other is breached, 
a performative contradiction. This is to say that if all who are affected 
cannot participate in the legal and political discursive practices giving rise to 
legitimacy, then that legitimation, which will be grounded in a claim to 
consensus, will be invalid. It should be clear that I do not regard the bar to 
participating, as seems to be implied in both Habermas' and McCarthy's 
usage of terms such as "diversity", "culture" and "subnational ethnic 
groups", and in their understanding of Honneth's "struggles for recognition", 
as residing in the differences that accrue from their being a "foreign" ethical 
community in a majority "indigenous" ethical community. Moreover I do 
not deny that there is an "indigenous" ethical community. However, I do 
deny that this "indigenous" ethical community evolved, as Habermas seems 
to imply within some exogenous structured cordon sanitaire which was only 
breached once the Black colonial chickens started coming home to roost 
over the past four decades or so. Performatively as well Habermas use of 
the terms "ethical communities", especially when he talks about them in the 
context of consensus formation in the constitutional democratic state, seems 
so static that it flies in the face of his previously stated understanding of such 
communities and identities as not essentially fixed, but subject to constant 
de- and reconstruction 
My point is, as I made in the earlier chapter, that this vectoring of space and 
time which he identifies and which impacts on people's lifeworlds, are 
identity shaping and changing forces which, because of racism and its 
history, Black people have long experienced. In other words "different 
socio-cultural backgrounds" are going to be affected as much, if not more, 
by this, no more so than when this is mediated by racism. It is not, 
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therefore, that the ethical framework of Black people interacts sui generis 
with the ethical framework of white people, to put it crudely, but 
shorthandedly, rather it is that this interaction is mediated by racism, as 
communicatively defined earlier. Intersecting with this are also other 
influencing forces of class and gender. The close intertwining of ethical 
and moral concerns is exemplified in the lifeworld and systemic experiences 
of Black people so that when "wrongs done to", often presenting in the form 
of communicatively distorted representations of Black people's "ethical 
communities" are challenged this not only raises moral concerns, that is what 
is good for all because not to deal with it means that one or more of the 
discursive principles is violated, but it is raised at a faster rate. Consider, 
for example the momentum of moral issues raised by the Stephen Lawrence 
case. I am trespassing slightly into the area of the organisation of the state 
which contextualises the category still to be summarised, the organisation of 
local government. However, this is necessary at this stage because if this is 
the "facticity" of race, political culture, and inter-alia, real-politik language, 
then within the constitutional democratic state, any discursive action aimed 
at consensus but which in the end, violates one or more of the discursive 
principles, can be opposed by those losing out. The problem, then with 
Habermas' formulation to date is that minority "ethical communities" are 
more likely to lose out more frequently if the distorted mediating force is not 
dealt with as a priority; action which will require their own participation. 
Further, as other justice/injustice cases surrounding Black people and the 
various normative processes in the legal structures and polity illustrate, there 
is no guarantee that moral claims raised by Black people will be recognised 
as such. The representation forces in the structures of communication are 
such that these can be, and often are, rejected as simply ethical concerns of 
those Black communities, thereby frequently pathologising claims for justice 
- the "chip-on-the-shoulder" syndrome. There is then the potential of a 
very radical reading of Habermas which places all in the end consensus 
decisions which violate the discursive principles always on the agenda so 
that the notion of contingency and change is radicalised, accelerated and 
questions not the principles of the political culture, which I read in terms of 
Habermas' abstracted principles of discursive communication - the deon 
tological framework - but certainly the facticity of that culture. As to the 
constitutional democratic state, Habermas sees this as the best means within 
today's complex world to reconcile lifeworld with system. It is a pragmatic 
choice which should be thus opted for pragmatically provided that in its 
development it does not breach those principles. Consider for example the 
current plight of Turkish people in Germany, and the ethnic "ethical" 
community which has been the main reference point for Habermas' thinking 
on the multi-cultural society. Habermas has long contended that the Turkish 
people in Germany have to be granted citizenship and that the current 
racially defined nationality law should be changed. He has also broadly 
supported the SDP in Germany, probably, as with constitutional democracy, 
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on pragmatic grounds. The SDP government, as they promised to in their 
election manifesto, plan to grant citizenship to Turkish minorities in 
Germany. However, partly as a result of a right wing backlash, this 
implementation of an election pledge has come with conditions which find 
an echo in some of Habermas' own positioning around the issue of 
minorities and the German constitutional state. This can, on the other 
hand, be taken as a too literal reading of Habermas. Thus foreigners 
seeking German citizenship will have to take a language test, swear an oath 
of loyalty to the constitution, should have no criminal record and should not 
be living on social security. They will also face political vetting so that, as 
Mr. Schilly, the Interior Minister, said "Islamic fundamentalists are 
excluded. 19538 One might very well ask whether or not the Christian 
fundamentalists will be expelled too. Whatever Habermas" intention, this 
cannot be the level at which his `acceptance of the political culture' and 
`constitutional patriotism' requirements can be read, not only because it 
breaches his won discursive principles, but because it illustrates the racist 
mediating nature of the interplay between the state, as currently constituted, 
and Black people. Further this manifestation of an exclusionary ethically, 
permeated state, as exemplified in the example just given, based as it is on a 
racist nationality law dating back to 1913, highlights as well that the 
evolution of the constitutional state in the west is inter-woven with the 
defining of who is part of that polity and who is not. In the case of the 
major western powers, those who are not are invariably Black. This brings 
to the fore again the question raised by McCarthy that it should be possible 
to envisage different interpretations of constitutional rights and arrangements 
at any one time. Habermas has criticised this, and instead placed the issue 
in a temporal line'in which progression proceeds from one `in the end' 
consensus to another. However, the constitutional democratic option is, in 
the end a pragmatic choice on the part of Habermas, and the questioning of it 
cannot simply be because there is another ethically informed variant, which 
is implied by McCarthy's criticism. On that basis, and here Habermas is 
right, religious fundamentalism, all, not just Islamic variants, can seek to 
claim back a previous domain. There is, however, a criterion which can be 
used to determine the legitimate questioning of the constitutional 
arrangements, both pragmatically and in principle which given the `facticity' 
of Black people's existence in the metropole, is important in ensuring that 
Habermas' insistence on "in-the-end" consensus does not lead to new forms 
of exclusion. On the issue of consensus and a plurality of value views 
Habermas, in an earlier piece of work, as McCarthy points out, argues that 
"when public discussion, rather than leading to rationally motivated 
consensus on general interests and shared values, instead sharpens 
disagreements by revealing particular interests to be nongeneralisable or 
particular values to be neither generalisable nor consensually orderable, we 
can still seeks agreement at higher levels of abstraction. " 539 The question 
then is what is this level of higher abstraction, which I hold to include the 
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questioning of the constitutional democratic state. Moreover, on the 
particular question of political culture, Habermas, I suspect because of the 
pragmatic considerations of time and the need to make decisions, considers 
that: 
"For the time being, however, the minority can live with the majority opinion as 
binding on their conduct insofar as the democratic process gives them the 
possibility of continuing or recommencing the interrupted discussion and 
shifting the majority by offering better arguments. "54° 
And, 
"Every political community must rely on the integrating force of a shared political 
culture if it is not to disintegrate into its segments"sa' 
I want to argue that there is one criterion and standard which determines the 
level of abstraction, and which can be used in all four inter-related facets of 
political culture itemised above; that is the general one of inclusivity which 
is contained in Habermas' own principles of discursive communication; a 
principle which cannot be compromised in the processes of developing and 
agreeing legal and political norms. When it comes to the `facticity' of 
Black people's experiences in the polity of the constitutional democratic 
state, then I am arguing further that we are already into that next level of 
abstraction so that it is not acceptable to argue that the minority can live with 
the majority decisions, especially if the making of that decision, or effect of 
that decision means that that inclusivity principle is violated. This abstracted 
moral arena, which is necessary to ensure the unconditional participation of 
Black people and thus, for example, the use of their languages, does not 
mean, as someone like E. P. Thompson believes, that it will result in a Babel 
like polity, something which can be glimpsed as well in Habermas 
assumption that McCarthy's plural visions means the collapse of political 
legitimacy. Rather the notion of political culture and within that, political 
language is recast at this abstracted moral level and we therefore have to run 
with the idea that the key elements of discursive communication can be 
translated and transmuted across languages and cultures in the polity, and 
thus jettison the idea, which seems to be lurking in the shadow of the 
concept of discursive rationality, that Black socio-integrative processes have 
a rationality deficit that excludes them from the domain of moral conflicts. 
6.15 Organisation of Welfare (5) and Welfare Agency (6) 
In developing the critique of Habermas by refracting his theory through the 
prism of race, I am conscious that I have neglected, relatively, the 
interrogative category of `welfare'. I have however, mentioned Habermas' 
procedural model of welfare law, particularly in his explication of that in 
relation to feminism, and noted that a similar exercise needs to be carried out 
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vis-ä-vis race. `Welfare' was included as a category in recognition of the 
history of the evolving inter-relationship between local governance and 
welfare generally to the extent that local government in the UK, for example, 
has acted as the custodial access point for large tranches of essential welfare 
services. The early part of this section seeks to show that the prevailing 
ideological models of local government, i. e. the localist and post fordist 
schools, are inadequate when it comes to attempting the inclusive 
examination of race, welfare and local government. Intersecting with these 
have been other attempts to examine race and welfare, but from a general 
welfare perspective. Some of these, like Williams, have attempted to locate 
the issue of race in welfare within a social labour based relations of 
productions theoretical framework both as a general remedying response to 
what Williams regards as the disinclination of social administration "to take 
account of the welfare experiences of Black people", and also for some 
social labour explanations of welfare, such as the post-Fordist model, to 
compound the omission by homogenising experiences as the reflex to forces 
of production. Latterly the response from social labour based thinkers, 
both the relations and forces of production variants, which, to give them their 
due, still attempt to critique and hold out hope of opposition to the prevailing 
neo-liberal and -managerialist approach to welfare, has been to tip their toe 
into the well of post-modernism. This has been evident certainly in some of 
Hogget's belated attempts to get to grips with race in his post-Fordist 
framework. It is evident as well in the influential Open University based 
development of welfare theorising. This can be summarised as a neo- 
Gramscian, spilling over into Foucauldian analysis, reminiscent in some 
respects to Laclau and Mouffe's work in the eighties 542 Within this 
approach race is theorised as a social construction constituted by different 
discourses and settlements in the arena of welfare, but focussed on the way 
in which the racialised "body... becomes situated in systems of meanings 
which both reflect past and present social relations and also structure 
experience... and social exclusions. "543 Whilst I have no problem with the 
general notion of race as a social construct, I do have problems with a theory 
implies a very weak space for opposition, especially opposition from Black 
people, and thus an over determinist role for these various constituting 
welfare discourses. 
By contrast Habermas' approach, which, as I indicated above, places a 
change premium on regenerating the forces of social solidarity in the "forms 
of communicative practices for self determination", offers a better 
framework within which to consider the full inclusive participation of Black 
people. That means that the nature of Habermas' linguistic turn is such that 
those epistemological processes structuring the forces of racist representation 
and, relatedly, those on tological groundings which speak of permanence for 
some and impermanence for others can be critically constructed and 
deconstructed in self determining communicative practices. I have already 
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raised critical areas in Habermas' theory which require further work and 
clarification in the area of democratic opinion and will formation if Black 
people are to be fully included in constructing those forces of social 
solidarity. These are germane as well to the area of welfare so will not be 
repeated, other than to indicate where in Habermas' thinking on welfare this 
has to be done. Four inter-linked stages in Habermas' thinking on welfare 
can be identified, all of which are underpinned to a lesser or greater extent by 
his evolving socialist remedy of regenerating social solidaristic forces. The 
first relates to his seventies work on crises in the capitalist societies and his 
argument, re-echoed, if somewhat slightly altered in his latest work, that the 
core crisis facing such societies is not so much economic, though that might 
be related, but legitimation. This in itself would reflect a profound crisis in 
the normative underpinnings of society, since unlike the other economic and 
political subsystems, it is a `contagion' in the socio-cultural system, that 
value arena which develops and guides the formation of social solidarity. 
The state straddles these subsystems, attempting, as defined by its core 
Habermassian role of resolving moral differences, to compensate one or 
more of the subsystems in order to prevent or attenuate potential crises. 
For Habermas the origins and development of the welfare state represent the 
attempt to compromise, consensualise and encapsulate the utopian 
aspirations of the working class through recognising that the full inclusion 
of, and participation by, certain sectors of society require a measure of 
redistributive justice which can be institutionalised on the bases of universal 
access to all, even if the treatment and outcome is in someway means 
dependent. The welfare system helps secure legitimation for the political 
order, if not in the detail of its workings, where Habermas' next notion of 
`juridification' comes into play, but certainly in the common sense notion of 
welfare universalism, accepted in everyday life, that it is there for `us'. 
Habermas' idea ofjuridification, which is developed in TCA, expresses the 
condition, with the benefit of the hindsight of BFN, that the structure and 
content of welfare law, because it has not involved all who are affected in its 
development and subsequent use, has an uneven double edged quality. 
Thus whilst it grounds some of the principles of redistributive justice by 
addressing the material needs which enable recipients and the system to 
reconcile some of the integration gaps, it at the same time tries to 
`administer' a consensus on social integration. To this extent it contributes 
significantly to the colonisation of the lifeworld of welfare recipients by the 
administrative system. Thus "the legal and administrative means through 
which welfare state programs are implemented are not a passive medium 
with no properties of their own... (but have a )... reifying and subjectivising 
power ... (so that) ... the 
deformations of a lifeworld that is regimented, 
dissected, controlled and watched over are more subtle than the obvious 
forms of material exploitation and impoverishment.... (to the extent 
that).... social conflicts that have shifted over into the psychological and 
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physical domains and internalised are no less destructive for all that. 044 I 
have argued earlier in this section that when the social category of race is 
explicitly introduced into the equation, then it can be seen that for Black 
people there is a double juridification process which throws into doubt the 
universalist claims of welfare and the in practice common sense universalism 
of the welfare system. This is expressed in the empirically verifiable 
unequal access of Black people to the volitionally discretionary services of 
welfare and the unequal, over access of Black people to those services which 
are underpinned by legally sanctioned compulsion, sometimes with a 
criminal justice element. The other commentators on the welfare state and 
race - those mentioned above - have tended to treat this phenomenon as a 
post world war two one occasioned by, in the example of the UK for 
instance, the large scale emigration of Black people to the metropolitan 
countries. Whilst the analyses of the causes for the racially discriminatory 
processes in the welfare set up might differ, there is broad agreement on the 
empirical salient features which shows the discriminatory results vis-a-vis 
Black users of the welfare system and vis-a-vis Black employees, or 
potential employees, in that system. Habermas himself, in dealing 
generally with the issue of the multi-cultural society, and by implication race, 
in his latest publications has written about the permeation of the state and 
laws by the indigenous ethical processes; a permeation in his view which 
should not obscure the potential for morally activating the universalist claims 
of those same processes and laws. However, there is, on Habermas' part, 
an underestimation, or even non-recognition, of the extent to which the 
indigenous ethical framework is informed and sustained by the exclusion of 
racialised others in its defining moments. Within moments such as the 
latter, the moral enters and should trump the ethical. Neubeck's and 
Cazenove's work on what they term `welfare racism' in the United states 
show the extent to which welfare is defined by whites through recourse to 
centuries old racial stereotypes. We need, briefly then, to contextualise 
more critically the issue of welfare, juridification and race. Habermas has, 
in `The New Conservatism', attempted to portray the welfare state as 
embodying the social utopia of social labour, a utopia he now thinks 
outdated. The diminishing of this utopia means that "a welfare state 
programme that continues to be nourished by a utopia of social labour is 
losing power to project future possibilities for a collectively better and less 
endangered way of life. " 545 Earlier I argued that this utopia of social 
labour in the welfare context ignored the utopias of race and gender equality 
because of the logic of its productivist core. We can now actually go 
further and argue that the utopia of social labour in welfare and its 
universalist claims were, and are, sustained by the exclusion of race and 
gender equality utopias. Certainly it is obvious that the post second world 
war development of the welfare programme and structures were heavily 
dependent upon the use of Black labour in its maintenance; labour that was 
discriminately differentiated and rewarded. The system "derived their 
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legitimation from general elections and find their social base in autonomous 
labour unions and parties. " This legitimation was often crafted on 
explicit and implicit understandings and practices that sought to structure a 
racially unequal access to and treatment by welfare because, as I shall argue, 
the welfare system from its early twentieth century nascent inception, was 
built on a white racially inclusive notion of `us' which is still the basis of the 
common sense notion of "the welfare system is for us. " In other words the 
welfare system post second world war, was both dependent upon Black 
labour to sustain it, and thus to keep alive its utopian vision, whilst at the 
same time it had to secure legitimation through processes which maintained 
its welfare identity as white. This was not some irrational, prejudicial 
reaction to the "sudden" presence of Black people, but the result of ethical 
processes built into the creation of the welfare system in the period spanning 
the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth centuries. Cohen, 
in trying to answer the question about whether or not the post second world 
war institutional racism of the welfare state was merely incidental or intrinsic 
to it, argues that, "the concepts of efficiency, eugenics, nation and empire 
have been constant in the debates about welfare throughout this 
century .... (and).... the 
labour movement played a central role from an early 
date in popularising these concepts in relation to welfare. " 546 He shows that 
the early twentieth century legislation affecting immigration and the nascent 
legislative building blocks of the welfare state which introduced the national 
insurance and pension schemes both had the same exclusionary reference 
point, that of Jewish immigrants. Implicated in this, and in many instances, 
leading the push for such exclusions both from the country and access to the 
welfare provisions, were, as Habermas describes the welfare system's social 
base, "the autonomous labour unions and labour parties. " Cohen shows, 
however, how both were active in the support, during that time period, in the 
drive to exclude Jewish immigrants from the country and specifically from 
the proposed welfare reform programmes, thereby helping tp racialise the 
process from the outset. Part grounding for these beliefs were what Cohen 
describes as the "National Efficiency Movement" which was represented not 
so much in terms of formal institutions, but rather in terms of "a series of 
ideas taken up by a broad range of organisations. "547 Efficiency, in this 
context, was constituted in relation to social Darwinistic concerns about the 
overall efficiency of the "Imperial race", i. e. white British people. It was 
differentiated by gender as well by putting upon women the responsibility for 
breeding. Within this equation, Jewish immigrants or potential immigrants 
were considered to be eugenically unfit. Eugenicist utterances linking the 
health and fate of the `white' nation to the desirability of keeping out Jewish 
people from the country and denying those already here were commonplace 
from leading socialists and founding figures of the British labour movement, 
such as the Webbs. These representations of welfare unworthiness 
received materially, substantial recognition in the racially excluding clauses 
that were built into the subsequent social legislation. Cohen goes on to 
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show how these eugenecist impulses were evident even in the continuing 
development of the welfare state post 1945. The continuation of this 
preservation of white welfare identity in the face of an increasing Black 
population after 1945 is well documented. The essential point of all of this 
is to try to give critical detail to Habermas' general notion of the ethical 
permeation of the state and law. This was not a general, homogenous 
ethical permeation, but expressed on the whole the social labour base of its 
prime movers. Even if in the working out of the society contained in the 
vision of that ethical permeation juridification came to express the 
instrumental management of legitimation costs by the state in attempting to 
socially integrate the working class, there was one aspect of that ethical 
permeation upon which there was general agreement. This was the extent 
to which the national identity formation and welfare identity formation was, 
dialectically almost, tied up with the keeping out of racialised others. 
Those that are excluded from the communicative discursive processes that 
guide the structuring of the norms and laws a society wishes to have as its 
social integrative medium, obviously cannot participate in the those areas 
which affect them. The point then isn't simply, as Habermas believes, that 
recourse can be made to the universal moral claims contained in such 
formations. Such recourse can be blocked if there are active processes in 
such ethical formations which unjustly maintain the identity, "who-I-am", at 
the expense of others. Earlier I argued that Habermas' notion of social 
learning as an evolutionary process, and here I take this to mean increasing 
solidaristic, communicative discursive processes in society which guide 
systemic imperatives, has a shadowing drag on its development. This I take 
to be race and racism which I regard as trans-epochal unresolved problems 
the solutions to which are the touchstone to the fulfilment of modernity. 
That is to say there is accompanying such learning processes technical, 
instrumentalised ones of domination. The notion of race efficiency in the 
development of the welfare state, is a case in point. When one tracks the 
emergence and development of the efficiency paradigm in the management 
of the welfare state today, it is clear that it developed and is used as a 
counterweight to the representation of equality programmes, especially race 
equality programmes, as inefficient. These new efficiency programmes are 
a palimpsest erasing race in the public sector so that there is a subtext which 
equates race equality, and thus Black people, with inefficiency. Equality 
initiatives have been depoliticised into managerial ones which can be, and 
are, measured against so called neutral management accounting objectives 
and standards. It finds its expression in the re-emergence in those 
previously equality oriented public sector organisations, of the white, male 
manager as the `efficient' norm. At another level it is a reworking of the 
anthropophagii relating to less than rational, technically underdeveloped, 
efficiency challenged Black person. This is, in a sense, an extension of 
Habermas' analysis of the neo-conservative welfare state which I outlined in 
earlier sections of this chapter. Briefly this is that there is basic 
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contradiction at the heart of the welfare project which in the seventies 
displayed crisis proportions. This contradiction is between its goal and 
method, the goal being the creation of egalitarian forms of life which can 
nurture self realisation and spontaneity, whilst that in itself is denied by the 
method, viz. legal and administrative means because generating such forms 
of life "exceeds the capacities of the medium of power. " The response to 
this dilemma, which at the time of writing in the eighties Habermas 
differentiates between the conservative wing of the social democratic parties 
and the stated neo-conservatives, but which on reflection in the light of the 
experience of the former parties in government now, we can now conflate 
under one banner, is as set out in the following. Firstly the legitimacy of 
the welfare state is sought by the reconstructed social democratic parties in 
terms of "deleting from the welfare state project precisely the components it 
had derived from the utopian idea of a labouring society.... (by 
renouncing)... the goal of overcoming heteronomous labour so that the status 
of a free citizen with equal rights extends into the sphere of production and 
can become the nucleus around which autonomous forms of life 
crystallise"548. These for Habermas, are the true conservatives because they 
"want to find a point of equilibrium between the development of the state 
and modernisation based on the market. " This is an obviously pertinent 
critique that can be made of new right labour in Britain, especially in its 
period of governance. This point is even more important as a means to 
distinguish Habermas' approach from that of those who might seek to 
appropriate his thinking as a means of intellectually shoring up the 
repackaging of borrowed neo-conservative ideas as the `third way'. The 
second part of confronting this dilemma of the welfare state relates to a 
number of measures first introduced by the neo-conservative right, but now 
accepted and promoted by the social democratic parties. Capital is allowed 
to valorise at the expense of the poorest in society. There are definite 
material cuts in the level of welfare available. Finally there is for large 
parts of the welfare system the "transfer of normatively regulated 
parliamentary powers to systems that merely function, without normative 
regulation..... (which)... turns the state into one partner among others in 
negotiation. " 549 This deliberate strategy of reducing the costs of 
legitimation results in the withdrawal of "more and more social areas from a 
decision making process that is obliged by constitutional norms to give equal 
consideration to all who are concerned in any specific matter. "550 
Habermas is right to a certain extent, but his analysis does not go far enough. 
Whilst it is true that there is the ongoing programme of removing form the 
polity tranches of the welfare state and reconstituting what was once a 
political relationship of stewardship with that of a neo-corporatist, functional 
partnership one, there is also a parallel programme being undertaken in those 
segments of the welfare state still under political control of depoliticisation 
of the internal processes through neo-managerialist, managerial accountancy 
processes. In this not only is the relationship of the employee to t political 
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organisation being redefined, the relationship of the client is being redefined, 
not as that of an equal citizen, but as that of the market determined consumer 
and customer. These are then, "the expression of a historical consciousness 
that has been robbed of its utopian dimension.,, 55 1 For Habermas, and at the 
general idealised level I agree with him, the pragmatic steps normally 
associated with adhering to the principles of social redistributive justice in 
the welfare set up, such as full employment, is not revolutionary enough. 
The relationship between the three resources modem society has at its 
disposal for steering the welfare state, money, power, and solidarity, has to 
be recast so that solidarity, that area from which the lifeworld, and inter- 
alia, political opinion and will formation draw there primary strength, is 
determinant. In terms of the potential form this would take, Habermas sees 
this being `directed' through autonomous public spheres which would have 
to "achieve a combination of power and intelligent self-restraint that could 
make the self-regulating mechanisms of the state and economy sufficiently 
sensitive to the goal oriented results of radical democratic will formation. " 
552 To achieve this would require that the mass political parties relinquish 
their mass loyalty generating function, that is their own legitimacy. This 
puts into stark relief the claims by new right Labour that they are trying, 
especially at the local government level, to reconstitute the relationship 
between the local populace and local governance on the grounds of active 
citizenship. To achieve that requires giving up the future right to govern. 
Such initiatives are likely, thus, to present themselves eventually in terms of 
what Beck has described as "facadism". We are now at the point at which 
the issues raised in the previous section in relation to race and political 
opinion and will formation come into play in relation to reconstructing the 
welfare state. There are, however, additional areas which can be 
highlighted, and which in relation to race lead both into Habermas' notion of 
procedurally based welfare and into the next section on the organisation of 
local government. 
The first relates to that of work in the welfare state and the prospects and 
potential for radical change. Habermas in his concluding section on the 
welfare state written in the late eighties, believes that when the welfare state 
becomes reflective, that is moves into the `ought' of solidarity based control 
or prime influence, "takes leave of the utopian idea of a labouring society. " 
This is because workers' subcultures have for the most part disintegrated and 
it is "doubtful whether their power to create solidarity can be regenerated in 
the workplace. "553 But, as Honneth and Joas have pointed out, the fact that 
social labour is no longer the prime locus for societal change and the 
working class are not therefore recognised as the historical subjects of such 
change, does not mean that we should abandon attempts to critically de- and 
reconstruct the area of'work'. ssa If, anything, as shall be shown in the 
empirical section, the issues and categories of race and gender resurrect the 
need for such change, but from a different perspective. Certainly the pursuit 
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of race equality within local governance and its welfare responsibilities, cut 
across those utopias of labour and gender, which in reality meant 
transgressing traditional institutional and practice boundaries in the attempt 
to reconstruct new ones that kept at bay the racialised forces in the structures 
of communication. Within this could be caught the glimmer of new 
relationships between employee, the citizen and the polity, prompted in many 
case by the reality that many Black employees, for example, were employees, 
trade union members, local community members, members of local 
community groups, welfare recipients, even members of local political 
parties, all at the same time; certainly far more so than white employees. In 
other words when the issues of race and women were entered as explicit 
variables into the equation, it became clear that the two areas of social and 
systemic integration cut across the area of work in ways that reconfiguerd 
and made critical again that which had been the emancipatory domain 
previously of the utopia of social labour, i. e. liberation from alienated labour. 
One can see how the argument can, and will be, developed about the claims 
made by mass political parties concerning the "need" to reduce the financial 
and legitimating costs, as evidenced in the latter case by Labour's explicit 
rejection of "loony leftism", which figured as one of the prime motivating 
forces for what I have previously described as the process of re- 
whitewashing the town halls, whilst at the same time maintaining the 
depoliticised facade of equalities as a means of assuaging the "ethnic" voter. 
In terms of the resources which Habermas identifies the welfare state can 
call upon to steer it, it is clear that both the Conservative and new Labour 
have opted for redefining and strengthening the media of money and 
administration at the expense of solidarity; a situation likely to lead to the 
increasing colonisation of the lifeworld. 
What does it mean to regenerate the solidaristic resources so that the current 
dominant steering media of money and administrative power can be 
attenuated, properly influenced and/or transformed? Habermas does not 
see this as rejecting any kind of utopia. Rather the "utopian content of a 
society based on communication is limited to the formal aspects of an 
undamaged intersubjectivity. " This does not suggest a concrete form of 
life, but only the normative outlines of "the necessary but general conditions 
for the communicative practice of everyday life and for a procedure of 
discursive will formation that would put participants themselves in a position 
to realise concrete possibilities for a better and less threatened life, on their 
own initiative and in accordance with their own needs and insights. "sss 
There can be little disagreement of this at this abstract level. Habermas has 
been criticised for his idealisation of potential social formations because it 
appears to ignore the realities of structures of power that might actually 
inhibit the achievement of such idealisations. For example, Foster, via a 
sympathetic reading of Honneth's criticisms of Habermas writes that because 
"discourse ethics .. presupposes a 
freedom from all forms of institutional and 
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cultural coercion, and an equal access to social information and cultural 
traditions of education.... (it).. fails to gain access to the moral claims of 
underprivileged groups (because).. it unwittingly de-moralises the 
normative claims of the oppressed by identifying moral claims with universal 
validity claims raised in public discourse.... (and through)... the restriction of 
intuitively mastered rules of language.. (which).. is too far removed from how 
subjects understand and experience injuries to their moral intuitions to be 
able to guide theoretically experiences of injustices felt by lifeworld actors. " 
556 In a sense this has a resonance with the criticisms I have made, not so 
much of Habermas, as of the readings made by some of his supporters and of 
the implications that can be read from some of his work. At another level, 
however, it is a misreading of Habermas because it reads too literally what 
should be a "keep-in-the-forefront" type of idealisation. The last quote 
above by Habermas is a good example of that which should be striven for 
and which, in line with Habermas' own theory of fallibilism, is subject to 
empirical validation. Thus the question is not whether or not it can be 
expected of the oppressed to be able to master the intuitive rules of language 
- that is too patronising since if they communicate with each other they 
obviously have - but whether or not the public sphere is open to languages. 
In other words is it right to read Habermas as saying that there can only be 
one language form in the public sphere? Or should we read him as saying, 
as I do, that, in terms of fulfilling the conditions of the utopia of an 
undamaged subjectivity based communication, if the empirical conditions of 
a multi-racial society, including the unequal power relationships, demand 
languages, as opposed to language, then that is fine. To do otherwise is to 
say that the conditions for achieving a solidaristic steering of a multi-racial 
society, and within that the multi-racial welfare system, are such that they 
negate the "general conditions for the communicative practice of everyday 
life and for a procedure of discursive will formation that would put 
participants themselves in a position to realise concrete possibilities for a 
better and less threatened life, on their own initiative and in accordance with 
their own needs and insights. " This cannot be right. 
We come now to the last, but probably latest, stage in Habermas' thinking on 
welfare which relates to his proceduralist paradigm of welfare law which he 
claims is better than the two currently dominant in complex societies: 
bourgeois formal law and the welfare-state model. Applying the 
interrogative category of social justice, the former model relied on the 
negative legal status of institutionalising private law in a context of market 
participants so that since all could now participate equally, social justice 
could be attained. The image of society contained within such a legal 
system assumed certain things about the fairness and equilibrating qualities 
of the market. However the self evident adverse effects of such a society 
led to the development of the welfare reform model which relied not "on a 
change in the normative premises, but only a more abstract version of them. " 
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Whilst the image of society changed, the basic system of rights did not. In 
addition to the negative rights it was found necessary to introduce "new 
categories of basic rights grounding claims to a more just distribution of 
socially produced wealth and a more effective protection from socially 
produced dangers. s557 Taking account of the changing dynamics of the 
welfare state Habermas argues further that the vision of the welfare society 
envisaged could be twofold - dependent upon the extent to which it is 
deemed necessary for the state to intervene. In essence rather like the old 
UK welfare state and the new "modernised" vision of new right Labour. 
However both, according to Habermas, "assume a competition between two 
agents, the state and those subject to it, who dispute each other's scope for 
action. " It is acknowledged that the welfare state, in whichever version, 
whilst it grants to each person the "material basis for a humanly dignified 
existence", also at the same time, "tends to impose supposedly normal 
patterns of behaviour on its clients ... (thereby)... running the risk of 
impairing individual autonomy... "SS8 It is clear that Habermas is 
attempting to define a type of dependency within the welfare system which is 
substantively different to the types of dependencies governments are seeking 
to tackle. In the latter, as evinced by new Labour's forays into welfare 
reform, a dependency upon the material benefits of welfare is detected; a 
dependency which it is believed dulls clients aptitude and attitudes towards 
economic self sufficiency. The prescribed new versions of welfare reform, 
i. e. restricting the access to welfare as a `positive' inducement to seeking 
work, come with an explicit pronounced vision of cultural values and 
expected forms of life. I have commented earlier about the racist visions 
and counter visions that these have as a sub-text. At another level it is a 
reworking of "arbeit macht frei. " Self esteem, one of the components of 
respect identified by Honneth, is to be achieved solely through a combination 
of hard work and cultural re-orientation. Habermas, on the other hand, is 
concerned with the type of dependency that reduces and vitiates the 
resources of solidarity. To achieve this Habermas proposes the 
proceduralist understanding of law. This discursive ethical account of law 
does not disavow a materialist conception of justice, as Foster claims, but 
rather projects the following vision. 
"According to this view (the proceduralist), the legal order is structured 
neither by the measure of individual legal protection for private autonomous 
market participants nor by the measure of comprehensive social security for 
the clients of welfare state bureaucracies. Although it is supposed to provide 
the guarantee of both of these, they do not form the paradigmatic cases. In 
the proceduralist paradigm of law, the vacant places of the economic `man' or 
welfare client are occupied by a public of citizens who participate in political 
communication in order to articulate their wants and needs, and to give voice 
to their violated interests, and, above all, to clarify and settle the contested 
standards and criteria according to which equals are treated equally and 
unequals unequally. "'" 
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For Habermas such a vision of society is different to the liberal and welfare 
state models because both of these share a "productivist image of a capitalist 
industrial society". In the proceduralist society the "public sphere and civil 
society are the centrepiece of the new image.... (in which).. the burden of 
normative expectations shifts .... to the forms of communication in which an 
informal and non-institutionalised opinion and will-formation can develop 
and interact with the institutionalised deliberation and decision making 
inside the political system. "560 At this point we are back again at the 
criticisms and questions I raised about how race equality issues are to be 
built into those of the "forms of communication" in opinion and will 
formation. Nevertheless, for Habermas, this self organising legal 
community is legitimate "to the extent to which that it equally secures the co- 
original private and political autonomy of its citizens.. (and at the same 
time) ... it owes it legitimacy to the 
forms of communication in which civic 
autonomy alone can express and prove itself. "561 In terms of welfare, this 
project then has to be continued not along the same lines, but at "a higher 
level of reflection. " The aim of this `reflection', to quote Habermas again, 
is "to tame the capitalist economic system, that is "restructure" it socially and 
ecologically in such a way that the deployment of administrative power can 
be simultaneously brought under control.. .. (involving). . . training the 
administration to employ mild forms of indirect steering .... (and)... linking 
the administration to communicative power and immunizing it better against 
illegitimate power. "562 Earlier, in the critique, I had agreed with those like 
Dryzek, Fraser and McCarthy who felt that Habermas should be talking not 
so much about `taming', or `training' or simple `linking', but about 
transforming the system. A more radical perspective is required, it is felt, 
especially when the issue of race is considered and held up against the 
inclusive principles of discursive ethics. This does not mean regressing into 
the epistemological era and notions of consciousness, but does mean 
rethinking the issue of praxis from a communicative point of view. In 
terms of the public sector, pursuing the aim of bringing the administration 
under closer communicative influence will mean in certain concrete areas of 
the administration dissolving the boundaries between the institution, 
employee and community member; and this is especially pertinent where in 
terms of race and gender, those roles coalesce around the same people. 
Habermas' linkage of public and private autonomy in the proceduralist 
paradigm derives from his analysis of the relationship between actual and 
legal equality under the welfare model. In this it is recognised that the 
material remedial effects of welfare can help in overcoming the 
discriminating, differential access to the law. However this comes with a 
price because often "statutory regulations on work and family life force 
employees or family members to conform their behaviour to a `normal' work 
relation or a standard pattern of socialisation.. . (or). . . recipients of other 
compensations pay for these with dependencies on normalising intrusions by 
employment, welfare agencies, and housing authorities... "563 Habermas 
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uses the issue of how women are confronted by this assimmilationist 
pressure in the welfare system and how the proceduralist paradigm provides 
a better answer. Feminists, as Habermas points out, have rejected both the 
liberal and welfare paradigms of law because of their assumption "that equal 
entitlements of the sexes can be achieved within the existing institutional 
framework and within a culture dominated and defined by men. "SM Now a 
similar argument can be advanced in relation to race and the position of 
Black people within institutions. As will be shown in the empirical section 
any attempt to take the argument beyond the parameters of the liberal and 
welfare model was met with the abandonment and dismembering of the race 
equality commitments and structures in many public institutions in the UK. 
These gender differences then are judged in terms of a male standard giving 
rise to the stereotyping of women in captured institutional categories, and are 
not seen as equally problematic requiring the interrogation of the relationship 
between the two. What is required is an inter-subjective concept of rights: 
"public discussions conducted inside the arenas of those who are 
immediately affected must first clarify the aspects and criteria under which 
differences between the experiences and living conditions of (specific groups 
of) women and men become relevant for an equal opportunity to take 
advantage of individual liberties. "sbs Broadening this argument to include 
other areas of group oppression - and here race can be seen to enter, as I 
have tried to demonstrate with reference to Honneth - and in the need to 
relate private to public autonomy, Habermas cites Honneth's work which 
shows that "experiences of insults to human dignity are what must be 
articulated in order to attest to those aspects and criteria under which equals 
should be treated equally... (and therefore) cannot be delegated to judges and 
officials, not even to political legislators. " I interpret this as arguing for the 
"building-up-from-the-bottom" approach to regenerating solidaristic 
resources, a process which, if one looks closely at the implications of 
Habermas' words, must mean de- and reconstructing the welfare 
administrative steering media. 
Finally what, in layperson's terms, does the `linguistic turn' mean in relation 
to welfare and emancipation? Leornard, a welfare specialist, who has 
attempted a reconstructive profile from a perspective broadly sympathetic to 
Habennas summarises as follows: 
"If a new emancipatory project of welfare is to be developed it must be based 
upon a moral critique of modernity from within. This internal criticism directs 
its attention to the side of Enlightenment implicated in domination and contrasts 
this with the emancipatory potential remaining in those critical discourses of 
modernity expressed in the revolutionary ideals of liberty, justice and 
equality..... It is a form of welfare in which the subject is not seen as 
homogenous .... (but).... as a resistant moral agent.... Whether the state can play 
a decisive role in the promotion of welfare as an emancipatory project 
depends.. . on the extent to which 
its personnel, institutions and practices can be 
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induced to change in the direction of a more critical view of modernity. This 
would involve an abandonment of the urge to control and homogenise 
populations "in their own interests" and instead return to those values which 
form the critical, emancipatory side of modernity; a belief in equality and 
justice. It is because such a shift in the discourse which drives the state 
apparatus is a precondition of welfare as emancipation that achieving power 
over that apparatus is necessary. "566 
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6.16 Organisation of Governance (3) and Agency (4) 
The critique of Habermassian based social theory has been undertaken so 
that the promise held up at the beginning of it being the best epistemological 
framework within which to develop a racially inclusive concept of local 
governance, can be properly realised. In so doing the key nodal points of 
the "organising governance" column of the interrogative matrix have 
emerged in the development of the argument requiring thus now the process 
of `joining-up' the dots. However before attempting that it is necessary to 
clarify an unwarranted assumption which can be read from the use of the 
term "governance", which is that this should not be taken as being 
synonymous with the state. Governance encompasses the state and the state 
overlaps with governance, but they are not equivalent. The Collins 
dictionary defines governance as the "action, manner, or system of 
governing", and "govern" as meaning "to direct and control the actions, 
affairs, policies, functions of a political unit". 567 In raising the issue of 
race and governance, especially within the context of substantive 
inclusiveness, two further questions arise which are "what exactly falls 
within the provenance of `governance'? ", and "who directs and controls such 
governance? " The development of a connective answer between these two 
interrogative points which considers race explicitly will flesh out the 
organisational framework against which Habermas' vision of the 
organisation of governance can be summarised. 
Governance can be either "done by" or "done to", or about the relationship 
between the two properties. That is to say it can refer to, what I have 
classified as `ossified action', or more transitively action that is ongoing, 
without at this point specifying the nature of the action, e. g. discursive 
communicative action. The third relational alternative refers to a critical, 
reflexive, understanding which will be enlarged upon later. In terms of the 
basic `either-or' characterisation posed above, it can be said that governance 
is about the balance which affords priority to either system or process. In 
terms of re-examining this through the prism of race my argument has been, 
and is, that Black people have been subject to the system, only ever 
contingently part of the system, and thus involved in a process which is 
systemically determined. The remedial converse of this is not so much that 
the process is all, because that would be a re-constitution of the Republican 
model, and thus subject to an ethical `whitewash', but that the system should 
be programmed by the process, and not the other way around, and further 
that this `programming' should not in its development, implementation or 
effects, exclude Black people. Above all this `programming' recognises the 
feedback loop that develops between the system and the process, and in 
reconciling and resolving the keystone problem of race, that this loop 
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changes the structure of the system. In tracking and sketching Habermas' 
conception of governance, we have agreed with other sympathetic critics that 
he has acceded too much to systems theories to the extent that the 
relationship between lifeworld and system becomes one in which influence, 
and not change, becomes the dominant goal. As such for Habermas the 
complexity of the modern capitalist society gives rise to increasing 
differentiation which is reflected in the evolution of systems, rather than 
`system'. He thus differentiates between the administrative and political 
systems, designating the latter as the only one which can act "politically". 
In this he does, as McCarthy points out, re-affirm the classical Marxist 
perception of the political system. The influence of the lifeworld comes to 
bear through the process of the public sphere acting as the discursive 
medium which allows consensus to evolve over normative issues, and the 
gathering momentum of which allows it to spill over and through the 
floodgates of will formation located at key points in the political system. 
My argument is that, whilst Habermas' theory attempts to move beyond the 
epistemological level into that of language, and thus into the realisation of a 
critically contingent socialism, his theory, despite belated expansions to 
accommodate race and gender, still contains residues of a western ethical 
framework. This begins to give it an on tological and epistemological 
grounding which does not fully include Black people. However my 
contention is that this is not a foundationalist flaw, but one that arises out of 
his not wanting to realise fully the radical implications of his own theory. 
Inserting race into the considerations, especially within the framework of the 
argued contention that race is one of the key trans-epochal problems carried 
over into modernity the resolution of which is a crucial part of the touchstone 
to the completion of modernity, provides a means of re-radicalising 
Habermas, without necessarily recreating any historical change subjects. 
Bearing that in mind, we can return to the criticism made by McCarthy, and 
with which I have agreed, that Habermas' implication that the administrative 
system is almost beyond lifeworld redemption, is done so to the peril of not 
fully allowing the widest range of possible outcomes to his own theory. 
Furthermore this categorical distinction which Habermas makes between the 
political and administrative systems becomes on tologically grounded once 
he allows only the political system to act, and, contrary to empirical studies, 
thus underplays the relationship between the administrative system and 
political system thereby not acknowledging the extent to which the 
administrative system itself `acts'. For example the British political system 
at the national level is characterised as one in which the executive has 
enormous powers, especially in the policy initiation area. Within this 
arrangement the parliament is seen and treated as a policy rubber stamping 
forum. Additionally, whilst in BFN Habermas acknowledges that more 
has to be done to make the administrative system more democratic in its 
practices, it is left at this level of a general plea to his readership. However 
not only McCarthy, but others as well, such as Alvesson and Willmott, have 
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outlined the extent to which Habermas' own work can be used as an 
analytically de- and reconstructive tool in organisational and management 
studies, the very substance of administrative systems. To which I would 
add that the pursuit of race equality within public administrative systems 
exposes those communicative fault lines around which democratising 
initiatives can cluster. If this is the case then it is clear that, pace 
Habermas, I regard the administrative system as part of the political system, 
and thus, part of the sphere of governance. This contention is given even 
greater weight when considered from the point of view of Habermas' 
acknowledgement that political, administrative, and within those, the legal, 
systems are imbued with a dominant ethical framework; one which can be 
held accountable to the universal claims contained in the moral vision. My 
qualifying subsidiary critique of this is that the identitarian outcomes of such 
an ethically imbued framework are the result of a debate postponed by 
centuries, and that it is not so much the presence of this framework, as those 
challenge points where the denial of counterpoints are part and parcel of 
maintaining that ethical framework. This framework then forms the taken- 
for-granted consensual back-cloth to the everyday processes of the 
administrative system, and, becomes, as I have argued earlier, the fecund 
seed bed for institutional racism. More than that this ethical background 
runs across administrative sub-systems and frames the responses to counter 
validity claims raised by other ethical and moral constituencies, such as 
Black people, who enter into and seek equal footing and space in these 
administrative systems. Thus even if, within these differentiated systems, 
there are differing responses because of specific `discourse histories', where 
that latter appellation designates no more than surface borrowing from post 
structuralism, the architectonic support of the racially differentiating denial 
is basically the same across the system- Earlier in this critique, I, 
following Habermas and Cooke, had contrasted the three elements of a 
validity claim contained in discursive communicative action which need to 
be addressed, with that of only one of those elements contained in a claim 
which is resolved strategically. It is within these validity shortfalls that the 
de-democratising and the unjust hierarchical power of systems lie. 
Furthermore it is the overt and also unconscious reliance on that ethical 
framework as the taken-for-granted consensual background which, within 
the context of strategic action, helps elide the three elements into one. 
These communicative blockages can be racialised easily when Black people 
entering such systems raise claims which, following the logic of Habermas' 
argument, can only be resolved with their full and equal involvement. Such 
claims can be denied, i. e. the claim for communicative discourse is distorted, 
through evoking the homogenising, symbiotic, relationship that exists 
between the essentialised exaggeration of the dominant ethical framework as 
a counterpoint to the failing homogenised `other'. For example the recent 
figures showing that a disproportionately low number of Black Afro- 
Caribbean applicants to medical schools obtained places compared with 
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white applicants, was excused by the executive officer of the Council of 
Heads of Medical Schools because, in his opinion, such students "mature 
late" and "fail to display many of the characteristics" needed to make good 
doctors. 568 The claims then of Black people do not only predicate the 
enactment of rights which are embedded in the implied moral order, but also 
those that of recognition. Honneth's notion of recognition through the 
satisfaction of three inter-related moments, i. e. self respect, self esteem and 
self confidence, can be seen, in the parlance of managerial orthodoxy now 
pervading the public sector, as the one of the key `outcomes' from such 
validity claims being discursively properly resolved. That is to say a process 
in which there was participation that satisfied the five principles of 
Habermas' discursive communication, as well as my critical interpretation of 
the language(s) requirement. Race then runs across historically contingent 
boundaries in systems to the extent that the dominant ethical framework is 
sought to be maintained in that position. On the other hand systemic inter 
and intra boundaries can be, and are, dissolved in responding to this form of 
racialisation when such issues are properly discursively, communicatively 
resolved. That is to say that attempts can be, and are made, to `resolve' 
these validity claims strategically. To that end I have argued earlier that 
there is a new form of racism which nods in the direction of formal race 
equality but denies its substantive achievement through the de-politicisation, 
hence de-democratisation, of equality processes. This managerialisation of 
`equality' gives rise to race equality resurfacing in the guise of `diversity', a 
response which oscillates between individualising the problem and re- 
essentialising cultural groups, as is evident in much American literature on 
`diversity', and thereby denies the collective nature of racism, and thus seeks 
to block the solidaristic bases of Black responses to it. It is in fact the 
formal recognition of certain rights, but without allowing the ability to 
realise and exercise such rights. These rights are not group ones, but those 
which have evolved through the period of establishing a positive `race 
equality regime', and thus refer to the right not to have collective wrongs 
imposed, i. e. not to be "wogged". Without this right not be forcibly 
collectivised, rights are effectively reduced again to the level of the liberal 
model I have argued as well that one of the important solidaristic responses 
to this should be the signifying Black collectivity, -which betokens no more 
than an acknowledgement that the homogenising nature of racialised wrongs 
`done-to' certain groups is the bases for a constituency in which solutions 
can be discursively pursued. The pursuit of solutions thus can be a force 
for democratising administrative systems, and thus for de-differentiation, 
especially where wrongs done-to covers inter- and intra-faces with the 
dominant ethical framework in such systems, e. g. Black employees and 
Black service users. This trajectory has to be contrasted with that currently 
being pursued by new right Labour in which transforming the system has 
been jettisoned in favour of rigorous `modernising' fine tuning of the system 
through a highly specified management financial accounting process of 
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accountability. In another sense it can be argued that to abandon the system 
as beyond redemptive action, as Habermas sometimes implies, is to leave it 
to the mercy of those who forego any hope of emancipatory change, such as 
new right Labour who prefer to make it `work' with maximum strategic 
efficiency, or post structuralists whose deconstructing discourse analyses 
contain only a faint hope of resistance spaces, and by default, therefore end 
up `Mynah Birding' liberal solutions. This trajectory contains as well a 
vision of the state and of governance which, (1) draws from Habermas the 
notion of the state as the means through which problems are resolved which 
are beyond the forces of social integration, (2) enlarges the political sphere 
of the state to include the administrative system, as implied by McCarthy's 
criticisms, and (3) cross tabulates it with the notion of the progressive 
decolonizing nation state, as envisaged by Fanon, which "brings the future of 
capitalism radically into question. " What this then releases is not the 
vanguardist notion of truth or progress, which might include a strong 
ethically framed nation defining process, as is contained in Fanon's vision, 
but rather the change from the bottom-up via the de-on tological state, so to 
speak, which guarantees that the voices of the `dispossessed' can enter into 
discursive communication around normative issues which effect them. It is 
in this sense then that Habermas' solidaristic aims of bringing the system 
under the determining influence of the margins can, in terms of race, be 
given more critical teeth. It moves away then - and this not so unexpected 
given that I invest the state with greater deon tological guardianship - from 
Habermas' view that the state becomes one of many action systems. It 
means as well that in the area of discursive opinion and will formation the 
organisation of governance must allow for the maximum degree of, and act, 
under certain circumstances, as guarantor for, autonomy. This is not the 
subject centred autonomy of the philosophy of consciousness variant, but the 
inter-subjective autonomy that characterises the linguistic turn in Habermas. 
But this brings to bear all the critical issues I have raised above about 
language, race and discursive communication, particularly in the polity. 
Here `minority ethical frameworks' struggle to be heard on an equal basis, 
and this raises a moral issue about the norms of inclusion, as well as those of 
the struggle to have their moral issues, which arise from those ethical 
frameworks, from being given proper consideration, for example those 
women who wish to cast aside the ethically framed patriarchal constraints of 
certain communities. Allowing the maximum degree of inter-subjective 
autonomy must mean as well taking at prima facie level the authenticity of 
those lived experiences which are brought to bear However I have re- 
asserted the communicative paradigm by drawing out the distinction that the 
lack of harmonization is because of "wrongs done to" rather than a value 
intrinsic clash between the dominant and minority ethical framework. This 
is what Honneth does in his theory of recognition and disrespect in which the 
attack on a people's autonomy is done through the inscription of an 
inauthentic palimpsest which attempts to rewrite their lived experiences. 
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To that extent autonomy and authenticity are inter-related to the degree that 
upholding the principles of communicative discourse means that the moral 
discourse of the former is `authenticated' by the degree to which the ethical 
discourses of the latter are free to enter into and leave inviolably, such moral 
considerations. Such inviolability betokens not the essentialised recognition 
of ethical discourses, but the principle of being heard without any intrusive 
forces of distorted communication. _ 
In BFN Habermas' espouses constitutional democracy, not as some form of 
social utopia, but more pragmatically, as the best way forward for complex 
societies; in a sense a "sub-domain of practical reasoning". Habermas' 
(in)famous requirements of new entrants to those societies of "constitutional 
patriotism" I have read as, both because of the grounding inclusive principles 
governing communicative discourse, and because of my own contention 
about race being one of the key unresolved problems impeding the 
completion of modernity, only ever being able to be sustained at the level of 
accepting the principle of constitutionality, and not the concrete forms those 
constitutions might take. In this sense the principle of constitutional 
democracy can be seen as the governance of governance; which is to say, at 
another level, the extent to which governance, if it is governance by those 
involved, is authenticated. Preuss, whom Habermas' uses approvingly in 
BFN, is clear that the constitution does not of itself give rise to some 
magical, moral, universalism because "religious and moral particularism, the 
proneness to error.... egotism and greed... (are channelled)... within a 
constitution. , 569 Rather constitutions "create such institutional-conditions 
as are suited to exert a beneficial pressure on society to rationalise and 
improve itself. . . by providing an operational 
framework, or more exactly, by 
creating a state or condition of `being constituted' in the broad sense of 
`being a group organised on certain principles'... (so that) ... a society is 
constituted when it must confront itself in suitable institutional forms and in 
normatively directed processes of adjustment, resistance and self 
correction". 570 To get a clearer picture of what Preuss is talking about, 
requires spelling out, in a negative, benchmarking way, what not being 
constituted means. This then "is a condition of a society which can deal 
only imperfectly with its destructive tendencies, its power structure, its total 
inequalities - in short, its institutionally underdeveloped potential for a 
successful confrontation of its normative foundations with real conditions". 
In a way then that ties in with my argument about governance, autonomy and 
authenticity, Preuss notes that "repression in the political and 
psychoanalytical sense are the two alternative strategies that form the 
opposite of being constituted". 571 
The next chapter, then, attempts to fleetingly outline the framework to what 




Positively Racialised Local Governance - controlling the 
Enlightenment's hidden dimmer switch 
7.1 Introduction 
I agree with Habermas' caution regarding any attempt to use his work as the 
bases for some utopian blue print, with the attendant, threat therefore, of 
authoritarian, distorted communicative processes being touted as the means 
of achieving that future status. The latter version can be associated with 
the dystopian vision incorporated into New right Labour's modernising 
agenda for local government in which the techno-managerial claims of 
strategic planning are raised above those who are the real participants in 
local governance because at the end of the day, such `strategising' will better 
meet the legitimation needs of national government. Habermas has thus 
been very clear that, notwithstanding his espousal of constitutional 
democracy, his utopia is limited to the deon tological conditions which make 
it possible for people to engage in communicative discourse free from 
distorting force, so that they can decide the future. It is, in another sense, a 
critically grounded re-working of making history "as-we-go", and thus the 
progressive, counter blast to the neo-conservative's premature triumphalist 
`hurrah' for capitalism, as evidenced by Fukuyama's `end of history' 
claim. 572 This particular notion of utopia accords with the one I set out in 
chapters 1 and 2 which talks about "periodising utopia" because it both 
allows for a "practical critical idealism which rejects the new realist, 
absolutist implying, perjorativising of utopia" whilst at the same time 
"permits discussion to take place without inhibitors about action oriented 
towards change for a better future.. " 
The key issue then, given the above circumscriptions about mapping the 
future, is whether or not it is possible to sketch out the `ideal type' form of 
local governance which is not race oppressive or exploitative so that the 
main objectives of this can be the "ideal type markers" against which local 
governance as was -( the bases of the research)- can be measured. In 
attempting to reconstruct racism and anti-racist politics, I developed a "keep- 
in-the-forefront" framework oriented towards certain ideal-type goals. These 
were that the analysis should not be particularistic, not teleological, should 
be reflexive, should provide the means for policy and practice interventions 
linked to substantive issues of democratic opinion and will formation, and, 
finally, should provide the means for pursuing the deracialising of race. At 
another level this attempts to uphold the principles of critical research which 
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are encapsulated in Horkheimer's criteria, i. e. "it must be explanatory, 
practical and normative at the same time. " 573 A similar framework can be 
developed for what I have in the title to this section called "positively 
racialised local governance. " That is to say that racism and derived notions 
of race as social constructions which exert distorting forces in the structures 
of communication in the sphere of local governance, are deconstructed, and 
deracinated.. Developing this framework requires, as a prefatory exercise 
not only re-stating and re-emphasising the urgent observation made in the 
paper on racism and anti-racist politics, that "the situation is worsening for 
Black people here, in Europe, and world wide"574, but also sketching out the 
wider context to race and local governance locally, nationally and 
internationally as a bases for reconnecting the two parts of this prefatory 
exercise. 
Quintessentially this notion of `reconnection' prefigures my substantive 
contention that the relationship between the very short period of race explicit 
local government, that from the late seventies to the late eighties, and the 
parallel evolving and subsequent de-democratising changes to local 
governance in the UK, has been greatly under-estimated by commentators 
and `experts' in the field of local government. In part this is not so 
surprising since my critique of two influential "progressive" schools, post- 
Fordist and localist, reveal the extent to which race is marginalised there in, 
with the concomitant conclusions that if they can marginalise, it is even more 
likely that the moderate to conservative variants will do so even more. 
What seems to inure in such analyses though, even with the benefit of 
hindsight, is the view, and their failure to countenance any form of 
relationship confirms this, that race initiatives were but marginal anyway to 
the problems facing local government. It's a point of view captured by one 
of the target council's political leaders who, in attempting to win on side a 
Black councillor over a vote which would have negative effects on resources 
for Black people, offered the view that, "... it (i. e. racism) would always be 
around... ')). 575 The implication being that to direct energies and resources in 
that direction was pointless. Nevertheless it remains to be explained why 
in one of the only two periods in the history of dominating contact between 
the UK and Black peoples when it could be said that the state, or parts of it, 
was overtly racialised, no substantive connection is made to the subsequent 
changes to that date, especially if this entailed the neutralising a positive 
racialisation. 
7.2 Colonisation, De-Colonisation and Re-Colonisation 
I equate the first period of the racialisation of the European state, in 
particular the UK with that which saw the growing contact between Europe 
and Black people grow into what has been analysed as colonialism. 
Osterhammel's provocative study of colonialism releases two definitions 
278 
which I want to make use of because they are germane to my argument. 
These draw a distinction between `colony', a particular type of socio- 
political organisation and `colonialism' a system of domination". Thus: 
"A colony is a new political organisation created by invasion (conquest and/or 
settlement colonisation) but built on pre-colonial conditions. Its alien rulers are 
in sustained dependence on a geographically remote `mother country' or 
imperial centre which claims exclusive rights of `possession' of the colony. "576 
And: 
"Colonialism is a relationship of domination between an indigenous (or forcibly 
imported) majority and a minority of foreign invaders. The fundamental decisions 
affecting the lives of the colonised people are made and implemented by the 
colonial rulers in pursuit of interests that are often defined in a distant metropolis. 
Rejecting cultural compromises with the colonised population, the colonisers are 
convinced of their own superiority and their ordained mandate to rule". 577 
Issue of colonial state where degree of settler autonomy created, either 
through delegation of authority to rule administratively and/or through 
limited, qualified franchise. 
Between the sixteenth century and the middle of the twentieth century, this 
system of colonisation, this "process of territorial acquisition", had resulted 
in a world system which saw "approximately half of the mainland earth ... 
covered with colonies.. . (to the extent that) about two fifths of the earth's 
population stood under colonial rule: 400 million in Asia, 120 million in 
Africa, 60 million in Oceania, and 14 million in America". 578 Over that 
four century period apropos the state, leaving aside the details of the 
periodisation of colonialism and the multi-faceted details therein, it can be 
said that the evolution of the modern European state with its attendant 
continuously refined and defined political freedoms went hand in hand with 
the evolution of a system of domination and exploitation of "others" whose 
differentiation from, and separation out of, those freedoms was defined by 
colour. The shelving of colonialism's details is not simply because, post- 
coloniality wise, we can only talk about the "histories of individual 
colonialisms", but because there is the realisation that over time such 
colonies, and their metropolises, were not hermetically sealed from each 
other. Osterhammel quotes Furnavell thus: "Modern colonisation is an 
affair of capital and not of men, and capital knows no country. 99579 He 
also, quite rightly points to the commonality of the colonial experience for 
the colonised, especially where, within historical periods, there was a change 
of colonial power. This he describes as the `constant' of the "colonial 
situation", the unchanging complex of rule, exploitation and cultural conflict 
in ethnically heterogeneous political structures that had been created by 
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influence from without. " The state in such colonising powers becomes 
racialised then through directing the domination of the colonies through the 
executive structures established in such colonies guided by, and over time in 
the relationship, self confirmed by, the `anthropophagied' notions of 
superiority. In essence, as Osterhammel claims: "The notion that non- 
Europeans differ utterly and essentially from Europeans was a cornerstone of 
colonialist thought ... (and).. the inferior mental and physical abilities imputed 
to non-Europeans would render them incapable of the large scale cultural 
accomplishments and heroic deeds that only modem Europe could achieve. " 
580 There is a sense then in which it is possible to talk about this very 
nearly world wide system as the first period of globalisation, a very 
racialised globalisation in which the relationship between the centre and 
periphery was not just one way, i. e. from top to bottom so to speak. There 
was an evolution and growth, as Habermas argues, in both normative 
learning processes as well as technical ones so that, I contend, modernity 
came into being with a shadow whose profile was not simply that of the one 
sided rationalising forces in modern Europe, but the extended one of Europe 
and its colonial appendages. In fact I would go further and argue that the 
impetus for much of the technical learning processes of domination, 
particularly that of political domination, those forces holding back the 
fulfilment of modernity, which is Habermas' aim, came from the relationship 
of domination between Europe and that euphemistically defined as "non- 
European. " Hannah Arendt's still seminally relevant analysis of the 
origins of totalitarianism, points to two new inter-related "devices for 
political organisation over foreign peoples", by which she means Black 
people, being discovered in the first decades of imperialism. Leaving aside 
her periodisation which I think is too late, she identifies these `devices as 
"race as a principle of the body politic, and .... bureaucracy as a principle of 
foreign domination. "581 She notes that whilst in the end "racism and 
bureaucracy proved to be inter-related in many ways, they were discovered 
and developed independently", yet in their combination there was "a range 
of potentialities of power accumulation and destruction. m, 582 Osterhammel, 
who does not make use of Arendt in his analysis, comes to a similar 
conclusion. Whilst he acknowledges the differing socio-political 
formations that were imposed in the different colonies according to the 
origins of the colonisers, he does draw out the similarities that came to be 
found in the colonial state which he periodises as developing from the late 
eighteenth century onwards. Whilst Osterhammel views the colonial state 
as a "political form in and of itself' and not an extension of the metropolitan 
state, nevertheless I would contend that they were inter-related. I would 
use the centre-periphery model to describe the relationship, one that 
resurfaces in the depiction of the relationship between local and national 
government in the UK, and even within the spatial and organisational 
arrangements of local governance itself. In a sense it can be said that the 
colonial state, even if it was not formally regarded as part of the national 
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territory, as say France did with some of its colonial possessions, was the 
local arm of the metropolitan state; it was, at the end of the day, "subordinate 
to the political authority of the mother country". It was a form of local 
governance on a global scale. What is interesting, because it echoes 
current developments in local governance, and I shall argue later for its 
direct relational relevance, is the way in which Osterhammel characterises 
the colonial state. It had two, core functional values: "to secure control 
over the subjugate peoples and to create a framework for the economic 
utilisation of the colony. , 583 But there was another way in which the 
colonial state was unique. Osterhammel describes its vistas of autocratic 
opportunity as resembling the "immediate aftermath of a victorious 
revolution, offering enormous leeway for political and social upheavals 
`from above' ). )584. Ferro, in broad agreement with this, describes the 
colonial situation as being the experimental test bed for modernity. 585 To 
which I would add the qualification that it was the experimentation in 
advancing the technical learning processes of domination that occurred. It 
is therefore true that "colonial expansion appeared to open up new avenues 
for an `enlightened absolutism' of a sort scarcely possible in Europe at that 
time". 86 The most obvious of these was that the colonial state was a 
bureaucratic state which, despite financial woes, because such states were 
expected to be largely self financing, had to work effectively and efficiently. 
Its bureaucratic development was such that Osterhammel speculates that "the 
advancement of bureaucratisation in Europe received significant stimuli 
from the periphery". 587 This is something with which Arendt in her 
analysis, is in agreement. In Britain, thus, "there was no bureaucratic 
apparatus until the structuring of the welfare state after 1945 that could have 
measured up to the administration of India, the Indian Civil Service (ICS), in 
both size and professionalism.... (it).. was the model for all nineteenth and 
twentieth century colonial bureaucracies.. . (and).. . the purest expression of 
the colonial state as a proconsular autocracy, and bureaucratic 
absolutism" S88 Moreover it was when bureaucracy was combined with 
race, especially the "civilising mission" colonialism espoused as the reason 
for acquiring territories, that one particular aspect of this experimentation in 
the shadow of modernity springs to attention. This is that the Europeans' 
belief that they "had uncovered `chaos' on to which they had to impose 
order" gave rise to a "colonialist utopia of an administration free of politics". 
589 The need for order meant that the colonial state could not display any 
weakness for fear that this "would encourage trouble makers to provoke a 
`Black rebellion"'. Apropos this, as an example, Osterhammel notes that 
Lord Cromer, described by others as great European proconsul in Egypt, was 
deemed so to be because he had a tendency "to de-politicise politics and 
reduce all human affairs to questions of proper administration. "590 
Bureaucratic rule does not mean the rule of law. Rather, as Arendt points 
out, it is the rule by decree which does not require the legitimation of 
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accountability back to assemblies of people, or of justification, but simply 
the expediency of applicability. 
"In governments by bureaucracy decrees appear in their naked purity as though 
they were no longer issued by powerful men, but were the incarnation of power 
itself and the administrator only its accidental agent. There are no general 
principles which simple reason can understand behind the decree, but ever 
changing circumstances which only an expert can know in detail. "59' 
The evolution of these learning processes of instrumental reason focusing on 
the governance of `foreign others' takes place within and informs the 
reservoir of political knowledge upon which the political processes of the 
metropolitan state can draw. It must be remembered that the apogee of the 
bureaucratic colonial state was as a short a time ago as the fifties, and not 
some period in the last century. The process of formal decolonisation is one 
that is still going on. To that extent it is quite feasible to argue, as I do, 
that the political `lessons' from colonialism, especially those derived from 
the colonial state, are integral to the body of possible political responses the 
state can draw upon in responding to situations where there is the perceived 
threat of trouble makers fomenting a "Black rebellion". 
If then this first period of the racialised state went up to the nineteen fifties, it 
also overlapped with the period after the second world war when the 
emergence of a nascent system of global governance and associated norms 
made racism formally unacceptable. The trope of the superior, civilised 
West had over the past four hundred years assumed differing perceptible 
forms from the initial self belief in the racial hierarchy of black over white to 
the fear of the racial backlash from those dominated. Furedi in an 
interesting analyses of the "evolution of the Western racial imagination" 
argues that by the end of the First World war the issue of race had become a 
source of anxiety for the west, so much so that he characterises this as a 
change form "racial confidence to racial fear. , 
592 The period of the 
thirties saw, in intellectual circles, the beginning of the diminuation in the 
belief in the scientific bases to the racial hierarchy and the beginning of the 
growth in the school of race relations. For the West the racial 
contradictions of the Second World War expressed through the need to use 
Black troops on an equal basis with whites, the post war ramifications for the 
accepted racial order both in the States and colonies, the racialised nature of 
the war against Japan, not to mention the use of the moral high ground 
against Nazi Germany's genocidal practices, simply increased this sense of 
anxiety voiced in terms of the potential threat to the post war international 
order. Race relations then "evolved in an attempt to minimise the danger of 
racial conflict". Furedi sees these early initiatives in race relations as 
attempting to create for white society a form of self censorship against 
allowing the more extreme forms of racism so that racial conflict could be 
avoided. He uses Tinker's observation to illustrate this that "the `race 
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problem' ... was the problem of the non-white who would not accept the leadership of the white. "593 However it is the implied communicative slant 
put on this era of race relations by Furedi which is important. He quite 
rightly observes that this attempt to silence the issue of race resulted in the 
paradox that those who felt race relations to be a problem also felt reluctant 
to tackle it openly, so much so that "it became all too easy to overlook the 
significance of race in the conduct of international affairs. 094 I would add 
as well that this applied equally to the way in which such affairs were 
addressed within the boundaries of the metropolitan state. In that respect I 
want to re-interpret Furedi's analysis in terms of drawing out what I consider 
to be the details of some of the important distorting forces in the structures of 
communication surrounding race in the metropolitan, especially as this 
relates to the way in which race enters, or does not enter, the arena of 
opinion and will formation. Furedi points to a number of ways in which, 
what I have regard as technical learning processes of domination, racism, its 
causes, and lines of accountability, were deflected and displaced. As early 
as the twenties, a British Foreign Office memorandum `Racial 
Discrimination and Immigration' stated, "Great Britain, the Dominions and 
the United States are all equally interested in avoiding discussion of this 
subject. "595 In the forties and fifties the argument was put forward, one that, 
as I pointed out in my earlier example regarding a councillor's comments, 
still occurs, to the effect that racism was an age old irresolvable problem 
which because of "the emotionalism which surrounds the whole question of 
race and prejudice made rational discussion impossible. , 596 There were 
other `takes' on this process of silencing, such as arguing that discussion of 
the subject would make Black people more conscious of their differences 
with white people; or pursuit of the problem is likely to simply result in anti- 
white racism (see the first to be prosecuted under the incitement clauses of 
the Race Discrimination Act); or blaming the eruption of anti-racist opinions 
on the fomenting politics of the racially classic agent provocateur, the 
rootless, disaffected `marginal man', the mulatto syndrome; or neutralising 
the issue by insisting it is other than race; or simply not allowing public 
discussion of the issue. Apropos the latter Furedi quotes one Whitehall 
official who feels that public discussion "would merely exacerbate racial 
feelings. " There is one other facet of this era of race relations which sought 
to disguise the true nature of the racialised state, and, which also resurfaces 
in the way in which race is being addressed by the state today. This is the 
way in which the ideal of race equality was attacked. Furedi makes the 
point that this was rarely undermined by asserting the superiority of the 
white race. Rather it was attacked by asserting the right to be different, 
including the right to be unequal. Hence the state "felt far more comfortable 
with conceding the right to be different than the right to be 
equal .... (because).. the right to equality 
demanded far greater changes to the 
prevailing racial etiquette than the right to be different. "597 
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"Throughout the twentieth century ideas about race relations have reflected 
hesitancy, bitterness, scepticism, bad faith and above all the desire to slow things 
down. The development of racial pragmatism in the inter-war period strikingly 
confirmed this tendency. It indicated that the conceptual isation of a distinct 
subject of race relations had as its problematisation the reaction to racism. Indeed 
until the 1960s most of the insights, theories and concepts associated with race 
relations were oriented towards the explanation and containment of this reaction to 
racism. "598 
The transitionary episode to what I have described as the first period of the 
overt racialisation of the metropolitan state saw then a change in the 
technical content of the learning processes of racial domination from the self 
confidence of racial superiority to that of the implicit, `lets-not-rock-the- 
boat' form of silencing of the issue. Both created enormous forced 
blockages in the structures of communication. These were challenged, in 
the metropole, by what one commentator has described as the Third world in 
the first city. That is to say by the reality of the previous colonising power 
having to deal with the reality of colonial migrants in the metropole. 
Throughout the sixties, and seventies the state has had to try to come to 
terms with the demands of Black people for justice. The second phase of 
the overt racialisation of the state is marked by those moves which see the 
attempt to formally involve the state in resolving those problems of social 
integration which have proved irresolvable without its intervention. The 
various race relations acts are testament to this, as are the race specific 
interventions in urban management. However it is in one particular part of 
the state, that which overlaps with the arena of local governance, that in the 
late seventies to late eighties, is seen in many inner city local government the 
attempt to open up those communicative blockages on race. Across the 
range of local government responsibilities, employment services, political 
representation and participation, initiatives can be seen which aim to achieve 
the positive racialisation of this particular part of the state. The recognition 
given to this second phase by theorists have for the most part concentrated 
on the pragmatic considerations to taking on board the issue of race in local 
governance. These will be covered in the next major section looking at the 
empirical details. For the most part the causal and historical context to 
these sorts of analysis have remained at the level of the post Second World 
war state coming to terms with increasing numbers of Black people living in 
this society. They have had extreme difficulty, therefore, trying to deal 
with the situation now which has seen the virtual elimination of many of the 
race equality initiatives in these political institutions, treating this reversal as 
the unfortunate by product of national government inspired cuts, the 
electablity expediency of new Right labour and/or, as one prominent race 
industry person has speciously put forward, the over zealous beastliness of 
race advisors. Attempts to move beyond this to a higher level of 
abstraction have broadly been threefold. The first, Gilroy's attempts to 
theorise the changes in the local state, I have already criticised as being 
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empirically challenged, and because he locates the locus of change within 
the cultural sphere, ends up effectively abandoning the local state as being 
unimportant to Black people. There are issues as well as about his 
privileging of one particular set of experiences in the history of white over 
Black racial dominance which militate against drawing out the solidaristic 
networks that link black people's experiences. However, to give him his 
due, he does not try to switch off the enlightenment, but, in his own way, 
tries, representatively, "to formulate our (my emphasis) own big narratives 
precisely as narratives of redemption and emancipation. s599 The other 
attempts can be situated within the realms of what I, following Habermas, 
have previously described as `posties'. That is to say the de-narrativising 
theorisation of race and the state. Inter-connectedly, but separately, there 
are two variants: those belonging to the post-modern school and those to the 
post colonial school. Of these, the post colonial is the more important. I 
want to summarise this as a lead up to detailing a contention, which is 
implied in my assertion about the underestimation of the degree of race 
thinking in the changes that have affected local government, that the 
`whitewashing' of the second phase, positive racialisation of the local state 
occurred not as some form of collateral damage accruing from substantive 
changes in other spheres, but from a high degree of racialised thinking that is 
directly linked to the knowledge base of the first phase. Whilst then I am 
highly critical of the hopelessness of emancipatory change which emerges 
from much of the de-narrativising `postie' type analyses, nevertheless I do 
acknowledge that their point of departure is similar to mine, and that, 
therefore, there are overlaps in their deconstructive details with mine, even if 
their reconstructive aims are weaker and more modest. 
As an example of the genre I shall refer to "Edge of Empire; Post- 
Colonialism and the City", by Jacobs The "post-colonial" has, I suppose 
the prima facie advantage of having the imperial and colonial past as a 
constant nomenclatured reference point in the name it calls itself. Jacobs 
work then, like much in the re-workings of geography through critical lenses, 
offers a lot on the continuing presence of colonialism and imperialism in the 
urban spatialities of the `first world', but little on the relationship between 
political structures, whether national, regional or local, and those spaces. 
Nevertheless it is possible to read off the inferred relationship. For Jacobs, 
then, the spheres of colonial discourse analysis and post-colonialism alter 
radically the understanding of imperialism, nation and race, especially in the 
way they have introduced the notion of space into these analyses. 
However, the major fault line is that such theories have functioned at the 
metaphorical level, and it is necessary for them to return to `real' 
geographies. This does beg the question of whether or not they ever did 
function other than at the metaphorical level. Where I do agree with her is 
at the general appreciation of the influence of imperialism on the present 
when she writes that "relations of power and difference established through 
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nineteenth century British imperialism linger on and are frequently 
reactivated in many contemporary First World cities. "600 For Jacobs the 
focus of the post-colonial in the metropole is that of Black people who have 
either emigrated there, or are long term subject populations. These are the 
sources for an identarian politics which is not "simply built around the 
structures of power internal to the city ... (but).... is also a politics constituted 
by a broader history and geography of colonial inheritances, imperialist 
presents and post-colonial possibilities. "60' I am not so sure that the 
colonial remembrances are so firmly embedded in Black populations a few 
generations down the line from those who first immigrated. I have argued 
before that it is the here and now which are more important for identity 
claims, rather than pseudo-histories. However, it is more likely, as I shall 
detail later, that it is within the arena of the technical learning processes that 
there remains a residuum of knowledge concerning the domination and 
governance of Black people which can be re-activated. First, however, it is 
necessary to detail what exactly is meant by the term "post-colonial", and 
more importantly, "post-colonial possibilities. " The post colonial critique 
provides a new conceptual framework, according to Jacobs, which whilst not 
denying the structures of domination, also points to the contingent nature the 
Self/other relationship; so much so that these "demonstrate the vulnerability 
of imperialist and colonialist power.. (and) ... highlight the way these cultures 
of power and domination never fully realise themselves. 402 There is then, 
in such theories, a greater sensitivity to the culture of imperialism. The 
contingency refers as well not only to the resistance generated, but also to the 
complicity and collaboration with such powers of domination. Where these 
accounts differ from economistic world systems' theories, such as 
Wallerstein's, is that culture is analysed as more than just an adjunct, but as 
the seed bed for "numerous desires and needs" which activated imperialism. 
Whilst the post-colonial, then is signified by the formal independence of 
former colonies after the Second World War, it attests as well to the 
continuing "force of neo-colonial formations and lives shaped by the 
ideologies of domination and the practices of prejudice established by 
imperialism. " 603 Post-colonialism, then contains a hope for liberation which 
puts it beyond the "limits of existing power relations. " There is then a 
diversity of perspectives within the overall category of `post-colonial'. 
However, despite this, they "all share a common political project.... which is 
counter-colonial". In terms of the First World city, Jacobs, whilst 
disagreeing with King's neo-Marxist based world system theory, agrees with 
his observations that "urbanism and urbanisation in the metropole cannot be 
understood separately from development in the colonial periphery. "604 To 
that extent then post war migration of Black people to the metropolises of 
the metropole have, in Jacob's eyes, brought the "edge of empire into the 
heart" for Britain, whilst her new international alignments do not signal the 
end of empire, but the "conditions for revised imperial articulations. " These 
give rise to new forms of exploitation and domination. However, given the 
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importance given to the possibility of `pure' post-colonialism which is 
captured in the theorisation of contingency, there is, then, the expectation 
that this should give rise to strong emancipatory counter-drive. What 
emerges, however, is something altogether weaker. The reasons for this 
have already been analysed in the critique put forward of the post 
structuralist position in which the subject becomes the `subject-effect' of 
various constituting forces. Thus agency towards the post-colonial resides 
in "the disruptive power of hybridity.... (which)... as a key signifier of post- 
coloniality ... (exposes)... the inevitable vulnerability of colonial structures of 
power ... (so that).... imperialism undoes itself, against itself. "6os 
At the general level there is much to commend the parameters for 
investigation of the post colonial vision: the emphasis on the continuing 
influence of the colonial and imperial past, the recognition of the two way 
relationship between metropole and colony, and the notion of contingency. 
However, the point can be made again that it is not necessary for a `post' 
type theoretical framework to garner such insights. Apart from which the 
contradiction between the emphasis placed upon subject-effect within such 
contingency, and the achievement of the liberatory possibilities of 'post- 
coloniality' is exemplified in the almost teleological construction of waiting 
for imperialism to undo itself. It is here, then, at this juncture between 
`real' world change and the deconstructive trail of a post colonial analysis 
that the problem occurs. How, other than at the general level already 
outlined, can such theories assist in determining the reasons for the sorts of 
changes I've indicated happened to the second period of the overt 
racialisation of the state? The metaphorical construction of coloniality has, 
after all, laid such theorising open to the charge of being no more than the 
writings about the experiences of `first generation diasporic intellectuals'. 
Possibly by reference to the notion of "governmentality", that is how culture 
comes to `govern' in the overall general sense "through the pragmatic 
deployment of social constructs. Even if the post-colonial were to be 
conjoined with that of `governmentality' it is hard to see how an adequate 
theory of the local state within an emancipatory framework could be brought 
forth, let alone that which seeks to look at the reasons for the disappearance 
of race as an overt, positive priority, from such institutions. In the final 
analysis, to coin a phrase, the post-colonial critique of imperialism, race and 
the nation does not adequately acknowledge that notions of universalistic 
rights and participation can be used against the excluding practices and 
inequalities which the `posties' claim are inherent in those processes. 
Osterhammel's final sentence in his short work on colonialism summarises 
the reality of the legacy of colonialism and imperialism in a way that 
emphasises the connection with the real world: "The post-colonial world has 
retained forms of manipulation, exploitation and cultural expropriation, even 
if colonialism itself belongs to the past. , 606 It is clear that his use of the 
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term "post-colonial" eschews the metaphorical realm and anchors itself 
firmly in the historical period relating to the formal granting and attaining of 
political independence. The culturalist use of the term "post-colonial" 
suffers because it both conflates, and by its own logic, celebrates, four 
aspects of the prefix `post'. These are the signifying reference to formal 
political independence, the, in my view premature, giving notice of a closure 
of one period, the mainly cultural continuance of imperialism, and the 
possibility of a future `pure' form of post-coloniality, i. e. no more 
colonialism. My argument would be, in line with the Habermassian 
contention, that modernity still has to run its course, that it is too early to 
close the door, however, circumscribed, on colonialism both systemically 
and in terms of social integration, where in the latter the application of the 
theory of lifeworld colonisation is still appropriate. To that end the 
persistence of colonialism, even if today its articulation differs, but is not 
substantively different, from its previous incarnation, requires terms which 
are more precise. I want to use two new ones - (I am not aware of it 
having been used by others) - which refer to two distinct, though related 
stages. The first is that of `re-colonialism' which refers to the recursive 
nature of coloniality and the way in which certain aspects of such patterns of 
domination and exploitation can be reproduced in the metropole. These 
are built around erecting or resurrecting distorting forces in the structures of 
communication with Black people which are derivatively similar to those 
which evolved in the colonies. The second term is that of 'trans- 
coloniality' which refers to those struggles and social processes which seek 
to challenge and extirpate such colonialist forces. It is only thereafter that 
the current arrogance of the `post' can come into play. 
However, it is in the framing of the race distancing process in terms of 
coloniality, that the dominating quality of the changes experienced by local 
governance can be exposed. Earlier I had, in an aside, pondered whether 
or not it was time to disinter Blauner's theory of internal colonialism. 
Osterhammel also makes mention of the concept of internal colonialism in 
relation to the position of cultural minorities in the metropolitan states, such 
as the Welsh. Whilst, I am not attempting to argue that the colonial state 
was transported back through time and imposed on the inner cities, I am 
going to argue that the reservoir of knowledge called upon by the new right, 
and unquestioningly carried on by new right labour, included that of the 
technical learning processes associated with the political state domination of 
Black people. I am going to argue that the growing perception and 
description of the positive race equality local state in terms of mess, chaos, 
lawlessness etc., shows a similar pattern to those arguments which in the 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were put forward to justify 
colonialism. I shall also argue that the notion of `racial fear' as a 
motivation for these interventions in areas of local governance characterised 
by large numbers of Black people is one that can be made. The definition 
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of colonialism referred to acquisition of territory. I shall argue that these 
changes can be seen as spearheading the re-acquisition of territorial units 
which were perceived as being out of control, subject to malign `race' 
influences. Even if the intention of these changes was universal, i. e. they 
applied to all local authorities, one of the major impetuses was that of trying 
to manage centrally the explicit equality priority that was seen to exist in 
many inner city ones. It is, thus, an inversion of the basis of the operational 
principle which puts race equality as the leading cutting edge for other 
progressive changes. In this case it was the cutting edge for oppressive 
changes. But this is not new for often in the past the leading edge practices 
of domination in the colonies were brought `home' to be applied to the 
working classes. I shall argue as well, that the effects of these changes 
mirror in many instances the main characteristics of colonial rule. There is 
the de-democratisation of large sections of local governance under 
Conservative rule, and now continued under Labour. Even Labour's 
attempts at renewing local democracy, will, in effect, shrink the democratic 
entry points for the local populace and concentrate the major decisions in a 
few hands, allowing the rest, including the populace, only the role of post 
decision scrutiny. At another level `renewing local democracy', as outlined 
by new right Labour, is contradicted by the highly centralised performance 
management accountability system within which the accompanying 
`modernisation' programme is framed; framed in such a way that the balance 
of accountability systems and processes is structured more towards national 
government than local populace. Another characteristic is that of the 
depoliticisation of local governance, the utopia of non-politics, through the 
administration and managerialisation of issues previously within the political 
sphere. The case of equalities is a good example. Earlier in this section 
on local governance I had also argued that the "metaphor of colonialism 
and... imperialism" was a good way of descriptively framing the 
"importation of second hand ideological technologies into the public sector" 
because it "is similar to the inequalities that inhere in the knowledge 
relationships between the first and third worlds. " It is more than just 
importation because it is as well an imposition which does not take account, 
or want to take account, of `local' needs or aspirations. The trope of 
imposing order on chaos607 is one that emerges again and again in the 
justification for many of the changes being pursued in local government, 
usually trailed under the efficiency, economy and effectiveness banner. This 
`order on chaos' theme derives from the justification of colonialism reservoir 
of technical learning processes and knowledge. Further the elevation of 
`leaders' in local governance, both in the formal political sphere, as in the 
case of elected Mayors, and in the administrative sphere, as in the case of 
heavily `PR'd' managers whose rule is marked by decrees satisfies another 
colonial characteristic. All of these mark a process which re-institutes 
distorting forces in the structures of communication because they in sum 
diminish, and remove, the overall prospects for local people to satisfy their 
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validity claims, especially Black people. It is by these indices, as well as 
those released by the experiences of Black people within the changing 
contexts of local governance, that I fell justified to use the term 're- 
colonisation'. These indices actually move the usage of the term 
`colonial', and its associates, beyond that of metaphorical and into the real 
world. Perhaps it would be more accurate to say that the use of coloniality, 
in terms of communicative action, is rhetorical I that it seeks at this juncture 
to influence. A brief word of explication is necessary because, whilst I 
have earlier in this section referred to Habermas' depiction of the 
relationship between opinion and political will formation as that of 
`influence', Habermas himself has sought in TCA to distance himself from a 
notion of influence, that of the Parsonian version. Briefly "generalised 
symbolic media which perform co-ordinative functions that operate 
automatically through equiliberating forces that are beyond the ken of 
individual participants... cannot resolve issues that require direct 
communication. " 608 As Mayhew points out this view is clarified further in 
BFN in which influence, following Parsons, is seen as a "generalised form of 
communication based on a trust in beliefs that have not yet been tested in 
discourse. "609 However he is careful to qualify this by insisting that the 
importance of influence must "ultimately rest on the resonance and indeed 
the approval of a lay public whose composition is egalitarian. "610 
Mayhew's view of Habermas' argument that "only non-strategic action can 
achieve agreements within the lifeworlds of actors who live in a world 
shaped by reason" is that this then excludes not only the realm of influence, 
but that of the role of rhetoric there in. For Habermas, rhetoric is a form 
of indirect force. Mayhew, on the other hand, who is sympathetic to 
Habermas, views rhetoric as "the .. (cultural).. means of creating and 
activating influence", employing "systems of linguistic and visual meaning 
to evoke solidary attachments. " 11 I think this needs to be refined, a task 
which can be achieved by cross-tabulating Habermas with Mayhew. To 
that extent then it can be said that in inegalitarian societies, a case can be 
made for rhetoric if it refers to obvious conditions which militate against the 
equal participation of all concerned. They, whilst they evoke solidary 
attachments which might be partial, as in the case I am making for 
describing the conditions of local governance as that of "re-colonisation" 
since it is more likely that this will have a resonance with Black people, are 
statements predicated upon the temporary postponement of discursive 
redemption, and at the same time influence the creation of such space which 
will allow for communicative discourse for all concerned. That is to say that 
in the interim, under conditions which do not favour communicative 
discourse, rhetoric can propel influence into creating space so that such 
issues can be discursively redeemed. This, in terms of a concrete 
example, can be seen in the way in which certain race equality initiatives 
were pursued in local government. 
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7.3 Transcoloniality 
In outlining the above I have attempted to structure a case for increasing the 
weight of influence the issue of race had, and has, in the changes being 
forced through the provenance of local governance. This is to enable the 
problem to be properly defined so that the solution is correctly identified. 
This is, in effect, a solution to the question posed at the end of the section 
outlining a Habermassian type analysis of UK local governance which was: 
"Is there a vision,... a normatively based outline of a racially inclusive 
model of local governance? " I want to begin answering this question 
through the cipher of "trans-coloniality", resurrecting the principle, as I do 
so, of race as the touchstone to enlightenment's fulfilment in order that the 
context to the answers can be seen to apply to all concerned. To that extent, 
within the purviews of local governance, coloniality is a condition not only 
experienced by Black people. I want to begin this by prefatory reference to 
Magnusson's work on municipalities because it captures and overlaps with 
the raw generalities of what I am attempting. 612 
Magnusson, on the bases of an international comparative analysis of 
municipalities, attempts to resituate the local government space and level of 
polity, as that very important and critical interface between local people and 
the state.. Key amongst these is the need to invert the statist emphasis of 
importance so that the `local state' becomes the prime political reference 
point for local populaces. His argument is that "systems of local government 
which had developed hand in hand with institutions of representative 
democracy were actually designed to contain democracy .... (to the extent 
that)...... the municipality was obviously a part of the state's local 
administration. "613 With regard to local governance he broadly 
characterises the developments therein as presenting a facade of being local 
when in effect such developments are largely state controlled and focussed, 
with the two major development schools being either state or market led. 
For Magnusson real, or substantive, politics emerges "when other forms of 
government fail. " He therefore puts a heavy premium on social 
movements, as do other theorists like Melucci, Touraine and Habermas, as 
having the critical potentiality for alternative politics, to current orthodoxies, 
one that because it is not state centred effectively decentres the state. Up to 
this point there is, in Magnusson, an overlap with Habermas' concerns, 
though this is not expressed in the theoretical detail that Habermas does. 
Habermas for example, in upholding the constitutional discursive democratic 
state as the pragmatic option, overlooks the detail of how those at the 
margins are solidaristically going to emphatically change and influence 
democratic opinion and will formation. Habermas reads sometimes as if 
he envisages this groundswell of discursive opinion gathering momentum 
and rolling over the state, flooding through the sluice gates, to use his own 
imagery. Magnusson, on the other hand, focuses, rightly in my opinion, 
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on local government as that part of the state which should have a local 
resonance for people. He does this by pointing to the potential that exists for 
the local state to become the fulcrum for enabling a different spatial and time 
configuration to that of the centralising, hierarchicalising sovereign state, a 
configuration that allows the real concerns of-local people to enter and 
displace the orthodoxies of the sovereign. Earlier in this part of the section 
I had argued that the `whitewashing' of the second phase positive 
racialisation of the state should be viewed as a form of re-colonisation. 
Colonisation is very much about closing down the spaces and controlling the 
time parameters of Black people's lives. This particular vectoring is very 
much also about re-asserting the primacy of the national state's legitimation 
concerns. How then does this square with Habermas' notion and emphasis 
on the constituted discursive democratic state? We can do this by referring 
back to Habermas' idea that the state arose to resolve those differences 
within the sphere of social integration which could not be resolved 
otherwise. This begins to give the state a moral role, one that in my 
opinion, not necessarily Habermas', has to be continually resurrected. 
Combined with Magnusson's notion of politics which is outlined above and 
which he re-iterates in terms of the view that "the timeful spaces are not just 
there in a re-assuring grid, but instead must be created by ongoing human 
action"614, then we arrive at a situation where the state, if it is to be about the 
way local people organise their affairs, must be continually recreated. 
Magnussson stresses the importance, therefore, of the potential of the local 
state for achieving that in a way that can accord more closely with the image 
of self organising political institutions. As a circumscriptive note to what 
might be deemed a free for all - after all, at the level of a prima facie 
reading, this scenario, as set out, would logically have to accommodate 
extreme right politics - my contention is that there is a residual moral duty of 
the state to ensure that all who can participate are allowed to do so under 
circumstances that are communicatively non oppressive. These deon 
tological rules, which are encapsulated in Habermas' five principles of 
participation, are self referentially regulative. That is to say that violation of 
one or more of these disqualifies the violator from participating, or self 
definingly, contradicts any declared consensus. If the state has to be 
`strong', then it has have strength in this area. It is this potential then, this 
potential for being local government to be part of the process of trans- 
coloniality, that needs to be outlined. Magnusson refers to this political 
space as being ambiguous, or liminal. I see this as attempting to define the 
similar space which is captured by Preuss' notion of the morally reflexive 
constitution, or my idea of the deon tological state. At the local level such 
institutions of local governance do not attempt to impose space and time 
limits on people or issues which arise through social movements, but act as 
"a juncture between localities and movements. " If colonialism is marked 
by the acquisition or re-acquisition of territories, then deterritorialisation 
should be a sign of trans-colonial-modernity. Whilst then the local state is 
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territorially a collection of localities, if its contingent, junctural role is 
realised, especially if this is cast deon tologically in terms of ensuring that all 
who can participate, do, "points localities and (social) movements beyond 
themselves to the world outside. " It returns us to the by now cliched, 
ironical ambiguity of the statement, "there is no place like home. " 
We arrive, therefore, at the situation where the normative, racially inclusive 
model of local governance is described in terms of a de-territorialised trans- 
coloniality. What exactly does this mean?..... In outline it actually 
dovetails with the critical details released through the interrogative matrix 
applied to my interpretation of Habermas' theory of local governance with 
that of the implied antithesis of the characteristics of the re-colonisation of 
local government. Within this place, space and time can be constantly 
redefined to resist and recreate the attempts to maintain the ethically framed 
territorialisation of the locale, including of course within this the local state. 
Above all, it means, as well, therefore, disrupting the attempts to silence 
`race' at the local government level, which are evidenced in strategies, such 
as the administrative managerialisation of equality. This disruption 
focuses on, and tries to break the state centred notion of politics which, as 
Magnusson notes is characterised by enclosure, i. e. bounded, and in terms of 
action, as Walzer comments, by closure, i. e. communicative discourse is 
instrumentally truncated. It brings into the fold something akin to the 
politics of social movements whose traits Magnusson has attempted to 
capture by describing them as being pluralistic, impermanent, inchoate, 
inclusive and unbounded and in so being "are the antithesis of 
enclosures... . (because).. . they lack 
fixity, boundaries and determinacy. "615 
Contra thus to Mile's contention that the theorisation of race in the 
metropolis is still too beholden to notions of the `colonial', I wish to re- 
incorporate the colonial because it still has a valency in analysing the 
changing profile of race equality in the political system. However this is 
also an attempt to move beyond the limitations of post-colonial theorising 
the essence of which is captured in Epstein's summary of Dirlik's acerbic 
view, viz., " `post-colonialism' is the moment when intellectuals from 
nations of what would until recently have been called the Third World arrive 
in universities and begin to speak in the vocabulary of post-structuralism, 
celebrating diversity and rejecting categories of capitalism and class. "616 He 
goes on to link multinational capital with the resurrection of multi- 
culturalism to the effect that the intellectual elites who now celebrate 
diversity are allowed to do so provided "they do not point to the global 
capitalist order that has created their privileged status... "617 One does not 
have to accept the implied economistic determinism of such a point of view 
to realise that the issue of inequality, especially those which are collective, 
has to be addressed in the normative vision of a racially inclusive local 
governance. The issues surrounding this were addressed earlier in looking 
at the changing grammar of political language. The conclusion there, 
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particularly in relation to race, was that it was not so much distribution 
versus recognition struggles, as, following Honneth, the reality that moral 
struggles, which include recognition ones, always frame interest based 
claims. Following on from this, therefore, racism immorally gives rise to 
collectivising wrongs done against groups; wrongs which share similar 
characteristics. This is separate from identarian claims such groups might 
make. The latter, if recognised, would result in Taylor type group rights. 
This is not what is being recommended. In the previous section I critically 
upheld Preuss' notion of a morally reflexive constitution with the 
qualification that "the organisation of power, particularly as this relates to 
creating institutional space, must, in a multi-racial society, include the deon 
tological rules for ensuring that unjust racialisation does not structure those 
spaces". These rules do not constitute rights for Black people, because 
those would be group rights, but, on the other hand, do provide the 
communicative structure in which societal universal rights can be properly 
realised. That is to say that it is more than the formal declaration in 
constitutions to the right to non-discrimination. Such a clear provision of 
rights is, for example, contained in the new South African constitution. 
But the formal statement of such rights is no guarantor that the target 
beneficiaries can exercise those rights. Thus, in response to a critical 
analysis of the state of township dwellers levels of inequality five years on 
from the end of white state rule, an ANC MP could counter this by pointing 
to the manifold rights township dwellers now had, particularly those non- 
discriminatory rights. 618 At face value what this appears to do is confirm 
those post structuralist based critiques of rights, such as the critical legal 
school and post colonialists like Dhaliwal, that those championing 
democratic based rights ignore the historical reality that the attainment of 
one group's rights at the expense of the others is a strategy often marking 
attempts to obtain rights. "619 Epstein, on the other hand, as a Marxist, and 
for that matter critical race theorists, who whilst inhabiting the same 
intellectual terrain as the critical legal theorists oppose their attempts to 
devalue rights, sees the culturally radical retreat into the arena of discourse 
as dangerous because its attempts to deconstruct the concept of rights does 
nothing, in fact it contributes, to the erosion of hard fought rights. Her 
conclusion that these rights should be "defended and extended" is one that I 
support. 620 However it is a notion of rights whose extension has to be spelt 
out in terms of procedures which, in relation to race, guarantee that there are 
no negative group rights being enacted in the shadow of positive individual 
rights. In terms of a racially inclusive model of local governance it is this 
part of the morally reflexive constitutional framing which needs to be first 
spelt out. Kavoulakos, in a critical but sympathetic interrogation of BFN 
draws attention to the issue of equality/inequality via the criticism made by 
other commentators that the procedural approach in their view does not 
adequately deal with the inequalities of democratic governance. 621 
However, Rosenfeld's explication of Habermas' proceduralist paradigm, one 
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which I broadly support, puts a premium on a radically flexible interpretation 
in which new ways of procedurally pursuing justice are highlighted. He, 
interpreting Habermas, notes that the "principal task of the strangers who 
relate to each other as equal consociates under the law is to reconcile the 
requirements of legal equality with those of factual equality .... ( so that in 
essence).. . it allows all identities and differences to be considered while 
weeding out strategic uses of them; and second it requires subjecting all of 
the identities and differences to every one of the perspectives represented by 
participants in communicative action. "622 The conundrum of equality and 
difference is framed by Rosenfeld in terms of a dialectic that helix like 
spirally develops between equality/inequality and identity/difference. In 
trying to metaphorically capture the problem Rosenfeld, in a way that neatly 
dovetails with my own concerns, also makes use of the master-slave and 
coloniser-colonised scenarios. In the latter he argues that difference is used 
as a means of domin ation and thus equality of identity becomes a tool of 
liberation. In the former, equality is on offer providing that the colonised 
gives up their religion, culture, language etc. My view is that with the 
substantive inequality of racism the two areas of difference and identity 
cannot be so neatly separated and categorised as an either-or position. 
Rather the key problem is how to deal with the inequality of wogging, which 
at one and the same time attempts to both exploit oppressive differentiation 
and oppressively promote certain identities. With that as the key focus, we 
can then turn to Rosenfeld's attempt to answer the question of how 
Habermas' proceduralism can produce justice amongst different 
perspectives. Firstly he is correct in thinking that the development of 
common ground for justice amongst different perspectives "depends on the 
nature of procedural devices involved in communicative action as well as on 
the existence of material conditions making it plausible for reversal 
perspectives to generate fruitful consensus or compromises. " Those two 
conditions, procedural devices and material conditions, determine the 
equality of opportunity for participants in communicative action to present 
claims. In terms, then, of achieving justice for unjustly racialised 
participants within the overall context of trans-coloniality, I want to try to 
specify the first procedural device which takes account of the material 
conditions of such participants as well, and which will substantively 
contribute to the notion of a racially inclusive local governance. This 
device I see as being legally rooted in the constitutional framework. In 
Habermas theory the law is not synonymous with the moral framework. If 
Habermas' principle of popular sovereignty "which entails that every 
political power should emanate from the citizens' communicative power" is 
to be realised in an unjustly racialised multi-racial society, then there needs 
to be more than the normal rights of non-discrimination which are 
legislatively enshrined. I am speaking here of the right not to be unjustly 
collectivised in oppressive differences of misidentifications. It is thus about 
justice for collectivities and not group rights. Constitutionally and legally 
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the procedural device I am talking about is that of non closure which will 
uphold two principles. The first is that people unjustly racialised will be 
brought into the communicative processes on issues that effect them. The 
second is that such communicative processes cannot close if the outcome 
disadvantages those participants in question and contributes at that or some 
future point to the breaching of the principles of communicative discourse. 
It can be construed that the achievement of this device will be caught up in 
some form of circular "chicken and egg" process if it is taken at face value 
that "the only legitimate normative regulations under Habermas' 
proceduralist paradigm would be those which have been assented to by all 
the participants in rational discourses which might affected. " However, 
Habermas argues that in the case of legal norms, as opposed to moral norms, 
"assent could be based on bargaining and compromise, as well as 
consensus. " It can also be held, as I have argued earlier, and, as I believe, 
should be applied in this circumstance, as a rhetorical device pending future 
validity redemption. A device like this is not that much at odds with 
Habermas' latest thinking on that which is necessary to include fully the 
marginalised groups in modem society. Thus: 
"Class structures have been replaced by the less conspicuous segmentation of 
marginalised groups that have become superfluous, and by the crumbling 
infrastructure in cities and entire regions. Perhaps this, too, should have 
consequences at a normative level. These could take the form of veto rights and 
special minority rights, (my emphasis) as well as advocacy agencies for those, 
who pushed even further from established public spheres, have increasingly 
fewer opportunities to better their situation on their own and thus raise their 
voices.. 623 
If the substantive principle of non-closure is to be upheld as the fore- 
grounding for detailing the possible normative framework to a racially 
inclusive local governance, then the difference between Habermas' version 
of the organisation of governance and mine is that democracy, as the 
unfinished project of modernity, has attendant trans-epochal unresolved 
problems of race and gender which need to be made explicit in the process of 
finishing, not because they are recent phenomena, but because though they 
were there from the beginning of the modem constitutional state; they were 
unjustly left off the agenda. My version then is that a racially inclusive 
democracy is the unfinished project for a trans-colonial modernity. This 
difference can be seen as well in the way in which Habermas unfurls his 
description and associated vision of society in BFN. I have already noted 
my ambivalence to that piece of work, particularly with regard to the extent 
to which it still aspires to radical democracy. 
However, Honneth's argument about the moral claims underpinning the 
process of mutual social recognition is a better communicative motivational 
framework to my contention that the moral in issues of racism cannot be 
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categorically abstracted from discursive practices of democracy and law 
making. Hence although Habermas has tended to presume that issues such 
as sexism and racism are left overs from lurking traditions best dealt with 
through an appeal to modernity's universalism, contemporary political events 
demonstrate the close connection between these forms of oppression and 
contemporary society. The procedural device of non-closure, which 
attempts to secure the moral justice claims integral to the discursive claims 
of Black people in a racist society, means then that the implicit acceptance of 
the market economy and bureaucratic administration contained in Habermas' 
accounting for social complexity and subsequent descriptive analysis, has to 
be questioned. The needs of a trans-colonial modernity coincide with the 
sentiments of Kavoulakos' conclusion that the "Habermassian approach 
undermines the possibility of a truly autonomous civil society that would 
demand an authentic democratisation against the power elites of the state and 
capital.. . (because).. . the 
idea of enhancing civil society without changing 
anything in the institutional framework is not a feasible political programme 
but wishful thinking. "624 If I am arguing thus that on matters of race the 
moral has to be brought directly into the process of discursive will and 
opinion formation to the extent that that distinction in practice is blurred, 
then this differs from Habermas' ideas on counter steering. Habermas, as 
Bohman quotes, has argued that "public opinion ... (does not).. by itself rule, 
but rather points administrative power in specific directions". 625 In other 
words it does not `steer' so much as `counter-steer'. My argument, thus, is 
that in the trans-colonial modernity on matters of race, not as the exception, 
but as the marker for wider inclusive practices, where Habermas' own 
principles of discursive practice are to be upheld, the administrative power 
has to be steered, and not just counter steered. The achievement of this, i. e. 
a position of `steering', returns us again to the principle of non-closure, 
which is apt because such a principle is the lynchpin for three other 
substantive normative areas which are particularly germane for the 
development of a racially inclusive form of local governance. 
These three areas are the relationship between the national sovereign state 
and decentred sites of governance, such as local government, the form and 
content of democracy, and the form of institutional mediation. The 
normative potential for a solidaristically steered, radicalised, racially 
inclusive, local governance is outlined not as a blue print, but, following 
Jean Cohen, as a both a tentative indicator of what might be possible in the 
democratic fulfilment of modernity, particularly a trans-colonial modernity, 
and a confirmation of her and Habermas' belief that the concrete details can 
only be worked out by participants in discursive communicative processes. 
This seeks as well to chisel a space in the prevailing neo-liberal and neo- 
conservative globalising orthodoxy on local government in which it might be 
possible to bring back into the fold the consideration of alternatives with, 
dare one say it, utopian yearnings. 
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7.4 Local Governance-State Relationship 
I have argued earlier that in the UK the relationship between the national 
state and local government has been characterised by a growing 
centralisation over the past twenty years to the extent that the content of the 
prefix "local" has almost lost all meaning. I have also argued that an 
increasing factor in the reasons for this centralisation has been the perceived 
need to `manage' race in the overall calculation of legitimation costs for 
national political parties. To that extent decreasing the profile of, and 
disestablishing race equality at the local government level has been seen as 
necessary collateral damage to the achievement of national electoral success 
and the maintenance of, in this case, new right Labour's legitimation 
equilibrium with the electorate. Increasingly this has taken the form of a 
highly prescriptive, government directed form of mediation often backed by 
accompanying legislation. This has extended as well to the promotion and 
prescription of managerial processes within local government and to the 
form and content of the local democratic process. The net result is that 
local government is now expected to perform to a highly specified script 
which is drafted centrally and over which local government has some control 
of only the punctuation. Further, in this section, I have developed the 
argument that this centrally directed re-orientation of local government can 
be conceptualised as a re-colonisation of local governance space and time. I 
want, thus, to begin de- and reconstructing this centralised relationship in 
order that the normative bases for a racially inclusive solidaristic steering of 
local government can be asserted. I shall do this by drawing together and 
inter-linking three strands. 
Firstly, whilst Habermas has not written specifically about local government, 
one gets the impression that his thoughts are aimed primarily at the national 
state. Often thus, whilst he talks about the decentred state, the thrust of his 
argument resurrects the image of the central, constitutional state. This taken 
together with his ideas on social complexity leaves one to surmise that he 
might regard local government as part of the necessity for mediating 
institutions in complex societies. Even if he does not, then that 
interpretation could be drawn, or an argument cast for the need for stable, 
mediating institutions. Habermas, on the basis of his descriptive analysis 
of social complexity in Western democracies, has advanced the argument 
that such complexity has done away with the two common proposed forms 
of radical democracy. These are (1) "that it is possible for the sovereign will 
of the people and the decision making power to constitute the whole of 
society", and (2) "that a society formed out of purely communicative 
association is possible. " 626 Instead the fact of such complexity requires that 
discursive democracy be mediated by political and legal institutions with 
their own rules. These institutions and rules compensate for "the cognitive 
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indeterminacy, motivational insecurity and the limited co-ordinating power 
of moral norms and informal norms of action in general. )1627 Bohman's 
interpretation of this is that radical democrats can no longer critique 
democratic institutions and ideals on the basis of a "direct contrast of the 
ideals of communicative association with the reality of complex society. s628 
I think that that is far too conservative an interpretation of Habermas, not 
least of which, is the implication that BFN removes the immanence from 
Habermas' overall perspective. I have already argued that race brings the 
contrast of communicative association with reality back into discursive 
processes. Further, apart from Habermas' diminished view of the facts of 
race under such conditions of complexity, an interpretation like this stands in 
contrast to Habermas' view that complex societies are polycentric. By this 
I understand him to mean that the locus of political power in complex 
societies is differentiated. Secondly Habermas has argued that the 
discursive democratisation of such societies should be met halfway by the 
increasing rationalisation of the populace. I have understood such 
rationalisation to mean the removal of force in the structures of 
communication. Thirdly I have argued that in multi-racial, but still racist, 
societies that this rationalisation means in effect the recognition of many 
languages in communicative processes which are both translatable and 
transmutable. If, thus the aim of Habermas' discursive democracy is to 
shift the steering balance from the centre to the periphery, then the 
institutions of local democracy, i. e. local government, should be closer to 
Magnusson's attempt to "reclaim the municipality as a space of political 
freedom" because it is "at the boundary between the state and civil society, 
the centre and the locality, social disciplines and everyday life., -, 629 This is 
a re-orientation which accords with Magnusson's wish to see municipalities 
as "paradigmatic", that is municipalities as "states writ large". Bohman 
argues that Habermas' notion of complexity means that the democratic 
principle and its criteria of public agreement cannot be applied directly to 
political institutions. However, I would contend that complexity is 
unevenly developed in society and that there are parts of the political system 
where it is empirically feasible to pursue such principles and criteria, 
especially where the communicative distance between participants and the 
system is not that great, as is the potential case with local government. 
This would mean that local government cannot be thought of as simply part 
of the mediating institutions for that would still maintain the top-down 
approach. Rather it should be conceptualised in terms of the liminal local 
state where not only the pitfalls of the ethical sovereign state are held in 
check, but the potential for local people to steer systems which still have a 
profound effect on their everyday lives, can be realised. We are not 
therefore talking about the decentralisation of complexity, which is implied 
in Habermas use of mediation, but the possibility of the dissolution of 
complexity and dediffrentiation at the local level. Empirically, in the UK 
where Black people have related to the state, it has been at the local level. 
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In fact race has drawn out and characterised the potential for the junctural 
role local government can and should play "between localities and social 
movements. " This will be enlarged upon in the following sections. 
Suffice, for the purposes of this part, to say that any such role would require 
the re-and deconstruction of the current relationship. We are looking thus 
at a relationship which places the emphasis on developing and maintaining 
the liminal role of local government because that would meet the discursive 
communicative solidaristic needs of local communities in a context where 
there is the attempt, at the minimum, to counter steer systems, whilst in terms 
of race it would provide the means to actually steer systems at the local level. 
However, such a relationship cannot be presented as a carte blanche for that 
could give rise to situations at the local level which are racially exclusively 
based. Formally defining a relationship like this, that is one that does not 
in terms of nation state interventions pre-empt the detail of the form and 
content of local governance, has to be done so within the framework of the 
participatory principles and procedural device, as outlined earlier, which 
should be anchored in the constitution. With these guarantors of racial 
inclusion in place, the junctural role of local government can unfold, 
develop, and, according to need, dare one use the term, diversify. 
7.5 Form and Content of Democracy 
Identifying a racially inclusive democracy as the unfinished project of a 
trans-colonial modernity, begs the question about what exactly the form and 
content of such a democracy is, especially within the framework of my 
contention that race is the lynchpin, trans-epochal, unresolved problem of the 
enlightenment. Part of my answer lies in my conclusion that such a 
democracy should bring back into the fold the moral in the discursive 
communicative consensus seeking validation of racial claims for justice; a 
practice which, unlike Habermas' argument, cannot be abstracted from 
everyday reality because such questions are so closely intertwined in Black 
people's life experiences. To this extent it diverges from Habermas' 
analyses of the democratic needs of the constitutional democratic state, as 
outlined in BFN. Bohman thus is nearer the mark when he describes 
Habermas' latest version of democracy thus: 
"Habermas' thinking about democracy also shows a similar development from a 
radical, participatory conception of democracy to one that is more indirect and 
procedural, mediated through legal and political institutions, and limited in 
scope by macro-conditions of complexity..... His most recent work now entirely 
separates democracy from his utopian legacy of holistic critical theory. "630 
In terms of race, however, the unresolved historical schism between Black 
and white, or between which ever groups there is the unjust racialisation of 
the communicative structures, holds out the utopian hope of resolution and 
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reconciliation, especially within the context of a communicative discourse 
theory of society. This is an anticipation of holism, even if it is a faint one, 
which isn't necessarily expressed in national societal terms, but, because it is 
there in the everyday experiental relationships between Black and white, cuts 
across, and, at times deconstructs, the taken-for-granted institutions and 
processes of society; a taken-for-grantedness which there even in Habermas' 
descriptive analyses. I have therefore argued for a form of, and content to, 
democratic discourse which is multi-lingual, taking into account thus the 
need for translatability and transmutability; for a discourse which in terms of 
race is moral and thus dissolves the categorical boundaries erected by 
Habermas between, for example, the public sphere and the administrative 
and political systems; for a discourse which is motivated by the injustice of 
non-recognition and false, imposed recognitions, and thus acknowledges the 
reality of power in race and discourse, part of the solution to which is 
expressed in the notion of subaltern public spheres. This differs form 
Habermas' espousal of representative democracy, albeit under the counter- 
steering influence, of an active citizenship within the context of a dynamic 
civil society and public sphere. Kavaloukas has drawn attention to the 
motivation deficit in such an analyses for the main political institutions to 
develop or respond properly to such forms of influence. Additionally he 
points to the fact that "the political system itself undermines both the actual 
abilities and predispositions of citizens to intervene in the political 
processes . "631 The fact of the matter is that no matter that the normative 
potential for an active citizenship is embedded in the democratic culture of 
society, it will not be activated by the mass political parties and media 
coming to realise that that is what they should be doing, as implied in 
Habermas' descriptive analyses and substantive justification. On the other 
hand processes of recognition claims, particularly those linked to material 
injustices as well, and/or involved in wider social movements, offer a better 
moral and motivational framework. Such a framework is built around the 
normative deficit between the claims of universality societal rights of 
political participation are supposed to bestow, and the actual discriminating, 
differentiating reality of the racially marginalised. Habermas presents his 
view as the only realistic one for contemporary complex societies, a realism 
that seems to be premised upon relieving the public from the burden of 
decision making. However, as Kavaloukas is right to point out, this leaves 
uncritically questioned the political institution of representation. This is not 
a point of principle, but one of an empirical option if one agrees with 
Habermas' view of modern complex societies. Kavaloukas' criticisms of 
the myth of the actual "pseudo-representative institutions of the `democratic 
constitutional state"' are given extra weight and substance when the issue of 
race is brought into the examination. This pseudo-representation is 
brought into sharp relief when focused through the experiences and 
outcomes of the long fight Black people have had to secure the political 
rights of Western liberal democracies; both in the case of those who have 
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long internal histories, as in the case of the United States, or those, who 
having been denied such rights in the colonial polity, had to migrate to the 
West. It is clear that the acquisition of such rights has not improved their 
lot either in relation to their socio-economic or socio-political circumstances. 
Dhaliwal's post-modernist critique of representative democracy, the sort that 
Habermas argues can be counter-steered, is correct in some ways when she 
writes that the exclusions of racialised subjects in such political systems "are 
implicated not as mere absences but rather as constitutive of, perhaps even 
necessary for, the formation of liberal democracies. " She makes use of and 
quotes Guinier's work in the United States to show that "voting alone does 
not signal fairness....; majority rule is not a reliable instrument in a racially 
divided society...; majority rule may be perceived as majority tyranny...; 
there is nothing inherent in democracy that requires majority rule...; 
(majority rule remains) unquestioned as long as the majority admitted a fair 
number of blacks to its decision making council. "632 The latter point, 
which `represents' to day the acme of thinking on race equality and liberal 
democracies, is problematic because "whilst black people may vote they do 
not govern (so that).. when the minority votes, it does not mean their interests 
will get represented. " 633 Even where, under the current system, there are 
representatives who are Black, their primary representative allegiance is 
often the mass political party; an allegiance which on numerous practical 
occasions has over-ridden any additional claims they might have made to 
being Black representatives. As I argued in an earlier section this politics 
of racial representation manifests itself very often in the undemocratic 
assumption of spokes-person roles by such representatives for essentialised 
`etnik' groups who then have thrust upon them unasked for collective 
identities which often fall over into ones that are `wogged'.. On the other 
hand the theorists of radical democracy, the solution sought by the left, - and 
here Habermas regards his deliberative model as radical -, according to 
Dhaliwal, who, like Mouffe about whom she is particularly critical, "do not 
specify with any concreteness how radical democracy would deal with these 
social relations (of racial hierarchy) better than non-radical democracy has a 
history of doing, do not engage the racial history of democracy in sufficient 
history and detail. " Dhaliwal is right to draw attention to the deficit, 
Habermas included, evident in the way radical democratic theorists have 
failed to address the substantive issue of race, the solution to which lies not 
so much in the history as in the working out of the practice of democratising 
in multi-racial societies. However, the point is that Habermas' upholding 
of representative democracy, even within the context of it being counter 
steered through the influence of the opinion formation flooding through the 
sluice gates of the institutions of will formation, still does not address the 
issue of race properly. My arguments about the multi-contents multi-places 
of democratic discourse go some way to filling in the specification blank 
spaces, Dhaliwal flags up at the general level, without necessarily calling 
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into question the whole democratic project which her anti-essentialist stance 
implies. 
Voting in current constitutional democracies has become an end in itself; a 
corrupt end because of the forces, such as the mass media and large political 
parties, `mal'-structuring the democratic communicative processes. This is 
part, as well, of Habermas' critique of capitalist polities. This democratic 
deficit has been recognised by some political parties and attempts to 
attenuate this by strategies to renew democracy through talk of developing 
an active citizenship bear, at first sight, an overlap with Habermas' concerns. 
However these attempts, as in the case with local government in the UK, 
have been marked by an absence any attempt to explicitly address the issue 
of race. Further these attempts are still rooted in the tinkering with the 
system of representative democracy and not changing it. If anything the 
changes being pursued at the local level are likely to result in less democracy 
and not more. For example democratic access points have been reduced to 
just one, whilst any form of scrutiny by the local populace is limited to that 
of a post agenda setting and decision making one. These bear the hallmarks 
of what Beck has described as `facadism', that is engaging in providing a 
new coat of paint in order to hide major structural cracks in the democratic 
processes of the political system. The state's concern with regenerating 
civil society, as exemplified. in new right Labour's attempts in this area, are, 
unfortunately, inextricably intertwined with their apostate embrace of the 
market. Within civil society autonomy is often now redefined, as 
Kavaloukas points out, "by the fact that among the `alternative projects' of 
the so-called `third sector', the state has supported those which can offer 
`flexible' and cheap social services - contributing to the reduction of social 
services. " 634 One wonders then whether or not Habermas' proposals for 
democratic renewal, limited as they are to that of counter steering, 
notwithstanding his claim that they are the most realistic ones, will, in the 
end, amount to the same. Certainly in terms of race, and I hold this as the 
normative yardstick by which to judge the inclusiveness of his theories' 
immanence, if he holds to that line, there is that distinct danger. Part of the 
problem is that whilst Habermas has argued for the periphery to control the 
centre, he has concentrated on the political centre in his analysis to the extent 
that he has paid insufficient attention to the descriptive details of the political 
institutions at the periphery and the potential that exists therein for 
developing that close interface between civil society, the public sphere and 
forms of governance. Addressing the `democratic deficit' then from the 
bottom up through the mediation of local governance means addressing the 
primary cause of this which is the passivity of the citizens. Whilst there is, 
under the current system, a "widespread feeling that political participation is 
futile", this is exacerbated where issues of racial justice are ignored or not 
dealt with properly. Where, in addition, such issues are `facaded' through 
a process which purports to be deliberative, as in the case of the pre- 
303 
Macpherson Report procedure, but the recommendations are subsequently 
attenuated or forgotten, then that futility, even anger, is increased. What 
this points to is the need to go beyond the current form and content of 
democracy, a task better achieved at the local level. I want to, propose 
therefore, within the context of the liminal local state, that the form and 
content of a radical democratic practice, one in which, as the normative aim, 
there is the potential for a racially, inclusive, discursively arrived at, 
consensus, is possible. This does not do away with the `vote'. Rather it 
situates the vote as one of many possible ways to register such consensus; 
and, further, where the vote is used, it is the outcome of a communicative 
discursive, inclusive process, and not that which conflationarily assumes 
discussion. Further, it does not do away with political representation, but 
ties such representation to new forms of communicative discursive 
accountability processes which in themselves might `wrench asunder' mass 
political parties' claims to represent the people. Implicit in this is my 
contention that the uniform democratic practice and system which exists and 
which Habermas upholds as necessary for complex societies, is not the norm, 
but an aberration. Such a notion fits in better, I think, with my view that 
there is an uneven development of democratic practice and Habermas' 
assertion concerning the politically decentred society with the attendant 
argument about the necessity for rationalisation from the bottom up to half 
way meet initiatives from the top. 
It is implicit in the notion of the liminal local state that the con tours of the 
form and content of democracy cannot be over specified because it will, 
ultimately, assume the shape of the discursive practices people adopt. 
Nevertheless, following Habermas in trying to specify the `only real 
alternatives to a complex capitalist society' does depend on the `reality' of 
the descriptive analyses used. My contention is that his underplays the 
reality of current, distorted colonial reality, and thus does not properly 
theorise the discursive democratic practices necessary for a trans-colonial 
modernity. To that end I argue that, on issues of racial justice, it is 
necessary to bring into the reality of such practices, moral considerations 
requiring thus the need for consensus for those validity claims. Further it is 
necessary for the discursive participatory principles to be embedded in the 
constitution and, in relation the needs of a multi-racial society, to be 
underpinned by the procedural device of non-closure. This is a qualitative 
step up from Habermas' argument that in everyday democratic practice 
agreement, and compromise are acceptable because it is should always be 
possible to put any issue back on to the agenda. Such an argument fails to 
appreciate fully that within the architecture of the principles of his own 
argument, that there cannot be compromise and/or agreement which in effect 
continues racially exclusive practices. These principled and 
constitutionally framed considerations, which include that of liminality for 
local governance, frame, then the development of discursive democracy 
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locally. Taken together, they begin to address, as well, the vectoring of 
space, time and place, an oppressive process which is acutely felt by Black 
people. This is a dimension of emancipation which Habermas, because he 
cedes so much to system, and thus societal, complexity, overlooks. 
Further, because the state is invested now with a greater responsibility in 
everyday practice for upholding moral norms of racial justice, the 
rationalisation implications of this means that there has to a greater 
solidaristic grounding of the consensual validation of these. This will give 
greater emphasis to the transformative dimension and avoid "the way power 
works within social institutions to subvert, deflect or undermine 
emancipatory claims raised in social struggle. " Whilst his latter point 
starts taking us into the next realm of institutional mediation, it does raise the 
important issue of the nature of the demarcation between democratic 
discursive practices and the political institutions. It should be clear from 
my arguments and from the previous section on the organisation of 
governance that I envisage a more fluid and fuzzy boundary line between the 
political system, in which political will is enacted, and opinion formation, 
especially on the issue of racial justice. This, under the conditions 
outlined above, is given greater emphasis at the level of local governance. 
Thus we can anticipate that unlike the current new right Labour 
modernisation programme with its clear boundary demarcation between the 
political system, the administration and the citizenship, that the liminal local 
state, within the principled context and constitution, will focus on the 
democratic form and content arrangements necessary to address the issues at 
hand. The only institutional requirement which can be prescriptively 
identified is that of the assembly. The form this will take cannot be over 
specified, e. g. will it be necessary for it to physically sited and located? 
However the reasons for an assembly at the local level are, for the moment, 
pragmatic, given the logic of political decentring which figures not only in 
Habermas' work, but also, I think draws genetic memory from Marx's notion 
of the withering away of the state.. At the time of the priority given to 
equality in certain local authorities, the key responsibilities of local 
government were often defined in terms of employment, services and an area 
of activity which could best be described as enlightened stewardship. This 
covered the grey areas of consultation, participation, involvement by local 
communities and as well the voicing and championing of issues on their 
behalf. However, under the current modernisation programme being put 
forward by the Labour government the focus is very much on services with 
accountability being structured in terms of financial management accounting 
systems coupled with a centralisation of representative democratic political 
powers in the hope, I contend, that legitimation for mass political parties at 
both the national and local levels, can be more easily managed/controlled. 
My idea and reasons for an assembly are linked more to focusing on, 
reviving, deconstructing and reconstructing that notion of stewardship in 
terms of a communicative discursive democracy so that participation and 
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involvement discursively become intertwined more directly with 
legitimation. With the constitutionally embedded equality of participation 
principles and non-closure procedural device as the structural keystone, the 
assembly should be fully inclusive of Black people, where because `Black' 
signifies no more than wrongs done to, the possibility exists for additional 
claims to cultural authenticity to be involved in a process in "which 
oppositional identities are themselves transfigured through the overcoming 
of the derogatory recognitions which constituted them as excluded. " What 
we have written within this process as well will be the critical re-appraisal of 
the concept of, and practice of, `representation' not only in its political form, 
and thus the nature of its legitimating content, but also in relation to the 
claims for group recognition and identities. One of the key responsibilities 
the assembly discursively discharges then for the local liminal state is that of 
maintaining a critically high standard of racial justice within that particular 
sphere of local governance; both in relation to its internal `business' and its 
external relations. The assembly becomes the discursive democratic body 
which `decides' the local state's programme and/or priorities. This does 
not necessarily do away with institutional mediation which is necessary in 
complex societies. However the notion of an assembly, as outlined above, 
does not presume the form and content of such a mediation. There is, for 
example, no reason why some now commonplace, accepted orthodoxies in 
public service arenas, such as `efficiency' and `effectiveness' cannot be 
referred to the assembly for both local defining and change more in line with 
inclusive discursive principles. What matters is that the extent to which the 
local populace wishes to bring into the discursive fold via the assembly the 
provenance of institutional mediation, even if this does lead to an "over 
burdening of public deliberation", cannot be prescriptively pre judged. 
Further the notion of an assembly does not do away with the differentiation 
of political decision making which Habermas sees as part of and necessary 
for complex societies. There is no reason why the local liminal state cannot 
have multiple sites of deliberative democracy. These, for example can be 
geographically and demographically organised, as was attempted by Walsall 
Council. The latter effectively did away with the bureaucracy and devolved 
responsibilities to ward and neighbourhood committees. On the other hand 
it could be organised by service categories, which would be discursive 
upgrading of the turn of the century form of local control of areas such as 
education. In both the relationship between the `administration' and the 
local populace is effectively rewritten. Foster in his work on attempting to 
apply Habermas' principles to public service organisations shows how it is 
possible to develop the principle and practice of consensually seeking the 
redemption of validity claims between those who work for the local state and 
those who are service recipients so that accountability becomes to be 
discursively defined. This begins to mark out a potentially new arena of 
discursive democratic deliberation which lies within, and inter-plays 
between, the `fuzzy logic' boundaries that exist between the administrative, 
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political and populace sites in and around the liminal state. In sum then the 
diagrammatic depiction in the previous section of the organisation of 
governance provided a categorical differentiation between the various 
elements constituting the processes of opinion and will formation. It should 
be clear from my attempts to outline the form and content of democracy at 
the level of the liminal local state that in reality there is likely to be an inter- 
meshing of these elements dependent upon the issue at hand. For example 
the subaltern public sphere will include at the local level the Black populace, 
Black employees and will also link into national, even international, 
networks. This might be deployed as an influencer on the local assembly; or 
as an influencer and participant in the assembly; or at the level of a 
participatory/action forum in a service area. At this level the `people' is 
not a fiction, as Bohman claims, but a reality. Under conditions of 
translatability and transmutability, there is not a singular ethical formation of 
the will in the Roussean sense, which Habermas distances himself from, but 
a transformative practice which keeps under inclusive solidaristic direction 
the emancipative use of resources effecting the ability of people to engage in 
discursive communication. A reader's letter in the Guardian, on the issue 
of poverty alleviation measures, quintessentially focuses on the substantive 
issue and provides a salient lead into the next section on institutional 
mediation. 
"As a divorced mother, I have lived with long term poverty and seen how 
it has limited the life chances of my children.... What is missing in the 
Poverty Audit (a government initiative) is the `third way' of treating it: the 
setting up of a mechanism for the participation of people with direct 
experience of poverty in the formulation, monitoring and evaluation of 
any anti-poverty strategies. Until this is in place, all solutions will be 
"635 imposed, as they have always been. 
But then, this is as it should be: the pursuit of unredeemed validity claims, 
stemming from unresolved trans-epochal problems of racism, in furtherance 
of realising a trans-colonial modernity, stands at the apical, sharp cutting 
edge to wider societal fault lines affecting other oppressed sectors of the 
community. 
7.6 Institutional mediation 
The importance of institutional mediation is everywhere, even if it is not 
represented precisely in those terms. It covers those action areas 
sandwiched between the forms of governance society has and the life-worlds 
of its constituents. It effectively manages the time, space, and for those 
unfortunate enough, the place parameters of the interregnum periodising the 
way in which such societies express their general consensus over the form 
and content of their own governance, even if this is in the limited shape of 
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the vote. Whilst its necessity in the development of a socially complex 
society is not questioned, the role and content of institutional mediation, 
particularly that of the public sector, has assumed ever greater importance 
over the past twenty years plus through a developing process of redefining 
critical interrogations and interventions on the part of the state. 
Epistemologically, whilst I am aware that juxtaposes at some points, and at 
others fuses a confluence, of academic disciplines - organisational studies, 
administration, management etc. - under the greater umbrella of post second 
world war welfare, I am going to speak generally and across boundaries 
about institutional mediation. This `generality' has to be distinguished from 
the new right and new Labour attempt to logocentrically centralise, control, 
conflate and define, such institutions through the colonising imposition of a 
neo-managerialist discourse, if I might, (smacking my hand repentantly), 
borrow that term from the Foucauldians. One of the pivotal interrogations 
has been thus, in my contention, that of attempting to define explicitly, and 
in the process of that definition affixing the determinant source of, a 
normative framework for the public sector. Normative, even if one adopts 
Habermas' differentiated schema of the moral and democracy, implies that 
there is some form of discursive process which realises the expectations 
against which, in this case the institutions, should be measured. The 
traditional frame of reference, against which even local government was 
judged, was that of the impartial, fair bureaucracy, exemplified in reality by 
the workings of the civil service. There was an implied normative 
framework which affixed the value horizons of what can be called the 
traditional administration. In the case of local government this was very 
much the case up to the late seventies. One can see this mirrored in the 
orthodoxies that informed the thinking and texts of academic public 
administrative studies. Where there was divergence from this view it came 
from Marxist studies which either dismissed the public administrative system 
as a tainted reflex of the capitalist economic system, and thus a capitalist 
class agent, or, where there was an attempt to engage with the detailed 
intricacies of administration, did so around the analytical axis of the worker- 
capital split. The `radical social work' theorising and analyses of the 
seventies are a good example of this. However, this is not to dismiss the 
importance of such theoretical strands for it helped form the bases of a broad 
spectrum of thinking which envisaged, albeit an inchoate vision, a 
radicalisation of the public sector, especially at the level of local governance. 
This push for change, acutely witnessed in some inner city local authorities, 
included the recognised need for change in the spheres of race and women's 
equality. The importance of bringing substantive subjects like race equality 
into the deliberations about what public institutions should be doing, lies in 
the wide ranging scope its critical impact had, and has. Because race 
demands - just as the civil rights movement was the precursor to modern 
social movements, so too new Labour has unacknowledgedly borrowed, but 
diluted, race equality's critical thrust -Joined up writing', it brought into the 
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spot light the normativisation of the administrative institutions. It was at 
the same time the explicit politicisation, with a small `p', of the 
administration. Now, my argument has been that new Labour, in an 
attempt to control the legitimation costs of local governance for achieving 
and holding on to national governance, embarked on a strategy of de- 
politicising the public administrative system, especially that of local 
governance, whilst at the same time explicitly normativising it. This 
normativisation accords to the public administrative institutions a number of 
similar values held together by a neo-managerialist ethos, usually expressed 
in terms of `performance management', whilst, crucially re-defining and re- 
enforcing at the same time the old orthodoxies that the administrative 
institutions are politically neutral and programmed by the political system; 
more over orthodoxies which re-inscribe the unjust hierarchicalisation of 
power. The move to cabinet style local government structures is 
indicative of this. In this then, there is an unfortunate overlap with one 
interpretation which can be placed on Habermas `realistic analysis'. It can 
be argued that Habermas' idea of focusing opinion formation on the 
processes of will formation, that is on the political institutions of 
representative democracy, bearing in mind his contention that only the 
political system can act, effectively cedes the administrative institutions to 
being beyond discursive redemption. In so doing it appears to sail very 
close to the Blairite model. The question is then whether or not it is 
possible "to ground a normative framework for critique" of the mediating 
administrative institutions where the derivation of those norms comes in part 
from those institutions themselves, and are not simply defined for them by 
the political system. 
My argument, however, and here it is foreshadowed in the previous section 
where I have argued for the fuzzy boundaries between administration and the 
political system, is that such a sharp distinction which seeks to mark out the 
mediating institutions as, in terms of political action and agency, a 'no- 
persons' land, is counter-productive to the achievement of a trans-colonial 
modernity. Perhaps this arises in Habermas because, as Honneth has 
critically argued against, he has reduced the sphere of work to instrumental 
action. Foster notes that Habermas, apart from his earlier theoretically 
substantive distinction between "instrumental action characteristic of 
productive activity" and the "communicative action of social praxis .... has 
had very little to say about the potential structurings of the work process to 
promote or suffocate autonomy, or to render work meaningful or 
monotonous. "636 This failure to address properly this area, a failure which 
is represented as well in the lack of detailed attention paid to how the 
administrative system can be made more democratic, effectively wipes out as 
meaningful the struggles by Black people and women in these institutions to 
have their moral claims for racial and gender justice to be redeemed. To 
that extent there is a qualified agreement with Foster's summary and 
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approval of Honneth's position which is that "we can make an internal 
differentiation within instrumental action according to whether the work 
process enables independent activity, initiative and a minimal degree of 
external control... (to) ... allow for the theorising of the potential for moral 
conflict within the work process itselfs637 This qualification in part links 
back to my earlier arguments about the need to differentiate between 
instrumental and strategic action, the location of these forms of action within 
organisations which should be thought of as structures of communication, 
and transformative action which denotes the actor induced agency giving rise 
to "communicatively transforming non-communicative action. " The other 
part of the qualification refers to the insertion of moral claims for racial 
justice into the processes of such institutions, processes which, within public 
sector institutions are more than just work related ones. The redemption of 
these claims, because they are boundary disruptive, will span a continuum of 
action with the possibility of "democratising the administrative system. " 
This is slightly different to Habermas' BFN model where the procedures of 
administrative activity are brought under the "control of public procedures 
on the output side", although that as one of a consideration of many options, 
close as it is to the current new right Labour version of output accountability, 
is not ruled out. Rather it is to put back on the agenda Habermas' TCA 
notion of "self regulation by those concerned ... (which).... in part could take 
the place of both administrative regulation and deregulation. " This self 
regulation within the context of liminal local governance, and the 
constitutional arrangements favouring non-closure, seeks to achieve that 
which is immanently contained within Habermas' theories, viz. the 
attenuation and/or prevention of the colonisation of the lifeworld by the 
system through processes like juridification. That is to say that we seek a 
form of institutional mediation which keeps open the necessary two way 
communicative channels between the life world and the polity of that 
society. Arato, in support of the BFN model, is both right and wrong to 
conclude that the "conception of the civil public sphere is central to 
contemporary prospects of democractisation, yet it helps to avoid such 
politically irrelevant illusions as the conversion of state policy making into a 
fully deliberative process, or the radical democratisation of all spheres of 
life. "638 He is right insofar as those seeking more radical democratisation, 
like myself, are not seeking the full transformation of the state. However 
he is wrong in seeking to impose artificial limits on the extent of that 
radicalisation, particularly if, as I have commentated above, that treats as 
`irrelevant' the struggles of Black people in such institutions for justice. So 
long as the hope exists in principle for more democratisation, and that hope 
is contained in Habermas' thinking, then the achievement of that principle 
should be determined in a practice which is properly informed inclusively by 
all of the relevant empirical details, which in this case must include race. 
Habermas' turn away from seeking a more deliberative administrative 
system is one taken on pragmatic grounds because of his realistic analysis; 
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an analysis I have already questioned in terms of race equality. To that 
extent I want now to return to the pursuit of an in situ deliberatively derived 
normative framework for public sector mediating institutions, especially 
those of local governance, through borrowing and using slightly differently 
the research term `triangulation' to position the three agency spheres 
involved in the normativisation of mediating institutions: elected political 
representatives, the employees in the institutions, and the relevant 
constituencies. For Habermas the solidaristic norms of society are 
anchored in laws, provided they have been consensually agreed to on the part 
of those directly affected. Such laws, however, straddle the nexus critically 
between facts and norms. That is to say that the exclusionary facts, or those 
excluded, provide the thrust for changing the law more in line with the norm. 
In reality both law and norm are `triangulated' through the apex of rights 
which, as Habermas, correctly observes expresses a relationship and not an 
objective thing. In the public sector institution it is not just the laws and 
associated norms affecting employment, as Foster implies, which mediate 
the relationship between employee and the organisation. Rather institutions 
like these are actually the confluence of a number of laws, and thus 
normative frameworks both expressing what exists and containing 
immanently what could be. Laws affecting employment, services, 
democratic arrangements, and the relationships between those spheres and 
the content of those spheres now run through and cross over in, the public 
sector institutions in the UK. Overlaying all of these are not only the anti- 
discriminatory legislation, but also the implied norms and rights of full and 
communicatively non-distorted inclusion. If one runs the two triangles 
together, that is the one outlined earlier which refers to the spheres involved 
in the normativisation of the mediating institutions, and that of law, norms 
and rights, then it should be clear that the latter acts as the more abstract one 
through which to consider the former. On this basis then the rights that 
emanate from a trans-colonial modernity include, as I argue above, the right 
not to be unjustly collectivised. The pursuit of this right within the 
mediating institutions will mean not just monitoring the output, as Habermas 
implies, but ensuring that it inures in the processes of those institutions. To 
achieve this requires de- and re-constructing those institutions so that the 
relationship underlying those rights can be secured deliberatively. This 
brings into the fold those three spheres identified, but does not, as the current 
facts of the arrangements do, prescribe the form this will take. These have 
to be the outcome of the pragmatic considerations affecting a particular set 
of circumstances. We want to overcome that which befell the working 
class in the UK in the nineteenth century, and which appears to be affecting 
the claims for racial justice made by Black people. Mark Neocleous argues 
that during that period "when the working class gained legal recognition in 
the nineteenth century as a `subject of rights', it was simultaneously 
constituted as an `object of administration'. Through this "the state was 
able to develop a `law-and-administration continuum', by means of which 
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the emancipatory claims raised in working class struggle were transformed 
into regulated and administered disputes through which class antagonism 
could, in effect, be domesticated and controlled. "639 There are 
glimmerings of a similar argument which could be raised with respect to the 
fate of race equality struggles for justice in the local state in which the 
struggles of Black people both within and without of the state have become 
and are now regulated and administered. The liminal notion of the local 
state ties in with my liminal notion of the term `Black' using it to denote not 
only the experience of collective racialised wrongs done to, but also as the 
discursive signifier which invites further communicative discourse. The 
move away from that within the spheres of local governance and wider 
public sector institutions is captured in the now highly controlled, 
administered and circumscribed race equality initiatives within those 
institutions and in the differentiation of `Black' into biological reductionist 
splitting off of those deemed to be `Asian'; the latter usually further dis- 
aggregated into a number of idealised ethnic groups. This bears out 
Deetz's observation that "the politics of identity representation may be the 
deepest and most suppressed struggle in the work place and hence the `site' 
where domination and responsive agency are most difficult to unravel. "M0 
Expanding the normative deliberative communicative spaces in these 
mediating institutions in order to enhance rather than objectify the proposal 
that these are in the end structures of communication, means being able to 
provide the framework and content within which race, whilst a critical 
factor, is not an exclusionary and dominating one. 
In effect then this `triangulation' envisages the spaces for deliberative 
discourse shifting and taking shape in between the interstices of the three 
spheres mentioned above and guided by validity claim issues at hand over 
which it is necessary to obtain consensus. This does not replace the 
representative democratic arrangements, but expands them so that the 
provenance of political legitimacy seeps out of the hands of the dominant, 
dominating large political parties into those who are directly affected. This 
both adds to the decentring of the local state as well as contributes to 
redefining and reshaping the `assembly'. Further the ideological gel 
which holds such institutions together, currently in the form of private sector 
based neo-managerialism, is brought under critical discursive scrutiny by 
those who are directly affected, viz. employees, the citizened public and 
political representatives. This begins to provide the space within which it is 
possible to develop alternatives which are more applicable to Zanetti's61 call 
for a transformative practice of public administration and to Cooke's 
analysis that slavery contributed to the development of management and thus 
has roots in racism. 642 His recommendation for "a post-colonialist 
deconstruction of management in which the role of empire and colonialism 
in its creation" can be revealed, edifying as that might be, needs to be 
changed to that of a trans-colonial reconstruction of management; one which 
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accords with Alvesson and Willmott's de and reconstruction of management 
as a colonising process thus: 
"Colonization describes the way that one set of practices and understandings 
which are strongly associated with instrumental reason that is dominant in the 
organisation and management of complex systems comes to dominate and exclude 
other practices and discourses that are present within the everyday cultural media 
of the lifeworld where human beings develop their basic sense of being purposive, 
wilful subjects with distinctive social identities"TM3 
7.7 Comparisons 
Finally, the difference between an idealised extrapolation of a Habermassian 
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In terms of the organisation of governance, my diagrammatic outline 
obviously envisages a greater role for the state, captured here by the political 
and administrative system categories, within the context of a morally 
reflexive constitution, which seeks to minimise the colonising powers of the 
market and administrative system because of the greater influence/change 
processes that occur in the public sphere/civil society-state interface. In 
my schema of things then, the political and administrative system adds up to 
the Political System. I have also "HTML'd" the potential relationship of the 
signifying Black collectivity, which "collectivises" on the bases of wrongs 
done to, and not conflated identity claims, to Black public spheres and life- 
worlds and to that of the state. Both diagrams point to a situation which 
could be, and not what is. 
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SECTION II 
Bridging Theory and Empirical Research 
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Chapter 8 
Prelude to Empirical Details - On Methodology 
8.1 Introduction 
In one sense the theoretical gestations of the previous sections which have 
been conducted at the meta- and meso-theoretical levels around the 
conceptual inter-play and/or antinomies amongst Habermassian critical 
theory, "postie" theorising, and what might previously have been labelled 
"bourgeois ideology", but now can be called liberal philosophising, as the 
meta-framework for considering the meso-level of race and local 
governance, can be considered as the necessary prefix to structuring the 
micro-level empirical details. These details relate to the examination of 
why and how over a certain, but short, period a local authority initiated and 
undertook a programme of race equality, a process described in the last 
section as the positive racialisation of the local state, and then set about 
effectively disestablishing that programme. It is about the priority given to 
the need for the local authority to oppose and over come racism and racial 
discrimination, and about the subsequent deprioritisation of that need. In 
structuring the empirical details by situating them at the micro-level of an 
inter-related three tier conceptual analysis, it is clear that these details cannot 
be realised by a simple retelling of events as a basis for an empirical theory. 
There are plenty of race and public sector studies which are structured at this 
level having thus a contextual salience soon undermined by the temporal lag. 
It raises as well methodological questions which are one and the same time 
about how the empirical data was arrived at, its relationship to the other two 
levels, viz. the meso- and meta-theoretical levels, and the criteria by which 
the strength and/or weakness of this purported relationship is established. 
For example questions about how the data was arrived at and used bring in 
my role as the primary researcher. But then the marker must be put up that 
this activity was not undertaken within the formal structure and context 
orthodoxly associated with the term "researcher", since I actually worked 
through and experienced the changes being examined. It can be argued 
thus that such a role spans at times separately and at other times 
conflationarily a number of research methodologies, for example case study, 
action research and ethnographic research, employing various means of 
analysis, such as narrative and metaphor. However to do so would be to 
treat the necessary methodological overview at the meso-level. Just as my 
argument about the need to treat race at the meta-theoretical level is linked to 
my contentions about race being trans-epochal problems the resolution of 
which is the touchstone to the proper completion of modernity, so my 
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contention will be that orthodox methodological arguments, for example the 
perennial qualitative versus quantitative one, if left at that status, allow race 
to slip through the conceptual gaps. I want to briefly outline thus a critical 
social research methodological framework which informs the way the data 
was accessed and organised. This is not one which has been developed 
with the benefit of theoretical hindsight and retrospection. That is to say a 
detailed look back at events and attempting to allocate those to a suitable 
theoretical pigeon-hole, what one critical organisational researcher has 
deemed, "fairytale methodology"644. Rather the principal researcher 
entered into a work experience of race and local governance as someone who 
was, and still is, heavily influenced and informed by critical theory, in 
particular the work of Jurgen Habermas. As a prefix thus to the next 
section's necessary digression on critical social research methodology, it can 
be said that an approach so informed meant that there was and is a 
commitment to relevant background reading and research at all three levels, 
a methodological activity which, I shall argue and expand on later, is one of 
the key components of a critical research project. In a broader sense this 
critical research project, outlined by Habermas in TCA II, included from my 
perspective, and from him the as yet unacknowledged, area of racism, which 
I and other Black people thought, conjoined with that of certain local Labour 
parties. This is a critical theory which is inclusive of an explicit anti-racist 
approach, seeking, as with the other emancipative strands, a fundamental 
transformation of society. As opposed to the limits of orthodox political 
thought, there is a sceptical, reasoned rejection of existing patterns of 
authority and power coupled with an active attempt to include, substantively, 
i. e. the application of the three `Rs'- respect, recognition and rights, those 
previously dominatingly oppressed, exploited and marginalised. 
This allowed for a normative template to be overlaid on the range of actions 
within this particular race and local governance experience, a range which 
was inclusive of myself and those other relevant actors caught up in the 
inter-play between appurtenant socio- and systemic integrative processes. 
This was the normativity of that which was necessary for the achievement of 
race equality in the sphere of local governance. Everyday practice within 
such a work context which was focussed primarily on the development of 
race equality within local government included, because of the ongoing 
background reading inquiries and normative framework, a research agenda 
informed by a critical, as in the sense of critical theory, scepticism towards 
the taken-for-grantedness of local government orthodoxies both then current 
and developing, not to mention race change orthodoxies. Underlying this 
scepticism as the symptomatic expression of the attempt both to resist the 
colonising tendencies of a racially structured world and at the same time 
transformatively make sense of that world, is the experience of the 
researcher as a Black person being brought up, educated and working in 
three societal variations of a racially hierarchicalised society - the 
319 
`racialarchy' of apartheid South Africa, the racial taken-for-grantedness of a 
neighbouring British colony, and the liberal racism of seventies, eighties and 
nineties UK. This is more than just the iteration of the experiental 
framework influencing and underlying the research for it points as well to 
substantive issue raised in the paper on reconstructing race and racism which 
is that the experiences of the racially marginalised are often portents of that 
which will affect the rest. In this particular instance it can be argued that 
the unsettling and migratory effects of a globalised system of racial 
dominance produced experiences which are only recently being felt and 
appreciated by white people in Europe. Globalising systems have been with 
us for far longer than recent popular and serious accounts of `globalisation' 
would have us believe. It depends, in this case, not so much on who is 
experiencing it, but on who is experiencing it and has the power to relate the 
tale. But there is as well a serious methodological aspect which comes out 
of this which is that the temporal disjuncture which characterises Black 
experiences vis-ä-vis white society can be seen as an inversion of what I 
have previously referred to as "playing catch up. " Where as my earlier use 
focussed on Black people being put in the position of trying to chase after 
race equality in societal institutional settings, the inversion points to the 
process whereby Black people are in the position of waiting for the rest of 
society to catch up. In that temporal nexus various inverted methodological 
catch up practices can be identified: the pseudo-scientific `value-free' 
objectivism of empiricism which requires nomothetic validation of Black 
people's expressed experiences of racism or the mediation of the idiographic 
accounting of Black peoples' experiences by white institutions. For 
example in one of the sub-target boroughs used in this research, it will be 
argued that the development of an explicit race equality programme allowed, 
fleetingly, for temporal synchronicity between the expressed claims of racial 
injustice by Black people and the appropriate institutional response because 
there were substantive avenues of influence and participation by Black 
people. In the intervening years the dis-establishment of that programme - 
the re-whitewashing of the Town halls, as I describe the process - has seen a 
situation develop in which an outside academic institution was called in to 
research and validate, or not, Black employees claims that they were being 
unfairly singled out for disciplinary action. M5 The research, as it so 
happens, backed up these claims. Whilst his points to the way in which 
social research methodologies, and the contexts of power in which they are 
exercised, have, and still, fail to grasp the reality of Black peoples 
experiences, so it also highlights, just as the development of feminist 
research perspectives have in relation to women, the core problem which is 
about the forces in the communicative structures of social research which 
prevent these experiences from being authentically captured and 
autonomously validated. In so far, thus, as the research purports to show 
how and why race equality was removed from the agenda of a local 
authority, and to derive from this, the normative outline of a racially 
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inclusive form of local governance which is based on the discursive 
democratic inclusion of Black people, so also the methodological framework 
outlined below purports to demonstrate how it better meets the objective of 
racial inclusivity. That is to say that the methodology supports the thesis of 
the communicative social construction of race, and for that matter local 
governance, within a validity paradigm that allows comparison between 
states of oppression, such as domination and exploitation, and corollary 
states of emancipation. Further it does so not on the foundationalist 
assumption that the racial bi-polar change relationship just mentioned 
grounds the life-world experiences of those who are on the recognised 
receiving end of such racism, and thus in terms of normative supporting 
agency it is simply a matter of tapping into conditioned, or awakening 
residual levels of consciousness. Rather it does so on the more modest 
basis of communicative fallibility which seeks to ground only the procedures 
guaranteeing the inclusive participation of all in the analyses of the problems 
and defining of solutions. Bohman, in contrast to what he sees as the 
overly theoretical heritage of German idealism which influences one of two 
interpretations of critical theory and results in the fallacy of an "overly 
ambitious goal of a comprehensive social theory which can unify all the 
diverse methods and practical purposes of social enquiry", opts for, instead, 
taking critical theory in a pragmatic direction. , 646 This is better suited to a 
democratic social organisation of knowledge in which "co-operative enquiry 
allows for the division of critical labour where the overall legitimacy of 
institutions and policies can be tested by a variety of participants from 
different perspectives and with different social knowledge.... (where the 
derived)... social scientific knowledge is a resource that may be socially 
diffused and shared by everyone ... (thus enabling).... entrenched asymmetries 
of information and power ... (to be).. transformed 
by the practical 
consequences of organised critical enquiry. , 647 In the previous chapters I 
have already argued that, in order for race to be properly accounted for, this 
requires a transformative interpretation and extension of Habermas' theory. 
Scheuerman, in an analysis which mirrors my own ambivalence towards 
what he describes as the ambiguity in Habermas' BFN, identifies two 
competing, but, in his view, incompatible, interpretations of deliberative 
democracy. The first points to an "ambitious, radical democratic polity 
based on far reaching social equality and equipped with wide ranging 
capacities for over seeing bureaucratic and market mechanisms". The 
second "suggests a defensive model of deliberative democracy in which 
democratic institutions exercise at best an attenuated check on market and 
administrative processes, and where the deliberative publics most of the time 
tend to remain, as Habermas himself describes it, `in dormancy' . Whilst 
my contention is that the first is necessary to meet the full communicative 
resolution of racism, it is also that the forms of critical enquiry require as 
well this radical orientation. To that extent the way in which the 
excavation of race within administrative and political contexts is done and 
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the results from this will support the need to retain the radical option. 
Scheuerman notes that Habermas does not fully develop the radical option 
evident in BFN, and that, for example, on the relevant issue of the interface 
between communicative power and administrative power, notwithstanding 
the mutual incompatibility of the derivative theories underpinning these two 
concepts, he does not develop an adequate "analysis of how deliberative 
processes can effectively `steer' and `bind' decisions within the 
administration itself. "49 The empirical data from this research then not 
only contributes to the support of that radical option and such analyses, but 
also underpins the core argument that if race is to be fully and inclusively 
resolved within a communicatively structured theory of modernity, then a 
radical interpretation of that ambiguity must be pursued. Further it will be 
shown that the defensive option mirrors key aspects of the conservative turn 
taken by Labour at the local level and that this contributes to the above 
mentioned recursive continuation of racial oppression, in itself a disqualifier 
of participation in communicative discourses. It supports then 
Scheuerman's contention that the "second model risks abandoning the 
critical impulses that have motivated Habermas' intellectual work 
throughout his... career. "65° 
8.2 Social Reality Correlates 
However, in pursuit of the re-invigoration of Habermas' critical strand, 
especially in relation to the perceived absence of any substantive race 
references within the construct of that theory, a re-interpretation and 
confluence is sought between Habermas and Honneth's moral grounding of 
recognition struggles. Briefly to re-iterate, so as to draw out the key, critical 
methodological concerns, Honneth argues that Habermas' understanding of 
the communicative rationalisation of the lifeworld, i. e. "the process whereby 
ever more validity claims come to require explicit consensual resolution", 
underestimates the extent to which this occurs behind the backs of social 
subjects, and, thus, is not experienced as "an enhanced moral sensibility. s651 
For Honneth subjects experience restrictions to their moral point of view not 
through intuitively mastered rules of language, "but as a violation of identity 
claims acquired through socialisation". 652 His communicative paradigm 
then does not do away with language as the main referent, but includes it in a 
wider notion of recognition and its violation. Honneth writes that critical 
theory "must be confident of identifying empirical experiences and attitudes 
which already indicate at a pre-theoretical level that its normative 
standpoints are not without basis in social reality. "653 Habermas' use of 
universal pragmatics means that he equates the normative potential of social 
interaction with the linguistic conditions for reaching understanding free 
from domination. But if the process of communicative rationalisation is a 
"behind the backs of subjects" process then "a correlate cannot be found 
within social reality for the pre-theoretical resource to which the normative 
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perspective of Habermas' theory refers reflexively; his conception is not 
aimed in the same way as Horkheimer's... at the idea of helping to give 
expression to an existing social injustice. "654 If Honneth's social reality 
correlates are to be found in the violations of recognition, and this brings 
back into the fold in a reconstructive way the notion of labour, what are they 
if, as Honneth holds, "the normative presupposition of all communicative 
action is to be found in the acquisition of social recognition. "655 The 
correlates relate, then to the "pathologies of recognition", which "for `our' 
society .... would require studies of socialisation practices,... familial forms... relations of friendship,.... forms of application of positive 
law,... patterns of social esteem. "656 My critique of this, as I argue in the 
previous chapter, is that it assumes a differentiation of cultures without being 
able to account properly for the violation of certain cultures. To pursue the 
research paradigm of Honneth runs the risk of pathologising those who make 
claims about recognition violation. Thus it is not the lack of recognition 
which is so important as the mis-recognition which needs to be addressed. 
For example I have attempted to define racism within a communicative 
paradigm at the meta-theoretical level in terms of it being the maintenance of 
relations of force in the structures of communication through the 
conventionalisation of biological or ascribed biological differences. The 
definition of this key form of mis-recognition cannot be directly equated 
with Honneth's elaboration of his concept of recognition violation because 
the latter appears to apply only to what I would call "expressive racism". 
That is to say the open process of `denigration', in its metaphorical and non- 
PC etymological sense. There are other phases to the recursive nature of 
racism, such as effective racism which is the end product not so much of 
mis-recognition, as the transitive process of non-recognition, especially 
where non-recognition ties into the valorisation of group identities formed at 
the expense of others. Under certain circumstances, as evidenced in 
apartheid South Africa, expressive and effective racisms are directly related. 
Where the relationship is ostensibly tenuous, for example because prevailing 
social norms, inclusive of legal ones, prohibit expressive racism, as is the 
case in some European countries, such as France, effective racism presents 
itself as the dominant phase. However, attempts at remedial action to 
tackle these forms of racism, in the shape of legislation and associated social 
integrative stabilising interventions by the state, can give rise to a discourse 
of equality, in this case race equality, which becomes shorn of discursive 
communicative processes so that discourse becomes `discourse/diskourse'. 
Within the context of a study of racism and genocide, 'discourse', is defined 
as, "a discussion structured by a stable framework with widely accepted 
reference points, images and explicit elaborations". 657 My preferred 
neologistic differentiation of `diskourse', a label for representational 
discourse as opposed to dialogical discourse, means then that those 
experiencing mis- and non-recognition no longer become equal, or even 
actual, participants to the discursive communicative processes effecting 
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equality, i. e. they are removed from the discussion. This gives rise to 
another phase in the recursive development of racism which I have, in earlier 
sections, called equal opportunities' racism. Perhaps a better term would 
be "facadic racism" because it occurs under the umbrella of an equal 
opportunities framework. Its corollary is virtual reality equality and virtual 
reality recognition. This `diskourse' of equality allows for the 
instrumentalised legitimation of political parties who can claim to be doing 
something on the issue, say, of racial justice, whilst also providing the 
rationale and language to challenge and disrupt Black people's experiences 
and claims of racial injustice. Such racism accepts as collateral damage, 
that its action will, in its oppressive wake, drag in a few white people, as 
evidenced by the restructurings which since the eighties have seen many 
Black employees ejected from what were once upfront equality local 
government institutions. These have been reality correlated as well in the 
resultant manifold claims of racial discrimination fought and won through 
the Employment tribunal system. Perhaps we should also think in terms of 
`third way racism' in the sense that Fairclough's critical discourse analysis of 
new Labour's nu-speak language of the `third way' does. 58 That is to say 
that the substantive interpretation and analysis of the critical process of 
creating the transformative inter-face between subjectivism and objectivism, 
relativism/particularism and universalism etc., which is how some theorists 
have used the term `third way', is instead depoliticised and replaced by an 
anodyne shopping list of alternatives linked by conjunctions like, "not only" 
X, "but also" Y, or, A "and" B. Thus, for example, "not only valuing 
diversity", but also "racialising and welfare pathologising Gypsy beggars a 
las Barbara Roche" 659 Because Black people are no longer a proper 
participative part of the discursive processes of the discourse, 
conventionalisation occurs and `diskourse' emerges which helps shape the 
acceptable face of the political organisation and helps contain and structure 
the Black experience. This leads us back to Habermas because, as my 
analysis of racism shows, such mis-, non- and `VR'-recognitions are 
constructed through conventionalising forces in the structures of 
communication so that social interaction for Black people is directed rather 
than equally enacted. Thus the social reality correlates have to be found 
for the acts not only of mis-recognition but also those of non- and 'VR'- 
recognition which might not, in the first instance present themselves in terms 
of intuitively mastered rules of language. Nevertheless their resolution 
will need to be structured in a way that allows for the formation of consensus 
free from domination; a communicatively based social interactive process 
conducted through the medium of language. Thus because Honneth holds 
that "moral experiences are not triggered by the restriction of linguistic 
competences.. . (but).. . are shaped by the violation of 
identity claims acquired 
in socialisation", he concludes that, contra Habermas' notion of the 
normative potential of social interaction residing in the linguistic conditions 
of reaching understanding free from domination, "the normative 
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presupposition of all communicative action is to be found in the acquisition 
of social recognition. "660 However, recognition acquisition devolves upon 
linguistically based communicative processes. In expanding the idea of 
communication away from the singularity of language, Honneth is right to 
draw attention to the way in which mis-recognition is not experienced solely 
linguistically, as Habermas implies. He is also right to point out that that 
feelings of disrespect are not valuable in themselves. That is to say there are 
no transcendental, overhead, emancipatory tramlines to which mis- 
recognised subjects are automatically connected. Rather, mis-recognition, 
and, in my view, non- and VR-recognition, are an ambivalent "source of 
motivation for social protest and resistance", as the history of resistance to 
racism by Black people shows. In other words it illustrates the point I have 
made in earlier sections that the experience of the problem cannot be 
conflated with the solution. Empirically then the research will seek to 
present and structure the findings which, in relation to racial domination, can 
identify the relevant social reality correlates which can contribute to 
answering not only the general question relating to a `solution' asked by 
Honneth, "the question of how a moral culture could be so constituted as to 
give those harmed by disrespect and ostracisation the individual strength to 
articulate their experiences in the democratic public sphere.... ", 661 but also 
its implicit problem corollary of what constitutes the nature of that 
disrespect. 
We need to explore further, however, before we move on to the empirical 
details, Honneth's notion of social reality correlates (SRC), and its 
importance to not only the structure of the findings' presentation, but also its 
crucial relationship to the methodological implications for a critical theory 
which purports to address real world issues; and this one, in the sense of my 
interpretation, does make such a claim. Honneth examines both 
Horkheimer's and Habermas' versions of critical theory and the extent to 
which it is possible in each case to "rediscover an element of its own critical 
viewpoint within social reality. " In Horkheimer's case, in line with his 
theory's Left Hegelian legacy, and remember here that Honneth derives his 
own theoretical version of communicative critical theory from the young 
Hegel, this requires that his societal theory should excavate a "degree of 
immanent, intramundane transcendence. " 662 In Horkheimer's own words 
critical theory was unique because it is the "intellectual side of 
emancipation. " The theory can only achieve this if it is able to both reflect 
on its "emergence in pre-theoretical experience and on its application in a 
future praxis". In the real world this means being able to provide an 
account of the "emancipatory readiness of the populace. " The failure of 
the Frankfurt Institute to realise this research goal are, as Honneth, and 
Habermas elsewhere, correctly identify, because Horkheimer still remained 
tied to the Marxist notion of a pre-theoretical interest linked to the social 
emancipation of one class. Horkheimer's reliance on a form of Marxist 
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functionalism meant that his analysis of capitalism as a "self enclosed cycle 
of domination and cultural manipulation" provided no room for the 
emergence of a "practical-moral critique in social reality. " For Honneth 
then "the key to updating critical social research ... 
(is).. the task of disclosing 
social reality categorically in such a way that an element of intramundane 
transcendence will again become visible in it. "663 In pursuit of this 
Honneth rejects post structuralism, correctly in my opinion, because its 
negativist critique means that "attempting to locate itself within social reality 
must be considered impossible, since this reality is no longer constituted in 
such a way that social anomalies, even emancipatory interests or attitudes, 
can be found in it. " 664 
For Honneth, because Habermas' paradigm of communicative action situates 
the conditions for social progress in social interaction and not social labour, 
it has "re-established access to an emancipatory sphere of action"; and in so 
doing has renewed the tradition of critical theory. However, Honneth sets a 
qualifying test which must be met before he is ready to accept fully that 
Habermas' theory does not suffer from similar empirical problems as that of 
Horkheimer's. That is that "Critical Theory must be confident of 
identifying empirical experiences and attitudes which already indicate at a 
pre-theoretical level that its normative standpoints are not without basis in 
social reality. "665 In Habermas' case applying this test reveals, as far as 
Honneth is concerned, that "the foothold in reality for his normative 
perspective has to be the social process which develops the role of linguistic 
rules for reaching understanding. "666 As shown above, Honneth doubts that 
this will become visible in some form of social reality correlate because the 
communicative rationalisation of the lifeworld, which is a historical process, 
occurs in reality `behind the backs of subjects' and is not directly 
experienced. In other words "moral experiences are not triggered by the 
restriction of linguistic competences... (but)... by the violation of identity 
claims acquired in socialisation. , 667 In pursuit of this Honneth advances 
his argument with reference to the pathologies of capitalist society, an 
endeavour which is a necessary corollary to understanding the emancipatory 
potential of such a society. On this point Habermas' social critique 
measures social pathology in terms of the "stage attained by the development 
of human rationality". As such because social critique is narrowed to a 
theory of rationality, forms of social pathology which cannot be linked to 
rationality cannot come to light. To supplement this shortfall Honneth 
argues that the rational conditions for reaching domination free 
understanding can no longer be the criterion for the pathological 
development of social life. Instead "the criterion is now provided by the 
inter-subjective presuppositions of human identity development.... found in 
the social forms of communication in which the individual grows up, 
acquires a social identity and ultimately has to learn to conceive of him- or 
herself as an equal, and at the same time, unique member of society. " The 
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conclusion then is that "the basic concepts of an analysis of society have to 
be constructed in such a way that they can grasp the distortions or 
deficiencies of the social framework of recognition, while the process of 
societal rationalisation loses its central position. " 668 However, in terms of 
race I am not so sure that this provides the relevant framework within which 
to excavate the relevant social reality correlates. Firstly I have already 
argued that it is the areas of mis-, non-, and VR-recognitions which are 
germane to race, and not recognition in itself. Further this betokens that it is 
not so much an either-or questions as one of keeping a categorical distinction 
between the two intertwined processes of societal rationalisation and social 
recognition because irrationality/irrationalization, as Habermas himself has 
defined it, are "those forces that are inconspicuously set in the very 
structures of communication and prevent conscious settlement of conflicts by 
means of intra-psychic as well as interpersonal communicative barriers. "669 
One of these barriers is contained in the assumptions Honneth makes about 
the substances of `social lower classes' communicative processes, and by 
implication therefore, those of Black people as well. In talking about the 
active resistances engaged in by such classes, he argues that "because 
members of these classes have no special cultural expertise in articulating 
moral experiences, we perceive in their utterances - prior to all philosophical 
or academic influences, as it were - what normative expectations are 
oriented towards in everyday social life... (and these).... social protests of the 
lower classes are not motivationally guided by positively formulated 
principles, but by the violation of intuitive notions of justice.. the normative 
core.. (of which).. . turns out to consist of expectations connected with respect 
for one's own dignity, honour or integrity. "670 At one level this reads like a 
version of the Roussean noble savage replete with guttural speech supporting 
gestures to communicate `his' dignity etc. This argument of Honneth can 
only hold if one accepts the untenable supposition that moral arguments can 
only be put forward in `academic speak'. Underlying this is perhaps an 
interpretation of Habermas' notion of rationality which sees it dependent, as 
Benhabib proposes, on there being one form of political language, the 
middle class standard notion of language. My argument, outlined in the 
previous chapter, is that there has to be languages both intra- and inter- 
society which can speak on equal basis if Habermas' notion of rationality is 
to be upheld in multi-racial and racialised societies. In other words the 
lower classes, dispossessed and other marginalised collectivities are quite 
capable of voicing their mis-recognition claims in moral terms. It depends 
on whether or not the hearer is capable of interpreting those claims 
competently. What we can say then is that built into the pathologies of mis-, 
non- and VR-recognitions is the normative expectation, from those who 
experience this form of oppression and domination, that people will be able 
to reach understanding on how to move forward. Thus it can be said that 
these forms of mal-recognition can be taken as evidence of the maintenance 
of force in the structures of communication, irrationality if you like, and 
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therefore made visible as social reality correlates. On the other hand the 
struggle against this can be taken as that which ultimately seeks the free from 
domination communicative means to resolve this, thereby providing the 
discernible normative framework read also as a social reality correlate. 
Social reality correlates, (SRCs), are more than just markers and signs about 
the communicative preparedness of society. They are the reflection of a 
substantive process of empirical research, without entertaining presumptions 
or assumptions about the methodological content of such research, which 
test, and in some cases maintain as well, as with action research, the critical 
boundaries between social reality and that "immanent, intramundane 
transcendence". In this case a communicative based solidaristic socially 
interactive integration determining, or at the very least, programmatically 
influencing systemic integration. In the area of race, recognition and 
communication the identification of relevant SRCs takes on an added 
importance in the light of one of the central theses of this research that race 
is a trans-epochal unresolved problem the resolution of which is one of the 
key touchstones to the fulfilment of modernity. As shown, thus, in the 
previous section where an outline of a likely normative model of a racially 
dominance free form of local governance is attempted, such SRCs have to 
include exercises in radical "institutional fantasy", and not just, as Habermas 
counsels, a careful brand of fantasising; in any event a quality which, as 
Scheuerman notes, is absent from his BFN. 
At this stage an argument can be seen emerging which says that SRCs can be 
likened to the amniotic fluid discursively feeding, and being fed, by micro- 
and meso-level theorising, but from which meta-level theory can only 
sometimes draw sustenance. That is to say at another level that whilst 
Habermas is extremely reluctant to directly relate his theory of domination 
free communicative discourse to everyday reality in any kind of a priori 
sense, preferring to see it as an idealised keep-in-the-forefront-of-your-head 
type of argument, I, in acknowledging the fundamental importance of race 
blockages in communication, am not so cautious about wanting to not only 
realise the everyday correlates, but also to engage with them. 
Methodologically, then, there are two inter-related areas which are that of a 
critical theory of research methodology - the meta-level - and that of the 
relevant `methodologies'. In pursuit then of the structuring and detailing of 
the empirical data, it can also be said that this frames the two remaining 
questions that require answering: what is a critical theory of research 
methodology and what is the outline not so much of the relevant SRCs, 
because these will emerge in the course of the structuring of the empirical 
details, but of the key contextualising theoretical areas to each SRC. The 
former is answered below, the latter in the structuring and detailing of the 
empirical details. 
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8.3 Critical Theory of Social Research Methodology 
In outlining the framework to a critical social research methodology 
(CSRM), I do so not on the basis of identifying the `best' methods, or 
attempting a recipe book of ways of undertaking race related research, but on 
the basis of taking the necessary one step further removed by seeking to 
explore the philosophy and principles of CSRM compared to the 
philosophical grounding of other methodologies. In so doing the question 
is asked from the outset which methodological approach is better suited to 
helping to frame the answers to the questions posed about racial justice. But 
then this is no more than has been attempted in the structuring of the 
introduction to the previous sections on local governance. Notice was 
given there that because "local governance studies have tended to languish in 
epistemologically boundaried discourses", and that even those, such as 
Marxist ones, which have attempted trans-discourse analyses, or those, such 
as post-modernist ones, which have tried de-narrativising these discourses, 
have all resulted in a form of "on tological naive realism which sanctions a 
WYSIWYG approach to research issues", then, if the capacity for 
emancipatory practice in local government is to be developed, recourse to a 
meta-theoretical level is necessary. This in turn is related to the first 
section on race which seeks to situate race "within a modernist meta- 
theoretical approach (so that race is treated) ... not as incidental to 
conceptual structuring, but as an explicit categorical element internally 
related to other considerations. " This return thus to methodological 
considerations attempts to flesh out the distinctive characteristics of CSRM, 
showing why and how it better deals with the empirical realities of race. 
In undertaking this reference is made to a number of key texts which 
specifically deal with the issues of CSRM. 671 Two of these, Morrow and 
Brunkhorst, derive their primary source, as I do, from consideration of the 
original and `heirs to' Frankfurt School critical theorists. The other, 
Harvey, appears to have derived a similar outlook to CSRM from sources 
which are mainly Marxist and neo-Marxist. 672 Of these only Harvey tries 
to demonstrate how CSRM is best suited to understanding race based 
oppression and emancipation. I want to start then with Harvey's attempt 
to derive a CSRM, but bearing in mind Morrow's assessment. Morrow 
explicitly acknowledges that Harvey broadly covers the same area as he 
does, but does not do so at any developed meta-theoretical level which 
Morrow argues is crucial to understanding the uniqueness of CSRM. 
Harvey, nevertheless, is important not only because he attempts to situate 
race and racism within CSRM, but because his meso-level approach, the 
`sociological', as Honneth describes it, accords at another level, with the 
everyday critical stance I adopted whilst engaged/working in and through the 
research. It outlines, as a prefatory summary then, an activist research 
approach to CSRM, which, however, in support of Morrow's qualified 
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approval, still requires a more theoretically honed overview; a requirement 
Harvey himself sees as necessary for CSRM. 
Harvey briefly distinguishes between Critical Social Research (CSR), 
positivistic based research, and phenomenologically based research whereby 
CSR is "distinguished by a critical-dialectical perspective which attempts to 
dig beneath the surface of historically specific, oppressive, social 
structures"673, positivistic research by "concerns to discover factors that 
cause observed phenomena or to build grand theoretical edifices", whilst the 
phenomenological inquiry "attempts to interpret the meanings of social 
actors or close analysis of symbolic processes. s674 Within these 
contrasting approaches `method' is no more than the way in which empirical 
data are collected, acknowledging that no method inherently belongs to any 
of the three perspectives. `Methodology' then, as Harvey perceives it, is 
"the point at which method, theory and epistemology coalesce in an overt 
way in the process of directly investigating instances in the social world. " 
On the bases of these definitions Harvey concludes, a conclusion supported 
by other CSRM theorists like Morrow, that there is no simple "methodic 
recipe for doing critical social research". This inferred call for a plurality of 
methods is supported through his development of his argument for the 
specificity of CSRM, especially if CSR "grounded in both gender and race 
oppression offer unique perspectives on critical analyses. " In pursuit of this 
Harvey develops a growing definition of CSR which, in some ways shows 
how the need, identified by Honneth for there to be illuminative SRCs for 
theories with an "immanent, intramundane transcendence", can be achieved 
methodologically. Thus: 
"Critical social research does not take the apparent social structure, social 
processes or accepted history for granted.. (but).. tries to dig beneath the surface 
of appearances.. (asking) ... how social systems really work, how ideology or history conceals the processes which oppress and control people..... In its 
engagement with oppressive structures it questions the very nature of 
prevailing knowledge and directs attention to the processes and institutions 
which legitimate knowledge..... Conversely, critical social research is an 
evolving process. As it engages dominant ideological constructs and 
presuppositions about the nature of knowledge it is necessarily dynamic in the 
evolution of its critique. So, what may be radical critique at one moment, may, 
in later context, appear superficial..... Essentially critical social research asks 
substantive questions about existent social processes. "675 
Within this framework then `methods' as opposed to a pre-given `method' 
are important because the data released "are meaningful only in terms of 
their theoretical context, reliability and validity are functions of the context 
and the epistemological presuppositions that the researcher brings to the 
enquiry. s676 If what is emerging appears to be closely related to neo- 
Marxist type framework, then that is perhaps because Harvey takes on board, 
via Bauman, before his apostate post modernist turn, Habermas' early notion 
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of emancipatory reason. Emancipatory reason views information as 
"partial, historically specific, inconclusive and the `reflection of a mutilated, 
maimed, truncated existence. "' Critical social research requires us then to 
go below the surface of given reality, such as `common sense', and to locate 
"social phenomena in their specific historical context. " Such analyses then 
are inclusive of "an overt political struggle against oppressive social 
structures... ", and can be ideal typed according to all or a number of the 
following features, which can be combined in what Harvey summationally 
describes as a "dialectical deconstructive-reconstructive process. s677 These 
are: 
f Abstraction in which CSR "starts with abstract generalisations and 
investigates them. " 
f Totality which refers to the argument that "social phenomena are inter- 
related and form a total whole. " 
f Essence which captures the "fundamental element of an analytic 
process. " 
f Praxis, which whilst it refers to practical reflective activity, also means 
that CSR must acknowledge that "changes in social formations are the 
result of praxis. " 
f Ideology which is either positive or negative referring in the first 
instance, for example, to a world view, or in the second instance, for 
example to the view that ideology serves not only to distort reality but is 
also related dialectically to the nature of social relations. 
f Structure which in CSR sees `structure' holistically as a complex set of 
inter-related inter-dependent elements. 
f History in which the CSR approach "involves two essential elements, the 
grounding of a generalised theory in material history and the exposure of 
the essential nature of structural relations which manifest themselves 
historically.... (thereby locating)... events in their social and political 
contexts.. " 
f Deconstruction and reconstruction which can be summed up as "a 
process of focussing on the structural totality or historical moment and 
critically reflecting on its essential nature. " 
There is at one and the same time both a general overlap with the critical 
research concerns of the Frankfurt school, including Habermas, and, when 
examining in detail, a sharp divergence as well from the latter's work. For 
example there are still residues of historical materialism and the social labour 
paradigm in Harvey's work which put a question mark over the extent to 
which CSR directed at race would seek incorporatist solutions to those sorts 
of problems. This is implied strongly in his notion of totality, with its 
Lukacian overtones, and his therefore strongly inter-related and inter- 
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dependent version of social structure, which in both would mean, for 
example, that `race' might be subjected to other forms of over-arching 
epistemological frameworks, inclusive of research epistemologies. For 
example in the previous Chapter on local governance I pointed out that 
Habermas' de- and reconstruction of key parts of Marx's theory was because 
he detected within the body of such theory a latent positivism. Further 
Harvey's use of Habermas' notion of emancipatory interests, which is 
reflected in his notion of `essence', might be said to be problematic because 
of the inherent foundationalism within such Kantian derived 
anthropologically constant knowledge interests which are not open to 
empirical verification; a problem highlighted in Honneth's proposal for the 
need for SRCs. These shortcomings can be pursued further if we look at 
Harvey's treatment of `race', which, to give him his due, he alone pursues as 
an explicit acknowledged emancipatory interest subject. 
He does this by reference to a number of what he regards as CSR based 
research studies countering the pathological treatment of Black people. 
These treat Black people as the problem, rather than seeing the issue as 
structural racism. For Harvey, and here there is agreement with him, CSR 
means that race is a social construction. Within this brief summation of his 
perspective, I want to concentrate on one of his examples he uses, which is 
that of Ben-Tovim et al's research678 into the politics of race equality within 
the sphere of local governance. This, borrowing from Gilroy, Harvey 
categorises as an approach which focuses on social policy issues, an 
approach which "supposes that radical theorists of race and racism should 
produce critiques of official race policy and formulation of alternatives. " 
The success of this depends on two assumptions: the idea of racism as 
divorced from class and a positive evaluation of the capacity of state 
institutions. Ben Tovim et al's action research examined the political 
processes at work causing and maintaining racial inequalities within the 
sphere of local governance in the late seventies and early eighties. It 
focussed on the political forces which could produce and reinforce racial 
inequality as well as those which could reduce such inequalities. Its 
approach was very much that committed action research in which it is 
explicitly acknowledged that all social research is to lesser or greater extent 
politicised, thus is not politically neutral, and particularly in the area of 
racism, "the tendency to divorce research from its would be political context 
and to abstain from research based interventions has only served the political 
status quo and in some instances no doubt to actually exacerbate inequalities 
themselves. "679 As such the authors are concerned that "the sociology of 
race should be overtly politicised and reflect the ethical commitment 
condemning racism. " 680 Related to this is their conceptualisation of the 
local state as involving three inter-related areas: a set of electorally 
accountable institutions, a relationship with those outside of the institutions, 
and, as a site of struggle to change those institutions. Within this context 
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the action researcher has a three element framework for intervention based 
on identifying the problem, analysing the political means by which the 
problem is created or maintained and undertaking a political challenge to 
overcome the problem. To do so means, however, that "the efficacy of 
research material is linked directly to an understanding of policy constraints, 
administrative machinations and political processes. " In terms of the 
theoretical overview, their approach is Marxist, not in terms of economic 
determinism, but in terms of granting `autonomy' to the political system. 
The criticisms made previously about the incorporatist tendencies of the 
Marxist social labour paradigm can still be made of the above despite the 
authors disavowal of the economic determinist linkage. This is because 
the epistemological and on tological limitations of social labour as an 
explanatory device are still present in their conceptualisation of the political 
process, a deficit reflected in the partially inclusionary/exclusionary 
determination of not only what is acceptable politics, but also who are 
tolerable participants. Thus Harvey says that the action researchers in this 
case "avoided charges of extremism" by building broad alliances and 
overcoming resistance through processes of negotiation and representation. 
It is to be questioned whether or not this common sense political 
pragmatism, insofar as it mirrors orthodox political processes, and 
presumably, because it is an action research project, inures the research 
itself, is theoretically refined enough to pose the race question more 
fundamentally. In a sense the answer lies in the benefit-of-hindsight 
retrospective look at what the research achieved in that particular local 
authority fifteen years after it was undertaken. The answer is a race 
equality infra-structure much weaker than most, and a local Black 
community still largely excluded from the local council; not to mention Ben 
Tovim as the year 20000 Labour leader of the council publicly calling for 
and backing the introduction of American style Mayors. The undemocratic 
nature of the latter political institution together with the history of race 
marginalisation in the States through political offices like these, whilst it 
confirms the limitations of the axiology of such political projects, also casts 
doubt on the ability of so structured critical research to include and pick up 
on substantively, Black experiences, other than through hand picked 
`representatives'. It is, in other words, too conservative a fantasy of what a 
racially inclusive form of local governance is about; conservative in my view 
because it is a `utopia' which makes no reference to meta-theoretical 
concerns, either literally or metaphorically. 
In the introduction to the last section on local governance, I argued for a 
meta-theoretical approach to de- and reconstructing theories of local 
governance, where `meta-theory' "looks at the presuppositions underlying 
theories" and "deals explicitly with those philosophical rationales with which 
we, often unconsciously, ground our actions. " The reason for this is to 
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generate a core elements' framework to enable the creation of a "critical 
discourse on local governance with explicit categorisation of, and internal 
linkage to, race/racism... " because it is necessary to deal with race explicitly 
at this level, since, whilst race existed autochtonally within the origins of 
such philosophical endeavours it is in effect `palimpsested' by a skewed 
universalism. For example, Scheurich, writing, from within a perspective 
that can be said to be straddling the critical -post modern continuum, 
specifically about research methodology asks whether or not it can be said 
that research methodologies are racially biased. 681 In dealing with this 
question,. Scheurich, like myself, does not leave the question of racism at the 
meso-level, but argues the necessity for examining it at the meta-level. 
Scheurich unravels his argument within the context of the notion of 
"civilizational racism", which refers to the civilizational assumptions 
unconscious to most members, but which nevertheless construct the nature of 
their world and their experience therein. Thus, following on from research 
theorists, like Stansfield who have explored in depth the issue of race/racism 
and methodology, it can be said that "the white race, what Stansfield has 
called `a privileged subset of the population' has unquestionably dominated 
Western civilization during all the modernist period ... (to the extent that 
the) .... ways of the dominant group (its epistemologies, on tologies and 
axiologies) not only become the dominant ways of that civilisation, but also 
these ways become so deeply embedded that they typically are seen as 
`natural' or appropriate norms rather than as historically evolved social 
constructions. "682 Such `ways' are "not outside history or sociology.. . (but 
are) ... deeply interwoven within the social 
histories of particular civilisations 
and within particular groups within those civilisations. "683 Concentrating 
then on epistemology because research methodologies are precisely about 
that, i. e. the creation of knowledge, though acknowledging the inter- 
dependentness of epistemology, on tology and axiology, Scheurich puts 
forward the idea of `epistemological racism' which means that "the current 
range of research epistemologies - positivism to post -modernism - arise 
out of the social history and culture of the dominant race, that these 
epistemologies logically reflect and reinforce that social history and that 
racial group (while excluding the epistemologies of other race/cultures), and 
that this has negative results for people of colour in general and scholars of 
colour in particular. " In effect it means that Black scholars have not only to 
become proficient in epistemologies that have been, and are, hostile to their 
being and experience, but also in some cases, not all, because it has to be 
accepted that many Black scholars are happier naturalling these 
methodologies, constantly negotiating the critical interface between using 
them to survive and, at the same time, deriving more appropriate, 
emancipatory epistemologies. Scheurich describes this process as scholars 
of colour having to become "epistemologically bi-cultural", because he 
conceives the solution, in line with his more post modernist leanings, as 
being within the realm of developing `alternative race based 
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epistemologies. "684 However, because Scheurich appears to commit the 
same mistake in constructing culture almost as if it were autogenetic, the 
impression is given that he is talking about parallel social contexts which are 
not inter-linked; let alone inter-linked through relations of racialising power 
which, in part. Structure those very self same cultures. This conflation 
again of wrongs done to and remedying action means that, unfortunately, 
Scheurich ends up uncritically citing such biologically reductionist Afro- 
centric theories, like that of Molefe Asante, as one of the alternative race 
based epistemologies. My view is that it is not the quality of being bi-, or 
multi-cultural which is so important in relation to research, as that of being 
epistemologically anti-racist, by which is meant being able to de- and 
reconstruct those epistemological processes which underpin and support the 
wrongs done to in racism. 
Methodologically Charles Mills' concept of the `racial contract', similar to, 
but different from Pateman's work on the Sexual Contract, provides a better 
framework. 685 For Mills the Racial Contract underwrites the social contract 
where the social contract in its most general sense is taken as that agreement 
between human beings emerging from a "state of nature" who agree to 
establish civil society and government, and that government, i. e. government 
by popular consent. The Racial Contract is seen as a bridging concept 
between the mainstream world of white philosophy and ethics and the real 
world of Black people - that of oppression, exploitation, imperialism, 
colonialism etc. The use of `white' and `whiteness' is not as a colour but as 
a "set of power relations. " Within this briefly summarised context, the 
Racial Contract is defined as: 
"... that set of formal or informal agreements or meta-agreements... between 
the members of one subset of humans, henceforth designated by (shifting) 
`racial' (phenotypically/genealogical/cultural) criteria... . as `white' and 
coextensive (making due allowance for gender) with the class of full 
persons, to categorise the remaining subset of humans as `non-white' and of 
a different and inferior moral status, sub-persons, so that they have a 
subordinate civil standing in the white or white ruled polities the whites 
either already inhabit or establish in transactions as aliens with those 
polities, and the moral and juridical rules normally regulating the behaviour 
of whites in their dealings with one another either do not apply at all in 
dealings with non-whites or apply only in a qualified form... but in any case 
the general purpose of the contract is always the differential privileging of 
the whites as a group with respect to the non-whites as a group, the 
exploitation of their bodies, land, resources, and the denial of equal socio- 
economic opportunities to them"686 
Mills' use of the notion of `contract' is very much in line with Kant's, and to 
some extent Habermas'. That is to say there is both a descriptive analysis of 
fact, as well as normative element from which judgements about social 
justice can be made. Whilst the idea of a Racial Contract at a metaphorical 
335 
level, is useful as an explanatory device to deal with the historical pattern of 
white over Black, for the purposes of this section, what is important is the 
analysis Mills makes of the meta-theoretical elements of the general corps of 
Western philosophical thought. Here he accords with my attempt in the 
section on local governance to generate the notion of exclusionary on 
tologies and epistemologies. Thus Mills argues that natural freedom and 
equality is restricted to white men resulting in a "partitioned social on 
tology... between persons and racial .... Untermenschen"687 Further the 
Racial Contract derives its own epistemology, "its norms and procedures for 
determining what counts as moral and factual knowledge of the world. 9,08 
This results in a bifurcated epistemology in which one branch is in effect a 
licence to `misinterpret the world', an ignorance of racism, which is 
validated by what Mills refers to as `white epistemic authority. " The 
other derives from and is inter-related to the experiences of Black people. 
The key question then, from a methodological point of view, is how such 
experiences can come to be known and accepted equally in the social and 
political realm; a state of affairs promised in the universalism of the political 
philosophies grounding Western societies. 
We come again, then, to the question of validity. Scheurich, in a post 
modernist inspired `deconstructive investigation' of validity, raises some key 
questions, though noting in terms of a summary core, that the numerous 
constructions of validity deriving from the multiplicity of research positions, 
in fact mask "a singularity of purpose or function. " Validity in social 
research is that "warrant of trustworthiness. " Good research has a 
`validity', bad research did not. Scheurich concludes that `validity' "is but a 
mask for a boundary or policing function across both conventional 
approaches and more radical versions of post positivism". 689 To support 
this he draws on Spivak who argues that by "explaining (through valid 
research), we exclude the possibility of the radically heterogeneous (the 
Other)", Levinas' position of `on tological imperialism. " Now there is an 
instinctive sympathy for arguments like these because they `validate' those 
often invisible hurdles over which Black people have to haul their 
experiences and claims for justice. For example one of the target boroughs, 
twenty years after the start of their explicit race equality programme, but now 
strongly into the throes of new Labour managerialism and what I have earlier 
termed `third way' racism, commissioned a piece of research to look into the 
claims of Black employees that they were being disproportionately 
disciplined. Under the aegis of the previous race equality programme such 
an investigation would have been undertaken by the in-house race equality 
staff backed up by the extensive employment functions' monitoring system. 
With the dismantling of those structures, the research went out to an 
organisation priding themselves on being non-political. Whilst there was 
statistical evidence to support the contention that Black employees were 
being disproportionately disciplined, the researchers, all white, concluded 
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that this might be due to the fact that either the organisations were acting in a 
racist manner, or due to the fact that the Black employees concerned were in 
effect incompetent. 690 Once again it can be seen that Black people's 
claims for. racial justice are in effect policed through being subjected to a 
validity process involving orthodox research; a highly politicised validity 
process which says that prima facie acceptance of Black people's claims, in 
the sense of there being communicative space for equality grounded 
argumentation, are no longer acceptable. Tempting, at one level, as it is to 
indulge Scheurich's solution which is for there to be a "Bakhtian dialogic 
carnival, a loud clamour of polyphonic, open, tumultuous, subversive 
conversation on validity as the wild uncontrollable play of difference", 691- 
and there might be some mileage here for this as a disruptive tactic - this 
does not begin to address the problem in the here and now, or inter-mediate 
to long term future. Rather I have stronger sympathy for Mill's argument 
that post modernism is "an epistemological and theoretical dead 
end..... symptomatic of rather than diagnostic of the problems of the globe", 
and that we should seek reconstructive solutions "in the spirit of a racially 
informed Ideologiekritik... . (which 
is)..... pro-Enlightenment (Jurgen 
Habermas' radical and to-be-completed Enlightenment, that is - though 
Habermas' Eurocentric, deraced, and de-imperialised vision of modernity 
itself stands in need of critique) and anti-post-modernist. "692 The only 
caveat, one which even Habermas and radical post modernists would admit, 
is that the boundary line between post modernist theorising and the 
theoretical and praxitic process of creating, oxymoronic style, an "anti- 
foundationalist universalism", is not as clearly demarcated as Mills thinks. 
Methodologically then, the problem is to outline a research paradigm, a 
critical social research one, I would contend, in which questions of validity 
and race, a socially constructed relationship in which the resolution of its 
core problematic goes to the heart of social research methodologies, are not 
abandoned because of hyper pluralised notions of incorporative policing, or 
reduced to instrumentalised, technical ones of science, but are contested 
communicatively discursively. 
I am going to outline, briefly then, such a methodology, linking it at key 
relevant places with the methodological practice underlying this piece of 
research. To do so requires that I borrow key categories of Morrow's and 
Brown's work on critical theory and methodology because their broad 
conceptualisation of the issue encapsulates my own thinking on the subject. 
It takes us beyond the theorisation of Harvey whose work on critical theory 
and methodology, whilst its explicit inclusion of `race' made it initially 
attractive, still presents meta-theoretical problems over that very same issue. 
Further Morrow and Brown's conceptual schemata ties in with my attempts 
in sections... and..... to outline race and local governance meta-theoretically, 
non particularistically, non-teleologically, and reflexively. Further it was 
hoped that it would provide the means to deracialise race. Briefly then we 
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can look at a critical theoretical social research methodology in terms of 
three areas which can be said to be `organically' linked ; critical theory's 
meta theory, non- empirical methods and empirical methods. The 
description `organic' refers to the argument contained in such a theorisation 
that decisions about methods are not technical ones, but are linked to the 
underlying premises of the researchers. 
In terms of meta-theory then, critical theorisation of social research attempts 
to takes us beyond the dualism of the characteristic categories within which 
the theories of research methodologies have become imprisoned. This 
includes as well the post modernisation of certain research thinking where 
any attempt to reconcile the two broad categories is abandoned in favour of a 
non-universalistic relativism resulting in either hyper-plurality or hyper 
egalitarianism. Thus CSR tries to argue beyond the antinomic 
conceptualisations of, for example, objectivism and relativism, or, more 
prosaically, quantitative and qualitative methodologies. It argues, instead 
for, dare one use this term, `a third way' between the two core oppositions. 
In advancing this, Morrow, builds his argument via a main reference to 
Habermas' conceptualisation of the epistemology of critical theory. As 
outlined before, Habermas' early argument on the epistemological bases to 
critical theory is developed Janus style with one eye critically de- and 
reconstructing social labour based Marxism, which Habermas views as 
having a latent potential for positivism, and the other eye doing likewise to 
positivism. Habermas' answer-is that of knowledge constitutive interests 
which, unlike positivism, disavows the claim that knowledge can be 
identified by a single interest. Instead Habermas proposes three basic 
categories of knowledge interest: empirical - analytical, hermeneutic - 
historical, and critical-emancipatory. 693 These interests have the quality of 
being quasi-transcendental; that is to say that such structures are not 
empirical, but "rather are deep structures of the human mind that we have to 
assume in order to have the conditions of possibility for what we in fact do 
know. " 694 Whilst Habermas came to reconstruct this conceptualisation, 
because of its still too foundationalist qualities, in terms of universal 
pragmatics, i. e. "to identify and reconstruct universal conditions of possible 
understanding, hence of communicative action"695, he nevertheless retains 
the notion of critical-emancipatory interest, even if it is recast 
communicatively. This goes to the heart of critical theory's core 
assumption which is that "every form of social order entails some form of 
domination and that critical-emancipatory interest underlies the struggles to 
change those relations of domination-subordination. "696 Morrow points to 
the way in which the critical-emancipatory interest moves from empirical to 
normative theorising. Thus empirically "power relations engender forms of 
distorted communication that result in self-deception on the parts of agents 
with respect to their interests, needs, and perceptions of social 
reality.... (which have)..... implicit normative claims, that is the necessary 
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assumption of an ideal speech situation where falsifying consciousness 
would be reduced because communication would assume the form of 
authentic dialogue not based on asymmetrical relations of power. " 697 The 
shift from knowledge interests to universal pragmatics has to be seen as a 
continuum of emphases, rather than a juxtaposition of new and abandoned 
conceptualisations. Habermas' emphasis in universal pragmatics is on the 
most general conditions for inter-subjective communication; an emphasis 
based on the argument that communication and interpretation are grounded 
and made possible by four implicit "validity claims of comprehensibility, 
truth, truthfulness, and rightness" which can only be properly redeemed 
discursively. Whilst Morrow thus sees a change in emphasis in knowledge 
interests on the origins of distorted communication to that in universal 
pragmatics of the conditions for inter-subjective communication, my 
perspective, through the prism of race, is that these two emphases are 
fundamentally inter-connected. It ties in with Honneth's attempts to 
reconfigure the bases to moral experiences in terms of the non-recognition of 
identity claims as a more feasible context within which to generate critical 
theory social reality correlates. That is to say that these are part of the 
oppressive, dominating conditions of distorted communication; the 
antinomic correlates of the general conditions for inter-subjective 
communication. To that extent my earlier arguments about the need for 
communication in the polity to be translatable, and transformative figure 
here. Morrow goes on to indicate that the status of knowledge that arises 
from critical work supporting the questions thrown up by universal 
pragmatics is not the same as that of empirically based direct observations. 
Nor is it strictly philosophical. Rather it is reconstructive in attempting to 
substantively thread its way in between the empirical and transcendental. 
An example of this is Habermas' use of Kohlberg's theory of the 
development of moral competences. These `universal development features 
of the species', (on togenetic), are seen to be a "universalistic basis for 
linking the on tological stages of development with the moral imperative of 
realising those possibilities.. . (and 
because).... universal pragmatic structures 
of human competence presuppose and imply idealised possibilities.. . (the 
extent to which)... societies fail to cultivate those potentials, they are subject 
to forms of criticism that are not arbitrary or culturally relative. s698 
Further the communicative ethics which flow from this means that it is 
possible to link `is' with `ought' so that the empirical reality of certain 
people not reaching a level of cognitive developmental competence can be 
related to the normative claim that such restrictions of potential are unjust. 
However, within the context of the multi-racial, racist metropole, judgements 
about `cognitive competences' can only be made if the deconstructive 
processes doing away with the forces distorting communication are, as I 
have argued earlier, thorough enough to ensure that all can speak equally. 
Otherwise we run the risk of ending up with what I detect in Honneth's 
argument regarding the ability of the `lower classes' to articulate the moral 
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argument, which is an implicit restatement of the inarticulate noble savage 
trope; or, in the case of Habermas a confirmation of the criticism that those 
linguistically competent in the dominant language are top of the on togenetic 
tree. To that extent the deconstruction, the problem, is intimately related to 
the reconstruction, the solution. Methodologically, thus, as an example, 
this, from a race perspective, might, as has been argued from a gender 
perspective, call for a radical overhaul of Kohlberg's theory. 
This, however, does not go beyond the potential of Habermas' theorisation, 
one which, with respect to knowledge, Morrow has termed interpretive 
structuralism. This is because there is no knowledge certainty, which is 
implied by the notion of consciousness, rather the "basis of knowledge is 
language, the means through which we have to represent reality. " In so 
doing we also include causal processes in social life which are represented as 
"structural mechanisms that constrain or enable social possibilities. " 
Distorted communication as mis-recognition and the corollary of recognition 
struggles, are obvious examples here. On tologically, therefore, 
Habermas' theory displays what Morrow has termed a `critical realism'. 
That is to say it eschews a correspondence notion of truth found in traditional 
realism, but one that holds "that the identification of deeper causal 
mechanisms does presuppose a view of reality outside discourse even if it 
can only be known fallibly through it. "699 What then of the dual on tology 
which Mills highlights which appears still to be Black people's lot. The 
unquestioned, even unconscious, assumption of being is the `reality' of the 
ubermenschen. In terms of Habermas distinction between work and 
symbolic interaction, Black people because they have been, and are, seen to 
be part of `nature' are known through work in so far as nature is worked on. 
Further social world structures are constructed by human agents; natural 
world ones are not. This introduces a qualitative difference between the on 
tologies of the natural and social worlds. In terms of race, recasting this 
dualism as a communicative structure not only brings `being in-itself' into 
the discursive realm, and the need for fully inclusive interpretations of 
knowledge, but also, methodologically, demands that those being researched 
are fully included in the communicative processes of that research. In other 
words race demonstrates, as I have argued in the previous section about the 
prospective form and content of the racially, fully inclusive sphere of local 
governance, but also derivative of my core contention regarding race and 
modernity's fulfilment, that methodologically we should talk not so much 
about on tology, as deon tology. 
Epistemologically Morrow argues that the interpretive structuralism of 
critical theory is pragmatist and constructivist with regard to epistemology 
and methodology. That is to say that it is pluralist in regard to these because 
it recognises that "science ultimately is based on a social consensus mediated 
through language.... (and that) ... the ultimate basis of scientific discourse is 
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not formal logic or factual verifications; rather it is a process of 
argumentation. "70° However, as I have argued earlier, such discursive, 
communicative, argumentative practices have to, bearing in mind my linkage 
of race and fulfilling modernity, uphold explicitly the principle of non- 
closure, with its attendant communicative principles of translatability and 
transmutability. These seek to address the keep-in-the-forefront wariness 
of transgressing into the area of what Scheurich has categorised as 
epistemological or civilisational racism. Methods flow from the argument 
thus, and are not simply ones chosen from a methodological melange. To 
that extent then Morrow is correct to argue that Habermas' critical theory 
moves beyond the empiricist analysis of surface type phenomena to a 
structural one involving generalisations about "deeper causal mechanisms 
and structural rules that operate historically. "701 
If then the form of social transformative knowledge, the critical 
emancipatory knowledge interest which I take to be the leitmotiv of 
Habermas' work, is a critique of domination that involves inter-subjective 
reflection, and not self reflection with its philosophy of history 
consciousness raising implications, as Morrow argues, then these 
"epistemological commitments call forth an explicit account of human 
agency and social action. " I have already used a meta-theoretical 
interrogative matrix involving the categories of epistemology, on tology and 
agency to frame my interpretive structuralist arguments regarding the context 
to local governance. Whilst this, and other arguments regarding race and 
positively racialised critical theory, will be validatorily highlighted through 
the empirical data organised with reference to identified key social reality 
correlates, I have already argued that in taking into account fully the race 
dimension, the nature and need for such agency has to be both de- and 
reconstructive. De- and reconstructive agency expresses a relationship 
rather than a pair of discrete activities. At another level this seeks as well 
to generalise the communicative linkage of Honneth's arguments to 
Habermas' and by so doing bring into the argumentative fold the agency 
areas related to recognition in the contexts of political and work 
organisations. These seek to bridge Habermas' implied unbridgeable nexus 
between communicative and purposive rational actions. I have codified the 
nature of this relationship through the use of the prefix `trans-.. '. This has 
given rise to the identification of a number of pivotal agency moments 
germane to the critical interrogation of race and local governance. In sum 
these have been identified as translatability, transmutability, transformation 
and transcoloniality. Morrow's assessment of Habermas' meta-theoretical 
categorical distinction between communicative and purposive rational action 
as being concerned more with the "fundamental questions about pragmatic 
universals of human communication..... (and with).... reconstructing various 
human competences with crucial normative implications , 702, rather than with 
more empirically oriented questions, echoes Honneth's concerns. My 
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argument is that in considering race, and for that matter gender, explicitly 
within the overall ambit of Habermas' theory, then matters of empirical 
interest have to be built into the testing and evaluation of those theoretical 
propositions. Key to this empirical linkage are those moments of `trans-.. ' 
agency and social action together with the conditions that inhibit such 
changes occurring. Race, both within the theoretical and social 
institutionalisation contexts, acts then as a barium meal exposing those cross 
overs and leakages which do not occur behind the backs of actors, but can be 
accessed through relevant social reality correlates. 
What then are the methodological mediations between the meta-theoretical 
concerns of critical theory and lifeworld experiences of people, and how are 
these refined or changed by the explicit, inclusive consideration of race? 
This is a question germane to this particular piece of research. We have 
already said that this goes beyond the orthodox construction of such 
methodological problems in terms of quantitative versus qualitative methods. 
On the other hand whilst it is acknowledged that there is no basis for an a 
priori rejection of particular methods, this implied eclecticism is qualified by 
the realisation that there is a need for a "critical pluralism in that it directs 
attention not only to how the type of theoretical problems shapes the choice 
of methods but also to the political and ideological contexts of 
methodological choices as part of the process of non-empirical 
argumentation. "703 This process of research takes place against a backdrop 
of a model of societal reproduction, Habermas', which is open ended, and in 
which the "reproduction of a given order is... (viewed)... as a highly 
historically contingent process . s704 To 
Habermas' two investigative 
concerns, that of the phenomena of social and system integrations, Morrow 
adds a third - that of socio-cultural mediation. This "bridges the social 
psychological analysis of individual actors... and the macro-structural 
analysis of social systems... 99705, and critically includes, thus, Habermas' 
systemic-lifeworld relations. Social cultural mediation is important 
because I take it to include those confirming or transforming processes of 
race. Thus, in terms of race, what is important are those mediations giving 
rise to processes of colonisation, the creation of race subjects, and those of 
de-colonisation, the undertakings of actors, and the `trans-.. 'based 
relationships between the two. Therein lie the concerns and answers to the 
bases to racially inclusive solidaristic action which can change and 
programme the system. 
8.4 Reflexivity 
If then critical theory can be said to be "eclectic with respect to 
methodological techniques", then this eclecticism is argumentatively 
contextualised to the extent that critical theory has two methodological 
moments: that associated with non-empirical methods and that with 
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empirical methods. Morrow categorises the non-empirical part of the 
spectrum in terms of it being reflexive and dialectical. Inter-relatedly 
reflexivity "involves meta-theoretical reflection that is a form of inquiry in 
its own right" as well as it being "an applied practice that, while drawing on 
general meta-theoretical categories is involve integrally.... in the overall 
process through which research is produced. "706 It is dialectical because, 
as Habermas argues, such thinking "obstinately sticks to these rules (of 
formal logic); it applies these rules even to think about logic itself, instead of 
breaking off their application at this crucial point. , 707 Complementarily 
Morrow argues that its dialectical character derives from its presupposition 
of "an on tology of social reality that recognises peculiar properties of social 
phenomena that are largely ignored by naturalistic on tologies. s708 Race 
then pushes these qualities of reflexivity and dialectics to the limit, because, 
by their own argumentative processes, such interrogations bring over the 
intellectual horizon the question of civilisational racism. In terms of 
reflexivity Morrow identifies four argumentational strategies, ones I broadly 
agree with. These, and here in terms of race lie its important saliency, 
"involve forms of cognition (which also involve emotional responses) that 
go beyond research techniques narrowly understood as merely a process of 
matching concepts and data. , 709 The four strategies are then meta- 
theoretical arguments, deconstructive and historicist argumentation 
involving contextualisation and discursive reading, self reflexivity involving 
existential argumentation, and normative argumentation. The case for 
meta-theoretical argumentation comes with the territory of race because its 
inclusion should critically question both the formal and informal logics-in- 
use. This has already been argued above. In terms of historical reflexivity 
it is argued that "historical grounding is one of the defining characteristics of 
critical theory". Whilst by itself it does not provide sufficient to justify 
establishing the validity of theories, it does provide one of the key reference 
points for deliberating the comparative merits of different theories. This is 
evident in the arguments so far surrounding not only competing forms of 
local governance, but also within the history of race and racism, and with a 
comparative eye on South Africa, the inclusiveness of universalist theories, 
like Habermas'. Deconstructive reflexivity Morrow traces back to 
Derrida's post structural theories which are concerned with critiquing naive 
realism, or logocentrism, "as a means of understanding how we represent 
`reality"'. This sort of analysis of how language mediates people's 
understanding, whilst it can be used, as post modernists do, to support the 
argument that all is ultimately interpretation and representation, does, in 
relation to critical theory, provide a methodological resource of 
deconstructive techniques. My argument, however, which is not that 
dissimilar from Morrow's, except that he puzzlingly does not appear to link 
the two, is that deconstruction, which I take literally to mean the `taking 
apart', within the context of critical theories of race, needs to include other 
interrogative areas, like discourse analysis and narrative. These are dealt 
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with under empirical methods. In relation to insider knowledge or 
existential reflexivity, Morrow neatly encapsulates the one dimension which 
appears to be over powered in orthodox research based race studies, when he 
writes that "all scientific knowledge is grounded in the lifeworld, common 
sense and everyday life. " Women and Black people have thus questioned 
the validity of research which has absented the dimension of `experience' 
because it gives rise to an ontological disjuncture resulting in a `reality' they 
do not recognise and which then comes to be imposed. This is reflected as 
well in the various institutional policy areas, such as complaints procedures, 
where the according of priority to `experience' in the areas of racism and 
sexism, has ebbed and waned with changing political legitimating strategies. 
It remains to be seen thus, for example, how long the experiental prioritised 
classification of `racial violence' which emerged from the Macpherson 
Report, will remain as part of police practice. Nevertheless it is required of 
`experience', if it is not to fall victim to the `hermeneutic circle' paradox 
involving endless interpretation, that it enters into discursive communicative 
processes to resolve the issue, not so much of the correct interpretation, as 
that of validity, contingently grounded. In this particular piece of research 
the experiences of the principal researcher played out and intertwined within 
and between both the identitarian socio-cultural, intellectual and political 
discursive processes surrounding the use and/or ownership of "Black", with 
a common reference point only ever being the transitive one of `not being 
white', and also his different, multi-roles in and around the positive 
racialising of local governance, are thus crucial. Finally, in relation to non- 
empirical methods, normative argumentation, far from involving `irrational' 
notions of value judgements, as orthodox research would argue, is rationally 
and inherently involved in the questions about the good and better life. In 
terms of critical theory such explicit judgements, which are implicit in other 
knowledge based studies, are complemented by analyses of relevant 
theoretical discourses. This particular piece of research can be seen as an 
attempt to situate race normatively within the sphere of local governance. 
But the questions raised by normative argumentation also bring into the fold 
the very nature of the research, because its inherent comparative quality 
means that it is not only `research about' which is the extent of the normal 
parameters of social science research, but also research `about what is 
better'. This moves it into the realm of evaluative research, the defining 
profile of which is very similar to that of critical research. My argument is 
that the pursuit of race equality in the area of local governance involved 
evaluative research processes, both explicit and implicit, which are 
ultimately linked to the meta-theoretical arguments about modernity and 
race, and the inclusive place, or not, of the latter therein; the `test' of such 
inclusiveness being, as I argued in the section on reconstructing race and 
racism, the deracialising of race. This notion of the contingent, time limited 
nature of `race' was built into some local governance anti-racist initiatives 
because they had as a core operational principle the argued assumption that 
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pursuit of race equality was the sharp end of wider required organisational 
and political good practice. Further, as House and Howe argue, good 
practice in evaluative research requires a deliberative democratic solution 
reflexively both within the structure and conduct of the methodology, but 
also in relation to the desired institutional and societal context to the 
programme under evaluation. 710 In sum then the table below, which is 
heuristically categorical, both closes this section on non-empirical methods, 
and also introduces the section on empirical methods. 
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Before highlighting some of the key individual critical research methods 
used in this particular piece of research, it would be appropriate to prefatorily 
contextualise these by adumbrating the research design. In one sense the 
section on reflexivity already covers the aspect of in depth reading and 
comparative argumentation identified as one of the tracers for critical social 
research. At another level, however, this has to be fleshed out by reference 
to the particular details pertaining to this piece of research. The research 
itself focuses on a particular London local authority's attempts to develop a 
race equality programme in the nineteen eighties, and on its subsequent 
jettisoning of that programme by the early nineties. The key problematic 
was, and is, how to account for those changes interpreted as those from 
potentially emancipatory to de-emancipatory. The principal researcher, who 
was at the heart of the initiation and development of that programme, did not 
turn to critical theory as a result of those experiences. Rather, critical 
theory, primarily through the works of Habermas was brought into that 
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particular context of local governance since it had been an informing 
intellectual meta-theoretical context to a series of work, including this one, 
and academic interventions. Inter-relatedly were, and are, the experiental, 
and interpretations thereof, counter interventions in the theoretical context by 
a Black person, the principal researcher, the idenity of whom is forming 
through three main racially dominant socio-cultural and -political contexts. 
These were, and are, an interrogative grid against which were played out a 
number of phenomena germane to this specific research project. These 
were at the meta-theoretical level the rise and wane of structural Marxism, 
and its post modernist spin offs; at the meso-theoretical level the 
experiences, changes and intellectual configurations surrounding `race' in 
the 70's and 80's UK, and in the late 80's changing South Africa; and, at the 
micro-level the researcher's experiences in and around local governance 
mediated through a number of differing roles, such as local government 
employee, trade union activist and voluntary sector organisations' 
stakeholder. Built into this was a research programme both implicit and 
explicit. It was implicit because the pursuit of race equality has an inherent 
underpinning of normative argumentation which is lodged firmly in the 
moral pantheon of social justice. It was explicit because the pursuit of race 
equality within the sphere of local governance through its relevant 
institutions and processes entailed the development, in many cases, of an 
explicit monitoring and evaluation research programme in order that 
progress towards the overall goal could be properly accounted for. Whilst 
it would, therefore, be easy to conflate this `fact' goal with the interrogative 
`norm' of this research, to do so would be to ignore my other argument that 
paralleling this normative impulse is the `un-normative' underside, which 
can be seen to emerge in the struggles and battles fought to achieve that 
`ought'. It can be said, by way of metaphorical illustration, that for very 
`is' there are two general oughts; that of the fulfilment of enlightenment, and 
that of its shadow, namely barbarous failure. The de-establishment and 
destruction of the race equality programme in this particular local authority, 
and others, came with prognosticative warnings about what was likely to 
happen to the state of race and racism both within the councils and 
elsewhere. The period, thus, after the formal de-prioritising of race offers 
information on the accuracy, veracity and validity of those warnings, as well 
as contributing to the social reality correlates of key conceptual structures. 
Morrow defines a research design, via Yin, as, "the logical sequence that 
connects the empirical data to a study's initial research questions, and 
ultimately to its conclusions. "712 There are two general types of research 
designs; those which are extensive, i. e. they require a large number of cases, 
as in a representative sample, and, intensive research design based on one or 
a few number of cases. In relation to critical social research Morrow goes 
further to proclaim "that the case study is at the heart of a number of research 
strategies that have been central to critical theory". 713 In this particular 
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piece of research, whilst the main focus is an intensive examination of one 
particular London local authority, comparisons are also made with a limited 
number of other London authorities at relevant junctures in their race 
equality programme development. It can be said, thus, as Morrow does in 
trying to `third way' a traditional research antinomy, that "the 
complementarity of individual explication (an ostensibly idiographic 
exercise) and comparative generalisation (a weakly nomothetic activity) lies 
in their mutual necessity - one cannot even begin to describe a `case' 
without a sense of `types' of cases". 714 Morrow identifies four case study 
based research strategies as being important for critical research: historical 
and comparative sociology, ethnography and participant observation, 
participatory action research, and discourse analysis. Whilst all of these 
can be identified with this piece of research, at some point or another, I want 
to permutate the notion of critical research methods, particularly those 
identified above, by race to release variations of these and some other ones 
which have been used in this research, and which, I also contend, are 
germane to race studies. 
Firstly to invoke the explicit consideration of race and racism in a study is to 
invite a historical and comparative dimension. This is because, as I argued 
in earlier sections, the mere notion of races presupposes the differentiation of 
space and time, the two key parameters controlling presence and place. For 
Black people, and others who are subject to racism, place and presence 
always run the risk of being disrupted because space and time is structured 
for them, very seldom by them, thereby potentially bringing into the 
discursive process nation interrogating differing histories and the intra- and 
inter-comparisons such differences evoke. There is then an acceptance of 
Morrow's central contention at the general level which is that "case study 
methods coupled with non-statistical comparative case studies are most 
compatible with the research problems identified by critical theory and its 
concern with intensive research designs. "715 In this research piece not 
only is there a comparison at the meso-level between one local authority and 
others in the UK, but, there is also one at the meta-level because race 
`internationalises' the core issue and thus tests the main theoretical 
explanatory framework, i. e. Habermas' theory, both at the `real' level of 
global application, and, given its universalist principles, the `norm' level. 
A comparison is thus made with a local authority in South Africa. Given 
the spatial and temporal disjunctures wrought by racism, there is obviously 
not a time synchronicity in the comparisons made between the two different 
national spheres of local governance. Rather a comparison is made 
according to the similarities in types of change being pursued in different 
societies, in this case that of race equality change at the local government 
level. Thus whilst the UK case study concentrates on the eighties, that of 
South Africa focuses on the nineties. In this period can be seen the 
emergence of the identification of a similar set of problems confronting local 
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governance in South Africa and the development of a similar solution 
framework. The bases for this comparison ties in with my arguments 
concerning racism as a trans-epochal problem which touch stones 
modernity's completion, and its unresolved status giving it a recursive 
quality. Thus whilst there is an uneven development of racism and its 
concomitant solutions in the real world, the latter in the normative sense can 
be tied into Habermas' model of societal evolution. This can be done, as I 
have attempted in the section on reconstructing anti-racist politics, on the 
basis that so long as the `modern' post conventional society still ties that 
state of affairs to the racist conventionalisation of other members of that 
society, then comparisons can be made contra the traditional time related 
notions of progress. In terms of race then, this means that liberal Western 
democracies, like the UK, which are the factual, empirical seedbeds for 
Habermas' theory, can be compared with so called `developing' in a way 
that does not evoke teleologically foundationalist notions of progress in 
which, "coincidentally", the West just happens to be the most "advanced" 
and "progressive", but on the bases of the progress towards a deracialised 
post conventionalisation. 
Within the context of the above intensive research design, no particular 
individual method was dominant. Instead there was a constant multi- 
methodic approach to data gathering which can be categorised two-foldedly; 
firstly in relation to the system-social integrative heuristic split which is 
socio-culturally mediated, and, secondly, in relation to the requirements of 
evaluative research which draws upon both quantitative and qualitative 
sources. For example on the quantitative side, which at another level can 
be argued to being analogous to system integration markers, the 
formalisation of politically legal institutional equality programmes were, in 
terms of necessary information, embedded in supporting race monitoring and 
evaluation systems. These generated comparative type information relating 
to defined groups of equality priorities and concomitant unfairly privileged 
groups, e. g. Black and white, or female and male etc. On the other hand 
the interpretation and supporting validity processes for that sort of 
information, some of them stemming from discursively communicatively 
solidaristic groupings of Black people both inter- and intra- the institution, 
can be seen to derive from the sorts of qualitative methods Morrow identifies 
and which I wish to racially permutate. 
Morrow runs together ethnography, particularly critical ethnography, and 
participant observation whereby the `critical' derives valency and value 
because "cultural description is carried out from the perspective of critical 
hermeneutics". 716 This moves it beyond the traditional concerns with prima 
facie description and explanation and into the realms of what Morrow 
identifies cultural critique as ideology critique. This can certainly be 
identified as one of the methodic strategies adopted in this research. Now, 
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whilst Morrow is cautious about those defenders of critical ethnography and 
participant observation who make "ideology critique and praxis the defining 
moment" because, following Habermas "its hermeneutic dialogical approach 
... requires `discipline' and autonomy... that is not adequately addressed by `action research' oriented toward immediate enlightenment", 717 this, when it 
comes to race, just as when it applies to feminist studies, cannot be so 
apodictically applied. That is to say that, as this research's empirical 
details reveal, critical participant observation, especially when it involves an 
existential reflexive dimension, involves both autonomy as well as "focusing 
on political practice and breaking down the gap between researcher and 
object of research". 718 At this particular point the boundary line between a 
categorically identified method, critical participant observation, and that of 
another, participatory action research, becomes blurred. However, there is 
another dimension to critical participant observation which comes into focus, 
particularly when the issue of race and racism is under study, that is the 
dimension of non-participant observation. For example it is quite easy to 
see that the formal role of a principal equality worker in the local authority 
under main focus involved a high degree of participant observation in which 
the development of race equality in different milieus within that context of 
local governance could be observed from an `autonomous' and `disciplined' 
viewpoint. On the other hand there were many instances where, in the 
general role of Black employees, or just in the role of Black person, 
participation was not possible because of the trope of `invisibility'. That is 
to say that Black people were not even noticed in certain social contexts. 
This was particularly pertinent for information gleaned from Black 
employees in the lower rungs of the organisation who, unnoticed or 
underestimated, were in positions to observe, but not participate. It could 
be said that the organisation unwittingly crossed the threshold, rather than 
the researcher being faced with the dilemma of how to access the 
knowledge. Elsewhere I have called this shadowing observation the 
nomenclature of which takes its cue from Bresson: "to be there watching and 
unknown, and quick, disappear.... to capture that moment. " This particular 
strategy has also been prevalent in that part of the research which has 
occurred after the principal researcher left the employ of the primary local 
authority and had to try and access information as an outsider. 
However, in terms of the many roles and associated research functions, the 
principal researcher occupied in the course of this study, and in terms of the 
overall research programme of critical theory, both implied and explicit, 
there is one method which can be said to be dominant, that of participatory 
action research. Morrow argues that engaged participatory action research 
becomes a legitimate possibility because critical theory is concerned with 
"the dynamics of power and exploitation in ways that potentially are linked 
to practical interventions and trans formations. "719 This is true of this 
research just as much is Morrow's linking of participatory action research 
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with that of standpoint methodologies in which "the researchers may be 
studying themselves, or at least others in a similar situation, " and thus there 
is "an intimate relationship between the critical emancipatory knowledge 
interest and individual development as mediated by collective awareness. 020 
One of the critically emancipatory qualities of participatory action 
research/standpoint research, one that, I contend can be empirically linked to 
Habermas' arguments concerning the anti-democratic `expertisation' of 
administrative systems, is that this method involves the erosion of the expert- 
subject distinction "coupled with a moral obligation to participate, given 
awareness of the lived experience of specific dominated groups. " The use 
and usefulness of this method will become evident in the ordering of the 
empirical data relating to the crossovers between the principal researcher as, 
within the organisation, employee, Black person, trade union activist, and, 
outside of that institution, as research outsider. 
Finally in relation to discourse analysis as a critical research method, 
Morrow is correct in quoting Meinhof to the effect that it is a widely and 
confusingly used term in the social sciences without a discernible, single 
unifying definition or concept. Earlier in this section I had defined 
`discourse' as "a discussion structured by a stable framework with widely 
accepted reference points, images and explicit elaborations". Morrow 
identifies two forms of discourse analysis which have been drawn upon by 
critical theory: that "sensitised to detecting forms of distorted 
communication linked to power and strategic forms of forms of interaction", 
and that in which "discourses ... are recontextualised with reference to the historical social relations through which they are constituted . s721 Both of 
these forms of analysis have been used in the course of the actual 
development of a race equality programme, with its associated evaluative 
research dimension, in the main focus local authority, as well as in the 
interpretations used in this study. However, the normative vision of 
`discourse' contained in the above forms of analysis are that it should be free 
from distorting forces in the communicative structures and within a process 
of `history-being-made'. What is important then is the nature of the 
discussion which comes to constitute the `discourse'. I have therefore 
differentiated between a dialogical discourse, borrowed from Bakhtin's 
anticipation of Habermas' theory of distorted communication, in which 
communicative discursive practices are the bases of the discussion, and 
representational discourse, or `diskourse', in which discussion is strategically 
structured through unaccountable power configurations, like those giving 
rise to `expertisation', or racism. Within the overall context of race and the 
particular focus of this study, the development of a dialogical discourse, 
which I take to anticipate an emancipatory discourse, is in conflict with the 
`diskourse' which seeks to maintain irrational forces in the structures of 
communication. The latter refers then not only to the prevailing and newly 
developing orthodoxies which sought, and seek, to legitimate the 
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depoliticised management of local government sans any substantive race 
quality dimension, but also to the attempts to `etnikfy' the emancipatory 
thrust. Within the attritional interface between dialogical discourse and 
representational discourse can be located the struggles for social agency, and 
interpretations thereof, within the `everyday', where the latter is defined by 
Roberts "as a utopian and culturally discontinuous space through which the 
struggles over social agency are fought out. " In the case of this study we 
are talking about the `everyday' for participants in and around the structured 
milieus of race and local governance. Accessing this through the mediation 
of a discourse analysis means bringing into consideration, as will be done, 
theorists like Lefebvre, Vanegeim, de Certeau etc. For example Roberts' 
critique of de Certeau's theory of the everyday that it parcels out politics "to 
multifarious cultural acts of resistance; a politics of feints, dodges and ludic 
subversions", can equally be applied to Gilroy's over valorisation of 
"cultural questions as a way of thinking about social power. , 722 Or, as I 
have described it earlier, "the politics of keeping one step ahead of 
`whitey"'. On the other hand Vanegeim's attempt to relate the `lived 
immediacy' with a critique of exchange value echoes the trade union 
`vanguardist' elements' approach to the `everyday' and employees in local 
government in the `pre-math' to the "demands of women's and post colonial 
liberation movements. " 
8.7 Conclusion 
Lastly, I want to close this section on critical social research methodology, 
and the methodology of this particular study, by briefly looking at the issue 
of `validity' via a summary review of Johnson's attempt to `do critical 
organisation research', because it is in and around a conceptualisation of 
`validity' that this study will be judged. 723 In a sense as well, this study's 
focus on local governance overlays the more specific study area of 
`organisations'. However, where as ,I have attempted to `avoid' the cook book approach to methodology, arguing for its contextualisation within the 
meta-theoretical framework of critical theory, Johnson, who draws as well 
from Habermas and other critical theorists, adopts an inductive approach in 
seeking to generalise from one particular piece of research. The end result, 
at the general level, is not that different from Morrow's definition, and my 
adoption of that, of critical social research methodology. Hence: 
"As a research programme ultimately linked to critical emancipatory 
knowledge interest, critical theory is distinguished clearly by a 
distinctive approach to methodology as a set of meta-theoretical 
assumptions and privileged research design strategies ,a core set of 
substantive commitments related to the analysis of crisis tendencies 
in advanced capitalism, and an explicit approach to normative theory 
and its relation to critique of ideologies. "7 4 
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The question, though, is how research of this nature is to be validated. 
Earlier I had argued that critical social research has to be validated 
communicatively discursively, as opposed to an instrumentalised technical 
process of validation, or the abandonment of validity itself because of 
notions of it being no more than a policing function over people's 
experiences. Johnson, borrowing from Lather's feminist research 
methodology, outlines four research validating strategies. These are 
germane to this study, and offer a basis for the development of 
considerations pertaining specifically to race related research oriented 
towards emancipatory questions. The strategies are triangulation of data, 
construct validity, face validity, and catalytic validity. Johnson opts for 
what appears to be a rather orthodox conceptualisation of triangulation 
involving a multi-methodic approach in order to allow researchers to capture 
a more complete, contextualised picture. There is no disagreement with 
this as a methodic approach. However, in order that race is properly 
contextualised, I would contend that triangulation needs to shift to another 
theoretical level. This would that of examining it in terms of systemic and 
social integrative processes and the way in which their intersections are 
mediated through socio-cultural and socio-political practices. Further such 
a conceptualisation gains more saliency when the focus is on work and the 
organisational context to such work because it is a prime activity in which 
can be observed the intersection, in many cases dominance, of system and 
lifeworld. Place that within an organisational context that is formally 
political, as well as a formal employer and is bounded closely by local civil 
society, then the notion of triangular validity gains new dimensions, 
especially where, running through all of those considerations is the question 
of race. 
Construct validity refers to the rigour and logic of the argumentation within 
the tradition of the theoretical approach(es) being adopted, especially if that 
tradition is being extended or revised. In this case the focus is very much 
that of the Frankfurt school, particularly Habermas, and its relevance, or not, 
to issues of race. The communicative discursive argumentative practices 
surrounding this aspect of validity, unfortunately, seem only to take place 
within the rarefied environs of academia; or I the case of this particular 
approach, await such debates. But this potential for debate elsewhere locks 
into the third aspect of validity, that of face validity. By this Johnson means 
going "back to the subjects with tentative results" and refining them "in the 
light of the subjects' reactions". The extent to which this directly 
participative aspect of the validity process was built into this study will be 
seen in the empirical details relating to what I have referred to as the 
evaluative aspect of the research conducted whilst the principal researcher 
was in the employ of the local authority in focus. Subsequent to that 
period of employ, contact was, and is maintained, between the researcher 
and, by now dwindling, group of Black employees. 
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Finally catalytic validity refers to the extent to which the research is 
emancipatory. Bearing in mind the circumscription and caution Morrow 
and Habermas exhibit with regard to the phenomenon of `instant 
enlightenment', it will be shown that the development of the race equality 
programme in that local authority, and the concomitant development of what 
could be termed critical emancipatory knowledge, did result in what Johnson 
regards as one of the success criteria for this component of validity. That is 
the programme resulted in Black and white individuals "ending oppressive 
acts in their work environments. " This, if it sounds too crude, can be re- 
conceptualised in Alvesson and Willmott's terms whereby emancipation 
"necessarily involves an active process (or struggle) for individual and 
collective self-transformation"725 which in turn can be `measured' according 
to whether or not they are questioning, incremental, or utopian. Given the 
relationship I have conceptualised between race and modernity's completion, 
it can be said that this study involves all three. 
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SECTION III 
Race and Local Governance - Two case Studies 
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Chapter 9 
Context to UK Race and Local Governance Details 
9.1 Introduction 
Just at the previous chapter attempted to develop the critical social research 
methodology which contextualises and informs the way in which the data for 
this project was arrived at, so this chapter should be seen as its complement 
because it organises that data in line with the methodological principles. 
The research data focuses, in the main, on the context to, and details of, the 
development of a race equality programme in an inner city London borough 
- referred to in this study as "Borough X" - during the period of the eighties, 
with a prospective and retrospective examination of the nineties aftermath of 
that programme's attenuation and destruction. Supporting this primary 
case study will be references, at key theoretical contextualising and factual 
junctures, to the development of similar programmes in other UK inner city, 
but mainly London, local authorities. It can be said that many of these 
other London local authorities' race equality programmes have either 
experienced a similar fate, even if the details of the determining processes 
and synchronicity of those are different, or, the effect of the changes to those 
programmes are, in fact, similar. That is to say they have, in the main, 
become transmogrified into `diversity'726 programmes. Whilst, therefore, 
the analyses and conclusions of this study obviously have wider institutional 
implications than just the primary target borough, the contextualisation of 
this study within a critical theory framework, something which has not been 
done before, means as well that an attempt is being made to address the 
nucleic philosophical underpinnings to local governance and the question of 
racial inclusion in the UK; in the terminology of the previous chapter, a 
critical realist on tology of race and local governance.. 
In the previous chapter I had argued that, following on from my theoretical 
contention that shadowing societal normative learning are those of technical 
learning processes for domination, the social reality correlates which can 
illuminate those important elements of intramundane transcendence can best 
be expressed through the instances of mal-, non- and VR recognition because 
within those can be gleaned as well that which is being suppressed contrary 
to the normative potential of society. The data, and organisation thereof, 
thus seeks to support a critical, multi-level epistemological frame of 
reference which can be expressed in the sense of outwardly flowing 
concentric circles covering the following categories: race, local governance, 
race and local governance, the state and multi-racial society, the meta- 
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theoretical considerations to these mediated through Habermas and the 
arguments with post-modernism, and finally, Habermas and race. The 
question can now be asked to what extent the empirical source of local 
governance is sufficient to act as an interrogative notifier of a theory which 
is constructed on a broader, grander scale, and on a visionary canvass 
strongly implicit of being global in application. The answer can be put 
forward in five parts. Firstly in relation to the critical social research 
methodology outlined previously it can be said that the study's methodology 
is derived "according to complex concepts of system, communication, 
discourse and power. , 727 Secondly, therefore, the "factum brutum" of the 
empirical `facts' of local governance is counter-factually played out against 
the facticity of validity claims which can only be redeemed through 
communicative discourse. Thirdly these principles accord with the way in 
which local governance is theorised in this study as a mediating systemic 
interface with the lifeworld which has the potential to be a communicatively 
discursive force for deracialising racial inclusion or systemic colonisation. 
For example, in a recent national study in the UK of Black Asian women 
forced into marriage, the Chair of working party overseeing the study 
advised caution and warned against alienating `community leaders'. 
Against that a local NGO, the Southall Black Sisters, put forward the view 
that such `leaders' did not represent the views of women and that "enough is 
enough - we look to the state to uphold women's rights. " (Guardian 6th June, 
2000)728 These are rights which very often are enforced through local 
institutions in communicative working, and which can be materially enacted 
through the proper provision of local governance services; a proper provision 
which entails the discursive working through of race, rights and 
participation. Fourthly the Habermas' sociological sketch of the 
normative promise of the margins programming and influencing the centre 
can easily be templated over the promise of local governance vis-a-vis the 
centre, just as the `fact' of marginalised `races, can be metaphorically used to 
interrogate the core suppositions of his own thesis. Fifthly, as shall be 
shown, the spurning of the race and women's equality utopias by local 
governance because of a perceived need to make legitimacy claims to the 
white electorate, and the related espousal of technicised modernisation 
solutions which entrenches functional reasoning and thus systemic based 
mechanisms of power and exchange, is a strategy which is adopted 
nationally. Thus not only are there many new Labour MPs who have their 
political origins in new model labour local authorities, but many of the 
`modernising' strategies being put in place for the wider public sector, have 
had their `dry run', guinea-pig, bases in local authorities, such as the target 
research one, which from the mid eighties onwards adopted a proto-Blairite 
solution to the management of legitimation problems. Overall then, just 
as, will be shown, the everyday normative frame for a racially inclusive local 
government was anchored in the operational principle in the race equality 
programme that if local government was not meeting the needs of the Black 
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communities, then it was likely that it was not meeting the needs of the wider 
community, so it can be said that if the sphere of local governance is 
collapsing then national governance is failing as well. It is the 
communicative inter-actionist antithesis of Blair's functionalist 
rationalisation of systemic modernisation, to wit, "I do not want to see as 
happened in the eighties, Tory MPs in areas like this because the local 
council couldn't get its act together. , 729 
In terms of structuring the data, consideration has been given to a number of 
possibilities, for example, a chronological retelling of the `story', a meta- 
theoretical system/social integrative split, a reference to a normative template 
etc. Each one of these is in one sense or another valid, but, in terms of fully 
accounting for the race considerations, none, by themselves alone, is. The 
framework will, therefore, attempt to incorporate most of the critical 
concerns generated by those previous considerations by being structured as 
follows: an outline of the theoretical complements to key social reality 
correlates, a schematic overview of the informing context to the initiation 
and development of the race equality programme in the target local authority, 
inclusive of a time frame, and in-depth interrogations of important social 
reality correlation illuminating processes within that overview played out as 
a contestation of discourses. 
9.2 Theoretical Complements to Key Social Reality Correlates 
This section will, in effect, summarise the main theoretical contentions 
which arise out of the critical interrogation of Habermas conducted in 
previous chapters/sections through the examination of a de-and 
reconstructive approach to race/racism and local governance. These, it is 
argued, and an attempt will be made to demonstrate this through the 
organisation of the empirical data, find their social reality correlates very 
often in the unfolding of the normative learning shadow processes of 
learning to dominate. Honneth's theory of recognition struggles includes 
such an approach for the articulation of a struggle for recognition, which is a 
moral struggle, arises out of the brute facts of misrecognition. Social 
reality correlates cannot be read off at the prima facie level with an attempt 
to then lock it directly into an evidential relationship with the relevant parts 
of the theory. Rather, as outlined in the previous section, they need to be 
argumentatively contextualised. Part of this contextualisation draws from 
my two tier categorisation of legitimation processes with regard to local 
governance. That is to say there are secondary, which can be associated 
with the meso-level, and primary, which can be associated with the meta- 
level, ranges of correlates. There is no automatic transfer from one level to 
the other. The following then are the pivotal theoretical contentions so far 
into which the empirical data has to argumentatively interwoven.. 
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9.3 Race 
I have argued for race and racism as a social construction, an edifice built 
out of the misinterpretation and transmogrification of somatic features, or the 
falsely attributable `natural' characteristics of defined `others'. In one 
sense the argument for race as a social construct is not new. Within the 
post modernist genre, race and racism fall within the purviews of a particular 
construction of discourse formation which in itself is not a way of describing 
the world, but a form of social power, the origins of which are difficult to 
trace. However, more importantly, it is difficult to escape, what one critic 
has described as a process tantamount to cultural doping, and to envisage, let 
alone, enact, any alternative, other than weak resistance. The social 
construction of race then appears to be the perpetual process of constituting 
and being constituted by this discourse to the extent that even those who 
oppose racism can be seen to become enmeshed and contributing to that 
which they are trying to eradicate. At the general level this finds some 
critical overlap with others who have attempted to pursue a universalist 
agenda which avoids the pitfalls of a reductionist social labour based theory 
or that of the race and racism as an irrational blip constructions of liberal 
humanism. In this perspective a categorical distinction is made between 
cruder, antediluvian racism which is explicit about falsely `naturalling' 
differences, and its modern counterpart where references to such differences 
are replaced by what has been termed `cultural racism'. Within this 
perspective attempts by some to counter racism, as in the case of Afro- 
centrism, are seen in fact to reproduce a mirror image of the older forms of 
racism. Moving out of racism thus entails an end to `race' as a viable 
epistemological category and into the purported primary domain of `culture'. 
Both approaches, united in their motivation by a rejection of social labour 
grounded theories of racism, even if the development of their subsequent 
theoretical trajectory appears to be mutually exclusive, result in a similar 
approach to understanding race and racism. In sum this is that one can only 
talk about `racisms', and not `racism', a multi-causal plurality in which 
theoretical lacunae can be filled either by reference to a never ending 
relativism or that stop gap of contingency, the `autonomous'. 
My approach, on the other hand, is to try and put forward a social 
constructivist argument about race and racism which is communicatively, 
and thus, evolutionarily, framed. To that extent it is possible to talk about 
two forms of discourse: that which is oppressively and dominatingly framed, 
or `diskourse', and that which is emancipatorily and, thus, discursively 
framed, or `discourse'. I see the roots of racism as being epochally prior to 
that normally taken as the advent of racism, i. e. the take off of industrial 
society; though it is acknowledged that the systemic domination of the 
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communicative lifeworld, which is the capitalist system, over presents 
racism as the differently hued outcome of a racialised process and discourse 
of material inequality. This derives from the argument that the 
groundwork for the move from one societal learning process to another can 
be found in the preceding one; an argument I hold which applies equally to 
the processes of learning to dominate. Within the unfolding of the history 
of racism, there are therefore trans-epochal unresolved problems which 
provide the distorted communicative framework for the catalysis and 
development of modern racism. This is identified in my definition of 
racism which is the maintenance of relations of force in the structures of 
communication, through conventionalisation of biological differences or 
ascribed biological differences. Conventionalisation refers to the process 
of maintaining for certain peoples the distancing relationship of `he', she', 
`they' or `it' thereby denying them the right to be part of the societal cultural 
and political processes that go into defining `we'. This is reflected both 
at one and the same time, in the relations of domination expressed through 
colonisation and imperialism and the formal defining of, and constituting, of 
the constitutions of the major western nation states. The trans-epochal 
status of racism defines as well its recursive nature. That is to say that its 
recurrence can be tracked back to its roots. Thus, for example, even the 
manifestation of what has been described as `cultural racism', can be seen to 
involve the same distantiation process and at the same time to be based on 
assumptions which `natural' and unjustly hierarchicalise perceived or 
imagined differences. The core of much racism is recursive, involving a 
re-telling of stories of `racial difference' where these differences are refitted 
in modern communicative means, including allowing those, who are 
historically the subject of these fables, to self proclaim, as is evident in the 
`etnikfikation' of collective identities. In developing the argument about 
racism primary reference has been made to the exemplar of the divide 
between Black and white where those two categories are not invested with 
any Manichean on tological characteristics, but are used as heuristic 
signifying categories. The definition of racism can be equally used for 
other situations of race. The argument about race and racism is then firmly 
tied into the conditions for the fulfilment of modernity, as put forward by 
Habermas. That is to say that if post conventional identity formation and 
learning is to characterise the fulfilling process of modernity, then the 
distorting forces in the structures of communication, those which maintain 
processes of conventionalisation, have to be eradicated. To his extent it is 
argued that the resolution of these trans-epochal problems of racism is the 
touchstone to the fulfilment of modernity because without such a resolution 
democratisation, which Habermas identifies as the key, will be 
fundamentally flawed. Deracialisation and democratisation are therefore 
inextricably linked. What then are the con tours of this linkage? 
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My arguments delineating this linkage are as follows. The first is tied to 
attempting to unravel the details of what it means to uphold Habermas' 
linguistic philosophical turn by examining the implications of trying to meet 
the conditions for domination free communication in an unjustly racialised, 
multi-racial society. These conditions are tied to those involved in 
redeeming the .. validity claims of speech acts, which are at the 
heart of 
Habermas' substantive, deliberative democratising practices taken as the 
core process in the fulfilment of modernity. My argument is, unlike 
Benhabib, and Habermas' seeming ambivalence, exemplified in his use of 
the term "constitutional patriotism", which can be interpreted, as Modood 
does, as quasi-assimmilationist, that in order to fulfil this in the unjustly 
racialised, multi-racial society, then one can only talk about languages, and 
not a single language, as the linguistic medium. Taking the linguistic 
plurality into account means then engaging with my ideas on translatability, 
transmutability and transformation. As Dryzek has similarly argued, this is 
the argument for democracy across difference, but without eliminating 
difference. These conceptions, related through the prefix `trans', refer to the 
contention, in what I think is a necessary extension to Habermas' and some 
of his supportive critics, like McCarthy's, liberal notion of culture. That is 
to argue that ethical communities do not communicate with each other on a 
basis of ceteris paribus, but often, as in the case with Black communities, 
through a hierarchicalising discourse/diskourse of racism, which means that 
issues of normative correctness, which Habermas identifies as the one 
instance in which consensus should be achieved, are explicitly there at the 
communicative interface. It is within this context that I can therefore 
contend that race and racism bring back into the fold of politics the `moral' 
in a way that requires validity claim consensus in the here and now. This 
being the case, its resolution, keeping in the forefront as well the link to 
modernity's fulfilment, because it is thus inextricably associated with both 
the conditions for speech validity redemption and Habermas' principles of 
democratic participation, cannot be relegated to the arena of compromise. 
Instead the moral resolution is the minimum baseline for moving on. 
Relationally this normative impulse is the necessary counter-point to the 
vectoring effect racism has on Black people's lifeworlds whereby space, 
time, and thus place, are put beyond their control. These interstices of 
space and time anchor the stability necessary for the development of respect, 
and the inter-relationship between self and collective identity in the process 
of recognition; all three being crucially necessary for ensuring substantively 
inclusive democratising practices. But this is not to attempt to portray 
Black people as victims. Rather, as modernity unfolds, this shadowing 
trans-epochal unresolved problems of non-recognition and disrespect 
increases the systemic pressure on Black lifeworids, far more so than on 
white lifeworlds, to the extent that primary level legitimation and 
motivational crises are more apparent in Black communities. There is no 
teleological correspondence in this phenomenon which places Black people 
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as the new subjects of history. The outcome of this increased systemic 
pressure cannot be predicted. I have argued thus that increased 
`etnikfication', neologising the emergence of ersatz manufactured identity 
claims, as in the case of Afro-centrism, is just as likely as are those seeking a 
post conventional politics of rights and recognition. (recognition and rights 
versus the communitarian responsibilities and rights) At another level this 
is in line with Habermas' arguments that the growth in manifold identity 
claims, far from being a confirming set of phenomena for post-modernism, is 
part of modernity's unfinished project. In extrapolating the normative 
impulses generated by the Black and anti-racist movements, I have argued 
for the need for a Black social movement where the term `Black' is used in a 
signifying, cognitive sense to denote those who experience the socio-cultural 
reductionist force of racism. That is, there is a commonality in the 
identification of the problem. But this, unlike those who seek 
exclusionarily to conflate biological differences, i. e. somatic features, with 
cultural claims, thereby ending up with racist mirror image identity 
pronouncements, or those who mask a naturalling and etnikfying tendency in 
the use of the suffix `descent', as in of African and Asian descent, has to be 
taken as an invitation to discursive communicative practices for those 
seeking consensus on identity claims and solutions. The `signifying 
`Black' is the core for my argument concerning the reconstructed Black and 
anti-racist politics which, within the context of an unjustly racialised, multi- 
racial society, sees the need for a collective actor and identity, but yet within 
which individual identities do not necessarily correspond because their 
individual describing, a political activity, is tied into discursive 
communicative practices associated with actions oriented towards solutions. 
In the context of the over colonised Black life world, this is also the 
construction of a communicative space which enables supporting solidaristic 
actions to be generated. This social movement, co-ordinated through the 
contingent, fallible `Black' is the means to focus a change momentum 
seeking the eradication of collective wrongs done to, so that the possibility of 
people being able to individually redeem their validity claims, can be done 
so without the distorting force of racism. This is the deracialising of race. 
In, other words, to sum up this section, racism creates those conditions 
within which can be glimpsed modernity fulfilling democratisation from the 
margins over the centre, as well as the nightmare scenario should such 
communicative blockages be maintained in place. 
9.4 Local Governance 
The section on local governance attempts, because orthodox local 
governance studies are seen to languish in epistemologically boundaried 
discourses of public policy, to develop a meta-theoretical inquisitorial matrix 
which can not only interrogate dominant local governance paradigms, but 
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also generate a critical emancipatory theory which is substantively inclusive 
of race. That is to say race is an explicit, inter-linked, consideration from 
the outset.. Within the overall consideration of present day and forwards 
utopias, the matrix provides the context within which to critique and reject 
two dominant, self avowedly, progressive theories of local governance, post- 
Fordism and localism. Instead, using a Habermassian framework, a critical 
emancipatory analysis is developed of local governance in the UK as a 
precursor to the examination of what a racially inclusive form of local 
governance would entail. Running through both sections is a running, 
evolving critique of the gaps, silences and conflations in Habermas' theory 
in and around the issue of race and racism. Local government is situated 
as an integral part of the state which in turn is examined within Habermas' 
argument that the state originally differentiates out to sort out consensually 
problems of social integration. This role under modern circumstances is 
put under severe strain because the evolved differentiation out of steering 
media tied to decision which occur behind actors backs, in this case systemic 
mechanisms of power and exchange, are, under capitalism, far more 
powerful and invasive than those of solidaristic action. The result is that the 
state has to undertake action which seeks consensus societally. This 
however can turn out to be a double edged sword. Social welfare is a case 
in point where mass social welfare post second world war sought to achieve 
the attenuated utopia of social labour by attempting to assuage harm from 
capitalist class divisions. This however entailed increasing costs to society 
both financially as well as through juridifying colonisation of welfare clients' 
lifeworlds. The new right's agenda of rolling back the welfare state 
through privatisation and depoliticisation of the public sector, and new right 
Labour's acceptance of that, simply recast the configuration of consensus 
formation by calculating that the marginalised could be excluded without 
much damage to the government's acceptance. I have argued that this 
issue, that of legitimation, which is the problem of how the political system, 
particularly the state is to be consensually grounded, is especially germane to 
local government. I have, in order to clarify the argument, differentiated 
between primary level legitimation, which is to do with a crisis level 
questioning of societal values, and thus equivalent to his notion of a 
motivational crisis, and secondary level legitimation which relates to 
questions about everyday political choices and decisions, which in turn may 
lead to primary level legitimation problems. Secondary level legitimation 
problems are unevenly developed in society and are linked to the 
organisation of the polity. Thus it is argued that the evolving dissensus 
between national and local government since the second world war and 
accelerated by new right Thatcherism saw from the late seventies onwards 
secondary level legitimation struggles being fought out in both the local and 
national political arenas; struggles in which the `management' of race was 
very much a large part. There is thus, another aspect to the argument about 
a rationality crisis which is overlooked by Habermas. His articulation is 
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done in terms of the relationship between the economic and administrative 
systems. My argument brings into the field of argumentation the contention 
that since the national state relies on the assumption and promotion of a 
homogenous set of socio-cultural values, something Habermas implies, any 
attempt to rewrite these heterogenously, as in the case of a multi-racial, racist 
society, will result in legitimation strategies, on the part of the state, being 
counter written racially. It is at this juncture that it can be said that issues 
of race go straight to that of the value bases of society, resulting in some 
cases, in Black people being more likely to experience and voice a 
motivational crisis. The strategy then, one which is continuing, was to 
create a forced consensus between local and national governments through a 
twin track, but related, approach of increasing centralisation and 
depoliticisation of large parts of local government. The latter is to be 
achieved by recasting the relationship between local people and local 
government from that of citizen to that of consumer and a large scale 
programme of centrally linked, management accounting based neo- 
managerialism, now legislatively enshrined in new right Labour's 
modernisation programme. The aim of this strategy is to ensure that the 
legitimation costs of local governance, costs which accrue to the political 
party in power in terms of their electibility, is brought under the control of 
central government, and thus in effect transferred to that part of government. 
Local government then becomes local in all but name. I argue that in 
pursuit of substantive racial inclusion, the utopia of racial justice, the 
normative potential for local governance can be re-energised and is 
threefold. Firstly there is the potential for contributing substantially at the 
local level to the social consensus delimiter of racism. Secondly thus, 
there is the potential to develop solidaristic resources at the local level which 
can influence, programme or change the local state. Thirdly the potential 
for using this groundswell of solidaristic resources to flow through to the 
centre, a programming from the margins, exists as well. These potentials 
are brought into stark relief through analysing the conditions which need to 
pertain for a racially inclusive form of local governance. 
However in pursuit of this vision, using a Habermassian framework, does 
require that key components of Habermas' theory are rethought if the 
conceptual paradigm of race and racism, as outlined, is to be an explicit, 
inter-linked consideration. The main points of my argument are as follows. 
Firstly, along with Dryzek, McCarthy and Scheuerman 730, I think that 
Habermas' ambivalence towards pursuing the radical implications contained 
in the potential of his theory is damaging, not least of which to the 
marginalised in Western societies. Secondly in pursuit of this radical vision 
I argue, like Joas and Honneth, that there is an action lacuna in his theory 
which appears to rule out transforming the world of work, or inter-alia, from 
purposively rational action to communicative action. In terms of race and 
gender considerations, this apparent dichotomy is not true and the use of a 
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continuum concept of action is more appropriate. The notion of ossified 
communicative action and transformative action is therefore introduced. 
Thirdly, and associatedly, Habermas' notion that only the political system 
can act, where the political system appears to be defined in the limited sense 
of classical Marxism, does not fit with the reality and range of political 
action that does occur. To that extent it is argued that the administrative 
system can be seen to part of a political action spectrum which needs to be 
included. Thus the boundary between the public sphere and the political 
system can be fuzzy, allowing for the prospect of political action and not just 
that of influence. Fourthly political language in terms of that which is used 
within the political system and that which is used within the polity, cannot be 
confined to one language, but has to be a heteroglossia in which the 
communicative interface of consensus formation is governed by the inclusive 
principles of translatability and transmutability. Fifthly, because of my 
argument that racism brings into the actors horizon field the moral and the 
logic of Habermas' own principles of equality of opportunity in political 
participation, I introduce the principle of non-closure in any instances of 
dialogical considerations of racism in the polity. Sixthly, in terms of the 
constitution, and especially Habermas' use of the term `constitutional 
patriotism', I argue that this can only be taken at the level of meaning 
acceptance of constitutionalism as a principle, pointing out the way in which 
Western political constitutions, like that of the USA and France, have from 
the outset consciously bracketed out any consideration of people, other than 
white, male people. This unresolved, trans-epochal problem at the heart of 
existing formal constitutions means that, in terms of race, patriotism cannot 
be expected towards an existing constitution, but only to the principle of 
constitutions. Lastly, in terms of critique, the public sphere is not immune 
from systemic colonisation, resulting thus in a hierarchical situation in 
which, following Frasier, it is possible to talk about subaltern public spheres. 
Within the later can be located what I have termed the `Black public sphere' 
which because it is concerned with collective `wrongs done to' that distort 
communication, can bypass the general public sphere, in order to seek 
appropriate remedial change. There is agreement then with Scheuerman's 
assessment that Habermas' BFN appears not to allow for too radical a 
fantasy of the alternative. Further, Dryzek has argued recently that BFN 
marks a too serious accommodation with liberal constitutionalism, even if it 
is the deliberative democratic wing of liberal constitutionalism, as 
exemplified in Amy Gutman's work, and thus Habermas' over concerns with 
modern capitalist society's complexity renders his latest work almost 
`uncritical'. 731 In contra-distinction to this, and I am in agreement with 
him, he both argues for a need to espouse and develop a radical, insurgent 
theory of a process of democracy, as opposed to a `model' of democracy, 
implying as that does an end point. To this he reserves the appellation 
`discursive democracy' to distinguish it from non-critical notions of 
deliberative democracy. The above critical points are seen as necessary if a 
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radical fantasy of an alternative, in this case a racially inclusive form of local 
governance, is to be realised. 
This alternative vision is thus sketched out, not as some form of blue print, 
but as an outline of what could be possible. This possibility is based on an 
analysis which argues that the centralising changes in local governance since 
the eighties have much to do with the management of race at the local level. 
This has given rise to a number of depoliticising initiatives which can be 
read, drawing on the UK's domination learning processes of colonisation, as 
a form of re-colonisation. Thus, rather than talk about the fulfilment of 
modernity, one should talk about the fulfilment of a trans-colonial 
modernity. A racially inclusive form of local governance would, thus, 
positively draw on three potential features. These are, firstly, the 
development of the relationship between national and local governance in 
the form of the local liminal state because that would meet the discursive 
communicative solidaristic needs of local communities in a context where 
there is the attempt, at the minimum, to counter steer systems, whilst in terms 
of race it would provide the means to actually steer systems at the local level, 
i. e. a deon tologically framed autonomy. Secondly democratic discourse 
should be multi-lingual and moral, and be realised in a number of democratic 
practices, not just that of representative democracy. Thirdly the nature of 
institutional mediation between the institutions of local government and 
local life worlds has to be seen as fuzzy allowing for an indeterminacy in 
which transformative action can occur. In this respect Bohman's notion of a 
`reflexive administration', which is reflexive because it is surrounded by a 
public sphere, is close to my thinking on this. 
732 Thus within a context 
like this, "processes of public input must be created so that deliberators 
within the framework of administrative institutions are compelled to take 
diverse perspectives into account as they constantly revise their basic 
"733 framework for decision making. 
These are the main points of the theory against which the empirical data will 
be organised to throw up the relevant social reality correlates. 
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Chapter 10 
Overview to UK Race and Local Governance 
10.1 Introduction 
The first part of the overview attempts to situate the start and development of 
race equality initiatives both in the target local authority and other relevant 
authorities, through examining three inter-linked contexts in the mid to late 
seventies. These are local governance, race, and race and local governance. 
The key factors that emerge from these are germane to the emergence of 
positive race explicit strategies in a number of London local authorities at 
that time, even if the permutation of these differed from borough to borough. 
Tracking back serves other purposes as well. Firstly it uncovers a number 
of residual concerns about local governance which still persist today. 
Secondly it revisits social labour based variants of arguments about the state, 
local state and their inter-relationship, or not, which were important in 
providing the political context to the inclusion of race; arguments which in 
the evaluative aftermath of the eighties have not really been revised. 
Thirdly it begins the process of re-evaluating and theorising this important 
period in terms of a communicative framework in which, unlike those social 
labour based theories, race is an explicit and substantively inclusive 
consideration. Fourthly it encapsulates the intellectual resources the 
primary researcher brought to bear in beginning the development of a race 
equality programme in the core borough. Finally it lays the foundation for 
the contention that the period of what I have described as a positive 
racialisation in local governance, contained the achievable potential for the 
development of a racially inclusive form of local government. The failure 
to achieve that, and the reasons for that, are explored in the in depth 
interrogations of key processes. 
My communicative based theoretical re-siting of local governance starts with 
the argument that the ebb and flow of local government change since the 
second world war in the UK is primarily the outcome of secondary level 
legitimation struggles of the state, the `local state' and their relationship. 
Inserting into that legitimation scenario the consideration of race which 
involved, as the unfolding of the race equality programme in many boroughs 
shows, the moral political demands for non-negotiable inclusion, propelled 
primary level legitimation problems into the reckoning locally and 
nationally. Dunleavy's summation of one of the important strands of 
Habermas' legitimation argument thus holds true for this. "To prevent 
formal democracy threatening to become substantive democracy Habermas 
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argues that the public realm has to be structurally depoliticised. "734 
Depoliticisation is key both to it testifying to one of the residual themes I 
mentioned earlier, but also to the way in which those from the social labour 
based critiques of orthodox local governance, and thus proponents of more 
inclusive based change, came to use that tactic as a means to manage `race'. 
10.2 Orthodoxies 
Highlighting within the sphere of local governance in the late seventies the 
important areas within the legitimation framework means concentrating on 
three domains: orthodox concerns about local governance, radical social 
labour based theories of the state, and reformist social labour based theories 
about the state. This begins to fill out the details underpinning the opening 
statement of the chapter on local governance which pointed to the trend for 
local government studies either to be imprisoned in limited boundaried 
discourses, or to traverse those under the aegis of Marxism. 
Orthodox discourses about local government and also orthodox concerns 
about those discourses in the period of the seventies reflect what can be said 
to be the orthodox dissensus of that period. There was a period of a 
decade and a half after the second world war when there was a consensus of 
sorts about local government which was essentially that they were `fit for 
purpose'. The purpose in this case being the political institution responsible 
for, and through which large tranches of, welfare services would be 
channelled. There was an unprecedented expansion of services with direct 
welfare impact, such as personal social services, housing, education, as well 
as an expansion in services which could be said to effect the well being 
infra-structure of local communities. The latter include areas like leisure, 
refuse collection, and services underpinning the emerging role of consumers, 
e. g. environmental health. The beginnings of the dissensus, from the mid 
fifties onwards, revolved around questioning how local government could be 
made more `fit for purpose'. Informing this debate, amongst a small 
relevant constituency of politicians, civil servants and academics, were a 
number of orthodoxies, which because of the nature of orthodoxy, simply 
seemed to beget more orthodoxies. What then is meant by `orthodoxy'. 
Dearlove, in a prescient examination of local government reorganisation in 
the seventies, comes up with a three factor definition. 35 This is that 
orthodoxy in local governance is characterised by views that are "widely 
shared and long established", rarely substantively questioned, where 
substantive refers to a deconstructive critique, and, put forward as 
explanatory statements without any form of supporting research. 736 
Resituating this within a communicative framework, it can be argued that 
orthodoxy, in the above sense, can be seen to be part of what I have 
described as representational discourse, or `diskourse', in which discussion 
is strategically configured through unaccountable power configurations 
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which prevent dialogue. There is an overlap here as well with my notion 
of action `ossification'. It is also part of the continuum spanning the range 
of systemic learning and which includes my arguments about learning 
processes for domination. Apropos this, Dearlove reflects that the 
"reluctance to theorise about the institutions of local government and the 
poor quality of much research are both effects and causes of the existence 
and survival of orthodoxies". 737 Unresolved problems, in the sense of not 
subject to communicative discursive practices, provide for representational 
local governance, in the same vein that trans-epochal unresolved problems of 
race maintain relations of force in the structures of communication between 
white and Black. Further we need to come back to the way in which this 
process of `orthodoxifying' recurs in the diagnoses of problems supposedly 
effecting local government in the eighties and nineties, and in the proffered 
solutions to those problems. Certainly it can be seen that the main 
orthodoxies, and some of the details there in, of the sixties and seventies, 
echo on into the nineties. The difference, as I shall argue later, is that they 
re-echo through a racialisation of the problems. 
A brief outline of those orthodoxies, which are to be found as well in the 
various government commissions and legislation effecting local government 
up to the late seventies, covers the following areas - the issue of local 
government democracy, the issue of local government efficiency, the issue of 
the quality of councillors, and the issue of management/calibre of officers. 738 
In terms of democracy the shibboleth then was, and still is, that local 
democracy is good, and certainly better that national level democracy 
because politicians within the sphere of local governance are closer to the 
people. However, Dearlove argues that the orthodoxy of democracy 
"presents the ideology of representation and responsible government as the 
essential local politics.... (which)... is not an adequate description and 
explanation.. . (serving).. . to mystify and even conceal 
the more fundamental 
reality of government power as it focuses on processes and so ignores what 
governments actually do and who they benefit. s739 This mystification 
involves, for example, ignoring in the sixties and seventies the role of 
political parties in local government because prevailing orthodoxy saw little 
room for politics in local government. Thus the Committee on the 
Management of Local Government, in 1967, argued that "local authorities 
are not concerned with `principles' because these are thought out by the 
government of the day..... (and that)...... much that local authorities do has 
no political content 74 ." Local government was seen very much as 
being 
concerned with administration, not politics, by some, mainly those within the 
purviews of the broader civil service. The counter, evolving orthodoxy, 
again put forward without any real research, proclaimed that, presumably on 
the basis that parties were in reality involved and there was no going back, 
such involvement, "renders responsibility for the general level of council 
achievement visible to the public, facilitates judgement at the polls, and 
369 
through the ups and downs of party fortunes at successive elections brings 
shifts in public feeling forcibly to the council's notice. "741 Either way, 
however, the legitimation fortunes of local government are, in effect, tied to 
the political fortunes of national political parties and/or government. 
At one level, it is true as Dearlove notes, that a common sense acceptance of 
the local government democracy as being in a good state, has led to the focus 
shifting to that of efficiency. However, it is probably more true to say that 
legitimacy problems that accrue from the spending on, or the efficacy of, 
welfare services, are likely to be picked up at national level, rather than local 
level. Concern about efficiency manifested itself very much in terms of the 
best size for local authorities in order to maximise such efficiency. 
Underlying this was the assumption, especially with local government being 
made responsible for more services and larger budgets, that small size local 
authorities would be inefficient. The logic of this could be seen in the 
commissions and attendant legislation in the early sixties and seventies 
which respectively gave rise to the creation of the London boroughs and 
metropolitan councils, each created out of the amalgamation of smaller local 
government political units. The apparent contradiction between smaller 
units and better democracy, and larger units and more efficiency, could be 
bridged by the other elements of orthodoxy. 
The first of these was the preoccupation with the quality of councillors. 
Dearlove deconstructs this `worry' and tracks it back to the disappearance of 
the qualified franchise, the emergence of universal franchise and thus 
enfranchisement of the working class. This trope of some not being fit 
enough to govern, as opposed to those who were, often, in the latter case, 
realised in the form of the landed gentry, continues into the second world 
war aftermath of local government. This is particularly so with both the 
expansion of services, increases in national government expenditure on local 
governance and the creation of larger, seemingly more complex, units of 
local government. It comes to be expressed - and here it echoes today as 
well - in the elitist based lament that because not enough professional and 
business people are involved in local government that there is something 
lacking in the calibre of councillors, and thus in the decisions taken. But, 
as I shall argue later, it also comes with a shadowing, at that time as yet 
unvoiced, unarticulated, sub-conscious differentiation, that those best able to 
take political decisions at the local level should not only be professional and 
from private sector business managerial classes, but also white and male. 
This growing preoccupation with addressing a created orthodoxy of 
efficiency via other evolving orthodoxies continues with the perceived need 
to improve the calibre of people working for local government, primarily 
through what I would describe as the introduction of a private sector 
managerial discourse, because, in a linked logic to the solutions sought to 
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improve the quality of councillors, local government should be looked at, as 
some people felt, as a business. 
Thus in both the Herbert Commission, the government's prelude to 
legislatively establishing the GLC and London boroughs, and the Redcliffe- 
Maude Commission, the prelude to the 1974 local government legislation, 
the linked issues of local government efficiency and better management were 
raised. But these were raised, as Dearlove points out, against the 
orthodoxy of local governance's traditional administration. By this was 
meant a view of getting things done in local government whereby 
"... existing activities have to be carried on and that the only choice the local 
authority faces is whether or not the activities should grow .... (on 
the).... assumption that existing activities should continue to be carried ..... in 
the manner in which they have been traditionally.... " 742 It was backed up 
by a view of structures and processes which saw the basic personnel being 
elected members and officers, multiple committees, because members did 
not have enough time to consider all matters of the council, and a policy 
process whereby policy initiatives stemmed from service departments and 
were ratified two-foldly via their respective service committees and the full 
council. Overall the role of the local council was seen narrowly as that of 
administering a collection of services. Against this prevailing orthodoxy 
was raised another two element orthodoxy. The first part of this was 
concerned with the perceived need to managerialise local government. By 
this I mean that management was to be seen and used as a manipulable 
discourse requiring those who have such responsibilities to be conscious of, 
and implement that which is deemed to be a good manager. Dearlove 
confesses his own bewilderment at the range of management theories, all 
derived from the private sector, thrown at local government, and what 
exactly they entailed. .. In the space, therefore, of the seventies decade he itemises the rise, and sometimes fall of planning, programming, budgeting 
system (PPBS), performance budgeting, output budgeting, management by 
objectives, corporate management, corporate planning, inter-corporate 
planning, resource planning, community planning, social planning, long 
range planning, connective planning, network analysis, area management, 
work study, operational research, cost benefit analysis...... 743. The 
dominant form of explicit management programme for the seventies, and this 
might be because it came to be linked to the second part of the remedial 
orthodoxy involving proffered structural changes, was corporate 
management and planning. These envisioned structural changes, as set out 
by the Maud Committee on management in local government, based partly 
on Maud's abhorrence of party politics at the local level, favouring an 
administrative solution, involved a reduction in committees and allied 
meetings together with the creation of a Management Board comprising five 
to nine members who would "lead and co-ordinate the work of the 
authority". These proposals resound again in the nineties in the cabinet 
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style executive committees being established in local authorities. The 
rationale for Maud's proposals, a rationale that can be read as justifying the 
changes in the nineties local government, is, as Dearlove spells it out, quite 
simple. "Local government is a big business; local government should, 
therefore, be organised like a business; and local government should be 
managed by businessmen - by men of calibre who will provide `vigorous 
leadership' and `think about big things"'744. What then is this 
management, in particular corporate management? Again it is worth 
quoting Dearlove because he encapsulates neatly the intention of such 
management strategies and techniques, and objectives of their proposers. 
"No matter what particular system you study, they all embody an attack 
upon incrementalism; muddling through; satisficing; fragmentation; 
specialist management; professionalism; vagueness of objectives and the 
failure to make policies explicit; the limited analysis of alternatives; short 
term planning; the absence of monitoring and review of performance, and 
so on and so on. Moreover, to a greater or lesser degree, they all seek to 
implement, that is, a system of general management which starts with the 
overt formulation of objectives; moves through the careful evaluation of 
alternative means to the attainment of these objectives before 
implementing particular policies; finishing up with a careful review of the 
effectiveness of the chosen policies in meeting the initial objectives, so 
re-starting the whole cycle of policy making. "745 
10.3 Lambeth's Orthodoxies 
The extent to which local authorities in the seventies came to embrace such 
managerial changes, is uneven. Certainly a few local authorities proved to 
be pathfinder ones managerially, especially in relation to corporate 
management, including the London borough of Lambeth. It is worth 
examining Lambeth in a little more detail because, in relation to this piece of 
research, it was one of the first in the country to introduce and develop a 
systemic race equality infra-structure, and is thus one of the sub-target 
born ghs. Additionally the principal researcher worked there in a formal 
research capacity and as an equality worker. This has to be contrasted 
with the target borough where, by the late seventies, the development of an 
explicit managerial approach was relatively inchoate. Whilst there appears 
to be a relationship between the introduction of race equality structures and 
processes and the sophistication or not of managerial systems, this is not the 
point of this particular mini excursus. Rather it is to try and show that 
orthodoxies, taken as communicative closures, often ride on the backs of 
others and also engender others. Dearlove's recitation of what the 
supposed attributes of management theories at that time are implies another 
orthodoxy which is to do with the essential assumptions of management; 
assumptions which are prevalent today in local government. Further the 
acceptance of such orthodoxies not only limits the options for discursive 
communicative practices, but also provides some with a strategic short cut 
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when faced with a choice that could lead to better communicative changes. 
Lambeth, by the late seventies, had a very sophisticated managerial and 
information infra-structure, contrary to the misrepresentation of late 
seventies and eighties Lambeth as `chaotic'. The only change, which 
could be the basis for such a derogatory judgement is the introduction of an 
equalities' programme. But therein lies another deconstructive tale which 
will be addressed later. Cockburn's social labour, and thus class, based 
critique of Lambeth, described as the `local state', contains some useful 
insights into the development of corporate management in that borough. 746 
There are three elements of that I want to concentrate on. The actual 
structure and detailed development of that management strategy I'll tackle 
when I outline the way in which race equality considerations were 
introduced into that authority. The first of these then is that, in the wake 
of the Maud Committee, the impetus for the introduction of corporate style 
management techniques came from the 1968 Conservative administration in 
the borough effected through the use of private sector consultants and 
INLOGOV at Birmingham University. Apropos the latter, Dearlove in his 
analysis is extremely critical of INLOGOV and some of its leading acolytes, 
like Stewart, who, Dearlove contends, are acting as if they are limply the 
"servants of power". 747 Pointing a critical finger at INLOGOV, SAUS and 
the Corporate Planning Unit of the Management Centre at Bradford 
University, he goes on to accuse them of engaging in a kind of research that 
is "objectively deficient and ideological" because it has a "practical and 
relevant orientation to those in power"748. Further these academics and 
institutions have been involved in selling systems of corporate planning 
through providing training courses on the arrogant presumption that these 
rational changes are best for local communities. I have already pointed to 
this issue of the conflation and conflict of interests that appears to have 
developed between certain local government institutions in academia and 
Labour Party changes at that political level, particularly those associated 
with the localist and post-Fordist schools of thought, respectively deriving 
from INLOGOV and SAUS. Secondly these changes in Lambeth were not 
undone by successive Labour administrations, including that which has 
become associated with the late seventies radical left take over of the 
borough. Thirdly the nature of corporate management, in fact most 
managerial theories, is such that it was essentially a senior management 
experiental activity of ownership whose effects were, on the whole, non- 
participatively felt by other employees. These three characteristics of 
corporate management in Lambeth in effect mask two orthodoxies which 
were accepted in the late seventies , and which some of the equality 
programmes of the eighties attempted to deconstruct. Suffice to say that 
these continue today in local government. 
The first of these is to do with the nature of management. Both Dearlove 
and Cockburn try to get to grips with this, but, in my estimation, flounder 
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because of the limitations of their social labour based critiques, particularly 
in the case of Cockburn, where management comes to be no more than the 
hand servant of capital. Alvesson and Willmott provide a better 
framework within which to outline the orthodoxy of management. 749 
Starting with the observation that whilst in everyday life in societies, people 
are involved complex and demanding business of organising their lives 
through the management of routines, yet this everyday process has, in 
today's society, become the preserve of experts, like managers. In belated 
answer to Dearlove's confusion about what exactly management is, A and W 
note that management is regarded as universal and comprises a number of 
technical functions. There is an assumption that these exist in a social and 
historical vacuum. For example on numerous occasions in both Lambeth 
and the target borough, the principal researcher had to question managers' 
and council members' ready use of one part of the orthodoxy that `managers 
had to manage', especially where this `right to manage' involved breaching 
the council's own race equality commitments, by pointing out that they did 
not have a divine right to manage, but did so under certain social and 
historical conditions which could be changed. More over, where 
management is presented as a technical activity, especially in a political 
organisation like local government, then problems which are "fundamentally 
social and political come to be interpreted as amenable to technical 
solutions. " 50 Managers then, through the training and inculcation that 
accompanies such `expertisation' are never presented with perspectives that 
highlight the politics of management, rather the "claims of technical, 
instrumental reason" are privileged. This `technicisation' of management 
then creates the illusion of neutrality. Within the context of the 
organisation whenever changes are put forward "on the rational grounds that 
they are more effective and efficient, they implicitly endorse and legitimise a 
society in which it is acceptable to treat human beings as a means rather than 
ends..... (so that) .... the authority ascribed to managerial techniques and skills 
operates ideologically to legitimise the treatment of individuals as objects of 
managerial decision making who are excluded from participating fully in 
decisions that directly or indirectly affect their working lives. "75 
Management practices invariably promote certain values and `punish the 
pursuit of competing agendas'. For example performance related strategies 
and techniques give higher value to individual, competitive and egoistic 
forms of behaviour which "deflects attention from moral-practical concerns 
about how individuals might co-operate to develop organisations, societies 
and a world system that is more rational in terms of collective husbanding 
and allocation of scarce resources.. "752 Managerial best practice, within 
the orthodoxy, is never evaluated in terms of "its contribution to the 
realisation of the progressive objectives of autonomy, responsibility, 
democracy and ecologically sustainable development. " Finally three other 
elements of the orthodoxy need to be mentioned, elements which do not 
`measure up' to the reality. The first is the claim that management 
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knowledge is a science, thereby legitimising social differentiating practices, 
like the replacement of `amateurs' by `professionals' in organisations very 
often through the ostensible rationale that such `experts' are more likely to 
provide technically higher grade and `value free' output. This is a trope, as 
shall be shown, which recurs in the arguments launched against the work of 
equality workers. Management makes use of techniques and 
exhortations, which in reality are rhetorical in content because they mask the 
ultimate aim of management, i. e. the "continuous moral political struggle to 
establish, build and sustain the `credibility' and `authority' that underpins the 
`prerogative' to manage. "753 Thirdly the orthodoxy of management's 
`technicisation' is part of the commodification of other spheres to the extent 
that politics is reduced to "the technically oriented task of `keeping the 
machine running"'7sa. 
The last point provides the way to introduce the second veiled and screened 
orthodoxy. This relates to the way in which local politicians and their 
parent political parties came to view and effect the running of local 
government in the seventies. In sum these were not radically different to 
what went before, nor for that matter did they show any type of radical 
departure from what I contend is the orthodox norm, in the so called `loony 
left' eighties. All periods showed an acceptance both of the orthodoxy of 
representative democracy at the local level and an acceptance of the 
orthodoxies of management. Neither of these two spheres of activity was 
seriously examined with a view to de- and reconstruct alternatives which 
might have been better suited to the normative potential of the espoused 
political programme. Certainly in the seventies, in Lambeth, for example, 
the successive Labour administrations, right through the `radical' eighties, 
did nothing to tackle the issue of management, and more particularly, what 
sort of management should an avowedly socialist council be pursuing. If 
anything orthodoxy was strengthened. From the early seventies onwards, 
in advance of most councils then and even now, Lambeth established what 
was called a Directorate of Management Services. This housed several key 
management functions, like human resourcing, training, organisational 
development, work study, job evaluation, employee relations. It also had 
direct functional and in some cases managerial, links with smaller relevant 
service areas in other Directorates. It was in many ways the managerial 
systems and information power house of the council. Whether through 
expediency, genuine acceptance of the managerial ethos, or simply not being 
able to visualise alternatives, local Labour politicians' approach was to use it 
as a means of getting things done and controlling the organisation. It also 
provided, informally, a nodal link in a three way network comprised of 
relevant senior managers, local trade union officials, particularly manual 
worker unions, and senior local politicians, that effectively influenced, and in 
many cases, took important decisions on the everyday running of the 
council. 755 In part the latter derived from the then still continuing view 
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and practice, that the Labour Party belongs to, and vice versa, the trade 
unions, i. e. the Labour Party is the political voice of the trade unions. At 
another level it could be theorised that all this demonstrated was the extent to 
which the local state served the interests of capital by replicating the 
collusion of dominant interests and classes in the organisation. On the 
other hand, given the broad socialist umbrella under which the politics of 
these boroughs could be placed, and the arguments in favour of such 
political action that they were, after all in the interests of the working class, it 
could attest to Dunleavy's argument that within Marx and Marxism there is 
the expressed and implied ethics of `it is good if it furthers the proletarian 
cause', i. e. ends justifying means. 756 Whether or not one can attribute 
actions like these to the determining power of capital, in the final analysis, is 
doubtful. Rather what can be said is that these action were taken within a 
context of power, and in furtherance of those conditions of power. A more 
sustainable argument would be that of Habermas' theorisation of system 
integration's steering media affinity to purposive rational action. Thus 
whilst the acting subject can fall back on his/her lifeworld, under conditions 
of systemic integration, an instrumentalised stance can only be retained 
through a functional form of reason involving an inversion of ends set and 
means chosen. My additional argument to this is that it is more realistic to 
talk about a spectrum of action since, as far as the political system is 
concerned, actors therein, do sometimes chose, as in the case of the boroughs 
concerned, objectivating action over the option of consensual forming 
communicative action. In the target borough, this relationship between the 
Labour party, especially its local government hierarchy, and the manual trade 
unions, proved a real impediment to the development of equality 
programmes. In the seventies, as well, the Leader of the Labour Party 
group running the target council, some one credited with beginning the 
process of opening up the council to the influence of local Black 
communities, though this claim is disputable, worked for Shell UK in their 
organisational development department. Whatever that experience might 
have been, there is nothing to show that any political demands were placed 
on the managerial or organisational development dimensions of the council. 
The then organisational sclerosis in the council, either in terms of adopting 
more `progressive' technical managerial strategies, or, more progressive 
radical ones, was evident, as shall be shown, by the lack of systems or 
processes the equality programmes could use to facilitate their introduction. 
In both there was an orthodoxy associated with the way in which politicians 
`got things done' which, as Dearlove argues, does not display any kind of 
normative vision. It is the antithesis to the normative vision contained in the 
following quote, a vision that could be realised from the potential of those 
politicians own political programmes. 
"At the centre of this process (of social movements) is the understanding that a 
free, democratic society is not the same as a society that boasts nominally 
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democratic political institutions. Rather, a democratic society is properly known 
by ... its members' everyday commitments to , and the upholding of, democratic 
values in all its institutions, including its corporations where goods and services 
are produced and distributed..... `workplace democracy is a moral political issue, 
not one of greater productivity and satisfaction.. . The moral foundation for democracy is in the daily practices of communication.. . The recovery of democracy 
must start in these practices. " 757 
There was, in effect, an action lacuna caused by the elision of key 
communicative actions areas within the sphere of local governance from 
consideration. This begins to illustrate the arguments I have raised in 
previous chapters, about the way in which potential communicative action 
areas within administrative systems can become ossified, and the potential 
that exists for transforming these. The extent to which these were also 
omitted from the alternatives to these local government orthodoxies, which 
were being developed during the seventies, will be outlined in the following 
sections. 
10.4 Against orthodoxy 
There are two levels to the theorisation of arguments, and subsequent 
arguments against, the orthodoxies of local governance in the seventies. 
The first of these was contained in the then evolving debate amongst 
Marxists about the state in capitalist society. Whilst this was for the most 
part conducted amongst university based academics in the UK, Europe and 
America, it had links to left wing political groups and parties, as well as a 
growing number of post '68 university educated `rank and file' working in 
the growing public sector, seen as the lesser of two evils when compared 
with the private sector. In one sense it could be argued that through 
various publications and political activities in the polity and world of work, 
that this constituted a developing sub public sphere in and around the nature 
of the capitalist state and the possible change alternatives. I am not going 
to go into too much detail about the intricacies of the differing varieties of 
Marxist arguments about the state, because the nub of my critique of one 
variant, post-Fordism, still holds for the other strands. This is that generally 
the state is seen as being ultimately derived from and/or serving capital, and 
more, specifically in terms of the post-Fordist variant, it is ultimately a 
structuralist functionalist account of the state. Dunleavy and O'Leary's 
analytical, threefold categorisation of the theorisation of the state within 
Marx's and Engel's primary works, is useful. That is that there is an 
instrumental/orthodox model in which the state is but "a committee for 
managing the common affairs of the bourgeoisie" with little to no autonomy; 
an arbiter model which allowed the state to behave more autonomously from 
the control of capitalists; and a functional model in which the state is 
governed by an "impersonal logic which drives government in a capitalist 
society to develop the economic base and coercively maintain social 
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stability. "758 Within this threefold broad categorisation, it is possible to 
provide a brief overview of Marxist theories of the state in the seventies; an 
activity necessary because these presage the evolution of several Marxist 
based studies and attempts at a theorisation of local governance. Given the 
critique made of orthodox and neo-Marxist analyses, from a Habermassian 
perspective, and, within that context, my contention that these types of 
analyses are epistemologically and on tologically incorporative of race, I will 
argue that these fault lines were carried over into both the subsequent local 
governance theories and the praxis variant that was influenced by this, 
known as `local socialism'. Thus the instrumentalist version of the state is 
based on the argument, underpinned by the assumption that the state is, in 
the last resort, a unified organisation, that those running the country through 
the state, bureaucrats and political leaders, have a common social origin with 
the capitalists. This provides the basis for a cohesive group. Parliaments, 
and similar legislatures, are but `talking shops' with the real power being 
concentrated in the executive branch. A variation of this is the state 
monopoly capitalist thesis which postulates that the large monopoly 
corporations and the state fuse into one instrument of economic and political 
domination and exploitation. Fine and Harris provide a subtle version of 
this argument. The modern arbiter model sees the state having a greater 
degree of autonomy which allows it "to impose stabilising policies which 
were not controllable by capital". 759 Poulantzas many writings about the 
state, especially his arguments that it "acts as a condensation of class 
struggle, mirroring in a distorted and class biased way the balance of class 
forces in the broader society", is an example of this. 760 A case of a relative 
autonomous sphere of the state is the legal system which through quasi-deon 
tological procedures, wards off direct control by capitalists, thereby allowing 
for the working class- to secure some victories which can be used in the wider 
sphere of class struggle based action. However autonomy is always subject 
to the last instance determination of capital. Modern Marxist based state 
theories of the functionalist persuasion, as was shown in the critique of post 
Fordism, argue that "changes in the economic base of society determine 
shifts in the political and legal superstructure. " In its more sophisticated 
guise the argument is that the bureaucracy's behaviour "is largely 
predetermined by structural forces in line with the functional imperatives of 
the capitalist mode of production... (so that)..... the state's organisation at any 
time is assumed to be optimally organised for the needs of capital at that 
time. "761 Whilst there is within the general understanding of functionalism 
no overall theorist or theory of the state, there are theorists who have used 
this form of argumentation in part of their reasoning. O'Connor's 
arguments in the Fiscal Crisis of the State exemplify this. 762 There are 
however variants on the general functionalist model which do attempt to 
provide an overall theory. The structuralist Marxism of Althusser is a case 
in point in which he tries to provide "a theory of the functional autonomy of 
the state from responding directly to the economic imperatives of 
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capitalism.. . (so that it) ... functions to organise the dominant class and to disorganise the subordinate classes through the use of either repressive or 
"763 ideological apparatuses. 
Taking this as the rough heuristic framework, it can be said that these were 
the dominant Marxist epistemological schemas within which the intra and 
inter debates about the state were conducted. Two salient characteristics 
stand out -none sought to theorise local government or race. Both of these 
considerations were, in their own distinctive ways, assumed, either through a 
conscious incorporationist train of thought, or, an unconscious failure to 
even think about these dimensions, to be an indistinguishable part of the 
theoretical whole. By the mid-seventies Dearlove notes that Bennington 
could observe that although " there are a number of theoretical studies of the 
role of the state in advanced capitalist societies.... there seems to have been 
much less critical study of the functions and operations of local government 
as an entity within the state apparatus. "7M Yet, ironically, Bennington's 
intervention in the debate itself attests to the fact that there were the 
beginnings of a critical alternative to the orthodoxy on local government. 
Further the trace of Bennington's career over time since the mid seventies 
also serves, at this point, to highlight the fault lines I mentioned earlier. 
This is the same Bennington who entered the debate via the seventies CDP 
experience, ended up heading the policy unit in the `socialist republic of 
Sheffield', under Blunkett, and, now heads the local government centre in 
the business school at Warwick University, neck high in government 
modernisation contracts. Relatedly, he has also been involved in trying to 
`sell' the idea of a `quality' organised local government structure to key 
South African authorities in the early nineties, a time when local governance 
change in that country was very much open to debate, not to mention 
dubious outside interventions. 65 Through this time leap to the nineties, 
by way of premature further illustration, I am implying that the depoliticised, 
managerialisation local governance, particularly of equalities, which has 
occurred today within the arena of local governance, has some of its seeds in 
the actual critical developments of the seventies which were antithetically 
fostered to then prevailing orthodoxies. I have referred to these problems 
as fault lines, locating them in the latent positivism and instrumentalism of 
Marx's theory which results in the invisible making incorporation of race 
into the dynamics of social labour. These could be readily discerned, as 
well, in the first tranche of critical local government studies. These lend 
themselves, as well, to the three level categorisation of Marxist theories of 
the state used earlier. 
Thus some of the early CDP studies were, in the seventies, extremely critical 
of local government's willingness to be influenced and directed by 
businesses to the extent that some of the studies' commentators viewed local 
government as an agent of business. This instrumentalised approach is seen 
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even more in Cockburn's study of Lambeth in which she argues that just as 
the state serves capital so too local government is but part of that larger state 
structure and are thus, "local agencies of the state. "766 It achieves its goals 
by undertaking two key tasks - "the physical reproduction of the labour force 
and an ideological role aimed at ensuring social harmony. "767 Dearlove's 
position can be placed within that of the arbiter model, for he argues that the 
autonomy of the local state from the short term interests of capital are always 
under a condition of tension caused by the needs of the national state to 
control accumulation and legitimation; a tension expressed in terms of that 
between capitalism and democracy. A variation of the arbiter model, but 
one that crosses over, in parts into the functional model, is that of Saunders 
dual state thesis. This was developed in part in response to what he 
regarded as Cockburn's simplistic and `crass' analysis. Whilst the work 
was being developed into the eighties, its primary thrust was established by 
the late seventies, 768 This proposes that there are two main functions of the 
state which devolve upon those of social investment and social consumption. 
Social investment policies support the profitability of private firms through 
the provision of the necessary infra-structure, e. g. raw materials, energy 
sources, transport networks, and financial support. Social consumption 
policies are aimed at meeting the needs of different groups of people who 
cannot have these met through the market. These needs are primarily met 
through the services which are within the remit of local government. At 
this level social consumption politics involve a wider range of competing 
and diverse interests in processes of representational democracy, the effects 
of which are real. .... Politics, at this level, is not, unlike Cockburn's view, 
based on class, but on the differing alliances over service consumption. 
Whilst what is emerging is a spectrum of analyses in which agency appears 
to range from that of being a reflex of capital to certain degrees of autonomy 
at the local level, there are still certain features common to all. The most 
obvious is the still thraldom to capital. Within this the autonomy of the 
state, and therein for agency, is, as Dunleavy summarises either relatively 
autonomous from capitalists or from the capitalist mode of production. 
Meaningful change can only, thus, be pitched at the level of the total 
overthrow of the state giving rise to a negative stance towards attempts at 
change at the everyday level. In part this argument harks back to the 
Second International schism between those who viewed the state as no more 
than the executive of the bourgeoisie and those, forerunners of the social 
democratic parties in Western Europe, who argued for using and extending 
the benefits of liberal democratic regimes. Dunleavy criticises these 
approaches, as well, for being `utopian'. This isn't the problem, however. 
If anything the problem is with the particular form of utopianism. The 
deleterious consequences of a lack of `utopia' in the orthodoxy of today's 
local governance politics is quite obvious. By the late seventies a view 
was emerging from those involved in the sphere of local governance in 
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diverse capacities that existing theories of local government were 
inadequate, both at the orthodox and radical levels. A further 
contextualisation of this `involvement' shows a confluence of a number of 
related socio-economic, -political and-cultural strands at that temporal 
juncture which together enhance the need for changes to not only thinking 
about local government, bit also, and this marks an important shift, doing 
something about `it'. At the socio-economic level, throughout the 
seventies, a process which started well before that period, there was a sharp 
decline in the traditional industrial base of many inner city local authorities, 
especially those of London. There was an increasing demographic shift 
because of the growth of local Black populations, not so much through 
immigration, though that was a factor, but because those populations being 
on average younger in profile, were larger. Coming through then were 
second, and even, third generation Black people in the UK. In other words 
the conventional working class constituency base of many traditional Labour 
run boroughs had, by the late seventies, undergone profound changes, many 
of them seemingly irreversible. At the same time the employee profile 
both within formal local government as well as within the immediate 
symbiotic organisations within the local civil society, was changing with a 
growth in the number of graduates and with an increase in the number of 
what can be called `activists' with local backgrounds in the workforces. 
Local civil society demands on local government, channelled primarily 
through local voluntary organisations, many of them funded via differing 
levels of government agencies `conduited' through local government, or, 
more importantly, seeking funding, both increased and were different in 
nature encompassing now a range of constituencies previously effectively 
silenced by the old, traditional labourist networks. By the end of 1979 the 
true intent of Thatcherism had been spelt out with the threat of rolling back 
the state accompanied by swingeing financial cuts being formally 
implemented through national government processes. This was a 
culminating occurrence in the then growing feeling, fuelled not only by the 
old style politics and failures of the previous Labour government, but also by 
the seemingly negative theoretical and agency cul-de-sac radical left wing 
parties and theories were in, that `some thing had to be done'. For many 
`doing something' meant joining the Labour Party so that by the end of the 
seventies the membership con tour of many inner city Labour Party branches, 
particularly those of London, had changed. 769 It could be said that for the 
Labour party running various inner city local authorities, especially in 
London, that a nascent local public sphere, an important arena for opinion 
formation and changing will formation, comprising the overlapping 
constituencies of the wider local Labour party, local trade unions, 
particularly those in local government, and local civil society organisations, 
was beginning to form. But `doing something' also meant trying to 
theoretically re-articulate both the experiences of those within the sphere of 
local governance, as well as, provide an argumentation for further agency. 
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I want to, therefore, briefly outline one of the most influential texts at that 
period, one that is an advance on what had gone before, in relation to 
radically theorising local government, even if it is still constrained by its core 
social labour framework. This, in the evaluative aftermath of the eighties, 
has been described, by one academic, as providing the rationale for `gesture' 
politics. 770 However, as indicative of the selective amnesia affecting 
certain academics in the still continuing `new realism' in local government 
studies, Stoker, for it is he, who was approached by the principal researcher 
to ascertain why there was in his studies very little reference to equalities, 
especially race equality, could do no more than refer him to another 
academic doing research on the urban programmes. Because the 
legitimation `embarrassment' of so called `gesture' politics, like race, has, it 
seems, worked its way through to how that period is historically defined by 
influential academics, an influence which exists, I contend, because of the 
boundary conflating funding-party political policy syndrome Dearlove 
identifies, it is even more important that the main thrust of the text 
mentioned above is re-examined. 
"In and Against the State" marked an important difference from previous 
attempts at radical theorisation of the state. 71 In one respect it, perhaps, 
was not that different because of its Marxist orientation and because the state 
the title refers to is in fact the local state. However it was written by self 
avowed socialists working for the state who believed that the struggle for 
socialism involved as well a struggle against the state. Some of the authors 
are women who argued that the struggle to change relations within society is 
not just against capitalism, but also against capitalism. For the authors the 
state is not neutral, but provides services etc. in order to maintain the 
capitalist society. However capitalism is not just about being an economic 
system. It is also, more importantly, a set of social relations, determining 
the way people see each other, treat each other, and, in some cases, controls 
people. Within this complex set of social relations the state obfuscates the 
issue by hiding the fact that "it is the capital relation" which is the root of the 
problem. The state establishes a hierarchy of power and decision making 
which, in fact, is one of class, inclusive of the subordination of women and 
race. Working for the state, therefore, means finding ways to oppose it from 
within as part of the daily activity by breaking out of the social relations of 
the state and creating alternative forms of organisation. Both the trade 
unions and political parties, which, by this, is probably meant the Labour 
Party, have not properly considered how "a state worker's hours of 
employment can be directed against capitalism and towards a transition to 
socialism". 772 Through exploring the question of `how', the authors come 
up with a series of four crucial points, which, given my arguments to date 
about the relationship between transformation and a racially inclusive form 
of local governance, bear repeating. These are that socialist practice has 
to be rooted in people's own experience; socialism has to have a vision of 
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what is possible; people's whole lives are subject to capitalism; and, that 
socialism is about transforming power relations, not capturing it. Even 
though the argument is cast in a social labour mould, there is a discernible 
overlap at the general level with the overall intention of Habermas' argument 
- the attention to experience/language as the core amniotic fluid for 
interaction, to vision/utopia, to capitalist/systemic domination and to 
transformation. 
The reason for citing this text is not because any attempt is going to be made 
to claim it as a definitive blueprint for the sweep of changes made in certain 
inner city local governments in the late seventies and eighties. Rather it is 
brought forward as exemplifying and capturing the intellectual feel and 
atmosphere of left thinking in and around the labour Party at the local 
governance level. It encapsulates and marks out the key difference from 
previous Labour attempts to use local government as a vehicle for social 
reform. During the seventies the expansion of local government in urban 
areas, coupled with the near monopoly rule in key city areas of Labour gave 
rise to what Gyford has described as `municipal labourism' characterised by 
a representative democratic process shorn of real competition and, inter alia, 
a high degree, in many cases, of administrative corruption. 773 The Dan 
Smith and Poulson cases of the seventies, stand out as key examples of this. 
Labourism was very much about the instrumentalised seizure of local state 
power and using the incumbent administrative machinery to achieve the 
stated political objectives. This form of local governance has to be 
counter-pointed to that of what has been described as the Labour new left, 
the ideas of which I have used from the above text as a summarising and 
symbolising framework. This movement of the new left at the local 
government level has been described as `local socialism'. 774 This is very 
much a historical description arrived at with a retrospective glance. At the 
time of formation in the seventies it was not in use as one of self description 
or activity designation. Nevertheless it is one I am going to use in order to 
provide a collective term for the markedly left wing shift in political 
complexion of many inner city councils and London boroughs in the late 
seventies and early eighties, all of which can be characterised as indicating 
an intention, either explicit or implicit, to bring on to the agenda, not, just the 
capturing of local government power, but, also, the transformation of local 
governance power relations. This intention to transform held out the 
promise, as well, to involve participatively the local communities. In 
other words there could be seen within this the nascent outline of an 
emancipatory claim that needed to be redeemed. Gyford traces the 
emergence of local socialism back to the late sixties when the dramatic 
losses experienced by Labour in the local elections started the process of a 
radical rethink by some. 775 Throughout the seventies the many factors cited 
elsewhere above, - municipal Labourism, changing inner city areas, 
changing left wing thinking on the state, changing membership of the labour 
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party etc. - are all seen as contributing to the rise of local socialism. For 
Gyford, and he is probably right on this, local socialism denoted not so much 
a formal political movement as a syndrome for associated ideas held by a 
loose network of people in and around the sphere of local governance, 
particularly the Labour party. By the late seventies it was only just 
beginning to be articulated. For example it took the 1983 general election 
loss by the Labour party for the London Labour Co-ordinating Committee to 
voice a desire to see a new vision of socialism; one not based on `the past 
paternalism of right wing Labourism's welfare state', but on one that 
recognised the need for `real decentralisation of decision making in all 
spheres. ' During the late seventies, the time frame for this 
contextualisation, what could be gleaned are the main areas comprising this 
new vision. These were roughly, the local economy, race, women and 
policing. There was implicit, as well, a new role envisaged for local 
government, which was till, then, to be worked out. At that stage, then, 
taking on the new areas had the promise of transformation, though the 
assumption of these new priorities did not necessarily mean a transformative 
rethink on local governance. It should be remembered that there was still a 
heavy investment by the local Labour party in `capturing' power at the local 
government political level. There was at the heart of this strategy by the 
new left, the promise of a Rubicon crossing that once was undertaken, 
effectively meant a dissipation of the power of the Labour party's 
representative democratically elected members. However, there is a real 
question about why and how, contradictorily, the new left in certain councils 
came to rely more and more on the political expediency of simply using the 
orthodox machinery of government. An outline of the emergence and 
assumption of power of the new left in Lambeth, one of the sub-target 
boroughs in this research, will serve to illustrate this. 
Lansley's account of the rise and fall of the municipal left is a useful starting 
point. 776 Lansley was, up to the 1982 local government elections in 
London, a Labour councillor in Lambeth. Chair of the influential 
Community Affairs Committee which had, within its remit, the area of race 
relations, he was seen in many circles as Ted Knight's number two.. He 
recounts that in the mid seventies, two left wing councillors, Ted Knight and 
Ken Livingstone, worked together to build a left wing base in the local party, 
with an intention to assume leadership of the Labour Group of Lambeth 
Councillors. This left wing base, to judge by Lansley's general descriptions 
of the changing membership profile of inner city Labour Party parties, 
comprised those groups I have identified above who, disillusioned by the 
politics of other leftwing parties and/or those non-aligned let wingers who 
felt that something had to be done. As in other borough labour parties, a 
single issue was used as a rallying fulcrum across which leverage could be 
exerted to change the leadership. In this case it was the attitude towards the 
Housing Finance Act 1972. Livingstone describes a Left caucus of about a 
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dozen councillors operating as a `disciplined group. ' By 1978 Ted Knight 
had become Leader of the council. Lansley concludes that this early period 
of Knight's leadership was characterised by a commitment to high spending. 
What's interesting about this description of the assumption of certain powers 
by the new left in Lambeth is the marked absence of any reference to going 
beyond what appears to be a very orthodox, incestuous political in-fight 
within the Lambeth Labour party, even though, for example, Lansley quotes 
the `In and Against the State' text as one of the influential intellectual 
rethinks on local governance. The different agenda thus seems to have 
been generated, not through any kind of communicative discursive processes 
involving local communities, but through the agendas brought in for 
consideration by new Labour party members. Even then these 
considerations, especially given that Lansley describes how various left 
wings groups, including the International Marxist Group, later Socialist 
Action, actually had a late seventies policy of Labour party entryism, were 
bound by Marxist notions of class in which race is subsumed under the 
reserve army of labour thesis. This included, certainly in Lambeth, strong 
ties between the political leadership and the leadership of the manual trade 
unions. This was a relationship forged in the image of the established 
white, male, working class solidarity; acts of which could be witnessed in the 
mythologies of sexual derring-do surrounding Lambeth's Directorate of 
Construction Services' Christmas parties, and the `muscle' provided to 
persuade apostate Labour councillors that switching to `independent' simply 
will not do. 777 Whilst, therefore, at a general level, the intention might have 
been, on the part of the new left, to deconstruct the stifling orthodoxy of 
municipal Labourism and, in so doing, provide a praxis dimension, inclusive 
of substantive democratisation, to left theories of the state, the indications 
are that the developing start of these programmes showed little evidence of 
this. If one jumps ahead to Lansley's attempts to show how new left 
policies affecting such taken for granted areas within orthodoxies, such as 
the bureaucracy, one finds that what he outlines is not so much substantively 
radical, as gestural. Shaking up the bureaucracy' as he describes it, seems 
to devolve upon giving councillor backbenchers more say in committee and 
in pre-committee meetings, getting rid of a few senior managers 
unsympathetic to the new policies, and bringing in more employees of 
similar political ilk to the policies being expounded. Important as these are, 
they are not, as he rightly observes, a root and branch re-organisation of 
management and bureaucracy in the council, which, at the end of the day, is 
what would have been required. Yet, if one examines the power 
relationships in Lambeth during the tenure of the new left, a re-organisation 
like that was well within their power to do so, if they wished. The fact of 
the matter is that such issues were subordinate to the sway of left wing 
politics being enacted between the council, the government, and the national 
Labour party. The new left in governance of local government were not 
prepared to share power, even with those for whom they had made promises 
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of participation and release from bureaucratic paternalism, unless this 
`sharing' was on the bases of the skewed universalism of the new Left's 
agenda. This agenda involved the acceptance of much of the orthodox 
ways of doing things. For example on numerous occasions the Race 
Equality advisers in Lambeth were `hauled over the coals' by the political 
leadership for doing what amounted to their job. In one instance the 
Principal Race Relations Adviser, Herman Ouseley, was made to apologise 
by Ted Knight to the Director of Construction Services, a Directorate and 
manager notorious for sexism and racism, because of a criticism he had 
made of that Directorate. 778 At stake here for the political Leadership, in 
this particular issue, was the relationship between DCS and the manual and 
craft unions, a priority deemed higher than that of race equality. On 
another occasion, the principal researcher then working as a race equality 
adviser in Lambeth with responsibility for management and employment 
services, co-signed a letter with other advisers to the political leadership 
pointing out that if they undertook a certain course of action that that would 
be reneging on their race equality commitment to the local people. A star 
chamber like court of inquisition was convened in which Ted Knight and the 
Chief Executive attempted to get the advisers to withdraw the letter and to 
identify the main author so that he/she could be dealt with. A revealing 
comment as to the real reason for the ire, and, at the same time, the 
embeddedness of the status quo, was when Ted Knight, jerking a thumb at 
the Chief Executive, said, "Even he cannot write to me like that. " In other 
words, despite Lansley's retrospective attempt to portray the new left 
administration in Lambeth as wanting to engage with the inherited 
orthodoxies of bureaucracy and management, the everyday practice of the 
political Leadership was very much that of preferring to reinforce the 
traditional communicative distancing "me member, you officer" divide. 
During the political stewardship of Ted Knight in Lambeth, the Directorate 
of Management Services, the Council's management and systems engine 
house, actually grew in strength. Apart from the work of the small race 
equality section, numbering two posts, which was the originator of all of the 
council's then race equality employment policies and changes, none of the 
other sections of that Directorate, nor the senior management, were either 
engaged in, or proffered, in terms of their intended work programme, a 
radical rethink of the internal structural relationships of the bureaucracy. 
When it comes to the clutch of people appointed to sensitive or senior posts 
because they were sympathetic to the political programme of the council, it 
became clear that `sympathy' to the programme meant in fact membership of 
the Labour party. In one discussion with a senior Black Labour Councillor 
in another borough, he maintained that broad alliance to, or empathy with, a 
socialist vision of local government was not enough, when it came to 
appointments . 
779 As far as he was concerned, and this stance, he was sure, 
applied to other councillors in other boroughs, the key defining criterion was 
whether or not that person was a member of the Labour party. In Lambeth, 
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using the early race structures as an example, all of those appointed to the 
first tranche of vacancies were members of the Labour Party. In two cases, 
the Principal Race Relations Advisor post and the Social Services Race 
Relations Adviser post, the appointees were key activists in their respective 
Labour constituency parties. When the Principal's post became vacant in 
1982 because the incumbent had moved on to head the GLC's Ethnic 
Minority's Unit, his successor, much to the consternation of certain people 
who thought that there were better candidates, was a Black Labour 
councillor from another London borough. As has been pointed out before, 
Ted Knight's praise of his first principal Advisor had been that "he brought 
in the Black vote. " It would appear, thus, that even in Lambeth, long held 
up as the pioneer of both local government race equality initiatives and as 
one of the first local socialist boroughs, progress and socialism had a 
conflationary affinity with the Labour Party in contra distinction to the 
promise of more open, participatory, democratic forms of political 
governance contained in the vision of local socialism. The question then 
is, if by the late seventies there was a promise of a more radical agenda for 
local government in some of the London boroughs, including those being 
examined in this piece of research, as well as indications of tendencies to 
short circuited orthodox practices which would frustrate the achievement of 
those aims, how can this be adequately theorised? This is a question which 
is even more important because it also begs the supplementary one of how 
this tendency influenced as well the establishment and treatment of the race 
equality programmes. 
Orthodox liberal theorists of government and politics would treat this as the 
passing kaleidoscope of individual actions by individual politicians within an 
overly pragmatic world devoid of immanence. One gets that impression as 
well from those who have attempted a retrospective examination of local 
governance from a nineties position. For example Stoker, despite his 
attempt at a quasi-sociological heuristic categorisation of local governance 
theories and practices covering the seventies and eighties, arrives at a 
prognostic position on local government which is determined solely by the 
prospective plans of the Conservative and Labour parties; an example, 
perhaps, of `apparatchik' reasoning. 780 There are shades of this limited 
reasoning in Lansley's review of local socialism in which the political 
programme, using the latter word loosely, comes almost to be seen as the 
outcome almost solely of councillors' actions. For example, apropos his 
section on race equality, which is sensationalistly revisionist, he concludes 
that whatever the criticism of Labour's approach from those within the race 
equality field, Labour councillors were really committed, implying counter- 
posedly, as do some of his erstwhile Labour colleagues, that the `failure' of 
that programme was, in some large part, down to the individual activities of 
race equality workers. Whatever criticisms there are, including my own, of 
Marxist attempts at theorising the state, or local state, there is at least an 
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endeavour to situate action within an intellectual framework that allows for 
both an internally logical review of such action as well as projection 
remedial action within a coherent vision. Whilst there appears not to be 
any reviews of local governance in the nineties by those who theorised local 
governance within a Marxist framework in the seventies, it is clear that if 
there were, then analyses of this type might err on the side of being too 
mechanistic. For example the instrumentalist version might argue that this 
is symptomatic of the collusion of interests between the petit bourgeois or 
bourgeois interests of the party leadership, senior managers and trade unions 
in what is no more than the local executive committee of the bourgeoisie. 
Consequently they are bound to act in that manner. Those within the arbiter 
model would argue that is proof of the "in the final analysis" undermining of 
autonomy by capital. On the other hand, within the purviews of the arbiter 
argument, those of the Trotskyist persuasion, and this was Ted Knight's 
political background prior to formal membership of the Labour party, could 
reasonably argue that `anything goes' in advance of the working class. 
Even a more sophisticated version of the post Fordist argument, undertaken 
in the nineties, which attempts to site, and cite, race and gender struggles as 
symptomatic of the forces undermining the Fordist project, and in so doing 
moves the post Fordist theory along the continuum into the arbiter camp, still 
under writes the determining logic through the language of capital. 78' All of 
these, as explanatory frameworks, are unacceptable because within them 
human action comes to be situated within contexts that can be seen to be no 
more than various shades of positivistic behaviourism. By the end of the 
seventies and beginning of the eighties, how then is one to theorise the 
situation of what has been termed `new left' Labour councils and the 
relationships between the party, councillors and the polity? The answer to 
this question has particular pertinence for the introduction and development 
of what I have termed the positive racialisation of local governance, a 
process begun in many of the above termed London councils in the late 
seventies and early eighties. 
10.5 Critical Unorthodoxy 
The answer lies within the framework of the communicative power model of 
politics outlined by Habermas and contained in his notions of politics as 
opinion and will-formation. This is in contrast to politics as administration 
in which political power is exercised through administrative power. With 
this as the back cloth it is possible to point out that the normative potential of 
the new left Labour `programme' of the late seventies and early eighties held 
out the promise of greater democratisation of local government. There was 
a window of opportunity which would have allowed for a path to counter the 
pessimistic assessment of politics made in the early nineties which was that 
the "space for deliberative politics is shrinking". However, it is clear as 
well, that the realisation of the political situation affording a greater degree 
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of communicative power was dependent on the Labour party, in particular, 
being able to overcome what I have described as `being suckered by the 
system'. This refers to the process whereby politicians, especially those of 
radical intent, and, as I shall argue in later sections, this pertained 
particularly to Black politicians, end up not as representatives of the people 
but as managers of power, including their own petty political ambitions. 
Further elaboration of the key problem faced by the new left in local 
government power in the late seventies and early eighties, is provided by 
Habermas' answer to a particular question. The question, in three parts, 
asked to what extent parliaments and political parties could be regarded as 
opinion and will formation institutions; to what extent could the party 
dominated political class be controlled in line with the principle of radical 
democracy; and, is it thus not necessary to democratise the political system 
to create more space for communicative power? 782 I take this to summarise 
the conundrum faced by the new left proponents of `local socialism' with 
their promise, particularly that to Black people and women, of greater 
participation in the processes of local governance. In some of the 
examples cited above it is clear that in the working out of this programme 
new left politicians had difficulty in, if not down right little intention of, 
transforming orthodox, or administrative, power. Habermas' answer to the 
question posed points this tendency out, as well as articulating the normative 
counter point. Thus: 
"Insofar as political parties have been governmentalised in the interim - insofar as 
their democratic substance has been internally exhausted - they are acting from the 
point of view of the administrative system within which they have established 
positions of power that they want to keep..... in a democracy the symbolic place of 
politics should remain unoccupied; but it remains vacant only if democratic party 
leaders are regarded as people's representatives and not as office holders or as 
potential administrative chiefs. This requires institutional imagination. The 
institutional measures that help increase the political parties `participation' in the 
formation of the political will, and keep them from acting as organs of the state 
would have to be in place at all levels... "783(BR-JH) 
Re-articulating the problem in the language of communicative power and its 
instrumentalised antithesis, administrative power, allows us to reconstruct 
the ambivalent potential for transforming local governance that existed at 
this period. This, in my contention, is one that could have allowed for the 
development of a racially inclusive form of local governance, or, as events 
unfortunately turned out, a de-democratising strengthening of administrative 
power with its attendant political parties' secondary level legitimation 
machinations entering the public sphere "as invaders from outside". 
According to Lansley after the 1982 local elections the new left in London 
had taken over, or made sizeable inroads, into seven councils, including the 
key target ones in this piece of research. How, why and in what form did 
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race come to be on the agenda of such councils at this period is covered in 
the next section. 
10.6 Race and Local Governance in the Late Seventies and Early 
Eighties 
The title of this section is a reminder of my previous argument that one can 
view the racialisation of the state in the UK through a periodisation which 
sees the first period as arising out the experience of colonialism and 
imperialism. This, borrowing Furedi's term, is one marked by an attitude 
of racial confidence in the `reality' of the racial hierarchy. The second 
period, differentiated out during the late thirties, is that characterised by 
racial fear in which the racial certainties are re-articulated in terms of 
culture, ethnicity and a reluctance in official circles to debate and discuss the 
issue for `fear' of provoking trouble. From the thirties onwards it is 
difficult to attribute to the state, and the two major parties which have 
administered it, any overall, planned strategy in relation to race in the UK. 
Its approach has been, or so it appears, piece-meal, ad hoc, knee-jerk and on 
the hoof responses to focus group impetuses, to bring it up to date on what 
seems to be current government policy motivators. Nevertheless I have 
argued that the racialisation of the state began with the onset of dominating 
contact with Black peoples over the centuries to the extent that the modem 
political enlightenment, and some of its key concrete manifestations, such as 
the revolutionary inspired western constitutions, are shadowed and built 
upon, learning processes of domination. These learning processes, in the 
absence of communicative based deconstruction and transformation, are 
recursive and inform the responses of the state to problems of race based 
social integration. At one level this complements Omi and Winant's 
argument, based on their analysis of the US state, that the state is inherently 
racial. 784 An example of both the racial inherence and the recursive nature 
of such racism, can be seen in the current government's response to asylum 
seekers and refugees which has clear echoes of the approach of the state to 
similar displaced persons, particularly Jewish refugees, prior to and 
immediately after the Second World War. There is, however, a question, 
not so much about the theorisation of the state and race, but about the 
appropriateness of such theories, where appropriateness is tied into providing 
an adequate empirical dimension. This is especially so for theories, which 
in order to take account of epochly changing race scenarios across a 
temporal spectrum, make claims that racism is always changing. For 
example Solomos criticises neo-Marxist approaches to this issue, like Hall's 
and Winant's, and their derivatives, like Gilroy's, for being too theoretical 
and not closely enough tied into empirical sources. 85 In contrast his own 
approach to the specific question of how political structures in the UK 
"function in relation to race and in what ways ... they produce and reproduce 
or help overcome racism"786 comes across as a manipulation and 
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regurgitation of a very extensive empirical database with insufficient 
attention to developing an appropriate theorisation. Within the two 
scenarios briefly sketched out above lies the problem of the interpretation of 
the state and race in the UK not only up to the early eighties, but up to the 
present as well. This is that there is either a surfeit of socio-political and - historical data with a modicum of analytical structure, or a grand theorisation 
sans suitable degree of empirical sources. In this regard mention has 
already been made of Gilroy's empirically challenged analysis of the eighties 
period of anti-racism and the local state. 787 Where, in the seventies, 
attempts were made to derive empirically based theories not so much of race 
and the state, as the state of race in the UK at that time, the derived studies 
tended to be overly sociological without sufficient attention being paid to the 
way in which racism both structures and is structured. Rex and 
Tomlinson's studies of inner city race problems is symptomatic of this, 
ending up with conclusions that bordered on the stereotypical, i. e. Asian 
responses to race discrimination were to seek "comfort" in capital 
accumulation, whilst Afro-Caribbean reactions were defensively "stroppy"; a 
regilding, perhaps, of the `chip-on-the-shoulder' syndrome. 788 On the other 
hand they captured the essence of what was then, and still is, an influential 
paradigm with regard to race, both within academic circles and the sphere of 
governance, which was that of `race relations'. My argument up to now 
has been that whilst biologically there is only one human race, `races', as in 
differences between groups of people on supposed biological grounds, 
especially those that are predicated on maintaining a hierarchy of 
domination, is a social construct which is communicatively structured. To 
that extent it too deals with relations between `races', albeit socially 
constructed races. There is, however, an important difference between 
arguments, such as mine, and the race relations paradigm I refer to above. 
My analyses seeks the transformation of the forces in the structures of 
communication which maintain the unjust racialisation of communication. 
It is about the de-racialisation of `race' and thus echoes at a general level, 
albeit from a differing perspective, David Goldberg's post modernist 
inspired call for not only the transformation of race, but also the language 
through which that transformation is sought. By the seventies and early 
eighties the transformative strand of `race relations' was to be found in the 
Marxist inspired analyses of race in the UK. In this de-racialisation was 
tied to the overall struggle relating to the overcoming of capital. For 
example Sivanandan and the Institute of Race Relations during this period 
launched a series of scathing attacks on the orthodox notion of race relations, 
as exemplified in the legislation and associated parastatal `race bureaucrats', 
because they were a "symbolic political act which gave the impression that 
something was being done while in practice achieving very little. "789 But 
this sounded like no more than the race dimension to the instrumentalist 
Marxist paradigm of the state. A variation on the Marxist transformation 
model of race relations is that of Miles in which race is an "ideological 
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effect, a mask which hides real economic relationships". In Britain this 
ideological work is enacted through the state, in the main, "as a means of 
crisis management and results in racialising fragments of the working 
class. 99790 The examples of what I have termed transformative models of 
race relations are put forward so as to provide the outline of that which they 
are critiquing, viz. the orthodox model. The orthodox model does not seek 
an immanent critique of `race', such as that conducted by Miles social labour 
based immanence. Instead it is enough that `race' is used as a basis for 
social interaction, the end product of which, often termed `harmonious race 
relations' is to be achieved through measures in which Black people are 
accommodated with and within existing structures and processes. Even if 
those structures and processes themselves unjustly differentiate on the bases 
of `race', the nature of the accommodation is such that they are not 
questioned. At another level, then `race' and `racism' are aberrations from 
the norm, rather than integral to that norm. From a communicative 
perspective it can be argued that within this accommodationist model 
consensus, the basis for `harmony', is not arrived at through de-racialising 
discursive communicative practices, but is managed and administered. 
Orthodox race relations then operates very much according to my notion of 
`diskourse'. That is to say there is a set of non-dialogical language and 
theoretical reference points mal-structuring the communicative framework. 
Whilst the social constructions of this model are contributed to by the non 
accountability of elite academic institutions, the main impetus derives from 
the race specific actions of the state engaged in the overall strategy of 
managing the `fear'. There are three main variants of this model - 
assimmilationist, integrationist and diversity. I want to deal with the first 
two because the last one is very much a phenomenon of the nineties. The 
first two, unlike the last, are marked by notions of collective identity, even if 
the bases for these are ersatz constructions rather than inter-subjectively 
grounded solidaristic actions. 
The post second world war evolution of the orthodox model of race relations 
was gradual, piecemeal, and only started gathering momentum in the sixties. 
Up to the late fifties government denial of a `problem' with regard to race, as 
Furedi and Katznelson791 separately argue, was very much the order of the 
day. This is not to deny Solomos's contention that race was very much the 
subject of discussion amongst Whitehall officials and politicians during this 
period and that both the Conservative and Labour governments of the 
respective days in the fifties instituted a number of covert administrative 
instruments designed to curb the inflow of Black immigrants. 792 What 
matters is that this was not a democratically open discussion, but one 
conducted in secrecy and under `fearful' conditions. But then this was 
symptomatic of the resources officialdom had to draw on in responding to 
race which were largely framed by the colonial experience. The aftermath 
of the second world war, with Britain requiring labour from its colonies 
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coupled with the drive for independence in those very same colonies, created 
an official cross referenced departmental response to such issues in which 
problems were denied for fear of `stirring up' trouble. But it was not just 
the state which drew on colonial learning processes for the populace at large 
had hundreds of years of unchallenged racist representations of Black people 
through which to mediate their social relations. It took thus the 1958 
Notting Hill disturbances for the government to start moving out of its 
`denial `mode and into the beginnings of planned action to manage relations 
between races. The `disturbances' referred to above, plus other incidents of 
a similar nature, had two components: first a clear indication that Black 
people here in the UK were not going to tolerate racism; and secondly, a 
warning note that large parts of the white populace did not want Black 
people in this country. It is at this point race entered overtly into the 
legitimation problems of the state and into the legitimation calculations mass 
political parties had to make. The result of this was firstly that the major 
political parties developed a consensus on matters of race, and secondly that 
this resulted in such parties seeking legitimation in a twofold strategy. 
Roy Jenkins, the sixties Labour government's Home Secretary, summarised 
the all party consensus to managing race in the UK, a now aphoristic status 
achieving saying which still underpins the UK government's approach to 
race, when he said; "Integration without control is impossible, but control 
without integration is indefensible. "793 The white populace's `fears' were to 
be assuaged through the government action aimed at controlling the numbers 
of Black people entering and being allowed to stay in the country, expressed 
symbolically through a number of racially grounded immigration acts which 
began in the early sixties. Political accountability for this was directly 
structured through Parliament. Between the Notting Hill event in 1958 and 
the first major, post second world war, racially structured piece of 
immigration legislation in 1962, numerous open debates, in the sense that 
they were recorded for public communicative consumption, took place at 
party conferences and in parliament, about the need to restrict Black 
immigration. 94 That is to say that whatever the criticisms about the 
inadequacies of representative democracy the legitimation test of the extent 
to which the government could be seen to be responding positively to the 
racist fears of white people, could be gauged to some degree via the ballot 
box. The 1962 Commonwealth Immigrants Act was symptomatic of the 
way in which race consciously entered the definition of who was allowed 
into the country, and thus into issues of nationality, without openly using 
race categories. Thus all Commonwealth passport holders were subject to 
immigration controls except those who were born in the UK, or held 
passports issued by the UK government. Solomos is right when he 
concludes that this particular piece of legislation was widely read as being 
applicable only to Black immigrants. 795 However, no such semblance of 
democratic accountability was afforded to meeting the legitimation claims of 
Black people living in the UK. Instead, as Katznelson argues and shows, 
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the British state reached into the past and then prevailing pattern of 
governance of Black people as expressed through the UK state's colonial 
experience and introduced a series of structures and processes, with its own 
descriptive language, through which the government and through which it 
was expected Black people would, mediate their legitimation perspectives. 796 
Between 1965 and 1976 three increasingly stronger pieces of race anti- 
discriminatory pieces of legislation were passed aimed at outlawing certain 
acts of racial discrimination. Given the `control-integration' leitmotiv, it is 
not surprising that the government and its functions were omitted from the 
scope of the Acts. Whilst at one level, thus, these acts also satisfied the 
legitimation interests of the government internationally for they appeared to 
satisfy the expectations of the increasing level of race anti-discriminatory 
international protocols and legislation, at another level internally they offered 
the ostensible hope of redress to Black people who felt they had been racially 
wronged. The inadequacies of al three acts were, however, to become the 
focus of legitimation contestations between the claims for justice made by 
Black people and the legalistic anchoring of the `control-integration' kernel. 
At another level it can be said that the development and implementation of 
the Acts failed to satisfy the principles of discursive communicative 
democracy for all of those affected were not party to the development of the 
legislative norms and final instruments. The 1976 race relations Act was 
very much the product of the white liberal wing of the legal profession and 
did not include in any substantive way the views and aspirations of the Black 
communities in the UK. It is not surprising, therefore, that Lustgarten's 
analysis of that Act includes the substantial observation that the chance to 
redress collective wrongs was missed, whether advertently or 
inadvertently. 797 In a nineties retrospective look back at the '76 Act, 
Anthony Lester, a barrister and prime architect of that Act, confirms that it 
was very much a product of the then Home Secretary's and his aims. His 
prefatory principles which he set out were that "the overwhelming majority 
of the coloured population is here to stay.... and that the time has come for a 
determined effort by the government..... to ensure fair and equal treatment 
for all our people regardless of their race, colour or national origins. r)798 
That late seventies and asynchronous acknowledgement of Black people 
being here to stay has to contrasted with the everyday experiences and 
interpretations of Black people in the ongoing debate about who belongs and 
to which they were never formally invited to participate. Katznelson quotes 
a Black person's reactions in the late sixties to the debate going on around 
him, but not with him. Thus, ".. in 1944 I was a serviceman in the British air 
force fighting for freedom and democracy. In 1947 I became a settler in 
Nottingham. In the 1958 riots I became a coloured man. In the 1962 
Commonwealth Immigrants Act I became a coloured immigrant. And in 
1968 I am an unwanted coloured immigrant. You tell me what's going to 
happen to me in 1970. "799 In previous sections I had argued that 
controlling, defining and also unsettling space, time and place for black 
394 
people is one of the direct results of racism.. Attempting to write in 
remedies for this on the back of racist immigration controls actually 
undermines the potential for achieving the universal moral norms 
underpinning such remedial instruments. Hence Lester points to the 
improvements in the '76 Act over the '68 one, such as the inclusion of both 
direct and indirect discrimination, the intention to cover public institutions, 
including the Crown, giving individuals direct access to legal redress etc. 
Unfortunately he also points out the ways in which such intentions were 
frustrated. For example interpretations by the House of Lords effectively 
exempted the crown from the Act by making only individual acts, and not 
institutional ones, liable. Built into the Act itself under section 75(5) was 
the permission for the Crown to discriminate on the grounds of birth, 
nationality, descent and residence, whilst section 69(2) allowed ministers to 
issue certificates on the grounds of national security to block the access of 
individuals wanting to complain to employment tribunals. Additionally the 
fact that individuals making complaints of racial discrimination were not 
eligible for legal aid effectively meant that such individuals could not be 
adequately or effectively represented in court-800 In other words the 1976 
Act, in many circumstances, allows for the facade of making, and seeking 
redress, for and to, claims of racial justice without substantively meeting 
those claims, and thus contributes to the both satisfying the legitimation 
responsibilities of government, and at the same time at the point of that 
facade cracking, a motivation crisis in respect of the government's right to 
govern. Within this context the main impetus for the development of the 
representational discourse of the orthodox race relations model grew. 
Katznelson derives his colonial analogy from the British model of indirect 
colonial rule involving the use of so-called indigenous and manufactured 
indigenous political structures through which the power of the colonial state 
was affected, pointing to the similarities between those and the structures 
and processes put into place in Britain post second world war to address 
`race' problem. However, there were other aspects as well that seem to 
draw from the colonial well, for example the differentiation out of racial, 
cultural and religious aspects of the Black populations and affording of 
different priorities to these giving rise to the claim that these were part of a 
strategy of divide and rule. All of this is true to some extent; true in the 
sense that they attest to my arguments about the learning processes of 
domination. However the one aspect that marks this out as being 
`colonial', and here I am in agreement with Katznelson, is the fact that these 
initiatives were removed from the direct, or other, democratic influence or 
control of Black people; they who were supposed to be the main 
beneficiaries of these actions. The way in which these structures and 
processes were established and the way in which they were expected to 
conduct there affairs amounted to a "quangoisation" of race. That is to say 
administration, not communicative discourse, was the order of the day. 
Katznelson makes use of the term `racial buffering' to describe the 
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arrangement of institutional structures and processes which were, and still 
are expected, to interpolate between Black experiences and the political 
process. 801 Thus he notes that a "key feature of classic colonial patterns of 
social control - indirect rule through a broker, native leadership -has been 
replicated in the mother country.... (where indirect rule).... refers in an 
omnibus way to a variety of colonial practices governing in different 
areas.... (and in which).... native chiefs were an integral part of the colonial 
administration. "802 In the sixties the government gave intention of 
formalising the institutionalisation of racial buffering in the 1965 White 
paper which set out the proposals to create a National Committee for 
Commonwealth Immigrants supported by a network of local NCCIs. The 
core of principles underpinning the philosophy and operationalisation of this 
approach still inheres in those of the NCCI's successor structures, the Race 
Relations Board and Commission and local community relation councils 
(CRCs), and, currently in the Commission for Racial Equality (CRE) and 
local CRCs. These principles were, and are, that the NCCI, and its 
support structures at the local level, were not there to be in the role of 
spokesperson for Black people or an institutional framework for pressure 
groups, but rather that of developing and managing a `consensus' between 
`old' and `new' communities through a role that can be best described as that 
of being cultural intermediaries. The 1967 guidelines for the formation of 
local committees, as Katznelson points out, emphasised that this was not "a 
committee to serve the interests of one section of the community, but a 
committee to promote racial harmony ... (being) ... therefore 
beneficial to 
all. "803 Representation was to be drawn from all local organisation sectors 
of the community, e. g. Rotary Club etc., as well as the `visible immigrant 
leadership'. For Katznelson, and I am in general agreement with his 
conclusion, "the significance of the critical structural decision to link the 
Third World population to the polity through buffer institutions, replicating 
key features of traditional colonial relationships..... was .... the building of a 
political consensus aimed at depoliticising race. , 
804 Whilst it appears that 
at the time of writing in the mid seventies Katznelson had a more orthodox 
notion of depoliticisation, that is linking it to formal participation, or lack of 
it, in the polity, his argument applies equally to the idea of depoliticisation as 
expressed in the nineties as that of "the modem orthodoxies of technocratic, 
managerial `consensus politics"'. But there is another aspect of this 
institutionalisation of `technocratic, managerial consensus' on race that 
Katznelson does not adequately signify. This is that whilst he points out 
that the successor to the NCCI, the Community Relations Commission, 
established by section 25 of the 1968 Race Relations Act, was, unlike the 
NCCI, made a statutory body responsible to the Home Office, he does not 
properly highlight the role and context of that lead government department. 
The Home Office was always associated with the responsibilities for law and 
order and immigration in which the latter task was from the outset racialised 
through over signification of Jewish immigration in the nineteenth century, 
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thus effectively blurring the boundaries between law and order and 
immigration. In the thirties, as Jacobs points out, anti-fascist mobilisation 
in the East End, together with the obvious involvement of local Jewish 
communities therein, created in the minds of Home Office officials and 
politicians the association of anti-racist movements, even if such a term 
would not have been used then, with that of the problem of public order. 805 
A nascent notion of `community relations' as the legitimating seed bed for 
good community order and harmony, and thus an antidote to both extreme 
right wing political demands as well as radical opposition to those demands, 
began to germinate. From the sixties, onwards then, the formalisation of 
the management of race by the state, through the political shibboleth of no 
integration without control etc. - and woe betide any politician who goes 
against this particular grain - came to be both symbolised by that 
Department's historical and contemporary roles, and at the same time invited 
critique and opposition because of the inherent contradiction in trying to run 
those two together. At another level then, in terms of the subliminal 
blockages to non-distorted communication, it can be said that Black people's 
presence in this country straddled a blurred political line which was, and is, 
being defined and moved between grudging acceptance and being merged 
with notions of the enemy within. Overall, however, Jacobs assessment 
that the race relations initiatives of government were more concerned with 
the issue of social control and order rather than addressing that of racism, is 
correct. The question now is to what extent my, and Katznelson's, analysis 
of the state's approach to Black people in the country as being primarily 
colonial in character holds true for the late seventies. The answer to this 
will be explored in the next section which details the relationship between 
these institutionalised race structures and processes and the local governance 
polity, thereby beginning to sketch in as well the race and local governance 
prelude to what I have previously described as the positive racialisation of 
local governance. 
10.7 Race, Local Governance and the Colonial in the Seventies 
In the previous sections I had argued that the nineties downgrading and de- 
prioritisation of race equality in local government, particularly those London 
ones which had been regarded as `leading edge' in this area of 
responsibilities, could be likened to a process of re-colonisation. This 
argument is structured not only in relation to the evidence of de- 
democratisation and imposition of administrative rule in those areas where 
previously there had been actual, or the potential for, communicative 
discourse concerning issues of race, but also in relation to colouring 
Habermas' theory of lifeworld colonisation. The point about raising this 
now is that this is different to Katznelson's argument concerning the 
colonisation of Black people in the UK post second world war. I see this 
rather, and I think Katznelson argues the same, as the extension of the 
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colonial paradigm of rule internally to deal with the `establishment's' racial 
fear of potential disruptions to public order, thereby threatening at both the 
primary and secondary levels the political and societal legitimating bases. 
Thus Katznelson, in considering the remedial alternatives, poses two 
possible ways forward in the seventies. The first envisages Black people 
being treated equally with white people and enjoying the same political 
rights without fear or actual practice of racism. The second draws on a 
notion of consociational democracy entailing a form of group representation 
in the political decision making structures. Leaving aside the unfortunate 
misappropriation and misuse of the consociational ideas by the eighties 
apartheid theoreticians in South Africa in an attempt to lend intellectual 
respectability to their then constitutional proposals, there are inklings in both 
Katznelson' suggestions of what I am arguing for. His first assumes the 
de-racialised society which I contend requires radical restructuring in the 
communicative relationships, including the political ones. The second 
marks out an overlap with the intellectual and political developments 
surrounding the movements concerned with Black representation in the 
Labour movement, both at the political and trade union levels. The latter, 
particularly those associated with certain trade unions, were quite influential 
in beginning to open up the communicative structures in local government in 
a way that helped the process of positive racialisation, and thus, in a way, 
running with the colonial metaphor, that of de-colonisation. 
We can flesh out the `colonial' paradigm, as the state sponsored and 
supported race related structures and institutions have come to be described, 
by reference to those structures and institutions formally incepted through 
the 1976 Race Relations Act. In the previous section I had attempted to 
define the colonial, in substantiation of the argument that the nineties are 
overseeing a period of re-colonisation, in relation to a number of non- 
discursive communicative features on the basis that the domination of the 
colonial regime is marked by the total absence of communicative discursive 
processes and mechanisms for the colonial `subjects'. These features are 
the development and imposition of administrative systems as a substitute for 
political ones by, primarily, viewing race as a problem to be `managed'. It 
can be seen that, whilst the actual physical distance between the `colony' and 
the metropole has now been shortened, the political communicative distance 
is just as vast because `race' is effectively removed from the political 
decision making bodies. The genesis of the 1976 Act bears testament to 
this. Whilst it can be argued that the pressure to bring in a more effective 
piece of anti-discriminatory legislation than that which existed in the 1968 
Act brought into the public sphere the burgeoning Black political voice 
being expressed through their own organisations, e. g. the Indian Workers 
Association, or those which covered similar areas of concern, e. g. the 
Campaign Against Racial Discrimination, the actual conceptualisation and 
drafting of the Act remained a white liberal activity, ultimately being 
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negotiated through, and sanctioned by an all white parliament without any 
real communicative channels to the Black constituency. The main 
institutional structure established by the '76 Act was the Commission for 
Racial Equality, (CRE). Whilst this body has more powers than that of its 
direct organisational predecessors, the Community Relations Commission 
and Race Relations Board, and the NCCI, the principles underpinning the 
latter, as I argue above, are still enshrined in the CRE. Ultimately these 
come down to the `moderate' management of race issues. The 
`paternalism' identified by Rex in the sixties state sponsored race 
institutions, still existed in the thinking that lay behind the establishment of 
the institutional structures. The CRE was, and is headed by a Chair, 
appointed by the government and who, in turn, oversees the work of the 
Commission. In this the Chair is aided by a board of Commissioners, again, 
all government appointees. Little wonder then, that the first Black Chair of 
the CRE was only appointed in the nineties. At the local level the existence 
and continuing establishment of Community Relations Councils continued as 
part of the CRE's brief. CRCs were, in some ways, a mirror image on a 
smaller scale of the CRE. The manager of the CRC, the Community 
Relations Officer, sometimes prefaced with the title `Principal', was, as is 
the staff of the CRE, a government appointee. The management committee 
of local CRCs are, on the whole, there at the behest of the CRO. Many 
CRCs also obtain up to half of their funding from the respective local 
authority. The relationship between the CRE and CRCs is, however, as the 
1981 Home Affairs Committee Report, strongly implied, very centralist. As 
Jacobs observes, "ultimately the CRCs do have to respond to the general 
administrative and financial requirements of the CRE. "806 In support of this 
observation he relates the incident of how the CRE threatened to cut off the 
funds of the Wolverhampton CRC because that body's proposed appointee 
to a senior CRO post was regarded as too radical for the CRE. This 
however says more than just expecting CRCs to adhere to administrative 
guidelines because it also demonstrates the trope of race moderation which 
informs the race politics of the colonial. The same HAC Report highlights 
what it describes as "an atmosphere of backbiting and bickering" which 
pervades the industrial relations perspective to CRCs, and which, from an 
effectiveness and value for money view, undermines the achievement of race 
harmony. 807 But then this is not so surprising. CRCs' responsibilities 
range from policy development, through public education, community 
development to community service. Its accountability lines, however, are, 
in many cases, tri-partite because they track back to specific responsibilities 
to the CRE, and local government, and a more general, unspecified one to 
the community. None of these were, or are, democratic in the orthodox 
sense, or discursively communicative, in the sense that I think they should 
be. Jacobs points to Black groups formally associating with CRCs, even 
though they were ambivalent about their role, because he reasons that these 
groups saw the CRC as a route to local government resources. To some 
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extent this is true. However, as I shall show with reference to Lambeth and 
borough X, the affiliation of Black groups to CRCs was in many ways 
limited, a partiality which had much to do with the politicking of CROs and 
the CRcs committees as they tried to form affiliate shields in an attempt to 
ward off criticism from more radical elements in the Black community. 
They also legitimated claims made by CROs that they had a `constituency' 
and thus could speak for the Black community. In some cases this partiality 
split along fractious ethnic lines as self appointed ethnic leaders spoke on 
behalf of their self claimed constituencies to lay claim to the CRCs 
resources, or those of the local council. But these fault lines were there 
from the outset of the state's attempts to create colonial buffering 
institutions. They hark back to the complaint from a NCCI development 
officer in the sixties that because of the tri-partite lines of fractured 
accountability, they "were caught in a bind" and thus had to be careful. 808 
Another commentator noted that the organisation generated "an atmosphere 
of superficial liberalism and generalised good will ... (but that) ... its 
characteristic style is paralysis and non-statement. " I would argue that this 
paralysis and internecine conflict inheres in the unstated politics of trying to 
manage a constructed, moderate consensus on race without the discursive 
involvement of Black people, because these problems, as they often do, turn 
on the types of purposive rational action given over to career decisions 
and/or personality clashes. More importantly it can be said that the focus of 
race equality, apart from being trapped in the orthodoxy of `race relations', is 
displaced on to the administrative system instead of the political system and 
that those macro- and micro-level normative decisions pertaining to racial 
justice are considered primarily within a managerial context governed by 
means-end reversal. It is little wonder that the role and status of the CRE 
and CRCs were viewed with a great degree of scepticism, and even down 
right hostility, by some organisations and activists in the Black community. 
In terms of what I have described as the transformative perspective on race 
relations, commentators like Sivanandan, viewed the whole process as 
evidence of the way in which the state responded to capitalist economic 
interests which both required the adoption of a migrant system of labour 
together with the control and management of race domestically through the 
creation of a parastatal race bureaucracy. Whatever the doubts about the 
social labour based determinism of Sivanandan's argument, there is, 
contained within his critique, the kernel of a valid criticism, which is that 
these bureaucracies appeared incapable of changing, or influencing the 
overall plight of Black people. 809 By the mid seventies there was 
overwhelming evidence pointing to the general state of what has been 
termed `racial disadvantage' experienced by Black people in the UK. This 
related to their differential life chances as expressed in their access to 
material and political resources. Across the whole range of citizen 
enhancing processes and resources Black people were worse off when 
compared with white people. Thus there were keenly felt and argued 
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issues around the failures of the educational, social and health, housing and 
criminal justice services, not to mention the visible threat to political 
participation posed by the rise of the extreme right. The empirical studies, 
which I'll only refer to generally and globally, speak for themselves. What is 
clear, however, is that the lead in opposing, fighting and proffering 
alternatives to these manifestations of racism, and their underlying 
philosophies, came from movements and activists thrown up by, and centred 
on, the Black communities. In these CRCs either lagged behind, or were 
very silent `partners'. Within this context it can be more easily 
comprehended why, upon coming to power in 1979, the Thatcher 
government resisted calls from its own right wing to overhaul and/or close 
down the `race relations' industry. 
There is however another important aspect to this which is germane to this 
piece of research. Many of the services mentioned above were either part 
of the local authorities remit, or operationalised through local structures with 
functional and/or mutually influencing links to the apparatus of local 
governance. The CRE did then, and still does, claim part of its legitimacy 
to speak on issues of race, from the contact and liaisons local CRCs have 
with both the Black communities and local authorities. From the outset the 
race relations structures, starting with the local NCCIs were in a prime 
position to try and influence the local authorities, especially since part of 
their funding sources in many cases were direct from local government. It 
can be seen, however, from the studies done on the Nottingham race 
structures in the late sixties and from that done on the Wolverhampton ones, 
that the relationships established with local authorities were, for the most 
part, ineffectually facadic, characterised by the local authorities wanting to 
maintain such structures as no more than talking shops, and, in some cases, 
CROs legitimating that devaluing process through their own career and 
status needs. 810 Race was then on the local governance agenda long before 
the development of internal race structures and processes in the eighties both 
formally, through the establishment of relationships with local CRCs, and 
informally through the myriad racist decisions which excluded Black people 
from most aspects of the local authority. Apropos the latter Jacobs cites the 
example of the Housing Department in Wolverhampton in the seventies 
where formalised informal race monitoring of housing applications, via hand 
written coded additions, with the intention of excluding those applicants. It 
can be said that the relationship between local CRCs and the local authority 
was very much that of the external adviser, marginalised by the local 
authority, and used only as and when it suited that local authority's needs; 
above all hardly ever being able to influence substantially the internal 
workings of the authority. The extent to which this can be said to hold true 
can be considered with reference to the mid-seventies history of the CRC in 
Lambeth, not only because it will provide us with the background to the 
decision to develop internal race equality structures in Lambeth council in 
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the late seventies, this council being the main secondary source of 
information, but also because this process will in itself be a rough template 
against which to consider the initiation of race equality structures in the 
primary target borough. This makes sense as well in terms of the time chart 
of events because Lambeth established its race equality structures in 1979, 
and target borough X their own in 1984. It will be argued that the 
Lambeth structures and underwriting processes had a seminal influence on 
the Borough X's decision to establish similar ones. 
Thus Lambeth's CRC was established in the late sixties under the legal and 
organisational auspices of the 1965 Race Relations Act and Race Relations 
Commission; later consolidated through the 1968 Race Relations Act. Its 
inception and early development criss-crossed the varying fortunes of 
Labour in the 1970 local elections, including the loss of Lambeth to the 
Conservatives at that time, and the subsequent re-assumption of power by 
the local Labour party in 1974. But this was a Labour Party which at this 
local level was changing from the old traditional one of the sixties. There 
was a larger influx, not only in terms of members, but also in terms of 
elected councillors, of both those who could be described as moderate 
`modernisers' and more left wing radicals. The importance of this was that 
it was the beginning of the attempts by the political party and leadership to 
forge external links with local community organisations and 
`representatives', especially those from the Black community, recognising 
that the old traditional, authoritarian, inward, incestuous form of politics that 
was old Labour, was no longer appropriate. The local CRC's role in this 
was afforded prominence both because it was the most conspicuous `race' 
organisation in the borough and because it was seen, and used, as a 
`respectable' cultural intermediary conduit to certain Black organisations and 
designated `leaders' or `representatives' from the community. Part of this 
reputation for `respectability' was maintained in it early years by the over 
representation of white people on the executive committee, including council 
representatives. Indeed it was only in 1975 that the first Black Chair of that 
committee was elected. In some case there was a political cross over with 
certain Black individuals who were themselves members of the Labour 
Party. 811 This is not so surprising. Other commentators have through the 
sixties, seventies and eighties analysed the extent to which, despite their 
record on race, the Labour Party has been, and is, seen as the `only' political 
party for Black people, if only because at the end of the day they still aspire 
to the norms of social justice. This was the case in Lambeth and from the 
mid seventies onwards there was a steady increase in the membership of 
Black people in the local Labour party. Additionally `race' could not be 
ignored by the politicians in Lambeth. The Black community represented 
over 20% of the population in Lambeth according to the 1971 census. The 
Lambeth CRC was seen, then, as a local `race' organisation with which the 
Council could do business, and, in so doing be represented as `doing' that 
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business on behalf of and with the Black community. The fact, however, is 
that "this `respectability' did not necessarily mean the organisation was 
either functionally efficient or indeed credible in the eyes of the grassroots, 
the majority of local black people .. (since)... it was often contended by CCRL's own members and officers that the organisation was little known 
and probably not much respected by many people. "812 This lack of respect 
and acknowledgement from the `grassroots' also stemmed from the CCRL's 
role in another important aspect of the state's attempt to run with a colonial 
paradigm in inner city areas with large Black populations. Since the late 
sixties and through into the seventies successive governments had, and have, 
attempted to influence the social control dimension to run down inner city 
areas through a number of inner city programmes all of which had a 
substantial grant dispensing element. The majority of these monies were 
channelled through local authorities. In the seventies Edwards and 
Batley's important study of these programmes concluded that the key 
incentive for their development lay in the underlying fear governments had 
of the potential for racial unrest in the inner city areas. 813 Atkinson's and 
Moon's study of urban policy in the UK argue and attest "to the long term 
role race has played in shaping the conception and development of urban 
initiatives", starting in the fifties. 814 The growth in Black population from 
about 500,000 in 1950 to just over a million in 1969 facilitated the 
development of an area based approach to urban policy by the government, 
as opposed to the immediate post second World War emphasis on a physical 
strategy, i. e. addressing in the most simplistic of terms the obvious physical 
manifestations of deprivation. In support of my argument regarding 
legitimation strategies and tactics on the part of the major political parties, 
Atkinson and Moon summarise this the thinking behind this change in urban 
initiatives succinctly. 
"Given the concentration of black and Asian people (their terms) in urban areas, 
some form of area-based urban initiatives would inevitably include many within 
its net while avoiding overt targeting. From this perspective the genesis of 
urban initiatives can be seen, at least partially, as a shrewd response to black and 
Asian needs and liberal opinion which, simultaneously, avoided alienating the 
white working class vote that was so essential to the Labour Party's electoral 
fortunes"s" 
In a previous chapter I had argued that the period of the nineties re- 
colonisation of the inner cities, marked particularly by the targeting and 
disestablishing of key race equality structures and processes in local 
authorities, is masked by a falsely constructed new universal need for 
efficiency, economy etc., and largely taking effect through the introduction 
of neo-managerialist programmes. This trope of `mal-targeting' Black 
people through an ersatz universalism as justification takes its originating 
cue from the exculpation for colonialism and imperialism. This is evident in 
the structuring of Britain's urban policy throughout the fifties, sixties, and 
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seventies wherein the universal `urban' was a code for finding acceptable 
ways to manage the `race problem'. This latter sentiment appeared to be a 
subsidiary element of the urban programmes where the combination of the 
local CRCs and local authorities, the former acting as the main, if not the 
only, scrutineer of `acceptable' Black grant applications, ensured that funds 
went to `deserving' Black organisations. At another level it expressed the 
views voiced by a prominent educationalist in one of the remaining British 
colonies in Africa in the late sixties that the best hope for independent 
African countries lay in the creation of a middle class through the proper 
targeting of resources, such as education. 816 Whether or not one accepts 
this tracking back of the urban programme rationale's anthropophagi, it is 
clear that the urban programmes of the late sixties to late seventies were born 
of a fear of US style racial violence in the inner city, and, given the 
ostensible universal character of the policy, born, as Young argues, "to 
ambiguity". This other strand to the attempt, by government, to manage the 
`race problem', is put into perspective by Stewart's and Whiting's 1983 
study of race and the urban programme. 817 They conclude that since Black 
people's major concerns are about racism and discrimination, an Urban 
Programme, understood as a source of funds for community activities, is "at 
worst a diversionary smoke screen to divert attention from the absence of a 
serious commitment to a multi-racial society. "818 What the latter quote 
attests to is the characteristic of trying to manage non-discursively within an 
underlying context of fear and denial which comes to determine the 
experience of Black people within such programmes. This is the attribute 
of marginality whereby race is manipulated consciously or unconsciously on 
to the backburner of priority social issues. There are two inter-related 
ways in which this can be seen to work in relation to the urban programme. 
The first is that because `race', particularly the dimension of race equality 
cannot explicitly and communicatively discursively, be built into the 
considerations, for to do so would be to undermine the unspoken 
legitimation compact with the white working class, there are no means to 
ensure that grant monies are equitably distributed to the Black community. 
The result, both in Lambeth, and, as shall be shown, in the target borough, is 
a grant funding profile heavily skewed in favour of white, often large 
traditional NGOs, with a spattering of Black groups. For example 
Ouseley, first Principal CRO with the Lambeth CRC, and then the council's 
first Principal Race Relations Adviser, noted that: 
`By 1977 there was a developing awareness within parts of the black community 
that one or two of the black organisations had better access to local authority 
funds, mainly because the personalities involved were known to Council officials 
and key elected members, and were regarded as the unofficial or even official 
spokespersons or leaders for the black community. This consciousness also 
extended to include the local CRC which was understandably, if mistakenly, 
regarded by some as a quasi-governmental body. Holding a unique and favourable 
position in the eyes of the council .... The twin combination of self-imposed black 
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leadership and a well resourced CRC were then increasingly being seen by some 
groups as constraining the development of a more natural black community 
response to issues directly concerning them... "819 
Then there is the second aspect of marginality, which again because of the 
dual, but contradictory, legitimation interests securing the constructed 
consensus on race, ensures that the parameters of any overt recognition of 
race by the state is restrictedly defined and controlled. A case in point is 
that of the definition(s) and use of Section 11 monies. Section 11 of the 
1966 Local Government Act enabled local authorities with significant 
numbers of Black children, especially Black Asian children whose first 
language was not English, to apply for up to 75% of the cost of funding for 
additional English teachers. As Atkinson and Moon summarise the intent 
of that part of the '66 Act, this was an attempt "to assist the assimilation of 
immigrants into the host population ... (and)... reflected the view that black 
and Asian children constituted a problem, and a concern that the white 
population should not feel threatened . -))820 Marginality was re-enforced by 
the practice of many authorities in applying for blocks of Section 11 money 
and then using that in a non-race specific role to bolster the mainstream 
budget. Additionally, as I shall show later, as if to emphasise the transitory 
nature of such initiatives, the majority of race specific posts created in local 
authorities during the expansion of race equality programmes, were funded 
under the auspices of Section 11. One can see most clearly the way in 
which the dual, Janus faced nature of the race contract in the UK, reflected in 
the 1977 White paper issued by the Department of the Environment, sustains 
the distorting blockages to communicative clarity on responsibility for racial 
justice, thereby ensuring the process of marginalisation as a means of social 
control. In the prefatory comments to the White paper publication the then 
Environment Secretary, Peter Walker, had argued for the need to discover 
the "extent of multiple deprivation suffered by Britain's black and Asian 
populations. " 821 Yet the actual white paper went on to state that, "the 
attack on the specific problem of race discrimination and the resultant 
disadvantages must be primarily through the new anti-discrimination 
legislation and the work of the Commission for Race Equality. "822 It is clear 
that at work here was, again, the hope that area based, `universal' urban 
programmes would, in their broad shotgun effects, pick up on Black needs, 
whilst, in an ostensible play to the white legitimating constituencies, the 
public focussing on the CRE could be visibly seen to be consigning race to 
its `rightful' ghetto. In both cases of marginality outlined above the 
scenarios illustrate the argument that the `colonial' operates through 
suppressing the proper discursive resolution of race through a recursive 
process of marginalisation. The latter-is often thinly disguised under an 
ostensible appeal both to generalities, whether this be "the civilising 
mission", or the area based approach to urban programmes, and to the view 
that these generalities are best achieved through administrative means. 
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There was a visible presence both metaphorically and in reality, in the latter 
case reinforced by the fact that the Town Hall was practically in the centre of 
that community's social focus, Brixton. The soon to be christened 'front- 
line- was less than five minutes walk away. This was the time, as well, of 
increased community mobilisation around issues of concern, especially to the 
Black community - the `sus' campaigns, those around the treatment of Black 
children in the educational system, the coalitions against right wing 
extremists, the increased labour disputes, such as Grunwick, both against 
certain employers and the complicity of major trade unions. It was the 
burgeoning development, as well, of an incipient Black public sphere and 
supporting network exemplified by race or Black specific communication 
forms of media, such as `Race Today' and, for the more torturously inclined 
Marxist intellectual, `Black Liberator', with both of those publications' head 
quarters being sited in Brixton. Unfortunately the extent to which, by the 
late seventies, these influences, the orthodox race structures and developing 
social movement on race rights and justice, flowed past and failed to change 
the nature and instruments of local governance in Lambeth, can be gauged 
through a cursory race profile of the council. By the time of the 1978 
local government elections affecting Lambeth there were no Black 
councillors. The proportion of Black people working for the council stood 
at under 5%. Local Black organisations and representatives had for some 
time been raising issues over what they regarded as the racist practices of 
two of the major service directorates, Housing and Social Services. The 
complaints about the Housing Directorate focussed not only on the 
differential access to council housing, compared with white people, 
experienced by Black people, but also the differential access to the good 
housing stock. There were certain run down council estates regarded as 
dumping grounds for Black people. With Social Services there was a 
strong view, soon to be confirmed by the Council's own research, that they 
displayed an over zealous policing and surveillant role in the lives of Black 
families resulting in inappropriate service interventions, reflected then in the 
disproportionate number of Black children legally taken into care. There 
were as well, growing anger over the way in which the urban programme 
was being managed through the conduit of the local council. 
823 The 
question, in terms of my argument, was how to break out of the colonial 
stranglehold represented through the language of the orthodox race relations 
model and its organisational, structural and legal realities of race 
management and social control. The answer lay in the way in which the 
Black organisations and activists achieved a sufficient measure of 
solidaristic and collective action which enabled them to break away from the 
confines of state sponsored action and to place the issue of race, and more 
pertinently race equality, explicitly into the arena of local democracy and 
governance; moreover place it with a degree of accountability back to that 
community. 
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By 1978 the two major points of contention, that of the patronising inaction 
on the part of the council with regard to race equality and the perceived 
imposition of Black self-styled leaders, bolstered by council connivance in 
securing disproportionate funds for their respective organisations, was the 
prime impetus for a large number of grass roots organisations coming 
together. This was facilitated by the local CRC, primarily because the 
relatively new CRO, Ouseley, wanted to push the CRC into a new radical 
direction which would see it playing a local facilitative role in anti-racist 
initiatives and far less of that which the council had constructed and come to 
expect, i. e. as spokesperson for the Black community. Out of this series of 
meetings between organisations came a large, federated one comprised of 
both Afro-Caribbean and Asian constituents. Called the Consortium of 
Ethnic Minorities, its aims were primarily to secure the development and 
advancement of ethnic minority organisations and communities in Lambeth 
through helping them to secure the relevant resources, to ensure they are 
consulted by local and national governments on issues relevant to those local 
communities, and to secure change in the way in which the local council 
addressed the issue of race. Apropos the latter point the local CRC had 
previously put forward to the council's political leadership that it needed a 
new strategy to tackle racism within the council. The response had been to 
deny the existence of a problem, to re-affirm the council's good intentions on 
race, and to offer the CRC slightly more resources to tackle the issue of 
discrimination. This, quite rightly, was viewed as both offensive and 
patronising by the CRC. However, it was to be this confluence of 
mobilised Black opinion and influence and the changes from the left within 
the local Labour party which saw a commitment to introducing relevant race 
equality change within the council being written into the local Labour 
Party's manifesto for the 1978 local government elections. It would be 
realistic to say that this `confluence' contained a number of values and 
motivations -a genuine desire on the part of both groups to secure the goal 
of race equality within the council; the more strategic one of securing more 
resources, primarily urban programme grant funds, on the part of black 
organisations; the equally strategic motivation of securing the Black vote, on 
the part of those left politicians then in the ascendancy. Nevertheless this 
array of forces was the prime impetus for the inception and development of 
race equality structures and processes within Lambeth Council post 1978.824 
What is important, and this is not a construction which has been put on it by 
any of the commentators on race and local governance in the UK, including 
Ouseley, is that not only did race move out of the shadows of government 
machinations into a more positive valorisation, but this goal of race equality 
as a positive, explicit one, was placed within the purviews of local 
democracy, thus offering the potential for a communicative discursive 
control and/or influence, fully inclusive of Black constituents, over race. 
407 
As a prefatory run in to the main work that derives from the target borough, I 
shall provide a brief outline of the race equality structures introduced into 
Lambeth Council. This will concentrate on the radical ambivalence at the 
core of these structures, and thus, in my view, the potential that existed to 
change fundamentally the power relationship between Black people and the 
institutions of local governance. It begins to pin-point as well my 
argument that this period, which I have identified as the positive racialisation 
of local governance, had within it the potential for the development of a de- 
colonising, fully inclusive relationship between Black people and local 
governance. At the time Lambeth Council was comprised of twelve 
Directorates, each covering a specific service area made up of related sub- 
service areas. In turn each was responsible to a service committee made up 
of councillors who, in theory at least, were responsible for the policy 
direction of that Directorate. However, ' the major committee was the 
Policy and Resources Committee with a remit for agreeing and overseeing 
the key policy and resource decisions and directions of the council. In 
terms of internal structures and processes, Lambeth was very much a large, 
hierarchical bureaucracy, but with a managerial and information infra- 
structure, because of the corporatist changes initiated in the early to mid 
seventies, which were more dynamic than many other neighbouring 
boroughs. That is to say that council policies were often underpinned by 
relatively efficient operational procedures and information systems. At the 
heart of this was the Directorate of Management Services which provided 
the intellectual, policy and procedure impetus resources for the human 
resource and organisational development direction of the council. Yet, this 
`modern', `progressive' stance on management still operated, as I have 
argued earlier, on assumptions that underpinned the orthodoxy of 
bureaucratic power relationships and those between elected members and 
officers. This allowed for a configuration of both formal decision making 
powers, as exemplified in senior management team arrangements, and 
informal ones which were equally, if not more, powerful, e. g. those between 
Chairs of committees, directors and senior union officials, often enacted in 
the local public houses and cafes surrounding the town hall. Within an 
arrangement like this is was extremely difficult for managers below the 
senior level to achieve, or initiate, any kind of radical change. Yet a race 
equality structure was created in the council in which the key personnel were 
graded at middle management level, with only the Principal post bordering 
on the senior management grade. Its relative success stemmed from the 
way in which the these posts by passed the bureaucracy in terms of formal, 
hierarchical accountability lines, and in essence, reported direct to elected 
members. 
The structure, agreed by the Policy and Resources Committee in April 1978, 
an agreement bolstered by the weight of support from the Consortium of 
Ethnic Minorities, comprised a Race Relations Unit in the Chief Executive's 
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Directorate, and Race Relations Advisers in each of the Management 
Services, Social Services, Housing and Amenity Services Directorates. 825 
Whilst in terms of the formal reporting line arrangement these posts reported 
to the Director, or Chief Executive in the case of the Principal Race 
Relations Adviser, those senior officers could only comment, but never 
amend, any advice or policy recommendations made by those advisers. That 
responsibility was to be the sole province of elected members. Additionally 
the Management Services Adviser, with the main remit for employment, also 
covered all the other Directorates, including, in terms of overall race policy 
on employment, those with their own advisers. The advisers were also 
functionally linked to the Principal Race Relations Adviser. It is true then 
that "the advisers were given an independent role with access to power", 
which also included the PRRA having "access to the Leader of the Council 
to generate speedy intervention on any issue of great concern. s826 At the 
formal political level the Community Affairs Committee, one with 
eponymous responsibilities covering areas such as grants to community 
groups, was given an additional set of references related specifically to race. 
This was to enable a formal co-ordinating role to be established on race 
matters at member decision making level. The role and responsibilities of 
the Race Relations Unit and Directorate advisers were, "to develop explicit 
race policies, to introduce measures to combat all forms of racial 
discrimination, to advise on equality programmes, to develop race awareness 
within the authority, to liaise with black community organisations, to 
spearhead the development of a race relations strategy for the authority, and 
to monitor the overall effectiveness of the race policies. s827 It is clear that 
for the period, 1978, this was an innovative structure, an innovation 
described mainly, even by its architect, Ouseley, as that which gave advisers 
`access to power'. That, and the apparent confusion evident in the `race 
relations' model written into the advisory function together with the `race 
equality' function, underscores what I had earlier described as the "radical 
ambivalence" underlying the role of the structures. I want to concentrate 
on the radical potential written into these structures which in the early years 
were never fully appreciated. This is that aside from the obvious catalytic 
change role these structures had, there was also that of being a 
communicative conduit for Black opinion to influence both the political and 
administrative decision making mechanisms in a direct participative way. 
For the most part, however, up to 1982, the race structures operated in a 
rhetorical manner; rhetorical in the sense that I have argued in an earlier 
chapter in so far as claims were made which were still to be discursively 
communicatively redeemed because those undistorted communication forces 
were still in place. To some extent this position was successful in so far as 
visible race equality progress could be discerned, primarily in the 
employment field where the number of Black employees rose considerably. 
It would be true to say that the bulk of the work in those early days focussed 
on increasing the level of Black people in the organisation. However 
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rhetorical claims, if they are to retain the promise of communicative 
democracy, have to tread a fine balancing line between showing how that 
promise can be fulfilled, and lapsing into the politics of representation. In 
ensuring the former, the actual representation of formal, instrumentalised 
authority in the organisation has to be divested of real value by those 
occupying such positions through participative activities with those they 
claim as constituents, whilst at the same time also using those formal 
positions of power and symbolic status strategically in the service of such 
communicative aims. It is unfortunate, therefore, that positions of status 
and hierarchical pecking order, were afforded more importance by that first 
tranche of race advisers. All this served to do was to help shift the 
emphasis of the race equality structures from that of being catalytic to that of 
being marginalised. For example, other non race advisory section 11 funded 
staff, but who nevertheless had race specific responsibilities, were not 
brought into the co-ordinating, developmental and participative activities of 
the race advisers, which in the end served only to announce a hierarchical 
order of race advice and to provide an unnecessary communicative distance 
which was exploited by those seeking to disrupt the race equality initiatives. 
But there are other positive examples of what could have been achieved if a 
more collective, solidaristic approach had been adopted. Two will be 
briefly outlined. 
The first relates to a research project undertaken by the Directorate of Social 
Services research section into the reasons for reception into, and treatment 
by, that directorate's child care services. 828 Built into this was a race 
monitoring question, which was the only ostensible race dimension to the 
project. However, it did enable the database to be differentiated on the 
grounds of race and so for identical sets of information to be compared. 
What emerged was that there were differences across the whole gamut of the 
projects span which could only be attributed to race. Whilst the 
recommendations arising from the report were accepted by the council, the 
detailed substantive report was suppressed by the relevant white manager on 
the grounds that it read as if it were written by someone totally alienated 
from the directorate. The term `white manager' is relevant because the 
report was written by the first, and at that time, only Black research officer in 
the section. What is interesting, however, is the reaction of the race 
equality personnel. The race adviser in the Directorate at the time was 
viewed with some critical scepticism by both the small number of Black 
employees and certain Black organisations. This is not only because she 
was white. It had to as well with her prominent membership of the local 
Labour party in Lambeth as well as the perception that she had not produced 
anything of substance since her appointment. The report on Black children 
in care came as something of a bombshell, and its suppression appeared to be 
more than just the prejudiced whim of one particular manager. It was 
notable, however, that the central Race Unit did very little to support the 
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publication of the report. Nevertheless, one of its agreed recommendations 
was that working party should be established comprised of relevant Black 
organisations and Social Services staff with the brief to produce a good 
practice guide on Black children in care. The thinking behind a good 
practice guide by the research officer concerned was that the care services 
for Black children had to be deconstructed and reconstructed with the 
participative involvement of the local community. Underlying this was a 
deeper, philosophical argument which owed a theoretical debt to the early 
works of Habermas. Further the written framework for this reconstruction, 
the guide, would have the status of a publicly owned and produced document 
against which the Directorate's race equality action in this particular field 
could be measured. In this respect the resultant service programme was 
some ten to fifteen years ahead of similar, now labelled `best value', state 
sanctioned service initiatives in local government. What this illustrates, 
however, is my argument that race equality action at this level is very much, 
though often unacknowledged, pathfinder, cutting edge action which 
precipitates wider structural change affecting the rest of the community. 
The important aspect of this change, however, is the way in which it 
demonstrates the potential for bringing in the Black community to affect 
democratically the construction of services which have a substantive impact 
on their everyday lives. I use the term `democratically' because the space 
provided by the working party and backed up by its terms of reference, 
which assured equal communicative status to all participants, enabled a 
communicatively deliberative consensus to be arrived at by all parties to a 
very detailed dissection and re-assembly of child care services over a space 
of time. Whilst the potential that existed in this specific configuration of 
local authority bureaucratic power, as invested in the participating personnel, 
and local Black community representation, illustrates the way in which 
Habermas' expressed hope and need for more communicative control and/or 
influence over bureaucracies, as exemplifying administrative systems, can be 
realised, there is obviously much more that could have been done to take 
these sorts of initiatives forward. The pity is that in the short history of the 
positive racialisation of Lambeth that this was the only de- and 
reconstruction of a service around a race equality axis which included the 
equal participation of the local Black community, to have been undertaken. 
Yet again, in illustrating that race is part of the unfulfilled completion project 
because it addresses the bases to overall societal inclusiveness, the core 
principles of the good practice guide covering areas like upholding the 
welfare of the Black child, active involvement of parents in all decisions, 
better structured and monitored placements, more attention to educational 
needs etc., which formed part of a submission to the relevant Home Affairs 
committee on children in care, can be found as universal principles in the 
1989 Children Act. 
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The second example draws on the key features to the establishment and 
development of a Black Workers' Group in one of the main local 
government employees' trade unions' branch in Lambeth. The then 
National Association of Local Government Officers (NALGO) branch in 
Lambeth reflected the changing political profile of local government through 
the seventies with a branch executive and officers comprised mainly of 
people on the political left, many of them Socialist Worker Party members. 
There were very few, if any Black shop stewards, and thus, because all shop 
stewards were de facto branch executive members, Black members of the 
executive. Yet, in keeping with the political complexion of the executive, 
there was broad support for issues of race equality, and for the council's 
developing foray into matters of race. Broad support, however, did not 
always turn into action which showed a full and proper understanding of 
racism and Black people's experiences therein. This is exemplified by an 
episode involving the branch's agreement to a proposal from what was then 
an equality sub-committee, to fund and sponsor a branch booklet on race 
equality which was to be distributed to all members. The booklet was 
produced in draft form within the stipulated time, but for some reason, 
languished for months with the branch officers responsible for publicity and 
publications. It took a motion of no confidence by the booklet's authors 
against those officers, put to one of the branch meetings, for the branch to 
rapidly expedite matters. This appeared to be symptomatic of the approach 
of the executive and officers where the residues of the seventies anti-nazi 
league and the SWP's incorporatist `black-and-white-unite-and-fight' still 
lingered strongly. Action on race, thus, extended then as far as subsuming 
it under a broad equality sub-committee of the branch executive. However, 
it has to be acknowledged that at that time, within the overall context of the 
trade union movement and the more specific one of Lambeth, especially the 
craft and manual trade unions, this was deemed `progressive'. 
Nevertheless many of the increasing numbers of Black employees were 
dissatisfied with what can be termed the `class ceiling', i. e. Black needs and 
aspirations in relation to the trade union constantly hitting up and melting 
against a class conflationary barrier. One of the consequences of this was 
that there was soon an unofficial Black Workers' Group which met in their 
own time and, at that time, was still small in numbers. None of these was 
on the branch's equality sub-committee since membership of that was 
restricted to Branch Executive members. The circumstances surrounding 
the production of the booklet, however, provided an overlap of interests 
between one of the authors of the booklet, who is Black and could only be 
part of that equality sub-committee as an ex-officio member, and the Black 
Workers Group. This imbrication was the basis for a series of meetings 
whose aim was to secure a more structured and formal footing for the Black 
Workers' Group. The option agreed and put to a specially convened 
meeting between the group and branch officers was: for the group to be 
formally recognised by NALGO; for it to be open to all Black members; 
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where Black was being used in its widest, generic, signifying sense; for there 
to be a number of seats on the Branch Executive allocated to the group; and for the group to decide who and how those representatives would be elected. 
At that stage all that could be achieved was an informal agreement to the 
proposed constitution of the group since its formal ratification involved a 
branch rule change, and thus required a two thirds majority at a full branch 
meeting of all members. There are a number of cogent points which 
should be briefly elucidated at this stage. Firstly the group's decision to use 
an all inclusive notion of `Black' moved the potential constituent basis out of 
the `ethnic' ghetto of simply associating `Black' with Afro-Caribbean or 
African where the latter terms are sub-coded via references to colonial 
anthropological measures, a process I had earlier referred to as the 
`Golliwogging' of Africa. This accorded with the Race Unit's 
recommended race categories on monitoring, and agreed by the council, to 
use Black as the main signifying nomenclature for those of Afro-Caribbean, 
African or Asian descent on the basis that racism presents itself as 
injuriously colour coded, and not on the bases of culture or ethnic 
background. The difference, however, between the group and the 
council's use of `Black' was that the group had a direct, democratic 
evaluation and control over its use, thus making it more contingent. 
Potentially this straddled a discursive line which could either open it up to a 
radical interpretation, or it could regress back into the ghetto. The second 
point is that the formal acceptance of the group would have to rely on 
winning the arguments at an open branch meeting. Whilst there would be 
support, even if some felt ambivalent, from most of the branch executive, the 
opinions and feelings of the wider membership could not be predicted. The 
fact that no Black shop stewards had yet been elected seemed to indicate, 
and was certainly felt by many Black members as being true, that the mostly 
white membership had trouble viewing Black members as being capable of 
holding union responsibilities. To counter this it was decided to try and get 
as many Black members as possible to attend that particular branch meeting. 
There were two reasons for this: to ensure the debate involved as many 
relevant Black people as possible, and, to ensure that there was a visible 
rhetorical Black presence in the hall as a counter to those who would want to 
introduce racial forces into the structure of discursive communication of that 
meeting. This bringing in of Black people to that meeting was achieved by 
the literal long march through the different sites of Lambeth local authority 
by the core members of the group armed with leaflets explaining why the 
group and meeting were important, and placing them on the desks of Black 
employees, sometimes engaging in argument and discussion with them. At 
the end of the day the arguments were won and the group formally 
established. 82 
But there was more to the group than simply being a meeting facility for 
Black members of NALGO. It became a basis for solidaristic discussion 
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and action within the council and between Black members and the Black 
community outside. In so doing the group was clear that racism cuts across 
the systems, processes and structures which white people accept as 
structuring their everyday working lives. This dissolution of boundaries 
can be a potential for opening up the communicative discursive channels for 
Black people in a way that, in terms of the council's race structures, can 
support them, or even pre-empt them, and, in so doing, enhance the 
participative involvement of Black people in council decisions. For 
example the group, through community contacts, became aware that the 
council intended to evict forcibly a group of Black squatters from houses in 
Railton Road, then associated with the Brixton `front-line'. It was clear 
that advice from their own in-house race structures was not going to be 
heeded. The group therefore pushed through a motion at one of the branch 
meetings to the effect that the branch should not only condemn this action, 
but also take out an advertisement in the local press outlining what the 
council intended to do and why it was wrong. The effect of this was 
immediate and important. It forced the political leadership of the council, 
mindful of what I regard as the race claims for political legitimation they had 
made, to call an urgent press conference to deny that they had intended to 
evict the people concerned, or would do so in the future. 83° The radical 
novelty of the group's action, that is establishing across previously accepted 
boundaries, a communicative link between local government employees and 
local community members in need to make the institution accountable, 
outside of the formal discursive restrictions associated with the 
organisational positioning of a bureaucratic employee vis-a-vis a member of 
the public, demonstrates how race dissolves communicative distorting forces 
as well as showing how substantive democratisation, as opposed to facadic, 
lies at the heart of resolving the `race problem'. At the time of this 
episode, 1983, the first wave of Race Advisers had already moved on, two of 
the key ones to similar posts in the GLC. These, for various reasons, 
despite the radical potential of the structural position their posts were in, had 
operated very much within the orthodox parameters of local government 
employees. This was especially so in relation to elected members where 
Labour Party loyalty - all four advisers were Labour Party members in their 
respective constituencies - appeared to be an influential determinant of what 
was deemed acceptable behaviour. Appeals to a constituency relied mainly 
on the examples provided by the many individual cases of racial injustice 
uncovered through their work. The second wave, including the principal 
researcher, for the most part, had no such party political affiliations. There 
was also a quite active link with the Black Workers Group and outside 
community groups. The effect of this was to begin to recast the 
organisational dynamics of the Race Advisers' role in a way that emphasised 
the solidaristic communicative constituency base, as against the hierarchical 
organisational role. This recasting involved as well a fluidity of 
organisational boundaries so that presenting situations which presaged 
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blockage and communicative closure on race equality, could be re- 
approached via other organisational or intra- or inter-organisational routes, 
certainly those through which Black people could voice directly their claims 
for racial justice. For example management or member level stalling on 
any piece of key race equality initiative could be re-approached via the Black 
Workers Group and NALGO so that the trade union concerned would not 
only push for that particular initiative, but also could be seen to be leading on 
an important aspect of race which was supposedly a manifesto priority of the 
local Labour Party. There was another important aspect of this 
reconfiguring of the Advisers' role and that is it accelerated the 
deconstruction of orthodox management, certainly in relation to the 
managerial orthodoxy I have spelt out in an earlier chapter, and raised issues 
of critical alternatives, specifically in relation to race equality, and thus, in 
pathfinder terms, more generally in relation to the overall duties and 
responsibilities of the institutions of local governance vis-ä-vis its citizens. 
This critical re-appraisal and re-alignment covered and highlighted the 
theoretical territory thrown up by writers like Alvesson and Wilmott in their 
attempts to derive a critical theory of management. The only difference 
being that these were real time, real practice alternatives, and not simply that 
of academic theorists. 
There are obviously more details relating to the period of positive 
racialisation in Lambeth council. These will be referred to in my outline of 
the work done in the primary borough, X. This brief sketch, however, of the 
development and initial implementation of race equality structures and 
processes in Lambeth serves three purposes. First, it begins to demonstrate 
the social reality correlates which indicate the way in which the colonial in 
local governance can be de-colonised through opening up discursive 
communicative channels with and through the active participation of Black 
people, as a counter to the those social reality correlates of the shadowing 
technical learning processes for domination. To that extent it begins to 
demonstrate as well my theoretical and pragmatic contentions that local 
government can be conceived of in terms of an institutional mediation with 
communicative potential between lifeworld and system. Secondly it shows, 
as well, the potential that existed in this period for a radical rethink of local 
governance, certainly in terms of increasing the democratisation of local 
government, which appear to have been ignored by this nineties wholesale 
embrace of the market by the major political parties. Thirdly it provides 
both the empirical and meso-theoretical templates within which to examine 
the target borough in this research study. 
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